

Zed

Dirty Work: The CIA in Africa



Edited by Ellen Ray, W. Schaap, K. van Meter and L. Wolf

DIRTY WORK

2

The CIA in Africa

Edited by
ELLEN RAY, WILLIAM SCHAAP,
KARL VAN METER, and
LOUIS WOLF

Preface by Sean MacBride

Zed

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*This book is respectfully dedicated to the
peoples of Africa, especially the liberation forces
struggling to overthrow the last but powerful
vestiges of colonialism and white supremacy.*

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Our day-to-day work is accomplished through the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. In this bimonthly magazine we publish the research both of our group and of other friends around the world, aimed at exposing international meddling by the intelligence complex—particularly, but by no means exclusively, the CIA. We urge interested readers to contact us at P.O. Box 50272, Washington, D.C. 20004.

Preface

by Sean MacBride, S.C.

Before accepting the invitation to write the preface to this book, I had some hesitations. Many different considerations were involved. Having weighed these carefully, I decided that it was my duty to write this preface.

The sense of duty that impelled me to write this preface can be subdivided under five different headings.

First, my deep affection for, and tremendous admiration of, the United States and its people. I came to the conclusion that all the values that made me admire the American people were being eroded by the covert operations of the CIA and kindred secret bodies. In the course of their history, the American people have usually responded generously and spontaneously to the calls of those who, throughout history, have been driven from their own country by persecution, famine, or poverty. Millions of my own countrymen, driven from their own shores by famine and persecution, sought and found a new life and freedom in the United States.

The words engraved on the Statue of Liberty at the entrance to New York harbor have a very real and dramatic meaning to many segments of the population of the United States:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

The world looked to the United States as the golden gate where the lamp of liberty was shining.

[Sean MacBride is the recipient of the Nobel (1974) and Lenin (1977) Peace awards, and of the American Medal of Justice (1978). He was an active participant in the Irish Revolution since his early youth, and served both as Foreign Minister of Ireland and as Representative of Ireland to the United Nations. He subsequently served as U.N. Commissioner for Namibia, and is President of the International Peace Bureau, Geneva.]

Time after time the United States has generously aided other countries threatened by famine or disaster. The survival of this great tradition is of importance, not only to Americans, but to all freedom loving people in the world.

But in my view, the survival of this great democracy is now being gravely threatened by the covert criminal actions of the Central Intelligence Agency and its associate services. If the United States is to be protected from this grave danger, it is essential that the activities of this secret agency should be fully exposed to the people of the United States.

Second, I am a fierce believer in the democratic system of governments. Among the democracies, the Constitution of the United States can be, and has proved to be, a bastion of civil liberty.

However, democracy and the rule of law could not survive side by side with a state agency that engages in covert operations ranging from assassinations to levying mercenary armies. Even if there is, now, an attempt being made by some to check the activities of the CIA and the other United States intelligence agencies, the whole concept of a secret government and army within a government is a menace to the democratic system.

Third, the existence of a vast intelligence-cum-paramilitary complex, such as the CIA and the other United States intelligence agencies, tends to make the political, legislative, and executive officers of government dependent upon the agencies' intelligence assessments. This is extremely dangerous. It may well mean that the country's foreign policy will be framed on the basis of intelligence assessments that are far from reliable or accurate. The entire foreign policy of the United States could become dependent upon the assessments of agents who do not have the necessary background or training. The many, many known false assessments made by the CIA and the other intelligence agencies of the United States establish the unreliability of such a system. The last instance, Iran, illustrates the position: The CIA operatives were so closely linked to SAVAK and the Shah's regime that they failed to understand what was happening in Iran and seriously misled the government of the United States in regard to a vital area of the world.

Fourth, the type of mercenary and other support that has been the favorite *modus operandi* of the CIA has done untold damage to the image of the United States and to its influence in the world. Not only that, but in many cases it has been one of the factors that has influenced United States foreign policy into giving arms, money, and political support to corrupt governments or movements lacking in any credibility. Thus, through the CIA, the United States became the vehicle for the overthrow of the Greek democratic government and the establishment of a cruel and corrupt military regime in Greece. Likewise, the United States became linked with the overthrow of the Chilean government and the assassination of Allende and the establishment of the Pinochet dictatorship. The allies of the CIA have been

PIDE in Portugal, SAVAK in Iran, BOSS in South Africa, and every dictatorial regime in Latin America. In addition, it was used by, or *it* used, the British, French, and West German secret services in the promotion of covert activities in other parts of the world.

Fifth, in a world rocking on the edge of a nuclear holocaust, misinformation, covert action, assassinations, infiltration, and destabilization of governments could easily lead to the "miscalculation, madness, or accident" to which President John F. Kennedy referred, as the dangerous factors that might lead to the destruction of the human race.

In kindred situations, the CIA and other such intelligence agencies of the United States government are easy targets for manipulation by the military-industrial complex and by arms merchants. The bribes and improper influence of the military-industrial complex and of arms merchants have corrupted and destabilized political leaders and governments all over the world. The warnings of President Eisenhower concerning the threat posed by the military-industrial complex must be kept in mind when dealing with CIA assessments and military strategies.

These are the five major reasons that prompted me to agree to write the introduction to this book. I regard the work of the editors and their colleagues, as well as that of the other members of the intelligence community who have turned away from the facile notion that they were serving their country and the cause of democracy by engaging in this vast secret conspiracy, of vital importance for the protection of human liberty in America and throughout the world.

Although the sole responsibility for the Vietnam war cannot be laid at the door of the CIA, that agency did play a large role in both the promotion and the direction of the most damaging and disastrous war ever waged by the United States—a war that irretrievably damaged the image of the United States and the morale of the American people. Nothing in the history of the United States has been as damaging to it as the Vietnam war. It is surprising, indeed, that there has been no objective analysis made of all the wrong or misleading assessments that led the United States to get involved in Vietnam or to continue its involvement long after it became obvious that the United States could not succeed. Likewise, the covert activities of the CIA in Greece, Chile, Iran, and Angola, and in many Latin American countries, have made the United States appear nondemocratic and imperialist. Its methods, as well as those of its surrogates, are usually immoral and criminal; their activities are destructive of America's good name in the world.

Time after time the assessments and policy proposals made by the CIA have been proved disastrously wrong. The CIA and FBI links with the Watergate episodes illustrated how such organizations could constitute a threat to the American democratic system. The American secret services have come dangerously close to being the secret government of the United

States. I am quite certain that the activities and parts of policies of the CIA as we know them are not a true reflection of the best elements in American life.

That a state requires intelligence services is a fact of modern international life. However, such services should be limited to securing information to enable the government to ward off possible surprise attacks. The CIA (in some instances in collaboration with the FBI) has acted in a manner that far exceeds its mandate as an intelligence-gathering agency. It has acted as a secret mafia engaged in assassinations, levying war in other countries, and organizing mercenary forces in order to overthrow lawfully established governments and to destabilize societies, governments, and organizations that did not meet with its approval. In most cases, the covert actions sponsored by the CIA had been intended to assist in setting up, or perpetuating the existence of, ruthless, corrupt, and antidemocratic dictatorships: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Greece, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Brazil and the Argentine are examples. In many cases, covert actions that received the tacit or active support of the United States government were based on or influenced by erroneous or misleading assessments by the CIA. In devious ways, either through the 40 Committee or through manipulation of the organizations of government of the United States, the CIA led the United States into the adoption of indefensible foreign-policy pursuits.

In addition to the covert actions for which the CIA was directly responsible, its close collaboration with other authoritarian secret services, such as PIDE, BOSS and SAVAK, involves the United States indirectly, but nevertheless in a very significant way, with the covert actions of these other terrorist secret services. Thus it appears more than likely that through its involvement with BOSS, the CIA was privy to the series of covert criminal actions now described as the Muldergate Scandals. General Van den Bergh has claimed publicly his close links with the CIA. In his articles on the Muldergate Scandals, Anthony Sampson claimed that both the CIA and Britain's MI6 exchanged information with BOSS and that the "Pretoria station still depends on BOSS reports about revolutionaries" (*The Observer*, Sunday, 21 January 1979). In the same article General Van den Bergh claimed that he was having lunch with a very senior CIA officer. These reports have not been contradicted. The Muldergate Scandals, in which leading members of the South African administration were involved, extended far beyond the confines of South Africa. In South Africa they involved a number of criminal offenses; outside South Africa they involved bribery and corruption of American officials and direct interference with politics and the press in the United States.

The BOSS operations required obtaining the services of "opinion formers and decision makers" in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world. The methods used included bribery and blackmail; murder is also alleged. It is generally believed that if the CIA was not directly in-

volved in the Muldergate covert operations, it was aware of them. In this way the CIA became involved in many of the "dirty tricks" operations of other secret services. Indeed, in a recent book published in England by a well-known defense correspondent, the author states,

There have been recent occasions when CIA Dirty Tricks have been so dirty that some individuals in the Agency refused to take part in them, or, having done so, regretted it to the point of resigning.*

Still more alarming are the suspicions that the CIA and the Pentagon were aware of, and probably collaborated with, South Africa's development of a nuclear capacity. It is now clear that South Africa has acquired a capacity to make nuclear weapons and that this was made possible by the collaboration in the first place of the Federal Republic of Germany and in the second place of the United States of America.

If this is so—and the evidence seems to be conclusive†—it would be a gross violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. It is, of course, possible that such collaboration as there has been in regard to South Africa's nuclear capacity was undertaken by the CIA and other United States intelligence agencies, including the Pentagon, without the prior knowledge of the U.S. government as such. But this illustrates the grave dangers involved in the covert operations of the U.S. secret services.

The disclosures made by John Stockwell, Former Chief of CIA Angola Task Force,‡‡ established clearly that the CIA considers itself above the law and disregards the instructions it receives from the United States government. The African continent has provided a fertile soil for the covert and destabilizing activities of the CIA. These activities have been responsible in no small measure for the involvement of other countries in the affairs of the African continent.

While perhaps the present Director of the CIA has been making efforts to confine the CIA to a more limited role, I do not think that he has, as yet, been successful. This book may help him to obtain a clearer view of the damage the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency is inflicting on African states and, ultimately, on the good name of the United States of America.

*Chapman Pincher, *Inside Story* (1978), p. 198.

†Cervenka and Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis* (1978).

‡‡John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (1978).

OVERVIEW

Introduction

by Philip Agee

Since World War II political movements in all parts of Africa have sought to end five centuries of subjugation, exploitation, and varying forms of tutelage imposed by Western powers. But as one colonial power after another conceded formal independence to African dominions, they often tried, with different degrees of success and failure, to install dependent regimes and institutions that would pose no threat to traditional colonial interests: minerals and the labor and infrastructure to extract them; petroleum and natural gas; markets for food and manufactured products; opportunities for capital investments; and sea routes through Suez and around the Cape. Favorable local political conditions were needed to protect the colonial powers' nationals who remained after independence and to assure optimum operating conditions for Western corporations. African natural resources and markets continued to be vital to the Western economies.

In the 1960s operations by the American government and American companies expanded both in support of, and in competition with, the traditional colonial powers. While competing with European allies for natural resources and markets, the U.S. had set up military bases in Africa and joined the Europeans in opposing the nationalist and anti-colonial move-

[Philip Agee, who spent twelve years with the CIA, is the author of *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* and the co-editor of *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*. This article was written in June 1979 for this book.]

ments that were supported by socialist countries or whose nationalism and radicalism made them seem threatening, while supporting those which were moderate and pro-capitalist.

As in the rest of the world, U.S. policy viewed Africa as a continent where radical and communist influence should be eradicated—a goal that required military support to colonial powers or efforts that would deny real independence to African countries by imposing and sustaining client regimes. Israeli government agencies and private companies, in addition to Americans and Europeans, also established operations, including technical assistance and military training in African countries.

For the Africans, however, the problem was to overcome the legacy of colonialism: poverty, illiteracy, disease, and the ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions that crossed the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders. And despite their many differences, African leaders were united, in words and often in action, in opposition to continuing colonialism, neo-colonialism, and white-minority rule. (Some French West African leaders were an exception, however, tending to identify ideologically with the West.)

The dilemma for Western powers in post-colonial Africa was not so different from that in other continents: how to preserve strategic interests while appearing to respect the right to independence and national sovereignty demanded by today's standards of international conduct. Rarely could they do both. Almost invariably the Western powers have perceived radical nationalism and communist support to nationalist movements as threatening their interests. Respect for African independence has seldom interfered with measures to counter such threats. Time and again, through secret intervention, overt military action, and support for client regimes, the Western powers have sought to retain control in Africa, fearing that nationalism and communist influence would erode their own security.

This book is the second in the *Dirty Work* series, continuing the attempt made in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* to expose and analyze clandestine operations. It is a collective effort, with participation by well-known scholars and journalists of African affairs, in order to present a wide and accurate account of how the United States and western-European governments have tried to intervene, often secretly, to support the political movements and leaders judged favorable to their interests and to defeat the movements they feared. Because most of the research can be verified only in the West, most of the authors are Westerners, not Africans.

No book could possibly detail all the plots, coups, assassinations, mercenary incursions, bombings, propaganda manipulations, bribes, trade-union penetrations, and secret arms deals. Yet these activities have been going on without interruption.

This book emphasizes attempts at secret intervention; however, these are so intertwined with overt diplomacy, military action, and private economic activity that they cannot be considered in isolation. Many of the analyses of secret operations in this book include these overt factors.

There is no pretense of trying to "balance" this book by describing similar, or different, activities of socialist nations. Although they may well employ clandestine operations, the frequency and depth of such activities have been modest in comparison with secret intervention by Western powers. Normally, socialist governments do not choose secrecy or pretexts for supporting a movement or government of their choice. Their assistance tends to be public, well-known, and without the stigma attached to political support, overt or covert, from the U.S. and the former colonial powers. Retardation of national development in Africa quite obviously is not a result of centuries of domination by foreign socialist powers, but of Western colonialism that still seeks to perpetuate control—fearing, almost equally it seems, real African independence and communist influence.

But the struggles in Africa today involve far more than East-West rivalries or the movement to end colonial rule and minority racial domination. Efforts to establish some form of socialism, and corresponding resistance to it, are at the base of contemporary African history. Yet the Western powers, perhaps rightly, cling to their fear that socialism, or any social reform in Africa, will find its natural allies in the Soviet bloc and thus jeopardize enormous Western interests. This fear prevails even though all parties seem to agree that, socialist or not, the African countries are inextricably bound to the Western powers by deep needs for the technology, products, and markets of Western countries.

In current conflicts Western diplomacy is in search of "stability" through "moderate leadership" for "peaceful solutions." Yet African political, economic, and social realities are far from being peaceful, moderate, and stable. Nor in many cases are the solutions.

These studies of clandestine intervention are not restricted to the Central Intelligence Agency, because the secret services of the former colonial powers and of Israel and South Africa have at times been as active as the CIA. In addition, there has been important cooperation among Western services in joint operations in Africa. French and British assistance to the CIA in recruitment of mercenaries during the Angolan civil war, and the CIA's close coordination with South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS) at the same time, are only two recent examples of such cooperation.

The world has learned much about the CIA in recent years. Its secret operations are the work of some four thousand career employees of the Deputy Directorate of Operations, also known as the Clandestine Services. These specialists in "dirty tricks" receive essential support from several thousand other CIA employees in administration, logistics, finance, training, and communications. And when necessary, as in Angola, the CIA can call on the U.S. military services for assistance.

In the mid-1970s, according to John Stockwell,¹ the CIA had about 3,000 secret operations specialists posted around the world. Most of them were working from U.S. embassies and consulates, where they were given cover as State Department employees. The Africa Division of the Clandes-

tine Services had approximately 400 people working in the CIA's Headquarters near Washington and in some 40 embassies and consulates in Africa. Stockwell did not reveal just how many people were assigned to African posts or how many were working in Headquarters, but Victor Marchetti has indicated that the CIA had up to 300 operations personnel in Africa at any one time, not counting the communications and other support people.²

Apart from the CIA staff personnel assigned to embassies and consulates in Africa, others pose as private individuals under varying forms of "non-official" cover. These may be ostensibly employees of private companies or employees of institutions such as the CIA's African-American Labor Center. Others may become professors at African universities, as Jay Mullen did at Makerere University, where he coached Idi Amin's basketball team.³ Still others are professionals. Kemba Maish, a psychologist at Howard University in Washington, D.C., has revealed an apparently broad CIA program for sending black American psychologists to Africa to produce profiles on left-wing leaders.⁴

Non-U.S. citizens, from countries other than that in which they are assigned by the CIA (the so-called third-country nationals) also serve as operations officers under private cover. These individuals may serve an entire career with the CIA, but since they are foreigners, they will always be assigned to field operations and will never work inside the CIA's staff offices.

How many non-official cover operations personnel are assigned in Africa is impossible to know with precision. These are the most difficult jobs for the CIA to fill, since they are so vulnerable without diplomatic status and because of the psychological pressures of separation from the rest of the CIA's people—the isolation of being "at the end of the line." Assuming the pressures within the CIA for placing greater numbers of operations personnel under private cover continued from the 1960's to the present, I would estimate that in all of Africa between thirty and fifty operations officers, both U.S. citizens and "third country nationals," are at work outside the diplomatic missions.

The job of these people is to recruit and run spies. Their targets are the host governments where they are serving, local institutions such as trade unions and the media, the representatives of liberation movements, and the foreign Diplomatic Corps, especially the missions of socialist countries. They maintain liaison and training programs with local military and security services, through which they try to recruit officers of the local services to report on sensitive political matters and the country's leadership. They also use local services, especially their penetration agents, to tap telephones, intercept mail, and provide security cover for buggings and illegal entries. And, most important, the CIA's officers constantly use, apply, and exploit the information they collect, in order to strengthen the people and institutions they favor and to weaken and destroy those they oppose. Their measure of success varies, of course, depending on the vulnerability of their targets and the Agency's own priorities.

Unfortunately the British, French, Portuguese, Belgians, and others are even more secretive than the CIA about their intelligence services, and we cannot be precise about numbers of personnel assigned to African operations. But we can be sure that their goals and methods differ little from those of the CIA, although competitive circumstances are bound to occur. And we have strong clues to the methods of these other services from some of their operations already exposed and the obvious interests these governments must protect.

Belgian interest in Africa quite naturally has focused on preserving their enormous mining operations in Zaire. Belgian support for mercenary operations in that country in the 1960s complemented overt military intervention in the same period. More recently, in 1978, Belgian paratroopers intervened to secure mining areas in Zaire's Shaba province. With a hope for future "stability" in Zaire, Belgium has now joined with France and China in a program to retrain Zaire's ineffective and unreliable military forces.

France, highly interventionist, is the only former colonial power still maintaining troops in Africa. These are stationed in west and central Africa, in Djibouti, and in the Indian Ocean. France uses these forces, and others like Foreign Legionnaires stationed in Corsica, to protect favored regimes in former colonies, and it uses its secret services for the same purposes. France has intervened militarily in favor of Morocco and Mauritania against the Polisario independence struggle in Western Sahara. During both the 1977 and the 1978 crises in Zaire's Shaba province, France intervened with military forces, and its secret service (SDECE) helped the CIA recruit mercenaries for Angola while backing its own favored independence movement, FLEC, in Cabinda.⁵ Readers will note that French intervention has been consistent and often effective in the short run, and, in the cases of its closest West African allies, in the long run as well. But perhaps France's most important long-term activity in Africa has been its assistance to the white regime in South Africa where French government and armaments industries have helped to provide near self-sufficiency for that government's giant war machine.

British interests center principally on its former colonies in west and east Africa and on the current struggles for majority rule in southern Africa. With the United States, Britain carries the Western cause in negotiations for majority rule in Zimbabwe, but Britain's greatest preoccupation is with South Africa. Disruption of the South African economy in the 1980s through black nationalist armed struggle would be a near calamity for the British, given their huge investments in and dependence on trade with South Africa. But the British are caught in the middle because they are also highly dependent on trade and investments in former black colonies that are united in support of southern African liberation from white rule. Thus the current struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia, preludes to the final showdown in South Africa itself, are critical for Britain's future. British security services, like the CIA, maintain close liaison with South Africa's BOSS, as they also do with the political police (Special Branches) they cre-

ated in their colonies before independence. Secret British support for Idi Amin's takeover of power in Uganda in 1971 shows that the British are also active, when necessary, in clandestine intervention.⁶

But the British government's most important activity in recent years in southern Africa has been its passive acceptance of sanction-busting commercial operations to supply oil and other necessities to Ian Smith's government in Zimbabwe. Similarly it has looked the other way as hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of Britons have been recruited as mercenaries for Smith's army and other "counter-insurgency" operations. Meanwhile South Africa's BOSS has operated almost with impunity in Britain to drum up right-wing support for its policies, to harass and keep apartheid's opponents under surveillance, and going so far as to sabotage the Harold Wilson government by attacking the Prime Minister's image.

Less is known of West German secret activities in Africa, although private West German commercial operations have been extremely important for the South African economy and, indirectly, for the Smith army's operations against the Patriotic Front. But West Germany's most important commercial operation was the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa, enabling that government to develop nuclear weapons,⁷ and the establishment of a missile-development program in Zaire wherein the German company OTRAG obtained near sovereignty over a huge area of the country.⁸

Israeli interests in Africa have clashed with Arab and black Muslim states. Practically every African country broke relations with Israel following the 1973 war. Israel's closest ally in Africa continues to be South Africa, and it is believed that close relations exist between MOSSAD, the Israeli service, and BOSS as a complement to Israel's military assistance to the South African government.

In South Africa, the whites are determined to continue their apartheid regime for as long as possible, while seeking to curtail international action against them through token or very limited internal reforms. They have played a key role in setting up the "moderate" Muzorewa government in Zimbabwe, in which minority white power will continue, in the hope that Zimbabwe will serve as a buffer against the black nationalist movements struggling for majority rule in South Africa itself. Similarly in Namibia, the South Africans have defied the United Nations by establishing a client regime that will pose no threat and that will exclude the SWAPO liberation movement. Clearly the white South African leaders are seeking to establish perimeters for internal defense that extend far beyond their own borders.

The South Africans have not only developed a nuclear-weapons capability and near self-sufficiency in armaments, but they have also established economic ties with certain African states of considerable importance to them, states that the rulers in Pretoria hope will moderate support for black power in South Africa.

Central to all of South Africa's survival operations is its secret service, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). As would be expected, this service has a major role in internal security operations to repress the liberation forces within the country, mainly the African National Congress and any other opposition that exists. But BOSS is also the executive instrument for a vast complex of secret domestic and foreign propaganda and political influence-buying operations. Through 160 secret projects reaching into western Europe and the United States, BOSS spent the equivalent of at least \$73 million, between 1973 and 1978. And despite the scandal resulting from revelation of these operations, they continue and no doubt will expand as needed.

It is not impossible that the harsh South African reaction in April 1979 to American use of the U.S. ambassador's aircraft to photograph South African nuclear facilities simply emphasized South Africa's intention to distance itself from Anglo-American policies in creating its extended regional security structure in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Undoubtedly such strains will continue as Western governments press for greater reforms than the South Africans are willing to make. Nevertheless, the South African regime and the Western powers need each other for economic reasons—a fundamental motive for Western opposition to U.N.-sponsored economic sanctions against South Africa. Yet for all the surface differences, collaboration among the security and intelligence services is likely to continue apace.

If conservative forces in Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States, succeed in obtaining recognition of the Smith-Muzorewa government and the lifting of sanctions, together with acceptance of a Namibian settlement that excluded SWAPO, then the intelligence services of these countries will surely increase their support of white power in southern Africa in coordination with BOSS. The long-term result will be even greater misery and death, and still greater hostility toward Western powers when black nationalists eventually achieve victory.

The material in this book is organized into several sections. First it presents analyses of the African interests of the major Western powers and their security services. A series of articles follows describing secret interventions in the major categories of operations, such as trade unions, media, and mercenaries, that affect many countries at once, sometimes the whole continent. Then it details major covert programs regionally and by country. An appendix, researched and prepared by Louis Wolf, attempts to repeat the effort made in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, this time to identify the CIA officers assigned to African posts since 1970 with as much of their career backgrounds as can be discovered from public records. Finally, there is a bibliography of suggested readings.

This book gives a broad and coherent picture of the danger to African independence represented by the secret agencies of the United States and other Western powers. Rare is the African country that in recent years

could elude intervention by neo-colonialist interests and the retardation of national development that such intervention so often brings. Yet these secret agencies are not phantom forces. Their methods can be understood and their people can be identified. Measures to counter their operations can succeed, as their numerous blunders and failures demonstrate.

Notes

1. See Stockwell's book *In Search of Enemies* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1978) for an invaluable account of the Angola intervention by the CIA.
2. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, Knopf, New York: 1974, p. 99.
3. Jay Mullen, "I was Idi Amin's Basketball Czar," *Oregon* magazine, May 1979, p. 55, and June 1979, p. 66.
4. See below, p. 87.
5. See below, p. 248.
6. See below, p. 174.
7. See below, p. 280.
8. See below, p. 219.

The CIA in Africa: How Central? How Intelligent?

by René Lemarchand

In an African continent understandably sensitive on the issue of sovereignty, we Americans have had a special myth to overcome: the myth of manipulation. I hope that this is dead. I hope that we have been able to convince the African governments that we are not involved in any way in seeking to determine how they are governed and by whom.

Thus spoke former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom, on March 14, 1973.¹ In the post-Watergate era such a statement strains credulity. The virtuousness of the intentions conveyed by Newsom's homily is indeed difficult to reconcile with the staggering evidence to the contrary recently disclosed through senatorial investigations, press reports, and various other sources.²

The crux of the problem is no longer whether we can dispel the "myth of manipulation" from popular perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, but whether, in the light of recent disclosures, the extent of U.S. manipulation abroad and its effect on the domestic politics of Third World countries lend themselves to an objective assessment.

Prying into the murky underworld of CIA activities raises obvious difficulties. Popular reactions to the evidence disclosed by the Church Committee mirror varying shades of indignation, cynicism, and embarrass-

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ment, all of which tend to reflect a generalized sense of uneasiness about the credibility of the moral image we seek to project. Yet there is clearly more at issue here than just a distortion of our national self-image. To put the matter concretely, one is impelled to wonder whether, in particular instances, CIA funds, shellfish toxin and cobra venom, falsified information, and "private" airlines are not the really critical components of the stock of resources at the disposal of Third World political actors, and whether terms like "legitimacy," "authority," "charisma," and the like are not to be treated as mere euphemisms for a far more sinister and effective type of political resource. All this is not meant as an attempt to rehabilitate conspiracy theories, only to suggest that insofar as the existence of such conspiracies can be established, they should not be left out of the "accounting."

As we now realize, "creating political order"³ in Africa and elsewhere is a process in which clandestine political and paramilitary activities have often played a determining role.

Despite all the sensationalism attending the disclosures of the Church Committee, our knowledge of CIA activities in Africa is still very limited in terms of both real coverage and the circumstantial evidence thus far produced for public consumption.

Although I have tried to supplement the facts that are now part of the public record with what little information I was able to collect in the course of my occasional (but deliberately distant) contacts with CIA officials in Africa and the United States, what follows is obviously a very speculative discussion. Furthermore, by virtue of my own geographical area of specialization, and because it happens to include two of the states about which evidence of CIA involvement is most readily accessible, my analysis draws heavily from Angola, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Finally, the reader should bear in mind that much of what I have to say about the effect of CIA activities might conceivably apply to its British, Belgian, and French counterparts. Indeed, judging from the extensive and apparently reliable evidence recently disclosed by Patrice Chairoff,⁴ there seem to be some striking parallels between the style and methods of the CIA in Africa and those of its French equivalent, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE).

The Scope and Centrality of CIA Operations

Most African states rank relatively high on the list of polities most vulnerable to CIA penetration. What makes them ideal targets for covert operations is their inherent fragility. The point has been articulated by the former chief of the agency's Clandestine Services, Richard Bissell, as follows:⁵

The underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection simply because govern-

ments are much less highly oriented; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organizations and individuals outside the central governments.

Bissell's characterization is an apt summary of the state of affairs prevailing in the Congo (now Zaire) from 1960 to 1965, in Madagascar in early 1975, in Angola in 1975-76. It seems hardly a matter of coincidence that all three countries experienced a relatively high level of CIA involvement precisely when their political systems were least stable.

Whether covert operations are launched in a foreign state depends on the choices made by Washington in response to particular crisis situations or combinations of events. Spheres of CIA involvement thus tend to contract and expand, in an accordeon-like fashion, depending on a variety of factors, including the salience of perceived threats to U.S. interests.

In their quest for quantifiable evidence some commentators have drawn attention to personnel figures and budgetary appropriations as possible indices of the agency's involvement; yet since both sets of figures are extremely flexible, one wonders what profit, if any, can be drawn from reliance on this kind of data. What, for example, is one to make of Bruce Oudes' contention that "the CIA African budget is in the vicinity of \$25 to 30 million a year" and that "no more than a handful, if that, of CIA stations in Africa could have a budget running \$1 million or more,"⁶ when we learn that \$25 million in arms were shipped by the CIA to the pro-Western factions in Angola during the last three months of 1975? Similarly, to argue that "the CIA's African division consists of only 300 of the 4,500 employees of the CIA's clandestine services operations, making it the smallest of the CIA's geographic regions in terms of personnel,"⁷ tells us very little about the actual distribution of CIA personnel in the field or their specific assignments, resources, and activities.

A more fruitful way of approaching the question is to focus on (1) the extent to which the field of intelligence operations has been effectively preempted by the agencies of the former colonial power and the degree of cooperation that U.S. policymakers can expect of such agencies in matters involving East-West rivalries; (2) the salience of cold-war issues (or issues that are defined in these terms by U.S. policymakers) discernible in the politics of any given African state; and (3) the magnitude of U.S. economic and strategic interests at stake in specific areas. All three factors are intimately connected.

The first of these variables takes on special significance in the former French territories, particularly where French economic, strategic, or cultural interests are being pursued most vigorously and systematically (for example, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and, until recently, Chad). The nearly ubiquitous presence in these states of SDECE and SAC (Service

d'Action Civique) "men"—both forming in effect the armature of the Foccard "machine" in Africa,⁸ together with the intricate network of informal cooperative relationships that have developed over the years between French intelligence agents, technical assistants, embassy officials, and businessmen, has had a strong inhibiting effect on the propensity of the CIA to manipulate African actors. The situation is evidently more complex in those territories where the French presence is no longer much in evidence (Guinea, Congo), and this is equally true, *mutatis mutandis*, of states like Uganda, Tanzania, or Zanzibar, where British interests have been drastically reduced if not eliminated. Inasmuch as the residual involvement of Western interests in these states has implied corresponding limitations on the presence of U.S. corporate interests the result has been to seriously narrow the range of opportunities for CIA intervention.

How far "preemption" by European intelligence networks has in fact operated to limit the spread of CIA covert activities in Africa can best be understood in the light of the impact of cold-war issues on the attitude of European and American policymakers and of the resulting patterns of relationships that have developed among their respective intelligence communities.

The intrusion of cold-war rivalries in Africa has given rise to two very different types of relationships between the CIA and Western intelligence agencies.

In some instances Western intelligence agencies seem to have established a cooperative relationship with CIA officials. I refer specifically to the situation that developed in Rwanda from 1962 to 1965. During these years the Rwanda elites were almost entirely dependent on Belgian security officials for information concerning the guerrilla activities mounted by Tutsi* exiles from Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. The head of the Rwanda Sûreté was a Belgian national, a former Force Publique major, who had close relationships with CIA operatives in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. He stayed on the job until 1968. Until then it was the Belgian-manned Sûreté that in fact constituted the eyes and ears of the CIA in Rwanda. The Belgian intelligence agents, were remarkably adept at col-

*Many of these exiled Tutsi elements became attracted by communism, but ideological considerations played a minor role in this phenomenon. Many of them, after all, had been strong supporters of the Rwanda monarchy prior to the revolution of 1959-60. Their sympathies for the communist world, and particularly for Mao's China, arose out of the exigencies of the Rwanda revolution. In the face of the overwhelming support given to Hutu "revolutionaries" by the Belgian administration and the church, they felt that a pragmatic alliance with China was their only hope of political salvation. Thus many Tutsi exiles ended up in China in 1963 and 1964. There they received intensive training in guerrilla warfare, and some eventually joined the rebellion in eastern Zaire before being pushed back into Burundi by the counteroffensives of European mercenaries and Zairian troops.

lecting information, recruiting informants, penetrating *inyenzi*⁹ networks in exile, and occasionally indulging in the same kind of lethal gamesmanship that has come to characterize some of the CIA operations elsewhere in Africa.

A similar type of cooperative relationship appears to have developed between CIA and Belgian intelligence agents in Burundi from 1962 to 1964. By 1964, however, the rebellion in eastern Zaire had reached alarming proportions, and when the "pro-Chinese" faction emerged in Burundi the United States initiated covert operations in Burundi and Zaire. Cuban exile pilots were hired by the CIA to fly bombing missions against rebel positions along the Fizi-Baraka axis; the agency set up its own "private" airline, the so-called Western International Ground Maintenance Operations (WIGMO), which served as a convenient cover for a variety of CIA-related activities, including the training of mercenaries near Albertville;¹⁰ CIA operatives were hastily dispatched to Bukavu, Goma, Bujumbura, and Kigali (in a reenactment of the measures taken after the rise of Lumumba to power, in the summer of 1960); and ultimate responsibility for the coordination of these and other activities was vested in the hands of the CIA "boss" in Zaire, Lawrence Devlin. Throughout the rebellion very cozy relations existed between CIA officials and their Belgian counterparts; a particularly friendly rapport was established with the former head of the Belgian Sûreté in Zaire, Colonel Vandewalle, who later assumed the dubious distinction of leading the Fifth Mechanized Brigade of mercenaries into Stanleyville in November 1964.¹¹

In sharp contrast, a highly competitive if not openly antagonistic relationship emerged between Portuguese and U.S. intelligence officials during the brief term of office of Rosa Coutinho as Governor of Angola in 1974. That Coutinho used his authority to facilitate the entry into Angola of substantial though unknown quantities of Soviet military hardware for the MPLA is a well established fact. The nexus of interests between Coutinho and Neto, backed by strong ideological affinities, was seen by Kissinger as thoroughly incompatible with the spirit of *détente*, ultimately resulting in what one observer described as "one of the largest covert operations undertaken by the U.S. outside Indo-China."¹² CIA involvement in Angola stemmed from the radically divergent appraisals made by U.S. and Portuguese officials of the cold-war implications of the struggle between pro-Soviet and pro-Western (and pro-Chinese) factions. In Gabon in 1964 and in Madagascar in 1971, the activities of the CIA were seen by French intelligence operatives as posing a direct threat to their protégés, to Leon M'ba in Gabon, and to Tsiranana in Madagascar, and hence as an indirect threat to themselves.

By contrast, the involvement of French "barbouzes" in the internal politics of Zaire in 1963-64 was viewed as little more than a mild irritant by Washington, as a fumbling attempt on the part of the Foccard networks to steal the thunder of the CIA in an area where the latter had already ac-

quired a far stronger position than the French could possibly hope to gain for themselves, no matter how hard they tried.¹³ The outcome of these maneuverings, in any event, was precisely the opposite of what had happened in Gabon and Madagascar a few years earlier. In both states French efforts to denounce the existence of alleged CIA "tricks" resulted in a drastic curtailing of the agency's activities; in Zaire, on the other hand, the CIA station emerged as all-powerful, with little effort on its part to add to the discredit SDECE and SAC agents had already cast upon themselves through their own ineptitude.

On the whole, the scope and intensity of CIA involvement in Africa seem partly determined by the perceived threats to U.S. interests posed by African actors—who, rightly or wrongly, are identified as "enemies"—and partly by the extent of cooperation that can be expected of European intelligence agencies in coping with such threats.

Whether African actors are seen as friends or enemies also depends on the relative compatibility of their policies with the magnitude of U.S. economic and strategic interests at stake in specific areas. Thus Zaire and Nigeria are generally seen as areas where a basic reorientation of economic and diplomatic choices by African actors would meet strong resistance from U.S. policymakers and possibly lead to countermoves by the CIA. This is particularly true of Zaire, which is strategically situated in the heart of the continent, and in which American investments are substantial.

Not unnaturally, a very cozy relationship has developed over the years between Mobutu and his CIA patrons: Aside from the fact that Zaire "is presumed to be a symbolic battleground between East and West, where the success or failure of one's clients would have repercussions throughout Africa,"¹⁴ the important fact is that the CIA did play a determining role in "winning the battle," largely because in picking Mobutu as its ally it also "came up with the right man at the right place."¹⁵ Mobutu owes a very large personal and political debt to his CIA mentors, and whatever efforts and resources were "spent" on Mobutu turned out to be a highly productive investment from the standpoint of U.S. corporate interests.

While the CIA continues to play a critically important role in making Zaire "safe for U.S. capitalism," the very magnitude of U.S. corporate interests in Zaire constitutes an additional motive—as well as an excellent "cover"—for the maintenance of an extensive CIA network on the scene. If the case of Zaire is any index, the relationship between CIA activities and U.S. corporate interests is circular: While CIA operations may play a decisive part in preparing the ground for the intrusion of U.S. corporate interests, these in turn provide further justification for CIA involvement—as well as the alibis and technological facilities deemed necessary for the conduct of intelligence operations.

The quality of evidence of CIA involvement in Africa poses yet another problem. It is not because the evidence happens to be plausible that it is

necessarily conclusive. At times the element of fraud is easy to detect (as when the assassination of Prime Minister Pierre Ngendadumwe in Burundi in 1965 was blamed on the CIA by his political opponents); sometimes, however, the source from which the evidence is drawn gives us no hint of whether it is accurate—only an impression of plausibility. Thus, the information leaked to the French press in 1971 that the U.S. ambassador to Madagascar, Anthony Marshall, might have acted hand in hand with the CIA station chief in Tananarive, John F. "Jack" Hasey, to plot with Tsiranana's rival, the Vice-President André Resampa,¹⁶ might have been accurate, but it is equally reasonable to assume that the evidence was fabricated by French intelligence operatives.

Again, the evidence may be "revelant" but incomplete. It may leave out some critically important qualifiers, along with the supplementary information that one would need to make sense of what is being revealed. One is left with bits and pieces of information that are hardly sufficient to get "the full picture." Consider, for example, the statement made by Sidney Gottlieb in his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 1975. Gottlieb, who in 1961 happened to be the head of the CIA's Technical Services Division, said that "the agency prepared and sent to Zaire a dose of lethal poison intended for use in an assassination attempt against former premier Patrice Lumumba in 1961."¹⁷ This extraordinary disclosure certainly tells us a great deal about Washington's attitude toward Lumumba and about what might have been the role of the CIA had not Lumumba been done away with through other means. But this may only be the tip of the iceberg. Gottlieb's testimony tells us nothing of the alternate plans which might have been developed by the CIA, of the part which CIA agents might have played in those or other "contingency plans," of the relationships existing at the time between U.S. and Belgian intelligence networks, of what part, if any, the CIA played in operating the transfer of Lumumba to the Katanga, of the allegation I heard in Kinshasa in 1960 that the CIA provided Mobutu with the money he needed to pay his troops in exchange for shipping Lumumba to his executioners. Nor indeed does Gottlieb's testimony give us as much as a hint of the sub-rosa activities he was conducting in Bukavu in late August 1960. (I met Mr. Gottlieb in Bukavu in August 1960. He introduced himself as a Canadian businessman, who knew Lumumba, and was eager to displace Belgian interests in the Kivu.)

In brief, the mere fact that the CIA did contemplate getting rid of Lumumba through a dose of lethal poison still leaves open the question of the role actually played by the agency at this critical juncture of Zaire's political life.

In spite of these reservations the evidence is not always so fragmentary or unreliable as to preclude a rough reconstruction of sequences of events in which the role of the CIA appears to have been central, or at least significant from the standpoint of the internal politics of African states. For

example: (1) the CIA played a direct role in influencing Kasavubu's decision to depose Lumumba on September 5, 1960, and in ushering in Mobutu as the "impartial arbiter" of the conflict between the President and Prime Minister; (2) CIA operations—ranging from the hiring and training of mercenaries to the procurement and maintenance of Skyraider bomber fighters and B-26s—were certainly instrumental in defeating Soumialot's Popular Liberation Army during the 1964 Zairian rebellion; (3) CIA agents, mostly operating from Rwanda, not only kept in close touch with opposition leaders in Burundi during the "pro-Chinese" interlude of 1964–65 but also provided them with "technical advice" and probably financial support in an attempt to turn back the tide; (4) CIA agents were largely responsible for planning Moïse Tshombe's hijacking in June 1967, and therefore indirectly responsible for the abortive anti-Mobutu mercenary-led coup that followed Tshombe's surrender to the Algerian authorities; (5) CIA agents played a significant role in manipulating the outcome of the 1967 elections in Somalia: The rise to power of Prime Minister Mohammed Egal was said to have been "facilitated" by "thousands of dollars in covert support to Egal and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali Youth League party prior to the 1967 presidential elections";¹⁸ (6) similarly, the CIA was directly involved in "facilitating" the rise to power of Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, in Madagascar, in February 1975—shortly before members of the Mobile Police Group killed him and replaced him with Didier Ratsiraka;¹⁹ (7) to this must be added the well-publicized and wide-ranging activities of the agency in Angola: the shipment of massive quantities of arms and ammunition through Zaire, cash payments to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, the hiring of mercenaries in Europe and the United States, and the supervision of logistical operations on the ground both in Zaire and Angola.

Much of the evidence for these other examples of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of African states is part of the public record. So far, however, surprisingly little has been said of what it all means from the standpoint of political development.

It is easy to see how intelligence activities might fit into the context of U.S. aid policies (assuming that slogans can be elevated to the level of policies): their primary purpose is to make sure that Third World governments will not succumb to communist subversion, a goal which apparently can best be achieved through another kind of subversion. The logic of this proposition is of course highly questionable.

Especially in point here is Donal Cruise O'Brien's contention that a fundamental shift has taken place over the last decade in the scale of priorities of U.S. policymakers, with the notion of "institutional order" taking precedence over "democracy."²⁰ It is at this level that one can best grasp the nature of the contribution made by intelligence activities to the developmental goals of U.S. policies in Africa: If development requires organizational strength, covert manipulation is presumably one of the ways in which the latter can be attained.

Another point concerns the economic side of the developmental equation. Leaving aside for the time being the covert activities of the agency, and focusing instead on its policy prescriptions, it may be worth our while to consider the implications of the 1974 CIA study on the strategic aspects of food resources. In the terms of the report, these resources "could give the U.S. a measure of power it never had before, possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II period."²¹

That food has indeed become one "of the principal negotiating tools in our kit," as Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz put it in 1974, is by now common knowledge, and the implications of this policy are by no means confined to the African continent. What is significant is that the CIA should engage in this kind of general policy recommendations instead of confining its role to intelligence analysis; equally noteworthy are the repercussions which the implementation of such a policy might have on those African states that are most cruelly affected by resource scarcities.

The point I wish to emphasize is that the maintenance of "institutional order" through covert manipulation abroad would seem to tie in logically with the sort of leverage accruing from the use of food as a strategic weapon, the former acting as the stick and the latter as the carrot.

Although covert intervention is perfectly consonant with the official tendency noted earlier to conceptualize development in terms of short-run political benefits, and with the primacy accorded to institutional order, this policy is obviously very difficult to reconcile with the requirements of long-run political and economic development. The dilemma is perhaps best expressed in Richard Bissell's own words:²²

Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build the economy of an underdeveloped country must be subtle, long continued, probably quite costly and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups within the country It is not surprising that the practitioners within the U.S. government of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in their preferences for friends, methods and ideologies.

The dilemma cannot be resolved by an act of faith—by a sense of confidence in the long-term benefits of a transplanted form of democracy—or by an act of contrition—by the recognition that since the "dirty tricks" of the CIA are incompatible with our value system they ought to be corrected and sanctioned. The setting up of guidelines and procedures to control CIA activities abroad is no substitute for the elaboration of a meaningful set of long-term developmental policies. In much of Africa CIA activities occurred by default as much as by design.

This is not the place to engage in a critique of various development theo-

ries, except to note the critical significance of legitimacy as a precondition to, or expression of, development. Legitimacy, in brief, is what allows political actors to enhance their capacity to fulfill certain developmental goals; although this may sound like a truism, what is perhaps less obvious is that the most likely candidates to claim the mantle of legitimacy in Africa are seldom those that are considered the "safest" from the standpoint of CIA standards.

It is, after all, in the logic of a nationalist movement that its degree of popular legitimacy will tend to increase in proportion to its anti-imperialist, and by implication anti-Western, orientation—at least in the early stages. When power is deflected from its original source of authority its quotient of coercion increases; or else the distributive output of the political system must somehow compensate for its loss of legitimacy. It is quite true, of course, that the coercive and distributive capacities of African actors have at times increased spectacularly as a result of their clientelistic ties with the CIA. Yet to the extent that this relationship becomes public knowledge, the legitimacy of the political system is inevitably called into question. Bribery and repression become routinized, and political actors tend to look upon their CIA connections as the best guarantees of their own political survival.

A vicious circle develops in which every effort made by African clients to restore the credibility of their public image leads them to rely more and more heavily on their CIA patron.

Although the case of Zaire is sometimes cited by U.S. officials as a prime example of successful covert intervention, it also shows just how counterproductive CIA connections may be in terms of legitimacy. Consider, for example, the sequence of events that took place in 1967: In an effort to allay suspicions that he was overwhelmingly dependent on the CIA (a fact that had become patently clear during the 1964 rebellion if not earlier), Mobutu decided in 1967 to assume a more radical stance, and in order to give a substance of "authenticity" to this new look, plans were made to bring Tshombe back from Spain and then stage a public execution of the "neo-imperialist" stooge. For this primary reliance was placed on the CIA.

The operation proved eminently successful, at least in its initial stage: On June 30, Tshombe's plane was hijacked over the Mediterranean and after a forced landing in Algiers the leader of the Katanga secession was surrendered to the Algerian government. At this point, however, it became apparent that Boumedienne was unwilling to deliver Tshombe unconditionally to Mobutu, a fact the CIA had failed to anticipate. Nor did the CIA foresee that as a consequence of the hijacking, an attempt would be made a few weeks later by mercenary forces to bring off a coup against the Kinshasa regime, which in effect made Mobutu all the more dependent on his CIA patrons.

Mobutu's determined efforts to prove that he is not a stooge of the CIA are also the most plausible explanation for his allegation, in 1975, that a

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plot had been hatched within the Forces Armées Zairoises involving the hand of the CIA. Not only did this patently fabulous claim enable him to publicly dissociate himself from the CIA at a time when congressional hearings threatened to bring into the open his occult relationship with the agency, but it also gave him a convenient pretext to get rid of a number of high-ranking officers within the army.

What remains unclear is the extent to which Mobutu's latest ploy is liable to backfire, and whether the expiatory victims chosen by Mobutu will not find supporters within and outside the army to seek some sort of revenge, possibly in the form of an army coup. Extolling the virtues of *authenticité* is barely enough to conceal the fragility of Mobutu's role.

In addition to the threats the CIA poses to the legitimacy of its African clients, the question arises as to what impact CIA connections may have on processes of national integration. On the surface the evidence appears anything but conclusive. At no time, to my knowledge, did the CIA try to encourage the Katanga secession; indeed the support which the agency gave to Mobutu was entirely consistent with Washington's policy of restoring and maintaining the territorial integrity of the Zairian state. The Angola situation, on the other hand, offers a classic example of the divisive effect of covert activities on the process of national unification. As I have argued elsewhere,²³

the effect of our policies in Angola has been to render the task of national reconciliation impossible. By giving massive unilateral support to the FNLA-UNITA faction—through CIA channels and thus even before the Soviet-MPLA military connection was firmly established—American policymakers (in effect Kissinger) have forfeited whatever opportunities existed at the time of promoting a rapprochement. Once we made it clear to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi that the U.S. government would support them to the hilt, financially and militarily, their expectations of success were raised to the point where any concession to their rival appeared unnecessary if not downright counterproductive.

Except for Angola, where contacts with Holden Roberto were established by the CIA long before independence, I know of no example of such a deliberate and systematic effort on the part of the CIA to create or exploit ethnic or political divisions within a nationalist movement *prior to independence*. The same cannot be said of the PIDE or SDECE.²⁴ Where the divisive implications of CIA activities emerge in their most sinister light is at the level of elite interactions in the period immediately following independence.

In a number of instances the contacts established by African leaders with CIA operatives enabled them to raise their stock of resources as well as their expectations to the point where they felt sufficiently confident to

create new parties, concoct plots and coups, or simply refuse to agree to a compromise which under different circumstances would seem the most rational option available. This, at least, is what my reading of CIA involvement in states like Zaire, Burundi, Angola, and Madagascar tends to suggest.

The "*divide et impera*" facet of CIA involvement must be analyzed not only in terms of the political-exchange relationships worked out with political opponents or factions within any given state, but also, and perhaps more importantly, at the level of the attitudes that are fostered by the CIA among its indigenous clients. What is involved here, in essence, is nothing less than an attempt to hamper the growth of individual loyalties to the newly emergent state. The following statement by Bissell is again instructive in this respect:²⁵

The U.S. should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty Such career agents should be encouraged . . . with a prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies—both individuals and organizations—making contact with them, and establishing the fact of a community of interests.

What this statement reveals is a conscious and deliberate attempt on the part of the CIA bureaucracy to manipulate the attitudes of "potential indigenous allies" in ways that are profoundly detrimental to the growth of national loyalties. It brings to light the importance of "indoctrination and training" in operating appropriate shifts of loyalty, and shows how prospects of "long-term employment" may be used by CIA officials to nurture a proper cast of mind among their potential allies. The implication is that only through continuous and intimate contacts with nonnationals can "career agents" be recruited into the agency and transformed into "loyal" auxiliaries in their home states. Such practices may constitute one of the most serious disabilities faced by Third World governments in their attempt to achieve a minimum level of national integration.

Finally, something must be said of the institutional constraints imposed upon African client governments as a result of their CIA connections. Given the range of activities included under the rubric of "covert action"—namely, (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and technical assistance; (4) support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) private training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary or political action designed to overthrow or to support a regime²⁶—it is easy to see how such activities, whether individually or cumulatively might positively hamper the adaptability, autonomy, and coherence of African institutions.

Trade unions, student associations, and church organizations may become so heavily dependent on CIA subsidies and advice as to lose all responsiveness to their respective constituencies. Their organizational goals may become almost exclusively geared toward the collection of secret information, espionage, propaganda, and so forth, to the detriment of their normal brokerage functions. Coordinated responses to environmental challenges become virtually impossible in these circumstances, if only because of the very nature of the reward system which operates to substitute external goals for internal ones, and individual gratifications for collective ones.

Not only the adaptability but the autonomy of political institutions is likely to be endangered by the spread of covert operations. The point here is not merely that the autonomy of an institution diminishes in proportion to its degree of dependence on an external agency; even more pertinent is the extent to which CIA activities operate to strengthen the dependence of political institutions on particularistic groups and interests—ethnic, regional, family, or clan interests.

In a number of cases the net result of CIA involvement in the internal politics of African states has been to greatly accentuate the dependence of their institutions on ethnic and regional particularisms, and sometimes on a very special category of occupational groups—i.e. mercenaries. The case of Zaire from 1964 to 1967, and Angola in 1975 and 1976, are obvious examples. The intrusion of mercenary forces into the political process of these states has yet to be fully elucidated;²⁷ that it has had a profoundly detrimental influence on the stability of their political and military institutions is nonetheless undeniable.

The vulnerability of African institutions to CIA penetration threatens their cohesiveness for much the same reason that it lessens their autonomy. Sub-rosa maneuverings, personal animosities, and conspiratorial attitudes are expected patterns of behavior among individuals engaged in covert activities. The injection of valued resources (usually in the form of cash) into the domestic environment of African states introduces a new structure of opportunities for opportunists at the same time that it sets the stage for underhanded maneuverings and mutual suspicions among them. The competitive impulses unleashed through various forms of covert “assistance” or “advice” carry profoundly disruptive implications; further adding to the fragility of political institutions is the sense of cynicism and self-centeredness which inevitably accompanies involvement in covert operations. Maintaining a proper *esprit de corps* and solidarity in these circumstances is an impossible task. What happens to the cohesiveness of political institutions in an environment saturated by CIA influences is perhaps best illustrated by the so-called Binza Group in Zaire—a loose assemblage of politicians whose only bond of solidarity stemmed from their various connections with CIA agents and whose brief life-span in the early sixties testifies to its utter lack of cohesion, discipline, and efficiency.²⁸ The Binza Group is indeed a prime example of institutional anemia.

The time has come to recognize the CIA for what it is—not just a

"spook factory" but an institution which in varying degrees and through different instrumentalities has had and continues to have a largely negative effect on the process of development of Third World countries. And the same, of course, applies to its foreign counterparts, most notably its French counterpart. If so, it is no longer possible to accept at face value the disputable claim made by some analysts, either explicitly or implicitly, that the main impediments to Third World development are essentially internal.

Notes

1. Quoted in *Current Foreign Policy* (Department of State: Office of Media Services) Publication 8701, May 1973, p. 4.

2. See in particular Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York, 1974), and Robert L. Borosage and John Marks eds., *The CIA File* (New York, 1976). Other works of interest on the CIA, but of a lesser caliber, include Patrick McGarvey, *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* (Baltimore, 1972), Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York, 1962), and David Wise and Thomas Ross, *The Espionage Establishment* (New York, 1967).

3. The phrase is borrowed from the much-quoted work by Professor A. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (New York, 1965).

4. Patrice Chairoff, *B... Comme Barbouzes* (Paris, 1976), esp. pp. 69-91; see also, "Les pions de la France à Cabinda," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 20, 1976, p. 27.

5. See Appendix 1, in Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, p. 362.

6. Bruce Oudes, "The CIA in Africa", *Africa Report*, July-August 1974, p. 49.

7. *Ibid.*

8. The origins of the Service d'Action Civique and its relationship to the SDECE are vividly described in Chairoff, pp. 11 ff.; the determining role played by Jacques Foccart in the implantation of French intelligence networks throughout French West and Equatorial Africa—partly through fake corporations, partly through personal connections, and partly through the infiltration of development agencies such as the Bureau pour le Développement de la Production Agricole (BDPA)—emerges with special clarity from Chairoff's narrative, pp. 83-94.

9. *Inyenzi*, meaning "cockroach" in Kinyarwanda, was the term commonly used in Rwanda to refer to the armed raids mounted by Tutsi refugees in exile against the government of Gregoire Kayibanda. For further information on the etymology of the term, see F. Rodegem, "Sens et rôle des noms propres en Histoire du Burundi," *Etudes d'Histoire Africaine*, VII (1975), p. 79. For a discussion of the historical background to the Rwanda revolution, see my *Rwanda and Burundi* (London and New York, 1970).

10. See the comments by Ted B. Braden, himself hired in Brussels through CIA agents to serve in Zaire in the mid-sixties, in *Ramparts*, October 1967; further references to WIGMO are found in *Congo 1967* (Bruxelles, 1968), pp. 341, 350, 356, 362, 510.

11. Vandewalle's role during the rebellion is made abundantly clear by his candid and highly instructive account of mercenary activities, *L'Ommegang: Odyssee et Reconquete de Stanleyville*, 1964 (Bruxelles, n.d.).

12. Gerald Bender, "Angola: A New Quagmire for U.S.?" *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 1975.

13. A specific example of the activities conducted in Zaire by French intelligence operative is the abortive plot reportedly carried out against Mobutu by a former OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète) Delta commando (known under the nickname of "Petite Soupe"); for further details, see Chairoff, *op. cit.*, p. 78-79.

14. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy, "Following the Scenario: Reflections on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention," in Borosage and Marks, *The CIA File*, p. 35.
15. Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story*.
16. Bruce Oudes, "The CIA in Africa."
17. Quoted in *Saint Petersburg Times*, Oct. 12, 1975.
18. Morris and Mauzy, "Following the Scenario . . ." p. 38.
19. See Tad Szulc, "Kissinger's Secret Empire," *Penthouse*, June 1975, p. 50.
20. Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal," *Journal of Development Studies*, VIII, 4 (July 1972), pp. 352-378.
21. See *The Manchester Guardian*, January 4, 1976 (weekly edition).
22. Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, p. 365.
23. In a letter to the Editor of the *Gainesville Sun*, December 28, 1975.
24. See for example the extraordinary account of the so-called Operacao Safira mounted by the Portuguese secret service (PIDE) against the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau in 1973, in *Expresso* (Lisbon), January 24, 1976. Organized by Barbieri Cardoso, Deputy Director of the PIDE (who apparently derived part of his inspiration from Edward Luttwak's *Coup d'Etat*, a kind of do-it-yourself instruction manual published in 1968), the aim of the operation was to take advantage of the tensions allegedly existing between Cape Verdian and Guinean elements so as to encourage the capture of the party leadership by pro-Portuguese Guinean elements. The April 1974 coup in Portugal was apparently the decisive factor preventing the operation from being carried out. Interestingly, SDECE was tangentially involved in the operation. See also the account of the so-called "Operacao Mar Verde" directed against Sekou Toure's regime in 1970, with the active cooperation of the PIDE and General Spínola, in *Expresso*, January 3, 1976. See below, "PIDE and SDECE: Plotting in Guinea."
25. Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, p. 367-8.
26. Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, p. 364.
27. See, however, the instructive discussion by J. Gerard-Libois and B. Verhaegen, "La Revolte des Mercenaires" in *Congo 1967*, and Vandewalle, *L'Ommegang*.
28. For a more detailed discussion, see M. Crawford Young, "Political Systems Development," in John N. Paden & Edward W. Soja, eds., *The African Experience*, Vol. I (Evanston, 1970) pp. 467-68.

The French Role in Africa

by Karl Van Meter

French Imperialism in Africa

Soon after the end in 1976 of the CIA's intervention in the armed conflict provoked in Angola, President Agostinho Neto of Angola declared that "the French territory, and more precisely its capital, has become the principal center of subversive movements which plot against different African countries In a word, France is the sanctuary for all the reactionary organizations who issue their subversive propaganda against the progressive regimes of Africa."¹ Unfortunately, this has been true since the beginning of French decolonization in Africa following World War II.

But neither the war nor the inevitable decolonization process changed France's capitalist economic structure. Measured by any general economic indicator, France is far behind the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany, and cannot compete openly with them in the international arena. To make up for this weakness, France has been willing to wage a desperate and dirty fight to keep its hold on former colonies, though often unsuccessfully, as was witnessed in Indochina and later in Algeria. After these two monumental defeats in the 1950s and early 1960s, France adopted a neocolonial strategy of granting statutory independence while clutching on to that which was absolutely essential to it: the economic benefits obtained from its former colonies. Even without considering the money spent to purchase oil, France has an important trade deficit that would be impossible to cover if it were not making a tremendous profit in its former colonies. However, in order to continue to enjoy the economic boon of neocolonialism, France has had to rely heavily both on its secret service's dirty tricks and on open military intervention in order to "protect" its neo-

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colonies from indigenous progressive leaders or movements and from foreign competition for economic dominance.

Since the beginning of the cold war, capitalist countries have tended to compromise instead of going to war over client nations in the Third World. So the French SDECE (Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage) and armed forces have spent their time fighting liberation movements in Africa while entering only occasionally into conflict with their American counterparts, the CIA and the Pentagon. Sometimes client nations become so repressive and discredited internationally that no other country tries openly to obtain an economic advantage which would challenge the role of the dominant nation. A clear example of this type of situation is the regime of Bokassa I in the Central African Empire. Who would dare invest there to compete with France for economic domination?

Economic dominance in client nations can be typified by considering the percentage of the modern sector of the economy controlled by the dominant nation. For France, in the case of the Ivory Coast, it is 50 percent; in Cameroun, 55 percent; in Senegal, 57 percent; and in Gabon, 65 percent. Moreover, these client nations supply at low prices the raw materials that are absolutely necessary for the survival of the French economy: aluminum from Cameroun, phosphates from Senegal, oil from Gabon, and uranium from Niger. One of these client nations, Upper Volta, is in fact the poorest of all Africa, with ninety dollars per capita average annual income in 1975. The loss of this economic dominance would certainly bring about great changes in France itself, and that is why the regimes of these client nations are so firmly supported in spite of their corrupt and often repressive nature.

Economic dominance can also be used as a covert means of support for other regimes. In early 1976, the Gabonese company Affretair was discovered to be busting U.N. sanctions by flying produce in and out of Rhodesia. The company was dissolved and integrated into Air Gabon and relations with Rhodesia were said to have been stopped. Then it was discovered that two small companies had been created, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Ltd. With much the same personnel and equipment they were continuing the illegal commerce with Rhodesia.² In this way, Gabon was serving as France's surrogate in supporting Ian Smith's regime.

In a similar fashion, France's client states were the first African nations to accept the strategy of "dialogue" with the racist regime of South Africa. On April 19, 1971, President Senghor of Senegal announced that he accepted the "dialogue." On April 28, 1971, President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast made a similar declaration, and later secretly received South African Prime Minister Vorster, another first for an African nation. On June 6, 1971, the Central African Republic formally recognized South Africa and, as part of the "dialogue," received financial aid. And, on July 6, 1971, Gabon announced its intention to accept the "dialogue" with South Africa. This was only one aspect of France's overall support of the apartheid regime.

In the wake of South Africa's disastrous invasion of Angola in 1975, France's client nations in Africa were obliged to abandon the strategy of "dialogue." Since then the French government under President Giscard d'Estaing has attempted to invent new means of assuring its economic dominance over its clients. While in the Ivory Coast during a trip in January 1978, Giscard d'Estaing announced the creation of a "Euro-African Solidarity Pact" which would fortify France's economic relations in Africa and guarantee military support to endangered clients. German officials viewed the scheme as a means of spreading France's financial burden while France would continue to reap the economic benefits.¹

President Giscard has now replaced this pact, which obtained little backing, with an even more grandiose scheme called the Euro-Afro-Arab Pact, which he announced during his trip through Africa in June 1979. The manifest lack of enthusiasm on all sides means that this proposition is also bound to fail. At the same time, rivalry among the capitalist countries has been increasing in Africa. At the European Common Market summit conference in London in 1977, Belgian Foreign Minister Van Elslande stated: "Paris is particularly interested in Zaire's mineral wealth, and the Belgians consider this a form of international rivalry." But such rivalries probably will not keep them from supporting the racist regime of South Africa, which they consider to be of strategic importance.

Military Intervention

If economic dominance is the *raison d'être* of French imperialism in Africa, the only means of sustaining such a situation is by the intervention of secret services and the armed forces with their bag of dirty tricks, ranging from bribery and assassination to the creation of false liberation movements and full-scale armed warfare. In fact, France is the only former colonial power that still has troops in Africa on a permanent basis. There, with limited military potential, it can often successfully play an interventionist role without excessive risks. Moreover, most western allies encouraged France in this direction.

Though formally controlled by the Minister of Defense, military interventions in Africa are directed by the "action service" or "Seventh Bureau" of the SDECE, the French equivalent of the CIA. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, one of the units directed by the action service was the 11th Half-Brigade of Shock Paratroopers, called the 11th Choc. It had bases at Calvi in Corsica and at Perpignan in southern France. The 11th Choc was dissolved in January 1962, and Colonel Roussillat, who was apparently responsible for the "action service," was replaced in the SDECE by Colonel de Froment.⁴ Other units of the "action service" active today include the 1st Paratrooper Regiment of the Naval Infantry (1st RPIMA), based in Bayonne, France, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Michel Franceschi and Commander Leblanc;⁵ the 2nd Regiment of Foreign

Legion Paratroopers (2nd REP) based in Calvi in Corsica under the command of Colonel Philippe Erulin, who is known to have tortured French nationals during the Algerian war;⁶ and the 13th Regiment of Dragoon Paratroopers, who use the base of Benguerir near Marrakesh, Morocco.⁷ These are the dirty-work units of the SDECE used for armed interventions in Africa, and there have been many.

Intervention in Chad

In 1960, France granted Chad its independence and installed President Tombalbaye, but the northern half of the country remained under French military administration until 1965. Due to Tombalbaye's corruption and his favoring of tribal kin, an armed revolt broke out on November 10, 1965, in Mangalme against the regime's tax collectors. The FROLINAT (Front for the Liberation of Chad) was then created in 1966 at Nyala, a town in the Sudanese province of Darfour, but underwent many splits, some of which the French secret services probably encouraged. In August 1968, French paratroopers intervened to defend Tombalbaye's regime against the FROLINAT. They remained until June 1971, but other members of the French armed forces stayed in Chad until October 1975, when they were asked to leave.

There was an attempted coup in August 1971 that failed. In August 1973 the leader of the Chad opposition, Dr. Outel Bono, was assassinated in Paris, under obscure circumstances.⁸ In April 1974 the French anthropologist Françoise Claustre was captured and held for a ransom for almost three years. The French secret services seem to be deeply implicated in this affair, since the large ransom was not only paid, but Mrs. Claustre's captor, Hissene Habre, was later to become Prime Minister. Then, on April 13, 1975, the Chad army overthrew the regime and Tombalbaye was killed. He had long since become useless to the French government. General Felix Malloum then came to power.

In April 1977 there was another attempted *coup d'état*, and in July 1977 French fighter aircraft had to intervene against the FROLINAT guerrillas. In May 1978, French troops intervened again to keep the FROLINAT from taking the capital, N'Djamena. On July 27, 1978, a DC-3 bought in France by Michel Winter and flown by Roland Raucoules disappeared and is suspected of having landed in Chad. Winter was a former French colonial paratrooper who saw action in Indochina and Algeria, where he joined the right-wing terrorist OAS. After that, he worked for the SDECE and fought as a mercenary in Biafra. The pilot, Raucoules, was also a former OAS member, mercenary in Biafra, and a member of Aginter Presse.* He had served as a personal bodyguard for President Bongo of Gabon and was a member of the first mercenary invasion of the Comoro Islands orga-

*See below, "The Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane."

nized by Bob Denard for the French secret services. Neither the DC-3 nor the two men have been heard from since.

In August 1978, Hissene Habre, the captor of Claustre, became Prime Minister, while Felix Malloum remained head of state. In February 1979, Malloum and Habre fought against each other and, as always, against the FROLINAT. Such are the politics of an unstable French client nation.

Intervention in Western Africa

In 1958, Ahmadou Ahidjo, who had been installed by the French, was directing the Trust Territory of Cameroun. The opposition to French neo-colonial rule was organized around the Union of the Peoples of the Cameroun (UPC), which had been founded and led by Ernest Ouandie and Felix Moumie. After the bloody repression of 1958, Ouandie led a revolt and guerrilla warfare against the pro-French Ahidjo regime. He was captured and executed many years later on January 15, 1971. His forces were fighting against French troops long after Cameroun's supposed independence in 1960. Felix Moumie was forced into exile in 1958 and actively sought support for the UPC and the guerrilla war throughout Europe. In Geneva in late 1960, a friend, a call-girl named Liliano Ferrero, introduced him to a French secret-service agent, William Bechtel. A few days later, Moumie died from a strong dose of poison. Fourteen years later, the Swiss authorities finally opened proceedings against Bechtel for the murder of Moumie.⁹ On April 5, 1975, Ahmadou Ahidjo won reelection for his third five-year term as President of Cameroun by a "vote" of 3,483,165 to 163.

In early 1974, Niger was an independent country led by President Hamani Diori. Its most valued resource, uranium, came from its Arlit mines. Discussions between the French government of President Pompidou and the Niger government over a realistic price for this uranium had broken down. When President Diori visited Paris for Pompidou's funeral in early 1974, he warned Prime Minister Messmer that he wanted to fix a reasonable price for Niger's uranium by the end of April 1974, before flying to a U.N. conference in New York. If the French government would not comply, President Diori was ready to denounce France at the U.N. A few days before the new discussions were to take place, a coup by pro-French elements of the Niger army overthrew President Diori.

The importance of this case can be seen from the secret report presented in December 1977 by the then Foreign Minister of France, Louis de Guiringaud, which estimated that a three-day stoppage of the uranium mines in Niger would cost France two million dollars.¹⁰

Among other major operations carried out by the French secret services or armed forces, is the massive support in men and arms given to the Biafran secessionist movement of General Ojukwu between July 1967 and January 1970, and the cooperation with Portugal's fascist secret service, the PIDE, in the invasion of Guinea-Conakry on November 22, 1970.

One of the jewels of French imperialism in Africa is Gabon, though events have not always run smoothly there. The neo-colonial regime of President Leon M'ba was overthrown on February 18, 1964 by a group of progressive members of the Gabonese armed forces. All political prisoners were immediately released. The next night French paratroopers sent by General de Gaulle arrived in Gabon and reinstated M'ba as President. It has since become the center of French secret-service operations for all Africa. It was used as a base for the support of the FLEC in Cabinda during 1975 and as one of the bases for the disastrous mercenary attack on Benin on January 16, 1977, organized by Bob Denard in coordination with the French secret services. The corruption of the regime of Gabon's present President, Omar Bongo, has become well-known.

More recently, in 1978, Bongo's personal doctor and a former Minister of Health, Carlos Graca, was implicated in an attempted coup against the then recently independent government of neighboring Sao Tome and Principe Islands. The MLSTP (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) government arrested José Frete, former Minister of Justice and member of the Political Bureau of the MLSTP. Also arrested were Alcino Lima, a chief of protocol for President Manuel Pinto da Costa, and a Mr. Santana, chief of the Public Security Police. Lima was to have exchanged President da Costa's briefcase given to him by Omar Bongo with another identical briefcase containing a bomb. Of course, the second briefcase could have been obtained easily in Gabon. At the same time, there were repeated incidents of violation of Sao Tome's and Principe's airspace and territorial waters. Though Bongo was kind enough to propose to send troops to help protect his neighbor, President da Costa understandably preferred to call upon the MPLA in Angola for help.¹¹

The military cooperation that exists between France and South Africa has become fairly well-known since the publication of John Stockwell's book *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* and articles such as "Where Would South Africa Be Today Without France?"¹² Additional hard evidence of French cooperation with South Africa and also with UNITA appeared on the docks of Marseille in April 1976. The French cargo vessel *Angio* of the Fabre company off-loaded 234 cases containing more than three thousand mortar shells in perfect condition.¹³ This ammunition came from French army stocks and had been shipped to South Africa for use by UNITA, but when the cases arrived, UNITA was in disarray, so the cases were returned to the sender, that is, the French army.

And militarily, how does France stand now in Africa? According to the specialized French publication *Afrique Defense*, France has now become the most important naval power in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, on the east coast of Africa, France has an estimated five thousand troops stationed in newly independent Djibouti, along with a significant number of military aircraft. On the island of Reunion, which is the French operational headquarters for the Indian Ocean, there are twelve hundred army

troops and eleven hundred marines.¹⁴ On the other side of Africa in its client nations, France has put three hundred troops at President Bongo's disposal and openly uses the large airport of Libreville in Gabon. In the Ivory Coast, four hundred French marines are stationed at the Port Boet air base near the capital, Abidjan, and are ready to be airlifted on short notice. In Senegal, there are twelve hundred troops including four mechanized companies. Also, the large air base in Ouakam near Dakar has proven to be of strategic value in air strikes against the POLISARIO in the western Sahara and for refueling aircraft used in the two Shaba interventions. Moreover, sixteen hundred French officers and noncommissioned officers serve in the armies of Francophone Africa as military advisors. Any progressive movement in a French client nation must reckon with this military force.

Jacques Foccart and French Dirty Work

Military or armed intervention is an integral part of French imperialism in Africa, and though it can be prolonged, it is usually intended to be quick. It is resorted to only when more covert means such as bribery, assassination, and repression, which are the daily work of the secret services, no longer suffice. Where covert dirty work alone has failed, the armed forces are also thrown in.

Covert action and French secret services in Africa were practically synonymous with the name of Jacques Foccart when General de Gaulle and later Georges Pompidou were in power. Soon after the end of the Second World War, de Gaulle formed a nonprofit organization called the Service of Civilian Action (SAC), which quickly became de Gaulle's own state within the French state. In 1947, Foccart was already responsible for African affairs for de Gaulle. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 during the Algerian War, Foccart was named General Secretary for African and Malagasy Affairs and began to use the SAC as his own secret service to infiltrate the structure of the French state and to execute dirty tricks throughout the world, mainly in Africa. It can be said that Foccart actually used the SDECE to do his bidding in Africa from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s. This was the period of the *barbouzes*, the unofficial but very real spies of the Foccart network.

After the end of the Algerian war, there was rapid expansion of the Foccart network throughout Francophone Africa to control the implementation of the French neocolonial strategy. During the period when Cyrille Adoula was Prime Minister of Congo-Kinshasa, he was manipulated by one of Foccart's men, Andre Labay, who was Adoula's chief of secret services. Labay was also involved in the diamond traffic that was a source of money, reinvested in turn in the heroin traffic. The Congo-Brazzaville leader Fulbert Youlou was also manipulated by Foccart's men who used the cover of Headlines Press Agency in Brazzaville for their work. One of these men, Jean-Marie Laurent, was also an agent of Aginter Press and lat-

er implicated in the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane. The assassination in Paris in 1965 of the Moroccan opposition leader, Ben Barka, was also the work of the Foccart network.

Though the actual functioning of the Foccart network was not entirely clear, it is nonetheless known to have been structured around a large group of commercial and semiofficial companies. The purpose of these companies was to make money to finance the activities of the network and to provide cover for the men in the network and their activities. Foccart's principal collaborators in these financial matters were Gilbert Beaujolin, Charles Beranger, and Richard Vautier. Beaujolin seems to have been the finance specialist while Beranger was Foccart's right-hand man in organizing and directing the network. Vautier carried out the dirty work. Beaujolin controlled the Societe Beaujolin & Cie. and the Societe d'Equipement pour l'Afrique (SEA), which in turn controlled Mercedes-Afrique, the Mercedes-Benz representative for Africa.¹⁵ He also controlled Martmair, a company specializing in the sale of arms and explosives, as well as two import-export companies, Barracude-France and Frenceexpa.

In addition, he controlled the semiofficial BDPA (Bureau for the Development of Agricultural Production), which employed four hundred engineers and technicians and about eighty civil servants. In early 1975, there were an estimated seventeen companies involved in the Foccart network. Most or all of them, while making profits, were also collecting information throughout Africa, as Barracude-France, Frenceexpa, and the BDPA had done, and also serving as a cover for Foccart's *barbouzes*.

One of these, Colonel Roger Barberot, had been in the French Resistance, had commanded the 11th Choc during the Algerian war, had been de Gaulle's Minister of Education, and then Ambassador to the Central African Republic. In 1968, Barberot was named director of the BDPA. On April 5, 1971, one of Barberot's employees and a Foccart operative, Roger Delouette, was arrested in Elizabeth, New Jersey, while picking up his car, which contained forty-nine kilos of heroin. The famous French Connection case broke and Foccart lost a man. According to an American agent, money from the African diamond traffic of the Foccart network was being reinvested in the heroin trade in America to make big profits and finance further dirty work in Africa.¹⁶ The person responsible for this activity was Richard Vautier, one of Foccart's principal collaborators.

Vautier and a Belgian named Marcel Hambursin were friends and personal advisors to the secessionist Katangan leader Moise Tshombe. With the help of Foccart man and former SDECE agent Francis Bodenan, who was in contact with CIA agents in western Africa, Tshombe flew from Madrid to the Mediterranean island of Ibiza for a visit on June 30, 1967. On the return trip, Bodenan pulled out a gun and forced the pilot of the plane, a CIA proprietary Beechcraft, to fly to Algeria. Tshombe died two years later in an Algerian prison. Also implicated in this affair was the director of Barracude-France, Maurice Herscu. Foccart's *barbouze*, Francis Bo-

denan, was to reappear later in 1975 as one of the French organizers of the FLEC-Brazzaville (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda). Richard Vautier and Marcel Hambursin also became known later as financiers of the right-wing terrorist group Aginter Presse in Lisbon.

Foccart's remaining principal collaborator, Charles Beranger, is especially known for his activity in Europe, but in the spring of 1975 he was working out of Gabon under a false identity, surveying activities of the COMUF (the Franceville Company of Uranium Mines), and serving as liaison between Foccart and President Bongo.¹⁷ From the list of dirty tricks and Gabon-based covert operations already given, such as the Biafran secession, the Cabinda FLEC, and the Benin invasion, it is clear that this country has served and continues to serve as France's dirty-work center in Africa.

Guinea

One of the African regimes that successfully resisted the subversion of Foccart's network was that of Sekou Toure in Guinea. When Guinea expressed its desire for true independence by voting against the Gaullist referendum of 1958, Foccart organized the Alby plan, the first of many that were to follow. Under the direction of two Foccart *barbouzes*, Claude Mercier and Albert Arnaud, Guinean Army officers were trained in Dakar by members of the "11th Choc" to prepare a coup against Sekou Toure. Their coup failed, but Foccart's men immediately began preparing a second intervention with "an important quantity of [arms], enough to equip two thousand men if necessary."¹⁸ Nevertheless, the April 1960 uprising proved to be a disaster for Foccart, who lost two men of the 11th Choc, an agent of the Seventh Bureau of "action service" of the SDECE, and many African collaborators in the battle. The Sekou Toure regime continued to resist these efforts, and it was only after Foccart was forced out of the French government in 1974 and after Georges Pompidou's death that Guinea normalized relations with France.

French Dirty Work Since Foccart

With the end of the Gaullist era and the arrival of President Giscard d'Estaing, Jacques Foccart was forced to return to private life. In the summer of 1975, he was working with the import-export company SAFIEX in Paris. Though he no longer has any official function, his network still exists and his influence in French client states in Africa is predominant. Moreover, he was replaced in Giscard's government by Rene Journiac, a former judge who for ten years worked for Foccart in the General Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs—that is to say, a Foccart man. President Giscard seems still to appreciate Foccart's advice, which he obtains during their monthly meetings.¹⁹ But even without invitation, Foccart continues to bombard Giscard with his advice on African affairs.

This sort of intervention is not appreciated by the SDECE under its present chief, Alexandre de Marenches. Indeed, after the disastrous Western intervention in Angola in 1975, Giscard asked his advisors to thoroughly reconsider French long-term operations in Africa and to prepare vast contingency plans for the future.²⁰ At the same time, there was a real shake-up at the SDECE which eliminated several Foccart men while at the same time expanding operations. The "action service" at the Cercottes camp in Loiret near the air base of Bricy, Orleans, saw new activity. And there was also much closer cooperation and coordination with the CIA than during Foccart's time.²¹

In spite of the continued effort to neutralize Foccart's network and its influence, French dirty work in Africa has seen no let-up. Even in France itself, there have been bombings against Algerian institutions and the assassination of some progressive Arab leaders. When President Neto of Angola denounced France in 1976 as the "center of subversive movements which plot against different African countries," he was referring explicitly to the OAL (the Organization of Free Africa), which was founded in Paris in April 1976 and had its headquarters there, before being transferred to more secure ground in Madrid.²² In the OAL, we find former OAS men, former members of Aginter Presse, and of course men who have worked with Foccart's network and the SDECE. Many of the same persons were involved in the unsuccessful mercenary invasion of Benin on January 16, 1977, led and organized by Bob Denard for the SDECE.

However, France's new post-Foccart era has been characterized mainly by its open armed interventions, such as in the Shaba province of Zaire in April 1977 and in May 1978 and as in the Western Sahara in November 1977. These have all been major operations coordinated at least with the United States. The first Shaba intervention (Shaba I, or, in its French code name, Operation Vervaine) took place with American consent given during a meeting between the French Head of State and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Paris, though the French had been planning such an operation for some time. In fact, the SDECE had prepared a secret report recommending that France furnish airlift operations similar to Shaba I to any of her client states in Africa menaced by a progressive movement. The reason given for this sort of initiative was the American government's "lack of willpower" and its tendency to try to find peaceful solutions to such crisis.²³

René Journiac organized Shaba I while acting as a go-between for Jacques Foccart and President Giscard. In Paris, these efforts were coordinated with the CIA through its chief of African operations, Francis Jeton. The execution of the operation was supervised by Colonel Marolle of the SDECE "action service." Colonel Marolle was well prepared for this delicate French role in a former Belgian colony, having been a former Belgian citizen himself. Ten French Transall transport planes, probably from the air base of Bricy near Orleans, and a DC-8 were put at the disposal of the

Moroccan army to transport fifteen hundred troops to Shaba. But even before the Transalls arrived, French military advisers were already in Shaba. They included officers of the 11th Paratrooper Division commanded by the former number two man of the SDECE, General Jeannou Lacaze, and others from the 1st RPIMA of Bayonne, a "research and information unit" trained in "special operations." Two of the commanding officers of the 1st RPIMA, Lieutenant-Colonel Michel Franceschi and Commander Leblanc, were even photographed at the Kolwezi airport in Shaba.²⁴ With these professionals were also some private dirty tricksters: at least two former mercenaries of the Benin invasion recruited through the National Union of Paratroopers, Raymond Thomann and Captain Armand Iannarelli. Of this armed intervention by the Western nations, Jonas Savimbi was to say, "France has shown itself to be a true friend of the African people."

In November 1977, French Jaguar tactical fighter aircraft based at Cape Verde in Senegal were sent against the POLISARIO guerrilla columns in the Western Sahara. It is said that this was the French payment for the sending of Moroccan troops to Shaba earlier that year. At the same time, the possibility of parachuting the 1st RPIMA into the region was mentioned. They had already gained experience in Shaba when they intervened along with the Moroccan troops. For several months previously, some forty members of the 13th Regiment of Dragoon Paratroopers, controlled by the SDECE "action service," were installed at the base of Benguerir near Marrakesh, Morocco, ready to intervene if necessary.²⁵

Some former members of the 11th Choc and French mercenaries were added to their numbers, and a recruitment campaign for French mercenaries for the Mauritanian army was denounced in Paris.²⁶ It should be remembered that it was from the base of Benguerir that Bob Denard and his mercenaries left to invade Benin in January of the same year. Denard was again to make the news a little over a year later when he successfully invaded the Comoro Islands and overthrow the regime of Ali Soilih on 13 May 1978. Denard's mercenaries later shot Ali Soilih, the very man that they had put in power in 1975!

During the same month of May 1978, France embarked on its most recent military intervention in Africa. This was Shaba II, which started with a secret meeting in Stuttgart, West Germany, among representatives of the United States, Belgium, and France. There seems to have been a race between the French and the Belgians to see who would be the first to have troops on the ground in Kolwezi, because while this meeting was taking place, Belgian paratroopers were leaving for Shaba in C-130 transport planes. The French immediately had one of their dirty work units, the 2nd REP in Calvi, trucked to Solenzara, Corsica, where they embarked on DC-8s of the UTA airlines and a Boeing 707 of Air France. Once in Kinshasa, they changed planes and were parachuted into Kolwezi the next day, 19 May. They beat the Belgians, who arrived the following day. Moreover, these were not the first French troops in Kolwezi, since forty of them, dis-

guised with dark makeup, had been parachuted into the Kolwezi airport with Zairean paratroopers on 16 May, a fact confirmed by several Belgian witnesses evacuated from the scene of the action.²⁷

Other Belgians were later to confirm that the supposed massacre of whites by the black guerrillas was in fact the shooting of twenty six Europeans in a house by the Zairean army in retreat. These same forces were later responsible for the slaughter, in reprisal for the alleged guerrilla attack, of eleven hundred black civilians whose bodies were discovered by the Red Cross or whose executions were witnessed by Belgian army officers.

Notes

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2. *Expresso*, 25 February 1978, p. 4-R, Lisbon.
3. *Africa*, May 1978, p. 47.
4. Patrice Chairoff, "Dossier B . . . comme barbouzes," p. 290, 1975, Editions Alain Moreau, Paris.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Temoingage Chretien*, 3 August 1978, p. 7, Paris.
7. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 2 November 1977, p. 3, Paris.
8. *Le Monde*, 14 March 1979, p. 6, Paris.
9. Chairoff, *op. cit.*, p. 459.
10. *Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
11. *Expresso*, 18 February 1978, p. 1-R; 25 February 1978, p. 4-R.
12. By Claude Bourdet, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1976, Paris.
13. *L'Humanite*, 4 March 1977, p. 12, Paris.
14. *Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
15. Chairoff, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 480.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
19. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 9 July 1975, p. 3, Paris.
20. *Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
21. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 24 December 1975, p. 4.
22. Frederic Laurent, "L'Orchestre Noir," pp. 350-52, 1978, Editions Stock, Paris.
23. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 27 April 1977, p. 3.
24. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 20 April 1977, p. 3.
25. *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 2 November 1977, p. 3.
26. *Le Matin de Paris*, 31 October 1977, p. 44, Paris.
27. *Temoingage Chretien*, *op. cit.*

British Intelligence in Africa

by Jonathan Bloch and Russell Southwood

Britain's empire in Africa was a sprawling conglomeration of 15 territories stretching from the Gambia in the north to the tiny mountain kingdom of Basutoland in the south. Some of these territories, like the cocoa-rich Gold Coast, were well bound into the international British trade network, whereas others, like Nyasaland, were poor backwaters, almost forgotten by its rulers in London.

The Parliament—which the British were fond of telling their colonial subjects was the “mother of all parliaments”—gave only one day a year to the affairs of this empire, and Africa was just one more part of that huge red expanse which school children knew was British.

The overall responsibility for security in this vast area lay with MI5, the intelligence department that looked at “internal subversion” in Britain. It maintained representatives in several colonial capitals, and they kept a watchful eye on the state of the local police forces and the territory-wide Special Branches. MI6, Britain's CIA, ran a colonial intelligence department that looked after the intelligence activities needed for the external relations of the British colonies.

After independence, the area became more the responsibility of MI6, with occasional security aid and assistance provided by MI5 to the newly

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independent countries. From the offices in the tall glass tower of Century House in South London, Africa was hardly a continent that held great promise to anyone interested in praise and promotion. The cold-war warriors were more interested in eastern Europe and traditional cloak-and-dagger operations in enemy territory. The Americans, for their part, preferred to leave the ex-British Empire colonies in Africa as the responsibility of the British, interfering only when decolonization seemed to move too slowly.

In contrast to American attempts by the CIA to buy or influence Third World politicians, the British left this task to the governors of the individual colonies who, during the years of decolonization, acted as patrons of politics, giving their favor to the more moderate, noncommunist nationalist figures emerging. Since the British ran the place, they had no need to use intelligence agencies to stage manage these activities.

The intelligence services kept the home fires burning by setting up trusts to give grants to promising students sent to them by the colonial governments and by keeping a discreet eye on the more vociferous nationalist politicians. They also watched with growing interest all visits to Moscow or Peking.

During the vital years of decolonization, British intelligence suffered a series of traumatic setbacks. Kim Philby, the brilliant spy who came within a hair's breadth of becoming head of the British secret service, defected to Russia. The spy whom everyone in MI6 had admired so much was now universally hated. Association with his name could ruin one's career. The knowledge that he had betrayed MI6 was common currency for several years before he finally escaped and his shadow fell across the Anglo-American special relationship on intelligence and paralyzed the service. It was Philby who proved that Britain's clubland ruling class was so blind that it could not even recognize the mole in its midst. Worse came with a whole string of minor defections. So by the time Harold Wilson came to power in 1964, Britain's once highly respected MI6 was at a very low ebb.

But more blows to its prestige would follow. Because of its past role in Africa, MI6 tended to operate a large part of its intelligence gathering from embassy staff. The most prized embassy intelligence postings were on the eastern European circuit. Africa was regarded as a rest from the storm. Send in the odd report and put the kids through private school. Not too many emergencies to ruffle the daily routine.

But the world was a fast-changing place in the early 1960s, and hunting communists was not the only skill needed.

When Harold Wilson left the Commonwealth Conference in Nigeria in 1966, he rode to the airport with his host, Prime Minister Balewa. As the car sped along to meet Wilson's waiting plane, there was rifle fire in the distance. Four days later Balewa's body was found in a ditch and the military had seized power. Diplomatically nothing could have been more embarrassing.

Furious that he had not been warned about this coup or the one in neighboring Ghana that overthrew Nkrumah, Wilson saw to it that the secret service suffered badly in the government's drive to save a hundred million pounds in foreign currency. It was against this background that MI6 launched its biggest operation in Africa—the sanctions-busting net—to salvage some of the respect of its new political masters.

Rhodesia—How It All Began

Rhodesia was unique among British colonies in Africa because of the size of its white-settler population. Postwar emigrants, attracted with promises of high wages and better status, had swollen the ranks of the privileged in the country. Rhodesia was the one colony that could actually claim to have a white working class. Its economy had been built around the laws of "separate development," which had ensured that Africans were denied the possibility of competing with whites in almost every area of economic activity. In the early 1960s, Rhodesia's Prime Minister, Edgar Whitehead, made several attempts to change this institutional structure by repealing some of the more racist laws restricting African economic activities. Like Britain, he was anxious that the country should start to create an African elite who would be able to play some part in the political life of the country. These attempts were rejected by the white workers who chose the anti-British, white-supremacist Rhodesian Front, voting it into office in the December 1962 elections.

Once in power, the Rhodesian Front rejected attempts by the British to impose an independence settlement on them. They felt that people like former Prime Minister Roy Welensky had been tricked over Federation. They no longer trusted the British. Slowly they weeded out pro-British officials in the army and the civil service. Talk of UDI—a unilateral declaration of independence—among prominent Rhodesian officials became an everyday occurrence. And finally the talk became a reality three years later when Ian Smith declared independence unilaterally on November 11, 1965.

Harold Wilson vacillated. He had a slim majority in Parliament and faced the prospect of a difficult election. Trouble in Rhodesia was the last thing he wanted. Except for the drafting of a few legal orders, no contingency plans had been made, although the prospect of UDI had been in the cards for several years.

Not all whites in Rhodesia were in favor of UDI. Out of 294 members of the Rhodesian Institute of Directors who were asked if they favored UDI, only 19 said yes. To counter these splits in the country, the Rhodesian government cleverly put the country on a war footing, uniting an internally divided white community against an easily defined outside enemy. Also to prevent spying on their plans to evade the sanctions net, the government passed an Official Secrets Act, which made it an offense to inquire too closely into Rhodesia's trade with the outside world.

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The Sanctions Net

MI6's Rhodesia operation had two purposes. First, there was a need for political intelligence about whether the Rhodesian Front party would accept new, face-saving political proposals. This took on major significance as Britain was faced with the embarrassing situation of not really being able to use force but needing to solve this sticky political situation that threatened to wreck diplomatic relationships with Commonwealth countries in Africa.

MI6's ability to collect this sort of intelligence was hampered by the type of contacts its mission staff were making. They despised the antimonarch, anti-British government Rhodesian Fronters and invited only the less racist British community to their cocktail circuit in any numbers.

To counter their isolation after UDI, MI6 sent a number of agents into Rhodesia posing as emissaries. One of these was Tory MP Henry Kerby. His mission was to assess the balance of forces in Smith's cabinet after the inconclusive talks between Wilson and Smith. His conservatism proved ideal cover, and he was able to report that Smith would be outvoted in his cabinet on any deal the British might persuade him to try.

The second element of the MI6 operation was a trade blockade. At best this would cause the political collapse of the Salisbury regime or at worst would ensure that they were more amenable to negotiations. How they thought the nineteenth-century device of a trade blockade by the British navy would work has never been adequately explained. It could only ever be half-effective, because the British agreed not to blockade the capital of Mozambique, Lourenço Marques, because it was used for oil supplies by the South Africans.

Wilson used the blockade to counter the demands for the use of force by black Commonwealth countries. The scheme was not without precedent: It bore a striking resemblance to the operation mounted by SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) in World War II when they cut off vital supplies of raw materials to Nazi Germany. Since war had not been declared on Rhodesia, the effect, as one British MP commented, was hardly earth shattering. "If we were at war, we'd starve Rhodesia out in no time because everyone would have stomach for what we are doing. As it is, no one has." However, Harold Wilson was confident enough to make a speech based on MI6 assessments that it would be "weeks rather than months" before the Salisbury regime would collapse.

In true Whitehall fashion, two committees were set up to deal with the imposition of sanctions. At the top was the small steering committee, which was nominally under the chairmanship of the Commonwealth Secretary although in practice a Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) took the chair. This committee included PUSs from all departments concerned, the Cabinet Secretary, and when necessary, an MI6 representative. It supervised general policy and made recommendations. Under it was a much

larger committee of officials from all departments concerned with sanctions under the chairmanship of the Minister of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office. This in turn set up a specific committee under Treasury chairmanship to deal with sanctions. Further subcommittees were set up to deal with aid to Zambia and the setting up of a BBC radio relay station in Botswana.

The Rhodesians were quick to allege that the first part of the spying operation involved a listening post at Francistown in Botswana, under the cover of the radio relay station set up by the BBC. In 1966 British soldiers were sent to guard the base used against cross border raids. This guard duty was eventually taken over by the Botswana police using money provided by the British government.

More important than this was Rhodesia's oil lifeline, which ran through Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. The British cut this off by putting a frigate in the mouth of Mozambique's main oil port, Beira. For all its threatening posture, this was pure farce. The Beira pipeline was indeed closed, but the oil continued to flow to Rhodesia through Lourenço Marques and up from South Africa. To check shipping in Beira, MI6 put first one, and later several, men to work, watching the port through a small network of informers. The activities of these agents were the cause of some diplomatic friction as they caused a considerable drop in trade to Mozambique.

Agents of the Portuguese secret service, PIDE, slashed their car tires and generally made life difficult for them. And on the diplomatic front, Portugal made frequent complaints about their activities.

To control its spying operations in Rhodesia, MI6 set up a headquarters in Malawi and used its British residual mission in Salisbury for on-the-ground work. In the months after UDI, it was MI6 officials on the staff of this mission who recruited sympathetic businessmen and journalists to spy on the Rhodesians. A prominent British journalist was recruited and provided information until he was Pled (declared a Prohibited Immigrant). It was, as one expatriate security man in a neighboring country put it, "open season." Agents recruited agents who recruited agents. To stop this, Ian Smith made several waves of expulsion orders culminating in a major sweep against sympathetic businessmen in 1967.

On top of recruiting agents, there was the low-level "legalized spying." A journalist would be invited to the British Mission to talk to an old contact there. The contact, a high-up embassy official, would say, "Would you mind if a new member of my staff sat in on this?" and they would be joined by an MI6 man.

The sheer lack of preparations is perhaps best shown by the comical Beit Bridge episode. Working on a tipoff, two embassy officials—W. H. Harper and N. W. Lomas—motored up to Beit Bridge, the span joining South Africa and Rhodesia, to look for oil wagons. The whole of the South African press was regaled with accounts of this secret activity, and they were carefully watched over by South African security police in a nearby car.

The first major incident to result from these espionage activities passed almost unnoticed in the British press. In early 1966, the Ministry of Information in Salisbury issued a terse statement saying that Neville French, a First Secretary in the British Mission, who had already left Rhodesia, "had abused his position by taking part in espionage directed at undermining Rhodesia in economic and security matters." French had recruited a civil servant, William Black, who was able to use his position to obtain classified information for the British. The Rhodesians watched him for a while and then moved. Black confessed and gave the Rhodesians the names of others involved in spying for the British in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Neville French was told to get out in polite diplomatic language and left under the cover of a row over Rhodesian diplomatic representation in London.

Also expelled was the Acting Deputy High Commissioner in Salisbury, Stanley Fingland. If the British were having difficulty finding out what the Rhodesians were doing, the reverse was hardly true. Another diplomat, Anthony Fremantle, a First Secretary at the mission, was expelled for spying in 1969.

Further embarrassment followed when R. Childs, a junior official at the British Mission, was forced to resign from the city sports club after allegations of spying on members. Peter Carter, the head of the mission and ex-Metropolitan Police Officer told the press, "The whole story is disagreeable, and we would rather forget about the whole thing." Hardly an emphatic denial. All this spying from the mission came to an end in 1969 when the mission was closed down.

After its closure, the American Consulate was involved in a similar spying incident. The Rhodesian Special Branch arrested journalist Roger Nicholson and lawyer Trevor Gallaher for spying. At his trial, Roger Nicholson said that he had acted in Rhodesia's best interests because he believed that the information he had provided would help correct false impressions that "the unnamed foreign power [America] was receiving from other quarters [Britain]." Both were paid by the CIA using Chase Manhattan Bank accounts in New York. Information supplied by Gallaher, including bills of lading, were said to have resulted in the prosecution of a UK firm, Platt Bros.

At the time of the trial, the Rhodesians made strenuous efforts to strike a bargain with the Americans. It went something like this. "If you keep your consulate open, no one will take any notice of the British pulling out of Salisbury. In return, we'll release your two spies." They were released, but the Americans broke the deal. According to "unofficial American sources" quoted in the *Daily Telegraph*, the British government leaked the reports of American involvement to force the mission to close, which it subsequently did. Not before the political officer at the consulate, the unfortunate Irl Smith, found himself getting a lot of press attention as the spies' contact man: "I haven't read the story," he said when asked to comment by the *Rand Daily Mail*, "I wouldn't like to comment in detail until I

have read it." However, all the messages sent by Nicholson, via a dead-letter drop, were collected by Irl Smith.

Britain supplied information from its spying operations to the UN Committee on Sanctions, and great pains were taken to show that others—like France—were involved in sending goods to Rhodesia. This helped shift attention from Britain's role in Rhodesia.

By the end of the 1960s, the sanctions committees in London hardly ever met. In 1972, the Beira patrol made its last interception and turned its attention to monitoring FRELIMO signals in the north of Mozambique. The sanctions-net operation had been a complete failure. It continued into the 1970s but on a much-reduced scale.

On the intelligence level, it failed for two reasons. First, it was difficult to put agents in place in a country that has been Britain's closest ally in Africa for more than thirty years. Second, intelligence is rarely gathered to be used in court cases. Every prosecution endangered the sources that supplied the material. In Britain, between 1965 and 1972, there were only seventeen successful prosecutions for sanction busting, and only two of these involved major export transactions.

But the failure of the operation—which rankled so badly in MI6 that several officers subsequently resigned over the issue—was caused by political factors. The British government lacked the will or the means to apply force immediately. It waited three years before applying full sanctions, dissipating any effort by constant political window dressing and new settlement talks. Military aid to Zambia was given grudgingly, only to keep the Soviets out of that country and to ensure it stayed in the Commonwealth. The massive British financial stake in South Africa and Mozambique meant that it was no good applying pressure on them to withdraw their support for the Smith regime. In the background were the Americans, who were faced with the same choice. Under the Democrats, Rhodesia was an awkward, insoluble blemish in their relations with black Africa, but the American financial stake in South Africa meant that Americans were hardly likely to apply pressure. Under the Republicans, Richard Nixon chose to stick firmly with the Rhodesians and the South Africans, taking the famous "tar baby" option. The final irony is that all through this major intelligence operation oil flowed uninterrupted through Mozambique to Rhodesia through an oil company that had—and still has—two British Government nominees on its board.

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The Lagorce Report: The Definition of a New EEC Strategy for South Africa

by Paulette Pierson-Mathy

The European Economic Community (EEC) is the first commercial partner of the Republic of South Africa. The volume of trade each year between the nine members of the EEC and South Africa represents ten billion dollars.¹ Almost one thousand subsidiaries and societies with participation from the Nine operate in South Africa. Sixty per cent of foreign investment in South Africa comes from members of the EEC. For these reasons, the Nine are considered to be the main support of the apartheid regime.

The importance of these relations explains why South Africa has a distinct diplomatic mission at the EEC headquarters in Brussels apart from the one accredited to Belgium, and why both missions are led by ambassadors.

The Nine, of course, condemn apartheid, but until a few years ago, these declarations were expressed on a national basis and were not attributed to the EEC itself.

[Paulette Pierson-Mathy is a professor of international law in Brussels, Belgium, and a member of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes in Southern Africa. The Lagorce Report, discussed in her article, was actually a confidential draft, which was leaked by angry Belgian socialists who were concerned with its sympathetic view of South African policies. This was seized upon by the South Africans, who published an article about the Report in the *South African Digest* of March 16, 1979. The following article was written in May 1979 for this book.]

The first manifestation of a common position on apartheid is contained in the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine, adopted on February 23, 1976, which related to the situation in the People's Republic of Angola. This statement condemns foreign intervention in Angola and, as far as South Africa is concerned, limits itself to expressing a "condemnation of the apartheid policy." Nothing is said about the invasion of the People's Republic of Angola by the South African army, though the South African troops were still in Angola at that time.

Since then, the Nine have expressed on different occasions a common position on the question of apartheid, especially at the U.N.

Two concrete measures have been adopted by the EEC in the framework of international action against apartheid: the refusal, expressed in common, to recognize the "independence" of Transkei or of any Bantustan and the adoption, in September 1977, of a "code of conduct" for enterprises having branches, subsidiaries, or representatives in South Africa.

The object of this code is not to fight against the apartheid regime, and its adoption does not represent a repudiation of economic relations between the EEC and South Africa. Its aim is only to correct some aspects of the discriminatory legislation in effect in the labor sector, especially in the factories.

A few months after the adoption of the code, whose results are almost negligible, the Commission of Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament prepared a confidential report on the "status, context and application of the Code of Conduct."

The report was written by P. Lagorce, a French socialist deputy. Discussed during four meetings of the commission and presented for advice to other commissions, this report was adopted unanimously by the Commission of Cooperation of the European Parliament on February 28, 1979.²

But this report does not deal only with the Code of Conduct, for which it suggests some improvements as well as reinforcement of the control measures for its application. Its ambition is more vast—it proposes "to responsible political men of the EEC" a strategy that should contribute to putting an end to apartheid.

What is the strategy that EEC is invited to elaborate in order "to solve the South African problem"?

It is founded on the recognition of a danger of explosion in South Africa if a change of policy does not take place rapidly in this country, a danger that threatens not only South Africa, but the whole continent and "most probably all economic, political and strategic relations between Europe and this continent."

This policy takes into account "the invaluable strategic and economic importance" of South Africa for Europe as a provider of raw material (the Cape route) and of the EEC interest in the maintenance, without interruption, of commercial relations with South Africa. Its aim is thus "to settle peacefully the internal conflicts of South Africa."

In defining the "Realpolitik" that the EEC should adopt toward the South African problem, the report rejects, first of all, any suggestion of a general economic boycott as "an unrealistic solution which would produce contrary effects to those desired."

More surprising and more grave still, Lagorce did not hesitate to consider universal suffrage as inapplicable to South Africa.

Referring to a statement by American Vice-President Mondale, addressed to then South African Prime Minister Vorster, in May 1977 in Vienna, proposing to introduce universal suffrage in South Africa, Lagorce commented,

that this "one man, one vote" proposition, even though democratic, has not contributed to the solution of the conflict in South Africa. Such a policy would aggravate, on the contrary, the situation.

Having thus swept away universal suffrage as inappropriate for South Africa and dispensed, in the same manner, with the statements of Andrew Young, American Ambassador to the UN, Lagorce thinks it necessary to dissipate what he calls a misunderstanding. He says,

The Republic of South Africa is not a colony and white South Africans are not Europeans living in Africa. Contrary to what is actually taking place in Namibia or in Rhodesia and to what happened in Algeria or in Angola, the question in South Africa is not the solution of colonial conflict.

The South African "Afrikanerdom" designates a white nation existing for more than three centuries and not white colonists.

The fourteenth generation of Boers thus have a justifiable claim to the territory of South Africa.

The Boers will never submit to people of color.

On the basis of these affirmations, which the South African propaganda would not deny, the author identifies himself with the Afrikaners and concludes:

The determination of the white Africans to maintain their identity as a nation can be compared only with the grim fight of the Israelis for their own Jewish state.

When political leaders of the EEC have understood this, a strategy aiming to put an end to the disastrous racist policy in South Africa could be defined. This strategy, to be adopted by the EEC towards South Africa, will then be parallel to the condemnation of the apartheid policy, in the elaboration of a concept defining clearly the right of existence of White South Africans and non-Whites complete with political guarantees. Sufficient

guarantees for the existence of all ethnic groups are the necessary condition for the peaceful solution of this racial conflict, whether in a divided South Africa or in a federation of its own.

And to be sure that he is fully understood, Lagorce adds:

The EEC would be well advised to treat the South African question in the same way as the Israel-Palestine problem.

These are the main aspects of this alarming document. Adopted unanimously by the commission, this document was greatly criticized when it was presented before the European Parliament. The report was sent back to the commission on March 15, and some of its worst passages, such as the rejection of universal suffrage and the comparison with Israel, have been eliminated.

But the general spirit of the report is still the same. It does not mention at all the liberation struggle of the South African people and does not try in any way to contribute to the elimination of this racist minority regime whose policies and practices are considered criminal by contemporary international law.

It ignores totally the aggressive attitude of the apartheid regime toward its own people and against the neighboring people struggling for their liberation in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, a country South Africa continues to occupy illegally.

The report does not mention the intensification of the armed attacks that the apartheid regime is waging against independent neighboring states and does not draw attention to the nuclear threat that the apartheid regime poses in southern Africa.

In its final version, the report even suggests a long-term strategy for the whole of Africa in which Europe would be invited "to participate actively in the internal pacification of Africa."

Such is the main content of this extremely dangerous document for the future relations of Europe and a liberated southern Africa.

Notes

1. This article was written just prior to the admission of Greece to the Common Market. The Nine is now the Ten.

2. European Parliament (EP) Commission of Development and Cooperation, Draft report, December 11, 1978. Doc PE 54493/rev. See also EP, Doc 9 March 1979, EP 54493/def, and Doc EP 54493/def March 27, 1979.

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THE RANGE OF COVERT INTERVENTION

Introduction

by Philip Agee

"Covert action" as practiced by the Central Intelligence Agency has been defined as "clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not apparent."* Secret services—the CIA and those of the other pro-Western powers—provide money, instructions, equipment, and information to indigenous agents in order to enable those agents to take action wherein they hope the hand of the secret service will not show. In the United States in recent years, the official designation of covert action has changed to "special activities" or "special actions."

So much has already been written about covert action that little descrip-

[This article was written in June 1979 for this book.]

*U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report: Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Book I, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, April 26, 1976, p. 131.

tion of these activities is needed. Both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, in reporting their investigations of 1975-76, discussed covert action methods and specific cases. Briefly, these activities may range from a simple poison-pen letter (which may be true or falsified), to supporting or splitting political parties, to establishing and manipulating trade unions, to fielding armies on a battlefield. They also include undermining public support for governments, overthrowing governments, and political assassinations.

Covert action seeks the strengthening or weakening of individuals and institutions, whether they be governmental or private, in order to safeguard certain perceived interests of the intervening party. The targets are governments, political parties, military and security services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public-information media. The objectives of covert-action operations normally require that action be taken within these institutions by spies who follow instructions from the sponsoring secret service.

Activities by a secret service like the CIA to strengthen and support other security services (money, training, equipment, guidance, and information) are also covert action operations because they seek to strengthen those services and thereby the governments or political factions that the receiving services protect. The CIA's support to the SAVAK in Iran for many years, although called "liaison" and "counterintelligence" within the CIA, was in effect a long-running covert action operation to support the Shah.

Covert action has often been described as governmental intervention in the wide gray area between polite correct diplomacy and outright military action. Its proponents argue that it can prevent military confrontation in conflict situations where "reasoned" diplomacy fails. During World War II the U.S. government learned the art of clandestine intervention from the British secret service, which had several centuries' experience applying such methods in the Crown's colonies and protectorates. But since the late 1940s the U.S. government, using the Central Intelligence Agency as its principal instrument, has dominated the globe in covert action—as in so many other spheres.

In the mid-1970s public revulsion in America to the CIA's political interventions, assassination operations, and other dirty work produced hope in some that covert action, at least in peacetime, would be reduced or even renounced altogether. And the early concern over human rights in the Carter administration added to this hope because gross violations of human rights normally result from the CIA's clandestine interventions.

It took just one year for these hopes to be dashed, confirming the belief of many that such hopes were not realistic from the start. In January 1978, one year after taking office, President Carter promulgated an executive order that tightened control over the CIA's covert action operations but at the same time provided exceptions that would allow the President to order

the CIA to do everything it had done in the past except political assassinations of heads of state.

Meanwhile the Congress considered several legislative proposals concerning the American foreign intelligence agencies and the domestic-security agencies such as the FBI. The goal was to provide legal charters to spell out, for once, what these agencies could and could not do. The debate has continued with scant result so far, civil liberties groups arguing for strict enforcement of constitutional guarantees and an end to covert action abroad, and the "national security lobby" on the right, including the agency itself, arguing about "the Soviet menace" and the past efficacy of "a little discreet help to our friends."

The tide seems now to be running in favor of continuing and expanding covert action operations through a loosening of the controls established during the revelations and scandals of 1975-76. In the wake of the disclosures, laws and regulations were passed requiring the President to approve most operations personally and to report on all covert operations to numerous congressional committees. Recent proposals seek to reduce drastically the operations which require Presidential approval and to exempt "small scale" operations from congressional reporting.

Moreover, the discussions lose sight of the glaring fact that all language of the underlying intelligence legislation relates to the gathering of information, not to the execution of covert operations. Indeed, the covert political manipulations practiced continually violate principles of international law, the United Nations charter, and local laws, as well as contradict the flowing rhetoric about nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations (be they "friendly" or not).

For Africans and others on the receiving end of covert action the American debate may well seem irrelevant, for the fact is that these operations have never stopped. But Americans must realize that continuation of clandestine intervention and the subversion of the institutions of other countries is almost always counterproductive in the long run, only increasing the moral and political isolation of the United States.

We should remember that covert action is the secret application of information—the *use* of intelligence. As long as the CIA places spies in countries having limited counterintelligence capabilities, the information collected by the spies will be applied, sometimes by the same spies, sometimes by others, to manipulate and subvert the institutions of power in those countries.

Although turmoil within the CIA and the controversy over past operations have perhaps reduced or weakened the CIA's covert action capabilities in recent years, the agency has continued to intervene secretly along with the secret services of America's allies, as the following articles vividly illustrate.

The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer

by Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara, and David Kolodney

Throughout the world, revolutionaries are studying the strategies and tactics of their central enemy, U.S. imperialism. They realize that in order to defeat a powerful but not omnipotent foe, some detailed understanding of the ways the U.S. empire works is necessary. While U.S. capital dominates and distorts the economies of its colonies, agencies such as the CIA work to manipulate political developments to favor U.S. interests. The exposure of the CIA's work was not only a setback for U.S. manipulators, but it has also been instructive to radicals in the white mother country in revealing the outlines of a sophisticated strategy for social control.

For the CIA, there has never been any real distinction between its intelligence (i.e., information gathering) and its action functions. In target countries—virtually the entire Third World—the CIA staff is integrated into a coordinated “multi-agency country team,” often in leadership positions. Its operatives often direct the overall thrust of U.S. penetration into the target country, seeking to fashion a strategy of “cumulative impact.” The idea is simple: create or reinforce pro-western institutions that individually might not suffice but that cumulatively control the country's economic and political direction. To-

[Africa Research Group published many important resource materials, including *Race to Power*, *The Extended Family*, and *Intelligence and Foreign Policy*. This article, by ARG members, first appeared in *Ramparts* magazine in 1970 and was later reprinted by ARG with an introduction that precedes the article.]

ward this end, CIA-funded scholars such as those at MIT have worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organizations—teacher, student, cultural, trade union, etc.—were founded or covertly subsidized through various conduits. Many of these sought to coopt important African leaders and act as channels of U.S. influence.

This article, first published in *Ramparts* and reprinted in the Black Panther newspaper and elsewhere, spotlights the way the CIA has promoted black cultural nationalism to reinforce neo-colonialism in Africa. Activists in the black colony *within* the United States can easily see its relevance to their own situation; in many cases the same techniques and occasionally the same individuals are used to control the political implications of Afro-American culture. It reveals how reactionary nationalism can serve imperialism, while revolutionary nationalism represents a threat to the U.S. empire.

Among the organizations disclosed as CIA-connected by various newspapers and magazines have been the following. STUDENT: National Student Association; International Student Conference; World Assembly of Youth; Institute of International Education; African Scholarship Program of American Universities. TRADE UNION: African-American Labor Center; various secretariats connected with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. CULTURAL: Congress of Cultural Freedom; American Society of African Culture; East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs. GENERAL: African-American Institute; Peace with Freedom, Inc.; Jomo Kenyatta Foundation; Milton Obote Foundation; Kenneth Kaunda Foundation. The United States remains involved in channeling money to various factions within southern-African liberation movements, hoping, of course, to mold them in pro-Western directions. (See *The Politics of Unity* by I. Wallerstein.)

Erratum: Writing about the CIA is always hazardous; records are unavailable, and the CIA deliberately leaks what it calls "disinformation" to cover its tracks and confuse its enemies. The CIA's own attempts at political camouflage are aided inadvertently by many principled liberals and even radicals. The liberals are so preoccupied with the odiousness of the CIA's secrecy that they often miss entirely the political purposes of the agency. Radicals have often resorted to unanalytical muckraking or rhetorical CIA baiting, which obscures the real game and, occasionally, assists the CIA in its characteristic strategy of heightening intergroup tensions within radical movements.

Our own factual check of the *Ramparts* article has unearthed some minor errors in detail that in no way discredit its argument:

1. The height, birth date, and facial appearance of James Harris are misrepresented.
2. Harris worked for the NSA and WUS *before* they received CIA subsidies; he stayed on as consultants to both, however, while they were heavily CIA backed.
3. The CIA's Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs was not headed by Amory Houghton, president of Corning Glass, but rather by Arthur Houghton, a director of Corning Glass.
4. The article gives the erroneous impression that the American Negro Leadership Conference was completely CIA backed. It was not. The ANLC received most of its funding from "clean" liberal sources.
5. ANLC Director Ted Brown was not from AMSAC, but from a trade union.
6. The CIA's international trade-union program did not channel most of its money through the ICFTU directly; instead, several ICFTU-affiliated secretariats were used, including, but not exclusively, the PSI. The PSI representative in east Africa in the period discussed in the article was also working for the ICFTU.

—Africa Research Group

I. Black Power Comes to Washington

Black Power has come a long way since that night in 1966 when Stokely Carmichael made it the battle cry of the Mississippi March Against Fear. For a time it was a slogan that struck dread into the heart of white America—an indication that the ante of the black man's demands had been raised to a point where the whole society would have to be reoriented if they were to be met. But Black Power hardly seems a revolutionary slogan today. It has been refined and domesticated, awarded a prominent niche in the American Dream. And Carmichael's statement of a few years ago, that the President of the United States might say "We shall overcome" over national television but would never call for Black Power, has also been disproven—by Richard Nixon, seemingly the most unlikely of men. The country needs "more black ownership," Nixon said during his campaign, "for from this can flow the rest: black pride, black jobs, and, yes, Black Power."

It is obvious that the Nixon Administration has made some crucial decisions concerning the possibilities of Black Power during its short time in office. With great fanfare it unveiled an elaborate program of black capitalism. And while it failed to lure Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins or others in

the moderate civil rights establishment into cabinet posts, it did find a man with even better credentials as a militant—James Farmer, former national director of CORE. The President has indicated since assuming office that he sees nothing dangerous in the upsurge of a black militancy, provided that it seeks a traditional kind of economic mobility as its end, even if it wears Afro costumes and preaches a fiery race pride while it sets up businesses and replaces white capitalists as our society's most visible contact with the ghetto. Of course, other black militants, the thrust of whose political programs cannot be absorbed by black capitalism or by a mere cultural renaissance, who do not look to the ruling powers of society for assistance in their revolution, will continue to be denounced, imprisoned, hunted and destroyed. For them there is the method of the stick. But in other cases the use of the carrot is preferred as more potent—and less predictable, as Mr. Nixon has well demonstrated.

He has made a surprising alliance with certain forces of black militancy. This may seem audacious, even dangerous, like playing with the fires of a revolutionary black consciousness. But it is actually a time-tested technique. The Nixon Administration's encouragement of cultural nationalism and its paternal interest in black capitalism are little more than an updating and transposition into a domestic setting of a pattern established years ago by U.S. power abroad. Although the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, the Ford Foundation and hosts of other organizations were involved, it was primarily the Central Intelligence Agency which discovered the way to deal with militant blackness. It found that the U.S. could maintain a foothold in the newly independent African states by creating and subsidizing an American elite of Afro-oriented black leaders (James Farmer himself was only one of many) whose positions in the civil rights movement were an invaluable, if often unconscious, cover for the Agency's primary aim—to emasculate black radicalism in Africa, and eventually at home.

II. AMSAC's Afros

It was the Spring of 1963, and at first glance it looked like a revolutionary round table in Havana. The list of participants in the conference read like a Who's Who of the Southern African independence movement: Oliver Tambo, acting president of the African National Congress of South Africa; Eduardo Mondlane (recently assassinated), leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front; Jariretundu Kozonguisi, president of the Southwest African National Union; leaders from virtually every other political faction of these countries as well as Zimbabwe, Angola, and Zambia. They were all wanted men at home, engaged in directing armed struggles against hated colonial regimes. But the meeting hadn't been convened by Fidel Castro. In fact, it took place at Howard University in Washington, D.C.

The architects of a Southern Africa liberation movement had agreed to

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come to Washington because the convening organization was a black group meeting at the nation's leading black university. The American Society for African Culture (AMSAC), composed of important black American scholars, writers, artists and professionals, was the most prestigious and articulate of all black groups interested in advancing African culture and building bonds between U.S. blacks and their African brothers. This conference was AMSAC's fourth international meeting in as many years. It looked like the beginnings of a black revolutionary's dream-come-true, the linking up of African and Afro-American freedom struggles. But what most participants didn't know was that the whole affair had been sponsored by the CIA.

The Howard University meeting provided an ideal opportunity for the CIA to look over the top African revolutionaries while providing an illusion of U.S. concern for their cause. AMSAC itself had begun as a way of keeping an eye on the resurgent African independence movement. It was organized in the aftermath of the first International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, held in Paris in late 1955. This conference had been convened by a group of African exiles and European intellectuals organized into the Société Africaine de Culture (SAC), which published the journal *Présence Africaine*, featuring men like Camus, Sartre, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire. But giving impetus to an organization like AMSAC was by no means on SAC's agenda.

SAC had asked the late Richard Wright, the black American writer self-exiled in Paris, to invite some American Negroes to the international gathering. Wright did so, although many whom he invited were unable to afford the trip. Those who did show up were among the most influential of America's black bourgeoisie, and many later became influential in AMSAC. Headed by Dr. Horace Mann Bond, a leading black educator and father of Georgia legislator Julian Bond, the American delegation included Mercer Cook, who later received the ambassadorship to Niger during the Johnson Administration; John A. Davis, later to become head of AMSAC; James Ivy, editor of the NAACP magazine, *Crisis*, and eventually AMSAC treasurer; Thurgood Marshall, and Duke Ellington. These were AMSAC's founding fathers.

At the outset of its career, AMSAC shared its New York offices with the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, a largely paper organization founded some years earlier by the CIA, specializing in information about and analysis of racial problems affecting international relations. The council merged formally with AMSAC in 1957, and acted as the major financial conduit to the new group, which was not officially incorporated until February 1960. The CIA conduits reporting contributions to AMSAC over the years included the Pappas Charitable Trust (\$65,000), and these foundations: Marshall (\$25,000); Benjamin Rosenthal (\$26,000); J. Frederick Brown (\$103,000); Colt (\$47,000), C. H. Dodge (\$28,000); Rabb (\$40,000), and Ronthelym (\$20,000). AMSAC's statement of purpose de-

clared an intention "to study the effects of African culture on American life; to examine the cultural contributions of African peoples to their societies; to appraise the conditions affecting the development of ethnic national and universal culture; to cooperate with international organizations with a view to . . . exchange of information of African culture"

"I joined AMSAC because I thought it would be really pursuing the ideas advocated by the Société Africaine de Culture," Harold Cruse, author of *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, told us, "but I was quickly turned off when they began to move in another political direction. It was composed of a combination of careerists, slick articulate operators with little conviction, and leaders of the integrationist Negro intellectual establishment. They were liberals without a base whose legitimacy came entirely from their association with established groups like AMSAC. I even doubt they were capable of thinking this kind of operation up themselves."

It will never be clear to what extent the "AMSAC Afros," as Cruse calls them, did think up the organization for themselves; but even if they did, they certainly didn't pay for it. That was taken care of by the CIA, which realized that AMSAC's brand of non-radical cultural nationalism could be useful abroad and perhaps eventually at home. The organization's 1962 conference report declared, "American Negroes do not hold important posts in the great corporations doing business in Africa. Nor can it be said that they seek to make or have been given the opportunity of making money in Africa. Mainly they bring service and love to the complex of Afro-American relations." This they indeed did, but often without knowing what and whose ends they were serving.

AMSAC's cultural and educational programs—the frosting on the political cake the CIA was serving up to emerging Africa—involved some of America's most prominent black artists: Odetta, Randy Weston, Nina Simone, Lionel Hampton and Langston Hughes. The organization also sponsored visits to Africa by American Negro scholars, writers, lawyers and intellectuals. AMSAC's representatives included scholar Saunders Redding, the man whom Harold Cruse describes as the chief of intellectual spokesmen for the American Negro establishment; artists Jacob Lawrence and Elton Fax, and former NAACP counsel Robert Carter. Men like these provided the cultural camouflage which not only disguised the political nature of AMSAC's work, but deepened its impact on Africans as well. But the careers of others, far less celebrated, tell more about the real AMSAC enterprise.

III. Black CIA Agent

One of the most interesting case studies of AMSAC's use of its Afros centers on the man who was the organization's assistant executive director from its early days through 1961—a tall, frequently goateed, black CIA agent named James T. ("Ted") Harris.

Born in Philadelphia in 1924, Harris won a DAR medal for good scholarship at La Salle College. After service during the war, he returned to La Salle where he built a reputation as a concerned and outspoken liberal. Visible, articulate black collegians were a rarity in those days, and Harris' reputation grew nationally when he became involved in student politics. In 1948, when the newly formed National Student Association elected him president, he quickly won admission to the inner circle, the CIA's "old boy network" which came to dominate NSA activities for almost 20 years.

Early in the '50s, Harris moved to Geneva, where he served as assistant secretary-general for the CIA-supported World University Service. From that post he returned to the U.S. for more training. After receiving a master's degree at Princeton's Public Affairs Institute, where he studied on a CIA Whitney scholarship, he was off to Cairo for field experience, this time on a Ford Foundation Research Fellowship. He returned to the NSA after his stint in Egypt, to run the important CIA-funded Foreign Student Leadership Program to "assist active student leaders in the Third World." Through this job, Harris came to know and befriend many African students in the U.S. His next assignment followed naturally. He moved on to AMSAC.

Harris was active in AMSAC through 1961. In that year, while the U.S. was desperately trying to stabilize a friendly national government in the Congo, Harris went back to the Ford Foundation, which made him secretary-general of a Ford-funded National School for Law and Administration in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). Harris spent two years there, shaping an educational program which, as he was later to tell AMSAC's Howard University conference on Southern Africa, provided a way to instruct the Congolese in Western administrative techniques. Congolese sources strongly suspected that the school also served as a conduit for CIA money which was pumped into the pockets of selected Congolese politicians. As soon as a dependable Congolese was groomed to take over the school, Harris returned to New York to help the Ford Foundation shape its overseas development programs for Africa and the Middle East. In 1964, he left Ford to direct education and training for the Corning Glass Works in New York, working under Amory Houghton, the man who had headed the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs (FYSA), the CIA's principal agency for funding its international student programs. In 1966, while remaining a consultant to Houghton, Harris moved on to join yet another CIA creation, the African-American Institute. At the AAI, he directed field programs, traveling frequently to Africa.

By January 1969, when Harris left AAI and international work, he had compiled an impressive record. He had traveled to all of Western Europe and to the Middle East, to India, Pakistan and 23 countries in northern, eastern, western and central Africa (as well as 49 states of the U.S.), often on speaking tours. His languages included Arabic, French, Italian and Spanish. He was a member of the powerful and prestigious Council on

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Foreign Relations and the NAACP, and a director of an offshoot of CORE, the Scholarship, Education and Defense Fund for Racial Equality.

The CIA backed AMSAC and supported people like Harris because its strategists had a sophisticated understanding of how a certain brand of African cultural nationalism could be dangerous to America's international objectives. They realized that cultural radicalism often stimulated political radicalism and that cultural issues, especially in the emerging African states, were often latent with explosive political implications. Maintaining an effective political presence in resurgent Africa thus required an active cultural dimension, and the CIA took an early interest in attempting to control the emerging cultural-political elites and, as much as possible, making sure that their concerns stayed at arm's length from revolution. The Agency saw cultural nationalism and new notions of "negritude" as alternatives to the type of revolutionary culture called for by such radicals as Frantz Fanon, who once said, "It is around the people's struggles that African Negro culture takes on substance and not around songs, poems, and folklore."

The architects of the CIA's covertly-backed cultural program selectively encouraged those black writers most friendly to the West. Through its program of enlightened patronage, these writers found a ready outlet for their work in a whole series of cultural magazines in and about Africa, funded by CIA-backed foundations: Africa Report (African-American Institute); Transition and The New African (Congress of Cultural Freedom); Classic (Farfield Foundation); and others. And finally, AMSAC had its own magazine, African Forum. The writers favored by these publications were not agents, but simply men whose politics were acceptable to the American culture brokers. And what Fanon later called "a charmed circle of mutual admiration at the summit" quickly emerged. Patronage and promotion won international recognition for the CIA's cultural elite while providing a cultural framework important to the directed development of African consciousness.

The CIA did not become the leading international impresario of black culture for the aesthetic pleasure of the experience. The great question during the heyday of AMSAC and similar organizations was what formal African independence would actually mean once it became a reality. And at some point, the CIA decided that the development of a safe cultural nationalism was critically important to U.S. interests in Africa. It was essential not only as a way of keeping cultural energies in line, but primarily (though the two are intertwined) to channel the explosive force of nationalism itself in directions suitable to the U.S. The tide of decolonization rolling over the continent could open the way for a new American Empire to break the old imperial monopoly of the European order that had controlled Africa. Or it could produce the kind of radical nationalism which would guard the new Open Door with inhospitable vigilance, and might even make accommodations with the communist powers. Thus the CIA

made every effort to promote a kind of cultural nationalism in Africa which would be satisfied with the removal of the most obvious forms of foreign domination; one in which concern for cultural integrity did not reinforce, but rather replaced, demands for basic economic and political autonomy.

This was the scope of the enterprise in which American blacks became indispensably involved, through AMSAC and other vehicles. But to appreciate the effect of this misalliance on African development and to see what the alternative of cultural nationalism meant in its social and political context in Africa (and could mean in the United States, if the Nixon Administration is successful), one must also view the operation from the receiving end. A particularly vivid example of America's ideological manipulation of African society in transition is seen in the role played by the CIA in shaping the nationalist movement in Kenya.

IV. A CIA Jet Set

The nightmare of primal black savagery that pervades white fantasies about Africa has been evoked most vividly by Kenya, scene of the blood-lust and carnage of the Mau Mau. This myth of the Mau Mau (as the Kenya Peace and Land Army was known in the West) is the inverse of the reality. Throughout the entire Mau Mau "Emergency," fewer than 100 whites were killed—including 57 counterinsurgency police; among Africans the toll was greater than 11,000. Colonial security forces, like the American "scalphunters," hunted men for bounty. Tens of thousands of Africans were herded into British detention camps. In one roundup, 35,000 were arrested in a single day.

The Mau Mau myth and similar racist inventions still hold firm in the popular mind, but responsible agencies of the U.S. government cannot afford to hamper their own effectiveness with such unsophisticated views. Thus, in the decade preceding Kenyan independence and since that time, the CIA has provided carefully selective support to elements of the same independence movement which most Americans could think of only with revulsion and horror.

The United States may seem in any case to be an unlikely supporter of national liberation struggles in the Third World. But the fact is that U.S. policy has never stopped at sponsoring black militancy, whether of the Mau Mau or of CORE, when it served the right purpose. As Vice President, Nixon reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following his 1957 African tour: "American interests in the future are so great as to justify us in not hesitating even to assist the departure of the colonial powers from Africa. If we can win native opinion in this process the future of America in Africa will be assured." The trouble with old style colonialism in Africa, Nixon perceived, was that it was so un-American.

The CIA's program in Kenya could be summed up as one of selective liberation. The chief beneficiary was Tom Mboya, who in 1953 became general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor. During the "Emergency," when all other African political organizations were banned, the KFL was the leading vehicle for the independence movement. It was harassed, its offices were ransacked, and many of its leaders were detained. But it survived and Mboya became a hero. Both a credible nationalist and an economic conservative, Mboya was ideal for the CIA's purposes—the main nationalist hero and eventual chief of state, Jomo Kenyatta, not being considered sufficiently safe. Mboya even propounded a brand of African socialism which favored "free" (i.e. anticommunist) trade unions and encouraged foreign investment, foreign banking, and foreign land ownership. African socialism, he said, meant "those proven codes of conduct in the African societies which have over the ages conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity, which characterizes our societies, and I refer to the African thought processes and cosmological ideas, which regard men not as a social means, but as an end and entity in society."

Like America's black capitalism today, this prescription hardly struck the strategist of white America as a threat. Mboya's cultural socialism was seen as something which could inoculate against the actual disease of revolution; it clearly deserved support. Mboya soon joined the CIA jet set, traveling the world from Oxford to Calcutta on funds from such conduits as the Africa Bureau and from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. (ICFTU, which played a key role in Kenya, is an aggregation of international trade union secretariats set up in 1949 to counter an upsurge of left-wing trade unionism outside the communist bloc. Its extensive international operations in Africa and elsewhere were funded and manipulated by the CIA through various of its U.S.-based affiliated secretariats. Recently, however, there has been a split with U.S. labor organizations.)

Mboya later became ICFTU representative in the region. His articles were published by other CIA recipients, including the International Union of Socialist Youth, the International Student Conference, and the World Assembly of Youth. Meanwhile the American press was touting him as a future leader of East Africa. Even the Wall Street Journal's article on Mboya was headed: "Businessmen Favorably Impressed."

The ICFTU also supported Mboya and his African socialism through his KFL, a model "free trade union"—aid which reached £1000 a month in outright grants during the early '60s. In addition, the CIA-supported Fund for International Social and Economic Education contributed more than \$25,000 to the Federation's coffers. One of the directors of this Fund, George Cabot Lodge (Henry's son), explained the importance of this aid in *Spearheads of Democracy*, a book which grew out of a Council on Foreign

Relations study group which brought labor experts together with Cord Meyer Jr., the chief of the CIA's covert funding program. Speaking for the group, Lodge wrote: "The obscure trade unionist of today may well be the president or prime minister of tomorrow. In many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, trade unions are almost the only organized force in direct contact with the people and they are frequently among the most important influences on the people." Aid to Mboya, he added, "has not only strengthened [ICFTU] but the whole cause of freedom and democracy in Africa."

The British were uncomfortably aware of what their "special ally" was doing in Kenya. In a British Cabinet Annex marked for "UK EYES ONLY," dated December 21, 1959, they complained: "The aim seems to be to take advantage of the difficult situation in which the United Kingdom and other European powers find themselves and to replace their influence and interests by direct U.S. machinery of the ICFTU and American contacts that have been built up with American leaders for this purpose." The document concluded that "Americans are not interested in the creation of genuine African trade unions as we know them. America has no Labour Party As a result, the American trade union leaders such as Meany, Reuther, and Dubinsky can afford directly and openly to execute governmental and particularly State Department and CIA policy."

The ICFTU often works through the mainly U.S.-based international union secretariats. In Africa, where unionization has been concentrated in government employment, the most important secretariat—and accordingly the main CIA instrument—has been the Public Services International (which was also instrumental in the overthrow of the Cheddi Jagan government in British Guiana). W. C. Lawrence, a PSI representative in East Africa, laconically expressed the organization's role in a February 15, 1962 letter to his superior, Paul Tofahrn: "It seems to me that it is up to us to see that they [East African unionists] know what is right."

In 1963, just after Mboya left his post with the Kenya Federation of Labor, it looked as if the Federation might be losing sight of "what is right." Strikes threatened throughout the economy, and PSI feared some kind of class polarization of the society during the critical transition to independence, perhaps leading to the wrong kind of independence entirely. PSI records reveal how it stepped in. General Secretary Tofahrn sent a "Dear Tom" letter to Mboya on January 29, 1963, reading in part: "Perhaps the Government can do nothing else but say 'no' to their claims, but then the question arises how to say 'no' in a manner so convincing that the people concerned accept 'no' for an answer." He added that he was sending a special representative, T. Nynan, to Nairobi "to seek to avoid a strike," and he concluded with the comment that "this letter is written in order to urge you to drop hints in the appropriate quarter."

Mboya's hints were right on target, and on February 13, Nynan was

able to report that the situation was in hand. "I was very lucky," he wrote, "getting the support of Brother Tom Mboya in my tries to avoid the strike."

V. Peace With Freedom

Underwriting Mboya and his Labor Federation was a natural strategy for the U.S. in Kenya during the '50s and early '60s. It advanced responsible nationalism; and it was painless, because the employers faced with higher wage demands were British, not American. By 1964, however, American investments, which would reach \$100 million by 1967, were becoming significant, and some of the Kenyan union demands began to lose their charm. But even more important, 1964 also brought dangers of "political instability" serious enough to make radio communications with the Nairobi Embassy eighth highest on the State Department roster for the year. Zanzibar revolted and Tanzania's Nyerere was nearly overthrown. Rebellion was spreading through the Northeast Congo, and Kenya lay astride the natural supply route. The CIA decided that a new approach was in order.

Mboya had long been supported as a force to the right of Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, but an accommodation with Kenyatta was now seen as necessary, particularly to insure that he did not support the Congolese rebels, and more generally to get him to close ranks against the agitating Kenyan left. It was a strategy which has since become familiar enough: utilize the credibility of the appropriate flexible militants to crush the rest.

In June 1964, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood met with Kenyatta and agreed that Western labor groups would stop subsidizing Mboya and the KFL; for balance, Kenyatta assured him that Russian and Chinese aid to the leftist leader, Vice President Odinga, would also end. Simultaneously, the CIA was making appropriate shifts in its operations, throwing its resources into a new kind of vehicle which would embrace the whole Kenyan political mainstream, while isolating the left and setting it up for destruction by Kenyatta. To this end the CIA shifted its emphasis to an organization by the name of "Peace With Freedom."

Incorporated in 1960 as International Features Service, a press agency bringing the thoughts of Hubert Humphrey to the people of the Third World, Peace With Freedom went nonprofit and reorganized in 1962 under the direction of Murray Baron, vice president of New York's Liberal Party. To insure a credible operation, Baron brought in NAACP head Roy Wilkins, who in turn convinced the United Auto Workers' Walter Reuther to come aboard. The CIA, of course, came up with the cash to help bring the combined forces of American civil rights and liberalism to Africa. PWF's income for 1963 consisted of \$27,826 from the International Development Foundation, a conduit, and \$130,799.78 from the dummy Price

Fund. A mere \$765.75 accrued from "other sources." Funding in the following years was the same story, all CIA sources—though the total had more than doubled by 1966.

By 1965, the original press agency operation had grown by leaps and bounds; it maintained 24 representatives around the world and published in 22 languages. Among the most popular writers, along with Humphrey, were Tom Mboya and Roy Wilkins.

Mboya had not been forgotten in the shift to PWF. The new organization contributed \$40,000 to the KFL for publication of its weekly newspaper, *Mfanyi Kasi* (Worker Solidarity), in English and Swahili. But this support now figured in a far broader context than it had in the past. PWF created and financed a whole string of East African organizations including the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, the East African Publishing House (now reorganized as Afro-Press), the Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, the Kenneth Kaunda Foundation and the Milton Obote Foundation in Uganda.

It was an entire prefabricated cultural and intellectual infrastructure, reaching from the elite academic setting to the mass media of radio and pamphleteering. It aimed, in the favored phrase, at "nation building," shaping a social infrastructure, an elite and an ideological base. In Kenya, Peace With Freedom's operation was practically all-encompassing. The principal exception was the Lumumba Institute, opened on December 13, 1964 (Independence Day). Although Kenyatta himself was the nominal patron, real control lay in the hands of Vice President Odinga and the left, whose cadres it trained.

In the following year, Kenyatta was encouraged to move against Odinga, cementing the deal he had negotiated with Attwood. The Constitution was revised to strip Odinga's vice presidential office of its power; his post in Kenyatta's political party was eliminated, his trade union base (competitive with the KFL) reorganized out of existence. When he resigned the vice presidency in protest, Odinga was successfully shut out of effective campaigning in the subsequent election. And the Lumumba Institute was dissolved by executive decree when its students objected to the government's formulation of "African Socialism." While the left was being destroyed, PWF's cultural-political complex was operating to keep the nation on an even keel, providing stable mechanisms for what could be misinterpreted as constructive dissent and in effect defining the limits of legitimate social and political debate. One man working with PWF in Kenya, Heinz Berger, described the significance of his program to us, saying its "existence means there is no gap which some other country or ideology could fill."

When Ambassador Attwood departed from Kenya in 1966, he expressed satisfaction with what had been accomplished there: "White fears of blacks in power in Kenya had proved to be unfounded; a white Kenyan was still minister of agriculture and 1700 Englishmen still worked in var-

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ious branches of the Kenyan government Odinga and the demagogues were out of office. The men moving up . . . were unemotional, hardworking and practical minded. When they talked about Kenya's agricultural revolution they sounded like Walt Rostow; they spoke of available credit, fair prices, technical assistance and the cash purchase of tools and consumer goods." U.S. exports had grown from \$13.5 million in 1963 to \$31.6 million three years later when Attwood left. It was quite a record for Attwood. But then, as he himself has modestly observed: "... an Ambassador who treats his CIA chief as an integral member of his Country Team will generally find him a useful and cooperative associate. I know I did."

There have been setbacks since, however—four of PWF's top men were refused entry in February 1968 by pro-British Home Minister Daniel Moi who alleged they were connected with the CIA, after which PWF's New York office shut down and the organization disappeared. And the problem of Kenyatta's successor may prove dangerous since discontent is widespread and growing and the economy is in trouble. But these difficulties notwithstanding, Attwood's enthusiastic recounting of how "Black Power in Kenya" had avoided demagogues and had ceased to be something to be feared is impressive. It could almost serve as an expression of the current devout and determined wish for just such a development of Black Power in the United States. Certainly the lessons of Africa have not been lost on those who have consecrated their wishes with coins in the fountain of black capitalism and cultural nationalism. But the carry-over to the present case goes beyond mere tactical experience taken to heart by the manipulators of black destiny. The CIA may no longer be the vanguard agency, but the momentum in the ideology that was set in motion continues strong, and there is continuity in the very personnel. People who provided the racial cover are still proving remarkably serviceable in that same role today.

VI. In the Shadow of Malcolm X

Because he is so decidedly "responsible" a black leader, Roy Wilkins' involvement with such CIA operations as AMSAC and Peace With Freedom may not seem an absolute incongruity. His public orientation toward established power has never marked him as a revolutionary *enragé*. He did, for example, call the nation's civil rights leaders together in 1964 to forge a consensus for a moratorium on demonstrations, so as not to embarrass Johnson and thereby aid Goldwater. The case of James Farmer, however (who alone, except for John Lewis of SNCC, rejected Wilkins' proposal), is quite different. He and CORE, which he headed from 1961 to 1966, have come down on the militant side of the "Movement," from being in the forefront of the Freedom Rides—which Farmer led and for which he was jailed—to the adoption of the slogan "Black Power" long before it became a way to public acceptance. The most disruptive civil rights

"direct action" campaigns in northern cities were sponsored by CORE, with Farmer's leadership and support. Nevertheless, even at the height of these years of activist militancy, Farmer could be found serving as an effective, if unwitting, instrument of CIA operations.

Farmer's most significant service was done in the course of two CIA-sponsored trips to Africa, the first of which took place in 1958. Farmer had already passed into the Agency's orbit from '50 to '54, when he served as national secretary of the youth affiliate of the nominally socialist and fiercely (if not exclusively) anticommunist League for Industrial Democracy (LID). The Student League (SLID) was an associate member of the CIA-financed International Union of Socialist Youth. (SLID was not considered sufficiently socialist for full membership.) SLID itself received funds to maintain its international contacts from the Agency's prime conduit on the student front, the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs. Here Farmer picked up the orientation and the contacts which made it inevitable that the CIA would cross his path again.

After leaving SLID, Farmer went to work for the New York based State, County and Municipal Employees Union, gaining the post of international representative. Farmer caught the attention of the union's ex-president, Arnold Zander, who was himself deeply and knowledgeably involved in the CIA's international labor program. Zander selected Farmer for the African tour; he was to represent their own public employees union on a five-member delegation of the Public Services International, which as part of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was earlier seen to be a mainstay of CIA operations in Kenya and Africa generally during this period. The 15-nation PSI tour was part of the overall "clean union" program being conducted by the Agency in Africa.

PSI President Zimmernuss, in reporting what had been learned from this journey, said that PSI guidance for African unions was sorely needed. "Their work is still in the kindergarten stage," he observed. He noted that the picture was brightest where white rule continued, particularly in the Belgian Congo: "There at least a trade union is able to work." The greatest danger uncovered was the communists who preyed on the Africans' simple innocence. "The African knows nothing of the communists," he explained. "They treat him as an equal." Fortunately this subversion was being countered by organizers of the Catholic union movement who, he reported, employed such imaginative tactics as getting Africans to join their union's May Day parade by offering them "trousers, shirts and other presents, that they could get no other way." Far more advanced forms of using the white man's gifts to preserve African unionists from the indignities of the communists have already been described with reference to PSI work in Kenya.

The PSI report on the trip refers to Farmer as a "colored trade unionist—a fact which naturally proved of considerable advantage to the delegation in its approach to the Africans." This is a somewhat dry description of

the outpouring of good faith lavished on Farmer and thereby indirectly on the organizations and politics he had gone there to represent. Farmer himself describes it this way: "... all over Africa black men made me feel as if they were my family. When I left Nigeria, on that first visit, Nigerian trade-unionists gathered at the airport to see me off, and they threw their arms around me and kissed me." By all means, then, the "fact . . . proved of considerable advantage"

Farmer returned to the U.S. in December 1958. Not long afterwards, Roy Wilkins invited him to join the NAACP staff. In 1961, he returned to CORE as national director, leading the Freedom Rides that year (two years later he was nearly lynched by state troopers in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana).

By 1962, when AMSAC created a subsidiary called the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLC), James Farmer's was an indispensable name on the definitive roster, which included A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young Jr., Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King Jr. Farmer described the purpose of the group: "As Americans of African descent, we felt we should take the lead in interpreting for America what was happening in Africa and also in explaining to Africans what was happening in America. We felt too that our opinions should weigh in the formation of American foreign policy regarding Africa."

In particular need of interpretation at that time was the spectacle of dogs, cattle prods, clubs and bullwhips used against black Americans by officers of the law. The American way of life was becoming increasingly hard to sell, and AMSAC's offspring (ANLC's one-man staff and chief traveling representative, Ted Brown, was from AMSAC and worked out of AMSAC offices) could be of enormous benefit to the government. Who could better reaffirm American legitimacy than the spokesmen of its victims? The very authority of black suffering could be turned to a national advantage.

Ultimately, ANLC did not achieve the great overall impact which had been anticipated by the CIA, which was paying the bills through AMSAC. The results were assessed recently by a secret meeting of a Council on Foreign Relations study group on U.S. African policy. There was no disappointment in the politics of the protagonists (though today SNCC would probably not be invited). Rather, as one discussant, Ulric Haynes Jr., a prominent black business consultant and former African affairs advisor to President Johnson, observed, "The move had been premature American Negroes at that time did not consciously identify with their African heritage. An effort of this kind would be more effective today than it was then."

Even so, ANLC was able to prove its usefulness. Its biggest job came in 1964, when American credibility in Africa had plunged disastrously in light of the Kennedy assassination, the presence of a Southerner in the White House, and the wake of the "humanitarian mission" to the Congo.

On top of everything else, Malcolm X had chosen that moment to make his two triumphant tours of Africa.

Ambassador Attwood described the embarrassment of Malcolm's visit: "On Kenya television he identified himself as the leader of 22 million American Negroes and painted an exaggerated picture of their plight. After he left, I alerted other posts of his arrival, suggesting they enlighten their African friends in advance."

His caution was well founded. One African newspaper editorialized: "An extremely important fact is that Malcolm X is the first Afro-American leader of national standing to make an independent trip to Africa since Dr. DuBois came to Ghana Let's make sure we don't give it less thought than the State Department is doubtless giving it right now."

Another African paper predicted: "Malcolm X is one of our most significant and militant leaders. We are in battle. Efforts will be made to malign and discredit him" And sure enough, while Malcolm was still in Africa a grant was being funneled through AMSAC to send—in the company of AMSAC's James Baker—a representative of ANLC on an extended African tour covering all the countries that Malcolm himself had visited. James Farmer was selected.

Farmer contends that he did not know the CIA was behind the trip, and that in any case it was not meant to counter Malcolm's tour. He recalls that on the day his trip was formally announced, New York radio stations disclosed that he was going abroad to answer Malcolm X. "Of course, that wasn't my intent at all," says Farmer now. "Malcolm called me up after those announcements appeared, and I of course denied them. He came over and spent an evening with me before I left, briefing me on his trip and suggesting people for me to look for. He left amicably and in fact it was on this trip—while I was in Ghana—that someone told me of Malcolm's impending assassination. That's why, if you remember, I was one of the few people who called for a federal inquiry and suggested that the CIA was involved in his murder."

Whatever personal intentions paved Farmer's path to Africa, the CIA got its money's worth out of it: Farmer was given red-carpet treatment. With enviable mobility he was able to meet with the heads of state of all but one of the countries he visited, meeting also with representatives of the Southern African liberation movements and—according to an AMSAC report—"he also talked to the U.S. ambassadors to the countries he visited and to other members of U.S. embassies there."

Writing after his return in AMSAC's CIA-financed journal, *African Forum*, Farmer was preoccupied with Malcolm's influence in Africa. "President Johnson," reported Farmer, "for all his inestimable good will—and I think he has it—has not been well-projected in Africa. In addition, Malcolm X contributed to the generally unfavorable African opinion of Johnson by characterizing him in speeches and conversations with Africans as a 'Southern racist.'" Elsewhere he notes that the response to his own defense of Johnson was "cautious."

"Malcolm made a considerable impact on African university campuses, but I felt this was largely superficial," Farmer wrote. The CORE leader told African audiences that what Malcolm had really been promoting was a form of apartheid. Farmer's African safari was, according to Jet Magazine, the Negro weekly, "a trial run for the post of assistant secretary of State for African Affairs." Much to his credit, he was critical of several aspects of the United States' Africa policy and didn't get the job.

In the case of the Congo he even went so far as to reveal and assail the fact that U.S. military planes were providing logistical support for the white mercenary army. On the other hand, Farmer could be counted on to eschew extreme alternatives to that policy. He recalls, "When I was in East Africa, many of the younger East Africans told me we [the U.S.] should get out of the Congo altogether. I told them I thought this nonsense. No major power would withdraw from so important a place as the Congo. It is both implausible and undesirable" Farmer's view was that Tshombe and the rebels were both "unacceptable," and that "the hope for the Congo lies in a third force: perhaps it is lying dormant among the brilliant university students—the politicians, administrators and professional classes of tomorrow"—a hope that CIA agent Harris shared when he set up his Congo school to provide just such leadership training.

One does not send a man like Farmer to Africa expecting him to be a sycophantic apologist for the excesses of American overseas adventures. Nor does one give him a cabinet post and expect him to turn his back on the variety of domestic militancy he helped pioneer. His record of criticism makes his basic sympathy for the reasonable exercise of American power all the more compelling. America has plenty of diplomats to make uncritical defenses of policy. But they do not have the same access to prestige that Farmer, with his militant credentials, enjoys.

VII. Good and Bad Black Power

In accepting a position as the ranking black in the new Nixon Administration, James Farmer noted that he could choose between standing outside and criticizing, or getting "on the inside" to help determine the course of events. Farmer was not alone in feeling that the new President was ready to come to terms with Black Power on pragmatic, if not ideological grounds. The current leadership of CORE, along with other militants, had discovered that the agencies of government and of private financial power were eager to get in on the ground floor and underwrite the stock of Black Power. As CORE's Roy Innis said of Nixon's presidency, "Somehow our agendas intersect."

Of course, Black Power, like African nationalism, could be conceived and directed in a number of ways, some of them not at all threatening to the status quo. And the current administration has already seen its job as winnowing away the Good Black Power from the Bad. Such an approach to America's racial crisis has been in the offing for some time. The media

have joined in promoting it to the white public. Time magazine announced over a year and a half ago: "What has clearly developed . . . is a Black Power movement on a more respectable base The most intelligent spokesmen for the new attitude think of it in terms of Black Consciousness—or more completely, of Black Pride."

This interpretation of the black revolution—sanctioning and encouraging those aspects which are the least revolutionary—is, of course, a reminder of the international strategy the CIA developed around AMSAC, the subsidies it gave to select leaders in Africa, and its sponsorship of Tom Mboya's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And again, as in those cases, the current emphasis is on a variety of Black Power which is a psycho-cultural redemption, not one that offers to reevaluate the social and economic power of its new backers. Common ground is staked out and emphasized between white capitalism and black militancy, but it is always safely within the boundaries of the status quo. And those who say that the status quo is simply not plastic enough to contain all the contradictions of racism in America are isolated as Bad Black Powerites. Just as in Africa those following the Frantz Fanons were pushed beyond the pale of respectability and those following the Mboyas rewarded, so today those militant blacks who accept black capitalism are heavily subsidized while those who support social revolution are hunted down.

As U.S. News & World Report has noted, "'Black capitalism' is turning out to be a form of 'Black Power' with wide appeal to members of both races," one which "is gaining backers—and financial assistance—among white businessmen, bankers and industrialist." Ralph T. McElvenny, president of American Natural Gas Company, gave a concise summary of the thoughts of many corporate leaders when he said last February: "The Negro must have a stake in the economy that gives him more to lose than to gain by rioting and insurrection." This statement parallels one made by Thomas H. Burrell, an activist in Philadelphia's burgeoning black capitalist movement: "If people in the neighborhood own a share of the business, when someone with a Molotov cocktail approaches the place, windows will fly open and residents will say, 'Don't you dare burn my dollar's worth.'" Reverend Leon Sullivan, organizer of the Philadelphia-based Opportunities Industrialization Center, a black corporation complex operating in 70 U.S. cities, as well as Puerto Rico, Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, adds, "I will never be satisfied until every black adult in America owns a piece of this country individually or mutually, even if it is no more than two square feet of earth or a share of stock."

Not everyone associated with black capitalism, of course, would express his vision in just this way. Many would differ sharply, but the white power brokers who are funding and encouraging black capitalism will embrace militant rhetoric so long as they have the potentially explosive situation itself under control. After all, the most Marxist of all interpretations of black capitalism comes from the official rhetoric of Richard Nixon: "With

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Sometimes the brokerage of power is merely ludicrous, as when the Labor Department set up a project in Washington, D.C. to hire 1000 ghetto youths to clean the streets and called it "Pride, Inc." Sometimes it is more candid, as when Ralph Taylor, assistant secretary of Housing and Urban Development in charge of the model cities program, said, "I'm not against black participation, but it must be tied in to the larger, white system."

Those who hold power in the society retain control, though they may grant support to dissidents when it suits their immediate purposes. And the lesson of the CIA's African operations is that those in power know precisely why their support is rendered, even if the recipients know neither the reason nor the source.

Black Power has come a long way since 1966. But the question now is whether the journey has been up or downhill, whether or not the slogan has made any significant impression upon the system which gave rise to it. James Farmer, his peculiar career capped by the strange irony of being the black man most intimately involved with the official administration of Good Black Power, once put his finger on a problem which has since only intensified. "The evil of slavery . . ." he wrote in *Freedom—When?*, "is in the way it permitted white men to *handle* Negroes—their bodies, their actions, their opportunities, their very minds and thoughts. To the depths of their souls Negroes feel handled, dealt with, ordered about, manipulated—by white men. I cannot overemphasize the tenacity and intensity of this feeling among Negroes and I believe any fair-minded person pondering the history of the Negro's enforced posture in a world of white power would concede the justice of this feeling."

The CIA and African Trade Unions

by Barry Cohen

In spite of the extensive exposure of CIA personnel and activities in recent years, very little information has been provided concerning CIA operations against labor movements in Africa. In *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*,¹ the authors reveal that only three hundred (or approximately 6 percent) of the forty-eight hundred employees of the CIA's Clandestine Services division were assigned to Africa. In other words, the direction of CIA activity reflected the low priority that the U.S. government attributed to African affairs. Nevertheless, valuable information has recently come to light regarding the history of CIA penetration and manipulation of various African trade unions. Given the role of labor organizations in African independence struggles as well as their function in the postcolonial period, CIA activity in this area deserves close attention.

Following the formation of the CIA in 1947, it was decided that covert labor operations would be much larger than those of its predecessor, the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had maintained a labor branch. A prime target at this time was the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The United States was interested in harnessing European trade-union support for the Marshall Plan. Since the Soviet bloc and Western Communist unions were opposed to U.S. designs to rebuild postwar Europe, the American Federation of Labor realized that WFTU's influence had to be undermined. Thus, the AFL's offensive actually began in July 1948 at a meeting in London with British trade unions. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union—an important section of the AFL—stated in one of its publications: "The declared purpose of the meeting was to rally support to the Marshall Plan. Actually, the conference

[Barry Cohen is a Canadian journalist living in London. This article is a revised, updated version of one that appeared in *Africa* magazine in September 1976 and was written in May 1979 for this book.]

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provided the initial move for the ultimate formation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions although no public reference was made to the development." Jay Lovestone, who then served as the Director of the Department of International Affairs for the AFL (and later AFL-CIO) "was one of the Central Intelligence Agency's most important men."²

Within the WFTU, there were some African delegates connected with the British TUC; however, no delegates from francophone Africa were involved. The WFTU eventually split into two camps regarding Africa. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and the United States wished to form a regional body to coordinate African activities; the colonial powers like Britain, France, and Belgium opposed these moves while insisting on preserving their "responsibility" for all affairs within their colonial domains. The U.S. was interested in undermining colonialism since this would both open up European empires to U.S. influence and commercial penetration, while simultaneously preempting Soviet-bloc efforts to profit from anticolonial discontent.

By 1949, at the peak of the cold war, Western trade-union organizations—responding to U.S. pressure and clandestine CIA provocation—split from WFTU to re-form as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Because of the need for anti-Communist unity under U.S. leadership, the colonial powers now found themselves in a weakened position.

Following the completion of his 1957 African tour, Vice-President Nixon reported to Congress: "It is of vital importance that the American government should closely follow what goes on in the trade-union sphere and that American consular and diplomatic representatives should get to know the trade-union leaders of these countries intimately . . ." Nixon need not have worried; between 1953 and 1957, the CIA actively engaged in eroding Britain's influence in its African colonies.³

Within the French territories of North Africa, the CIA carried out similar clandestine trade-union support. CIA operatives funded the formation of the Moroccan Labor Federation (UMT), which subsequently affiliated with the ICFTU and formed a close relationship with the AFL-CIO. Because Morocco enjoyed internal autonomy, workers' organizations were not so closely tied to French parties and unions as those in other francophone territories. ICFTU interest in Morocco dates from 1951, when a delegation of CIA labor operatives visited and recruited agents in the Istiqlal party. Particularly following the deportation of Sultan Mohamed V, these agents organized demonstrations for independence. CIA money for the independence movement was funneled through and around the ICFTU. When the Sultan returned to power and began to arrest labor leaders and suppress strikes, the CIA organized against the Sultan until he was finally overthrown.

In Algeria, the CIA supported some unions which favored the cause of Algerian independence. As the French authorities became aware of American meddling, they tried to prohibit any CIA presence within Algeria. U.S.-French rivalry in Africa has always been pronounced, compared to any contradictions that existed between Britain and the United States. As a result, the United States was never so concerned with peaceful roads to decolonization in francophone Africa.

After the experience in Kenya, trade unionism spread throughout Africa. In 1959, in Brussels, the AFL-CIO won control of the ICFTU Executive Board. Because of the growth of the AFL-CIO's influence within the ICFTU, the latter decided in the late 1950s to establish a regional office for Africa in Accra. The strategy rested in using the Ghana Trades Union Congress, headed by John Tettegah, as a continental base for pursuing its activities in tropical Africa. However, the influence of pan-Africanism was rising and threatening to counter those plans. At the All-African People's Organization conference at Accra in December 1958, the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) was created. The AATUF gradually espoused the militant pan-African line associated with Kwame Nkrumah.

The United States and ICFTU made strong attempts to pressure African unions into adopting hard anticommunist positions. Having failed to do so, they naturally were delighted when Nkrumah was overthrown.* Indeed, the AFL-CIO launched a world campaign to discredit the AATUF by claiming that it was being manipulated by communists.⁴

In November 1960, the African Regional Organization in Lagos was established by the third ICFTU Regional Conference. AFRO, having become the focus of ICFTU operations, adopted a new propaganda style. Whereas previously, the ICFTU had claimed that AATUF members were under communist manipulation, it now accused them of being "arms of government administration." Many ICFTU affiliates formed the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) with the ostensible purpose of establishing an independent labor organization. With the disaffiliation of the KFL in November 1965, the ATUC held little hope of providing an alternative to the AATUF. In addition, by March 1965, a dispute between George Meany of the AFL-CIO and Omer Becu, president of the ICFTU, was now in the open. The United States began to lose interest in the ICFTU, and the latter's active role in Africa diminished.

With the granting of independence to most former colonies by the mid-1960s, the CIA's role as a supporter of trade unions as political movements for independence began to change. Previously, the CIA acted as a force to clear the path for the penetration of U.S. multinational corporations into Africa. However, it was now faced with immediate tasks of maintaining a stable investment climate for American business—particularly in mining and agriculture—as well as creating conditions for a pliable African work force.

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To fulfill these functions, the CIA helped to establish the African-American Labor Center (AALC) in 1964. In many ways, the AALC was meant to supersede the postwar role of the ICFTU and ensure Washington's control of U.S. labor activities in Africa. The AALC was the counterpart for Africa to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)—an earlier CIA front that operates with considerable success in Latin America, and is still going strong.³ In both its structure and its programs, AALC resembled AIFLD. Indeed, many former AIFLD operators went to work for the AALC.

Since February 1965, literally hundreds of projects have been undertaken by the AALC in forty-one African countries to develop "labor leadership" on the continent. According to its 1976 figures, the AALC maintained a staff of 134 personnel in Africa and the United States. The bulk of its 1976 budget came from the Agency for International Development, which contributed \$2,250,000.

Activities have been concentrated in several major areas. First, and perhaps most important, have been programs in leadership training with an emphasis on labor-management relations. Thus, in 1965, the AALC founded the Trade Union Institute for Social and Economic Development in Lagos. Here, more than five thousand officers and members of Nigerian trade unions have been trained. Since 1968, the AALC has also contributed support to the Ghana Labour College, where trade-union leaders from more than twenty African countries have studied. In addition, hundreds of African trade unionists have been sent to the United States for advanced training. Many have been enrolled at Harvard and other prestigious universities.

The AALC has maintained various connections with the Trade Union Education Centre in Botswana and the Ethiopian Labour Education Program, as well as establishing the Regional Economic Research and Documentation Centre in Lomé. Because of its extensive information and data sources of African labor legislation and collective agreements, the Lomé institute is unique on the African continent. As a result, many African union negotiators must depend solely on the RERDC for their background material. Since 1965, it has worked closely with the Zairian national trade-union center as well as two Angolan trade unions based in Zaire—the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de l'Angola (CGTA) and Ligue Générale des Travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA). All these programs have stressed developmental economics and, at the same time, created a vast infrastructure for the African labor aristocracy.

Other programs sponsored by the AALC include vocational training to complement the multinational strategy for developing labor-intensive trades such as auto mechanics and electronics. Through such facilities as the Pan-African Cooperative Training Centre in Cotonou, Dahomey, the trade-union members studied the possibilities of creating credit unions and cooperatives in providing a higher standard of living for the developing labor aristocracy. Rural clinics have been established which promote popu-

lation-control programs—a significant component in American underdevelopment policy. In the area of communications and information, the AALC has assisted virtually all African trade unions in the production of their newspapers. In 1972, it established the Pan African Trade Union Information Center in Kinshasa, Zaire. And finally, for close exposure to the American Dream, many African trade unionists have taken tours to the United States, financed by the AALC, to meet members of the AFL-CIO.

To carry out this wide range of programs, the AALC has obtained some financing from African governments, but overwhelmingly, from the AFL-CIO, A.I.D., and multinational corporations. The support of the latter is most feasible when one considers that the March 1965 Bulletin of the AALC announced that it would “also encourage labor-management cooperation to expand American capital investment in the African nations.”

Nevertheless, behind the AALC's overt activities, the Covert Action Staff of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (dirty tricks department) busily carries on. Of course, there has never been a conflict of interest; AALC leaders like Irving Brown, its first executive director until 1974, have had close connections with the CIA. Thomas Braden, head of the CIA's International Organizations Division from 1950 to 1954, revealed Brown's association in 1967 in a *Saturday Evening Post* article, “I'm Glad the CIA Is Immoral.” In a reference to Brown's postwar activities in smashing Communist union opposition to Marshall aid in Western Europe, Braden wrote: “It was my idea to give the \$15,000 to Irving Brown. He needed it to pay off his strong-arm squads in Mediterranean ports, so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of Communist dock workers.” In addition, on February 24, 1967, an article by columnist Drew Pearson in the *New York Post* pointed out that Brown “spends CIA money in Africa.” Pearson also mentioned that “Lovestone takes orders from Cord Meyer of the CIA.”

Philip Agee identifies Brown as “the principal CIA agent for control of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.”⁶ During the pre-independence era in Africa, Brown was the major instrument of the ICFTU in helping nationalist movements wage political opposition to European colonialism.

The cold-war struggle to win the hearts and minds of African trade unionists was bitterly fought in Nigeria—a key state in any strategic analysis of Africa. AALC support was given to the United Labor Congress of Nigeria (ULCN) to counteract the influence of the Communist-backed Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). In 1969, Alheji Adebola, former leader of the ULCN, became strongly opposed to AALC involvement in his union. As he admitted in 1976, “I formed the impression that some of the officials of the foreign trade unions in Nigeria had something to do with the CIA Since the advent of the African-American Labor Center in Nigeria . . . treachery and betrayal has found a comfortable asylum in the Nigerian trade-union movement.”⁷ For his efforts, Adebola lost his

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position of leadership in the ULCN to fellow unionists who were more amenable to American interests.

A subsequent Nigerian governmental investigation in 1977 reported that the AALC and the ICFTU "had a free hand in the running of the affairs of the Congress." Representatives from both organizations were involved in policy-making meetings. The inquiry also revealed that U.S. funding of the ULCN was so substantial that most of the union's affiliates did not bother paying dues. In addition, money was used to bribe other labor leaders to affiliate their unions to the ULCN.

Southern Africa

ZIMBABWE

Attempts by the AFL-CIO and ICFTU to engage in the politics of Rhodesian trade unionism in the early 1960s did not lead to any substantial results. The remainder of the decade did not witness any significant union militancy, largely because hundreds of trade unionists had been detained by the Smith regime. However, with the rapid intensification of guerrilla warfare and Western efforts to install a neo-colonial black administration in Salisbury, the AALC quickly entered the political arena.

In 1977, Reuben Jamela inaugurated the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour, claiming it to be the largest trade-union federation in the country. The opposing union federation, the African Trades Union Congress, led by Phineas Sithole, has claimed that Jamela was receiving American backing. Considering Jamela's past involvement with the AFL-CIO, ATUC's charges are probably quite accurate.

At the end of the 1950s, Maida Springer Kemp (the CIA contact officer for Mboya)⁸ visited Jamela in Zimbabwe and gave him funds to travel to Tunis and various trade-union centers in Europe. During this period, Irving Brown and Jamela established a close friendship. In fact, in a recent private interview, Brown admitted making two payments to Jamela to promote his trade-union schemes.

Upon returning from his European tour, Jamela used ICFTU money to organize local unions and to send trade unionists to the ICFTU "training" center in Kampala, Uganda. Because of allegations that this union college was training spies, Milton Obote closed it in 1966.

However, Jamela's work gradually came to be opposed by many African nationalists who alleged that he was a "capitalist and imperialist stooge." In 1962, the divisions engendered by Jamela's activities led to a split in the ATUC.

Jamela boasts that thirty-five unions are affiliated with his Federation. Nevertheless, Jamela did admit in private correspondence that of the thirty-two unions attending the ZFL's inaugural meeting on November 27, 1977, only ten were truly viable unions. He added that "these twenty-two

unions are very important as they definitely form the necessary nucleus for us to build on."

A visit by an AALC delegation in June 1978 may have completed the groundwork for expanding the ZFL. Delegation members included Deputy Director, Jerry Funk, who formerly worked on the research and publications staff of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers. In the mid-1970s, this federation was dissolved when it was revealed to be a front for the CIA. Funk left the AALC in 1979 for a position on the National Security Council.

If the United States and Britain accord some form of *de facto* recognition to the pro-Western regime of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, new opportunities will arise for international capital to expand investment and trade in Zimbabwe. To ensure a high rate of profitability, the existence of an American-backed union federation like the ZFL will grow in importance.

SOUTH AFRICA

Shortly after the ruling National party assumed power in 1948, the government quickly embarked on smashing the organized sections of the country's working class. In 1953, it introduced the Native Labour Act, which denied official recognition to African trade unions and declared all strikes by African workers to be illegal. In a further extension of apartheid logic, the act prohibited unions with white, colored, and Asian members from accepting African workers. In this way, the South African government hoped to complete the segregation of South Africa's labor force.

At this time, the international labor movement became involved in the organization of South African workers. In 1953, the British Trades Union Congress paid its first visit to South Africa and recommended that "in the greater interest and urgent necessity of unity," the white trade unions should apply apartheid. The TUC subsequently went on to support the creation of the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), which excluded black workers from its ranks.

To defend African rights, the nonracial South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was formed in March 1955. Closely allied with the militant African National Congress, SACTU emerged as the only trade union organization which stressed the importance of marrying political and economic issues.

Western interests and a section of the African middle class were unhappy about the political direction SACTU and the ANC were taking. In 1958, two representatives of the ICFTU visited South Africa and advised SACTU to break ties with the ANC and the Communist-backed WFTU. When SACTU refused to do so, the ICFTU branded it communist and refused to lend any support for SACTU's campaign to organize African workers.

Meanwhile, the United States was actively involved in splitting the ANC and its labor base. By 1959, the rival Pan-Africanist Congress had

been formed. The Federation of Free African Trade Unions (FOFATUSA) was founded in late 1959 with thirty-thousand pounds from the ICFTU. FOFATUSA was intimately connected with the PAC and strongly in opposition to SACTU. It unabashedly declared: "We are interested in industrial politics . . . and *not* in party politics." Although it disbanded in 1966 FOFATUSA served, throughout its short lifespan, to further divide the African workers.

SACTU, on the other hand, continued to suffer increasing repression. Its leadership was either banned, exiled, or murdered. By the mid 1960s, its internal organization had seriously declined, and in 1967, it decided to go underground. Although some of its members died in detention following the political upheavals of 1976, it is beginning to show signs of a revival.

The 1960s were essentially a period when workers' struggles in South Africa were in relative abeyance. The numerous trials and widespread state repression which followed the 1960 Sharpeville massacre produced a deep demoralization among non-European sectors of the working class. Like other capitalist economies during this decade, South Africa experienced a tremendous boom. The lack of independent trade unions gave the state the power to deal with the black labor force in any manner it chose. Western states considered South Africa to be not only an exceptionally good investment area, with the highest returns on capital investment in the world, but also a valuable bastion for the preservation of Western interests in an inherently unstable region.

The apparent order and stability of the apartheid system were shaken during the 1970s when black workers began to assert themselves in the face of deteriorating living conditions. Mass strikes in 1973 were followed by two general strikes in 1976. The intensified struggles of African workers in the 1970s attracted the renewed interest of the AFL-CIO.

Worried about the radicalization of southern Africa due to the racist policies of the white regimes, Brown warned Congress in 1973: "Unless we of the 'free world' can condemn and fight African apartheid, there is real danger that liberal and noncommunist forces will be unable to cope in the future with the situation through lack of support and may be superseded completely by the totalitarian forces of both sides."

Since the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO from the ICFTU in 1969 because of the latter's insufficient anticommunist fervor, the United States has pursued its own independent strategy in regard to South African trade unionism. The AALC has generally opposed South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations as well as international boycotts and campaigns for the withdrawal of foreign investment.

At the 19th Annual Conference of the Trade Union Council of South Africa in 1973, Brown declared that "large funds" from the AFL-CIO would be forthcoming if proper trade unions for blacks were to be allowed.

The AALC claims to have "been a constant and vocal critic of the whole concept of the repressive and inhuman apartheid system."⁹ However, in 1976, the AFL-CIO refused to take part in the international boycott against South Africa called by the ICFTU on the grounds that similar actions were not planned against the Communist bloc.

At the same time, Jerry Funk testified before the U.S. Senate—much to the delight of South African government propagandists—that the AFL-CIO "recognizes that . . . a total economic boycott may hurt first and most lastingly the very people you want to help, the black, colored, and Asian workers."¹⁰

By late 1977, however, the AFL-CIO was forced to take notice of the gathering political storms in southern Africa. Its convention urged President Carter to put "intense pressure" on South Africa and Rhodesia to end apartheid. At an AFL-CIO executive meeting in February 1978, George Meany described South Africa as a "destabilizing force" because its oppressive policies were encouraging Soviet-Cuban penetration in Africa. The Executive called on American corporations in South Africa to recognize all "bona fide" trade unions and even urged U.S. sanctions if milder action failed to achieve sufficient reforms.

Yet the AALC continues to work against any radicalization of black trade unionism. In October 1978, it convened a meeting in Botswana in order to give moderate South African unions an international forum. Despite the opposition of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, African delegates from pro-Western states like Kenya, Liberia, Zaire, Togo, Lesotho, and Botswana attended. The meeting resulted in a big split in pan-African trade unionism, largely because of AALC's resistance to any recognition of SACTU.

In a similar way, the U.S. government has stepped up its activities in the South African labor field. In a "confidential" Telex message sent by the U.S. Embassy in Cape Town in February 1976, to various U.S. missions in Africa, it was stated: "In South Africa, [U.S.] Embassy would give first priority to the labor field," in terms of training black South Africans. At least sixteen South African unionists have visited the United States in the last five years, as guests of the State Department. They tend to be drawn from the ranks of the most moderate black trade unionists and TUCSA.

The U.S. labor attaché at the Consulate General in Johannesburg has a key role to play in the overall strategy. According to a State Department admission given in Senate hearings in 1976, "It is important that the Labor Officer expand his contact with unregistered black unions . . . and various groups involved in upgrading the skills of black workers . . . and keep in close contact with the white-controlled labor organizations in order to encourage liberal elements."¹¹

At least one labor attaché who has served in Johannesburg has been named as a CIA agent. He is Ed McHale, who was labor attaché in Johannesburg in 1972. He was unmasked during the CIA scandal in Australia in 1977.¹²

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When disaffected unions associated with TUCSA and unregistered unions were considering the organization of a new black trade-union federation, they arranged their first meeting at the U.S. Information Service's library in Johannesburg. Much to the dismay of certain delegates, they were confronted with a film and a lecture by a State Department official on American unionism.

The United States is searching for a "middle force" in its South African strategy to contain revolution while liberalizing the apartheid system. As the crisis deepens, the position of the large African working class will be crucial in determining the outcome of the contending political forces in South African society. Western governments, in particular that of the United States, are clearly aware that the formation of a moderate pro-Western union movement will be essential in preserving the substantial Western stake in South Africa.

Notes

1. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by Victor Marchetti and John Marks. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1974, p. 99.
2. *African Trade Unions* by Ioan Davies. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966, p. 201.
3. See above, "The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer," by Schechter, Ansara, and Kolodney.
4. See *In Search of Enemies* by John Stockwell (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), p. 201, for a clear admission of the deep role played by the CIA's Accra station in the military coup that deposed Nkrumah.
5. For an elaboration of AIFLD's operations in Latin America, see *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary* by Philip Agee. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.
6. *Inside the Company*, p. 603.
7. *Where Were You Brother? An Account of Trade Union Imperialism* by Don Thomson and Rodney Larson. London: War on Want, 1978, p. 61.
8. *People's News Service* (London), September 19, 1978.
9. *AALC Reporter*, March 1977.
10. *South Africa Digest*, November 12, 1976.
11. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Second Session, 1976, p. 762.
12. *The CIA's Australian Connection* by Denis Freney, Sydney, Australia, 1977.

Academics: an Overview

by Ken Lawrence

The three articles that follow survey the various connections between the intelligence agencies and the sector of the U.S. academic community concerned with studying Africa. The story they tell is just the tip of the iceberg, however, since it is safe to assume that only a small percentage of CIA academics are ever exposed while the great majority remain secret.

The pioneering work in revealing these relationships was done in 1969 and 1970 by Africa Research Group; their publication, *African Studies in America—The Extended Family—A Tribal Analysis of U.S. Africanists: Who They Are; Why to Fight Them*, is still the best introduction to the subject. One brief section of that pamphlet places the discussion in its proper perspective:

It should not be surprising that it was the CIA which played the crucial role in stimulating interest in African affairs in the United States. In the late fifties, the political handwriting on the Africa wall was quite visible to Washington's super sleuths even if the State Department seemed blinded by its racist loyalty to its British and French allies. In 1954, it was the CIA that put the African-American Institute on a solid financial footing, in close cooperation with the American Metal Climax Corporation, the African mining concern whose Chairman became the AAI's big angel. In that year, when Boston University launched its own African Studies program, William O. Brown left the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence to head it up. As the nation's chief *central in-*

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telligence agency, the CIA understood that generating information and contacts in Africa was a priority if the U.S. was to be assured access to the Continent's "emerging" political leaders and economic resources.

In late 1956, Max Millikan, the economist who took a leave of absence from M.I.T. to become a deputy director of the CIA, and then returned to direct that university's CIA-subsidized Center for International Affairs, invited a former State Department employee Arnold Rivkin to develop and direct an African Research Program at M.I.T. Rivkin worked out a "suitable research" design with fellow professor, Walt Rostow, an intelligence officer and close advisor to Lyndon Baines Johnson, now in exile with that war criminal in Texas. Rivkin's assignment was to forge policy proposals within the context of a broader "free world" framework. Standard procedure at the M.I.T. center at that time was the practice of publishing books in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the other "sanitized" for public consumption.

While the CIA was "inspiring" university African Affairs programs, it was also getting its own African Intelligence division organized. In August, 1958, the Committee of Africanists selected by the Ford Foundation to "survey the present condition and future prospects of African Studies," had a rare direct interview with the CIA to assess its need for personnel. According to their report, the Agency said it would need "a constant staff level of something like 70 people specializing in the African area; they particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or political science. They are, however, prepared to train a man if they can get a person whom they feel is suitable for their type of work." Their type of work, indeed! The CIA still recruits for new personnel on the campuses. The State Department, interestingly, only projected a need for fifty officers over the next 10 years. By 1961, according to State Department Advisor Vernon McKay, "the professional staff of the Africa office declined from twenty-three to fifteen *when certain long range research activities* were transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency" (*Africa in World Politics*, p. 296).

The CIA continues to shape and monitor all government sponsored research on Africa through its participation in the Foreign Area Coordination Group and its close links with the State Department Intelligence Agency.* It has access to all other academic output through the willing cooperation of many scholars—who register

*The correct name of this State Department division is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Eds.).

their work with the State Department—or through close and overlapping ties with such agencies as the Ford Foundation and its academic front committees. As well, many individual scholars have ties with the CIA or its front groups. L. Gray Cowan, for example, the 1969–1970 President of the African Studies Association, was known to have liaisons with one Willard Mathias, a high-level CIA functionary. Mathias was a visiting fellow in 1958–1959 at Harvard's Center of International Affairs. His topic of study: Africa, of course. Cowan has also been a long time member of the African-American Institute's Board of Directors. And on and on.

The close ties between the CIA and so many African Studies programs suggests more than the insidiousness of the former or the submissiveness of the latter. What emerges is more of a symbiotic relationship; a game in which the players wear different uniforms but play by the same rules. *Look* editor William Attwood, the one time ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, inadvertently offered some clues about the CIA's attractiveness to many scholars in his memoirs, *The Reds and Blacks*. On his return to the U.S., Attwood recalls, "I put in long hours answering questions for roomfuls of people at CIA (pipes, casual sports jackets, and yellow pads) and State (cigarettes, dark suits and white notebooks)." Academics prefer those pipes and yellow pads every time.

The interview with Kemba Maish that follows gives a rare glimpse of one CIA approach. Actually, this one seems to have been relatively cautious and restrained; at other times the agency has been more heavy-handed and persistent. René Lemarchand, professor of political science at the University of Florida and author of an article in this book, described his experience in a recent letter:

As a result of my interest in Burundi politics I became a subject of interest for the CIA in 1965. This was at a time when the ruling coalition in Burundi was widely suspected of pro-Communist sympathies, and when the deepening rift between Hutu and Tutsi had taken on the quality of a trial of strength between East and West. In the fall of 1965, shortly after my return from Burundi, I was contacted by the head of the CIA operations in Miami, Mr. Justin Gleischauf, and was asked by my chairman, Mr. Manning Dauer, to display maximum cooperation in answering Mr. Gleischauf's questions. This, by the way, at a time when I had not yet been given tenure.

I was asked "in the interest of the U.S." to be as informative as possible on the circumstances of Chinese penetration in Burundi, and who were the personalities that

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might reasonably be described as "pro-Chinese." This I refused to do. The alternative was to provide Mr. Gleischauf with a broad historical "digest" of the political evolution of Burundi, but this was evidently of no interest to him, clearly beyond his patience. I was again contacted by Gleischauf in 1966 and for much the same purpose. Again I declined the invitation to furnish him with names of pro-Communist figures. This was the last time I saw Mr. Gleischauf.

Above and beyond what the incident tells us about the CIA's *modus operandi*, it also raises a question of ethics among scholars. I find particularly objectionable the conduct of Manning Dauer, who thought it appropriate to use his influence and prerogatives as Chairman to apply undue pressure on me to see to it that I would act in the most "cooperative" fashion. Even more objectionable is the attitude of those academics who feel that it is in their interest as well as in the interest of the United States to proffer confidential information to CIA agents. The University of Florida has been notorious for the willingness of its academics (primarily historians and geographers) to cooperate with the agency. There is indeed more than a touch of irony in Dauer's statement to the *Alligator* (March 9, 1977) that "universities should not lend themselves as cover for CIA activities and research—it would be contrary to what we stand for." The same statement from the same person would have been inconceivable in 1965.

Only recently did Lemarchand learn that his expulsion from a teaching assistant position at Lovanium University near Leopoldville [now Kinshasa] in 1960 was probably prompted by priests working hand in glove with U.S. intelligence agencies. Using the Freedom of Information Act, he obtained his files from the FBI, CIA, and State Department. Among the documents was a letter written by a Zairian priest, Bonifaas Leyka, to Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, describing Lemarchand's supposed "communist and revolutionary activities" in Zaire. Lemarchand writes, "It seems fairly clear in the light of the evidence I was able to get that the Catholic Church did act in the closest and most cooperative manner with CIA agents in the Congo."

Another who refused to work for the CIA was George Rawick, professor of sociology at Oakland (Michigan) University when he was approached in 1968. But the man who tried to recruit him, the late James R. Hooker of Michigan State University's African Studies Center, was probably one of the CIA's most effective academic agents. Hooker was highly regarded by liberals and leftists, spoke out against the Vietnam War and brought Eugene McCarthy to MSU, and was personally close to leaders of liberation movements and heads of state in Africa and the Caribbean. He

had willingly furnished Rawick an article for publication in a special issue of *Radical America* (July-August 1968) on Black liberation; his book, *Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism* (Praeger, 1967), was well received.

According to Naomi Ware, his widow, Hooker was recruited to the CIA during his first teaching assignment to Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, in the late fifties. He spent a year in Washington, D.C., where he was trained by the CIA, then went to London for his doctoral research. After that he was off to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, paid by one of the CIA's foundations. (Ware didn't recall which foundation; she said Hooker had been surprised that even after its CIA connection was exposed in the *New York Times*, none of his colleagues put two and two together and identified him.)

"It was strictly to evaluate the status of political parties and who seemed to have support and following. He was debriefed on, 'Do you think this guy—whoever it was, maybe Kenyatta, or Banda, or whoever—do you think this is a really decent sort of guy?' The job was to follow up his knowledge of those African leaders who had been bustling around in London, and make an on-the-spot evaluation of their constituencies." He was also involved with Southern African trade unions, so in 1963, when the CIA wanted information on unions in the West Indies, Hooker got the call. The American Petroleum Institute provided the cover this time, according to Naomi Ware.

Hooker told his wife that he had quit the CIA before he met her in 1969, but a number of his colleagues doubt that. At the time of his death in May 1976, Hooker was in close contact with a black South African trained in police administration at Michigan State, whom two of Hooker's colleagues described as a security officer for Holden Roberto's FNLA in Angola. He used various names: to some he was Machema Machema, to others Nga Ndibongo. Hooker told one professor that Machema was "between the CIA and the military."

When he died, Hooker possessed Machema/Ndibongo's field notes on Angola; the beginning of a letter in his typewriter read, "Dear Nga." Those documents were returned by Naomi Ware (by that time separated from Hooker); they "would have done nothing but damage a lot of people, probably." Professor William Derman recalls that Hooker viewed FNLA and UNITA as Angola's salvation and publicly supported them; Naomi Ware confirmed that her husband gave money to FNLA.

James Hooker was recruited to the CIA as a liberal. He abhorred the witch hunts of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee. Ware says the CIA recruiter's argument went like this: "None of us are ever going to get an intelligent approach unless we get you trained, intelligent people in there to tell us what's going on. If we rely on those yahoos, look what we're going to get." Apparently this pitch continued to be effective among academics long after the McCarthy era.

Jay Mullen went to work for the CIA in 1971 as a scholar specializing in East Africa. "At the outset, I was worried that my interviewers might be crypto-fascists who would turn thumbs down on my job application because they considered my Vietnam attitudes or my ACLU membership to be unpatriotic, but most of them expressed attitudes that reflected my own." After his CIA past was exposed, Mullen joked about his career in a two-part article (censored at the CIA's request) in *Oregon* magazine (May and June 1979), "I Was Idi Amin's Basketball Czar." As a lecturer in history at Makerere University in Uganda, his tasks were to cozy up to Amin and to cause trouble for the Russians and Chinese there.

Most of Professor Mullen's account describes the foolishness associated with espionage, but even so, it is sometimes revealing: "During my own tenure in the country the greatest source of information was the station's liaison with the 'local service,' a euphemism for Uganda's secret police. The CIA provided the government of Uganda with training-advisory assistance in exchange for the opportunity to tap the telephones of the country's resident Russians and Chinese." He doesn't say whether any of this troubled his civil libertarian conscience. After Idi Amin broke off relations with the CIA, he bribed a well-connected Ugandan to plant wiretaps and bugs.

Although Mullen says his station chief scotched a proposal from a high-level CIA official to murder Amin in 1973, he shows that the purpose of the spying was to be able to cause trouble, even though "Ugandans were a low, low priority on our list of targets." "Never one to be unprepared, the Chief was always developing contingencies. Could we get a layout of the armor regiment's base? Where were their radios located? The officers' mess? Where were the tanks?" Even the discovery that a Soviet agent carried a pistol led immediately to plotting dangerous mischief: "The Chief was not interested in Dmitri's motives as much as the operational possibilities. 'The next time he goes to Nairobi maybe we'll have an African ram his car.' It might be possible to expose his illegal weapon. . . . There would be the potential for an embarrassing diplomatic incident."

Today Africans are primary targets of the U.S. intelligence agencies. It is likely, had Kemba Maish been swayed by the CIA recruiter, her assignments would have been much more insidious than those given to James Hooker and Jay Mullen.

CIA Recruitment for Africa: The Case of Howard University

from CovertAction
Information Bulletin

Kemba Maish, 33, is a professor of psychology at Howard University in Washington, D.C., the preeminent black university in the United States. She teaches clinical and community psychology. She is a member of the Association of Black Psychologists, and has been very active in black organizations since the 60s. Her doctoral dissertation was on Black Power and Pan-Africanism.

Imagine her surprise, then, some months ago, when she returned a phone message she had received at Howard and heard the operator answer, "Personnel, CIA."

This was the beginning of uncovering a pervasive and sinister CIA recruitment program for Africa, aimed at black professionals at Howard and elsewhere. Kemba Maish debated whether to say anything to anyone; simply being contacted by the CIA can raise questions with friends and colleagues. But she realized that not speaking out would be falling into the CIA's trap. It was more important that the community be aware of what the CIA was doing. She taped an interview with WHUR, the Howard University radio station. The night her interview was to air, between the 5:15 news summary and 6:00 news program, the tape of the interview disappeared.

The *CovertAction Information Bulletin* contacted Ms. Maish, and she agreed to tell, once more, her story— alerting black students, teachers and

[This interview, with the introduction that precedes it, appeared in the April-May 1979 issue of *CovertAction Information Bulletin*.]

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professionals to this menace threatening the black community in America and, ultimately, African people wherever they are in the world. The interview was conducted recently by the Washington staff of the *Bulletin*. The text follows:

CAIB: Tell us what happened, how you first had contact with the CIA, and when you realized what was happening.

KM: Approximately April of last year—I had been at Howard almost a semester at that time—I received a call from someone named Roy Savoy. I was out at the time and he had left several messages.

CAIB: Did you know the name, or who he was?

KM: I had never heard of him. Naturally, I tried to get back to him. The first time I called, the person who answered said, "Personnel, CIA." I was very curious as to why Personnel, CIA, was trying to get in touch with me. When I finally talked with him, of course I was still upset, but I decided to sit back and relax and hear what he had to say. I wanted to hear his whole program. He said that he was black, which was very clear from our conversation, and that he was the director of some section of the CIA which was recruiting black people, specifically black psychologists, to go to Africa and develop profiles on foreign nationals. I asked him what he meant by foreign nationals, did he mean develop profiles on African people. He said no, that I would just be developing profiles on communists that were in Africa so I wouldn't have to worry about spying on my own people. He went on to talk about paying me a fantastic salary, paying my way to Africa, all kinds of very enticing programs.

CAIB: Did he talk about under what guise you would do this, what you would say you were doing, your cover?

KM: No, not at that point.

CAIB: Did he mention sums when he talked about money?

KM: No, he really didn't, but he implied that it was much more than I would be getting at Howard. That would be something we could negotiate, the salary. Then he went on to tell me how he got my name, without my asking. I was wondering, but I was going to wait. He said he had gotten my name from the University of Maryland, that first he had gone to the director of one of the black programs at Maryland.

CAIB: Did you know who that was?

KM: Yes, somebody who was outspoken on the Maryland campus and generally concerned about black people.

CAIB: Did Savoy say that he had obtained your name from him?

KM: No, this was just the first step. He got the names of professors in the psychology department from that director.

CAIB: Could you tell from the way that Savoy explained it whether the director knew that he was giving names of professors to the CIA?

KM: Yes, I got the impression that he knew. Savoy told me that he had received the names of professors from him, but that Oscar Barbarin in the psychology department gave him my name.

CAIB: Had he been a professor of yours?

KM: Yes, I had worked with him very closely; he was on my thesis and dissertation committees. Both my Master's thesis and my dissertation involved looking at the relationship between political activism, political orientation, and positive mental health in black people. Barbarin had worked with me for two or three years, so he knew my interest in issues related to the liberation struggles of all African people.

CAIB: So Barbarin knew that you were not a conservative?

KM: Oh yes, he knew everything about me and my political activities. After Savoy told me that Barbarin had given him my name, I was still sitting back, not saying anything. When he finally finished, I told him he was a traitor to the African people. I went through the whole thing, about the connection between the FBI and the CIA, about what the FBI had done with the Black Panthers, Fred Hampton, Mark Clark; and Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, within this country. Then I mentioned how in Africa the CIA had organized a *coup* against Kwame Nkrumah, and had actually murdered Patrice Lumumba. I went on down the line. I said, how could you possibly do this? Then he said he was sorry he'd called me if he had upset me. I said I was glad he had called, I was glad that I had the opportunity to say what I wanted to say to him, and he just said he was sorry, that he wouldn't bother me again.

After the call, I started to be concerned about being contacted. I began to wonder why, with my background, the CIA would contact me. In a way I was personally incensed, how dare they? I tried to figure out what it was. Either they hadn't done their homework, which I doubt very seriously, or they thought that if they could get me, a black psychologist who knows African history, African politics, and who had been involved in political organizations for some time, they would have a perfect person.

I had been assuming they would think I couldn't be bought, but why should they think that? They've obviously bought other people, this was just one more person. Obviously I wanted to go to Africa; maybe they could make me think I was doing some service to the African people. So after I thought about it, it began to make a little sense. I thought they would think, well, even if she says no, she wouldn't go public because of all the paranoia. But my feeling was that it is better to be in the open about it. I felt I had to let African people know what is happening, so that they can protect themselves. That is more important than personal considerations.

That was when I arranged for the interview with WHUR. I figured if they were beginning to seek out black professionals in the psychology department, if they were already getting names, this was a very destructive sequence of events. I didn't know where it would stop. So I talked to the people at WHUR, and did an interview with them, several weeks after it happened, explaining what had happened and what implications it had for the black community, because Howard is the foremost black institution in the U.S. The fact that they are recruiting and using Howard as a training

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ground was extremely important for black people to know, to be aware of. The interview was taped, and a small part of it was played on the 5:15 news summary, a summary of what is coming later. Then, about 45 minutes later, at the time for the regular airing, the tape was mysteriously missing. As far as I know, WHUR never found out what happened to the tape.

CAIB: What did you do then?

KM: I decided to go back to Maryland to talk to both people who were involved in giving names. I did just that. I went back and talked first with the director. I asked him how he could give out names to the CIA, and first he said, well, he didn't give out my name. I told him that it did not matter, that he was still acting as a CIA agent whether he realized it or not. He became quite angry that I had come to him because he hadn't given anyone my name. He said that they come to him for all sorts of information. I should add here that Roy Savoy was a student at the University of Maryland. He had just graduated in the last year or so, and he came to the director as an ex-student now working for the CIA and interested in having some names of people to do whatever. Perhaps that made it a little more palatable to him.

CAIB: How did he justify this with his political beliefs?

KM: I asked him that. I said, with all that you've done, how could you give names to the CIA? You know what the CIA has done to our people. He repeated that he didn't give the names of any students. He was really upset, and at first I don't think he realized the implications of what he had done. He asked if I was questioning his commitment, and I said that I was; it wasn't the words that mattered, it was the actions.

His rationale for what he had done was that they could have gotten the names anyway, so he didn't feel that he was giving away anything they couldn't find out themselves. I explained that by giving them certain names from the Department he was giving them information, he was telling them which professors would be the most likely to have information about black students. He saved them from having to go through the Department Chair, who might not have had the knowledge of the black students and professors that the director of a black program did.

We eventually talked for a long while, and finally he said he had learned a lot from our discussion and would never do that again. He just hadn't realized the implications of what he was doing. He is a serious person, and I never thought he would do what he had done purposely. So he was another of those unwitting agents.

Then I went to see Oscar Barbarin, who had actually given my name. Barbarin at that time had been at the University of Maryland about three years. We are both members of the Association of Black Psychologists. I've known him since about 1973, and he knows my political persuasion and the many activities I've been involved in.

CAIB: Had he been supportive of it?

KM: Certainly. He was concerned about black people, and I don't think he would ever consciously do anything against black people. I went to see him, and I was furious. He knew what it was about; he was physically upset; he knew why I was there. I don't know whether the director had called him, or he just knew that in a matter of time I'd be there. I asked him how he could do it, how he could give the CIA my name? He said that a number of government agencies come to him for names and information; he saw the CIA as just another government agency. I was shocked that he would even say that. I told him that he was supposed to be politically aware, that he had to know what the CIA has been doing, not only in Africa but also around the world. And he said he never stopped to think about it. He said that after he gave them my name he realized maybe he shouldn't have done it but then it was too late.

CAIB: Did he say what they asked him for, what sort of criteria they had when they were asking for names?

KM: He said that they were looking for black people who wanted to go to work in Africa. Barbarin knew that I knew a lot about African history, African politics, as well as having been politically active. He said he didn't think I would be interested but I might give them the names of people who would be interested. I told him that was even worse. Not only was he acting as an agent for the CIA, but he was assuming that I would also act as one. I told him that he had no idea what he was doing, that he could get me killed, just by having my name on a list. He said he was really sorry, and he didn't realize the implications of what he had done, and he was very upset that I would call him a CIA agent. But I told him that was the role he was playing, whether he realized it or not. That's the key point to me; a lot of people don't realize what they are doing and they are getting a lot of other people involved in something they have no idea about. Or they are closing their eyes to it; they don't want to face the fact that if they turn down the CIA, they might jeopardize some funding or grants. Perhaps they want to cooperate so it won't interfere with the development of their careers.

Right after this, I called the Association of Black Psychologists, and I told them the CIA is recruiting black psychologists to go to Africa. Savoy had already contacted them and they knew his name. We discussed how dangerous it was for African people all over the world. The CIA knows that wherever African people are, we could fit in—in Africa, the Caribbean, South America—all they have to do is train us, teach us the language, teach us the particular customs, and we'll fit right in. They've already used black people from this country to infiltrate liberation movements and progressive groups both in Africa and in the Caribbean, basically using one group of African people against another.

We started to talk about the conference in St. Louis we had coming up in August. They told me that Roy Savoy had already inquired about the conference which was to take place, and wanted to set up a booth. I asked them to call the people in St. Louis and alert them.

When I went to St. Louis, I found out that Roy Savoy was there, had his name tag on, had set up a room, and was already recruiting. The communications were really bad, and somehow he got in through the St. Louis people.

I managed to get the executive committee to allow me a few minutes to explain my experience with Roy Savoy, and to point out that he was already at their convention. A lot of them were shocked. He had registered openly as CIA, and I tried to explain the implications of this to them as an organization. They proceeded to get rid of him then, but by that time he had already contacted a number of students and professionals. I began to speak with people there and realized that a number of professionals around the country had been contacted. Not only professors at Maryland, but also professors at Howard, and elsewhere, had given names.

What I'm saying is that it is not just me as an individual; many students and professionals are being contacted. Just the other day a student at Howard told me he'd been contacted by the CIA, and he was angry too.

CAIB: It sounds from all the evidence that they are doing blanket recruiting, that they will contact a large number of people, and be turned down by so many percent, and so many percent will agree. If you said no, well, you were just one. What they didn't count on is your going public, and we should talk a bit about that, about why you feel it is important to go public.

KM: I guess it's most important for African people to understand the implications of all this—what these people have done in the past, who they are, what their connections are. The major corporations are tied up with the police and the intelligence network, as well as the military. And a lot of people look at the spy programs on TV and think there's nothing wrong with being a spy, all these people have exciting lives and are doing a service to their country. People must understand that they are not doing a service to us in America, they're doing a service to the large corporations and to the American government, and to maintain profits—but in terms of our lives, all the FBI and CIA have done for us as a people is to kill us and our leaders and to destroy our organizations, not only here but around the world. They're doing it through our institutions, through our black organizations—they're recruiting us and we think we're doing a service to our people when actually we're helping to destroy our people.

It's important that people understand this and begin to work against it, to expose it every time it happens. I know of about ten people at Howard and other places who had been contacted, and not one of them had said a word. Yet, when I spoke up, they began to say, you know, they contacted me too. But they just kept it to themselves and were angry about it. You have to expose this, to let people know you've been contacted, and it's much easier to do that once we all do it. Then there isn't as much paranoia and suspicion, and we have each other's support against retaliation.

CAIB: What kind of rap were these students given?

KM: Basically the same kind of thing, that they would be helping the

African people and they would be working against communism. That's been played up so much both in Africa and here that a lot of people think they would be doing a service. Also a lot of black psychologists have gone to Africa, and lots more want to go. There is a big push toward African psychology, and if you want to know anything about it, well you have to go to Africa, and this is a way to go to Africa. Sometimes they do this very indirectly, and people don't know under whose auspices they're going. They're just getting the money to go.

I should mention that all of this applies to foreign students too. The CIA has a program where they recruit "nationals"—people born in a particular country—to go back to that country as a CIA agent. We should talk about the dangers here. These students need to be alerted, need to understand whose agents they are if they work with the CIA. They will not be working in the interests of their people, but working against them.

CAIB: How would you sum this all up for our readers?

KM: I want to make the point of how organized this recruiting effort really is, and how dangerous it can be, not just to African people, but also to all people of the "Third World." At this point in time, in the "Third World" in general, and the African countries (Africa and the Caribbean) in particular, the masses of people are rising up against the old order characterized by centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The CIA has had a long history of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. By putting down just rebellions of the people, destabilizing governments, destroying organizations, planning and financing *coups*, and murdering leaders, the CIA has attempted to change the course of history in places like the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Cuba, Chile, Iran, the Congo, Ghana and Angola, just to name a few.

In the African world they have found it much easier to infiltrate by using black agents rather than white. In fact, it was black CIA agents, born in America, who were instrumental in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 and in the invasion of Guinea in 1970.

This use of black against black is also reflected in the position Andy Young occupies as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In that capacity he travels throughout the African world, seeking to make American imperialist policy more digestible simply because it comes in black hands rather than white. African leaders aware of this ploy have told him it won't work. The revolution of the African world is not the civil rights struggle of the 60s. The people will not be placated, they will not be bought off.

This new consciousness not only informs the people of past transgressions but also brings with it new vigilance which alerts them to potential CIA agents. Based on the recent overthrow of the U.S.-supported oppressive and exploitative government of Eric Gairy in Grenada, one might expect the CIA to attempt to overthrow or intervene in the affairs of the New Revolutionary Government of Grenada. But the people are organized

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against such interference. The CIA reign around the world is coming to an end.

We must not become the enemies of our people. We must organize against all CIA activity. We must fight the CIA.

guarantees for the existence of all ethnic groups are the necessary condition for the peaceful solution of this racial conflict, whether in a divided South Africa or in a federation of its own.

And to be sure that he is fully understood, Lagorce adds:

The EEC would be well advised to treat the South African question in the same way as the Israel-Palestine problem.

These are the main aspects of this alarming document. Adopted unanimously by the commission, this document was greatly criticized when it was presented before the European Parliament. The report was sent back to the commission on March 15, and some of its worst passages, such as the rejection of universal suffrage and the comparison with Israel, have been eliminated.

But the general spirit of the report is still the same. It does not mention at all the liberation struggle of the South African people and does not try in any way to contribute to the elimination of this racist minority regime whose policies and practices are considered criminal by contemporary international law.

It ignores totally the aggressive attitude of the apartheid regime toward its own people and against the neighboring people struggling for their liberation in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, a country South Africa continues to occupy illegally.

The report does not mention the intensification of the armed attacks that the apartheid regime is waging against independent neighboring states and does not draw attention to the nuclear threat that the apartheid regime poses in southern Africa.

In its final version, the report even suggests a long-term strategy for the whole of Africa in which Europe would be invited "to participate actively in the internal pacification of Africa."

Such is the main content of this extremely dangerous document for the future relations of Europe and a liberated southern Africa.

Notes

1. This article was written just prior to the admission of Greece to the Common Market. The Nine is now the Ten.

2. European Parliament (EP) Commission of Development and Cooperation, Draft report, December 11, 1978. Doc PE 54493/rev. See also EP, Doc 9 March 1979, EP 54493/def, and Doc EP 54493/def March 27, 1979.

The CIA and the Media: an Overview

by Cyrille Fall

An American congressional subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Edward Boland (Democrat, Massachusetts), is charged with investigating the role played by the CIA in manipulation of the news, especially that of Third World nations. It has just revealed some particularly interesting facts.

To observers of the spy scene, the clandestine activities of the CIA in the international press have never been a surprise: however, the revelations that emerged during the testimony of ambassadors, journalists, and retired diplomats have cast new light on developments in the Third World.

1. Numerous correspondents of the American press overseas were, during the period considered by the subcommittee, either paid agents of the CIA or instruments (conscious or unconscious) who furnished precise and often very useful information to the CIA station chiefs in various Third World capitals.

For this reason, in spite of the formal denials they have issued, several American newspapers and press agencies, including the prestigious *New York Times*, have been accused of having had on their staffs agents of the subversion headquarters. Cyrus Sulzberger, the famous columnist of the *New York Times*, was said to have published, under his own name, an article entirely drafted by the CIA. In his answer, Mr. Sulzberger claimed that it was normal for an American journalist working abroad to maintain regular contacts with agents of the Agency.

2. Several newspapers and press agencies having correspondents abroad were financed or entirely controlled by the CIA. Some among them were the direct property of the American intelligence agency. The number of newspapers, magazines, press agencies, radio stations, and other news media entirely or partially financed by the Agency is estimated at more than 200.

[This article first appeared in the February 20, 1978, issue of *Afrique-Asie*, in Paris.]

Dozens of them, set up abroad, were not financed by the CIA but rather were "infiltrated" by its salaried agents:

3. Nearly a dozen publishing houses, among which figure certain prestigious names, have published more than 250 works fabricated entirely by the CIA. These books were distributed afterward on the African, Arabic, Asiatic, and South American markets, thanks to publicity advertisements in the Third World press, or directed toward the Third World.

4. Certain American journalists worked for other American-government organs that depended on the Pentagon establishment.

5. During the last thirty years, a dozen high functionaries of the CIA have worked as foreign reporters of several American newspapers and press agencies, often with the agreement of the press managers.

Fabricated News

6. An official of the CIA admitted that his office often had access to salaried agents who worked in the foreign bureaus of the Associated Press or United Press International. The CIA furnished them with entirely fabricated "news" that they managed to insert into the wire services' transmissions. According to the Associated Press, these writings reached half the world's population! Of course, AP and UPI have formally denied these accusations.

7. The effort expended by the CIA to manipulate the news and mold public opinion have often succeeded in fooling not only the chancelleries but also the American diplomats themselves. At that point, a system was installed in all the American embassies to put them on guard against "black propaganda," that is, the propaganda manufactured by the CIA, generally through the intermediary of foreign newspapers or magazines financed by the Agency. Interrogated publicly by the congressional subcommittee about whether the CIA gave instructions to its journalist-agents on what they should write, former CIA director William Colby answered without hesitation, according to the *New York Times* of January 2, "Oh, certainly. We do it all the time."

Colby confirmed that the CIA utilized both American journalists and "locals." In several cases, press clubs that are found just about everywhere in the world were used as meeting places to gather and transmit the information. The past directors of the press clubs in Mexico and Manila, for example, were CIA agents.

8. Three former American ambassadors who represented the U.S. in Africa, William Porter, Dean Brown, and William Truehart, admitted in their testimony having been advised by the CIA of the news fabricated by it for the local press. "I do not believe," said William Porter, however, "that this sort of 'black propaganda' has been effective very often. It was rapidly detected by the governments and by certain journalists. Remember that Mao died six times before he really did." Ambassador Brown ad-

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mitted that he had placed the American journalists in Africa and the Arab world on guard against certain news that originated in the CIA psychological-warfare apparatus. "Often," he said nevertheless, "the European press reprinted the news and we could do nothing to warn its directors about it."

In closing, let us underline that the testimony gathered by the subcommittee seems to confirm that several Western, African, Arab, Asiatic, and South American newspapers were either the exclusive property of the CIA or for the most part financed by its antennae. The methods and the sources of financing varied, certainly. But the objective of their utilization, to disseminate "black propaganda," remains unchanged.

As for the new CIA director, Admiral Turner, he has maintained all during the subcommittee debates the necessity of recruiting and utilizing foreign journalists, even while pointing out that he was committed to put an end to that practice—in regard to American journalists and press people only.

Media Manipulation in Angola

by John Stockwell

The propaganda of the Angola civil war was to be as important as the fighting. For that effort, Bubba Sanders was chosen, a senior GS 15, a short, cherubic, and energetic officer whose mission in life was to apply his irrepressible mind toward the harassment of the Soviets throughout Africa. Unfortunately, Bubba, while a fountain of schemes and plots, was not blessed with infallible judgment. His presence on the task force would be a mixed blessing, I thought, remembering a mailing other CIA propagandists had made to Burundi while I was there in 1970.

As COS, I had had approval of that operation, and I gave it, when I received the proposal from headquarters for a propaganda mailing designed to embarrass the Soviets. I assumed the mailing would be subtle and that I would see the suggested format before anything was posted. But neither I nor any other knowledgeable operations officer saw anything until posters began appearing in people's mail boxes in the capital, Bujumbura. They were about twelve by eighteen inches, printed in stark black and red, portraying a sharp military boot heel crushing hundreds of small figures. Across the top in bold French was printed, "A BAS MICOMBERO DICTATEUR!"—Down with Micombero, Dictator! Written across the bottom, as sponsor of the poster, was the cachet of a world youth congress, well known to be supported by the Soviets. The mailing worked so well that the Soviet ambassador was subsequently asked not to return from home leave in the Soviet Union.

But there was a large hitch. The propagandists had correctly sensed that Micombero ran a bitterly unpopular minority government. What they had

[John Stockwell resigned publicly from the CIA after twelve years, the last few as Chief of the Angola Task Force. This article is taken from *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*, published 1978 by W. W. Norton & Company.]

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missed, or chosen to ignore, was that the schism between Micombero and the masses was purely racial. Micombero and his government were elite Watutsi, sensitive to the threat of the suppressed Hutu masses and terrified at the possibility of a Hutu uprising. The Watutsi could only interpret the poster as encouragement for Hutu activists, who were known to be seeking support for a revolution. Periodically the Watutsi were accustomed to take preemptive measures by killing a lot of Hutus. And, lo, two years later, in 1972, in a paroxysm of genocide that ranked with modern history's most brutal, the Watutsi did kill dozens of thousands of Hutus, while the United States and the rest of the world turned its back. How much of a role our ill-advised mailing played in the matter is open to conjecture.

Now three years after the massacre, I found Bubba in the Covert Action branch, already working hard on propaganda ploys to publicize the Soviet support of the MPLA in Angola. The Russians seemed to him delightfully vulnerable as they dumped arms into the civil war. He was scheduled to leave shortly for Rome, Kinshasa, and Lusaka where he would get the propaganda machine in gear.

"The key is a fourth force in Angola," he told me in his office in the Covert Action branch in "D" corridor. "We need to organize a fourth liberation front which can call for a coalition of all the forces, and denounce the Soviet arms shipments."

"Where will we get people for this front?"

"Angolan exiles—stranded students. There are some right here in the States. We'll call them the Angolan People's Front."

"Bubba, if you use Angolans who've been studying here in America, everyone will know it's *our* front. They won't be listened to by anyone but our friends."

"Well, we'll find some in Europe. They won't know the United States is involved. They'll think they are being funded by rich Portuguese refugees. We'll get Angolans who really believe in a peaceful solution, and they can operate maybe from Spain or Brazil. Can you get me the names of some Portuguese who would help?"

I promised to query the Lisbon station and the Portuguese Task Force.

"No matter," he said, "we can use Rodriguez or Jimmy Manus. They're sitting out in McLean with nothing to do. Also, there's Bryan Cassidy up in New York; he was outstanding when we were working on the Kurds in Iraq. And we'll have to get Ray Chiles from Rome . . . at least for a couple of months. He is beautiful at this sort of thing." Rodriguez, Manus, and Cassidy were writers who supplemented their incomes by doing part-time contract work for the CIA. Ray Chiles was a GS 14 staffer with experience in covert action projects.

"All for the fourth force?"

"No, no! We've got to get the FNLA talking to the press in Kinshasa, and UNITA working with the newspaper in Lusaka. We've got reporters in our pockets in both these places and Mobutu and Kaunda aren't likely

to complain when we plant articles in their newspapers. Then, we can take articles from those newspapers and have our agents in Europe pick them up and put them in the world press. We'll need officers in Kinshasa, Lusaka, London, Portugal, New York . . ."

He leaned back and smiled. "This is one PSYCH operation I'm going to enjoy! We'll call it IAPHOENIX. You know, the bird that keeps burning itself and rising up from the ashes—like the FNLA coming back from its defeats . . . IAPHOENIX, I like that!"

I stared at him in disbelief. PHOENIX had been the cryptonym for the agency's terrorist program in Vietnam. Even the agency claimed PHOENIX had killed over twenty thousand people; the Vietnamese government claimed twice as many. Colby himself had designed and managed this program, before he became director. During the spring of 1975 he had tried to explain it to Congress, and the press had worked it over.

Bubba seemed not to have heard of the PHOENIX program. He looked momentarily confused, then brightened. "Well, we'll call it IACADENCE," he said as I left.

Politically the war was complicated, with a strange conglomeration of bedfellows. The FNLA and UNITA were supported at one time by the United States, China, Rumania, North Korea, France, Israel, West Germany, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, and South Africa. The MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, Algeria, Guinea, and several Eastern European countries. Throughout the war there was a constant sorting out and dozens of countries eventually shifted their support to the MPLA. On October 24, the Chinese withdrew from the Angola war, their advisors packing and leaving, holding a press conference at Ndjili Airport as they left.

France was intrigued by the smell of Angolan oil and Zairian minerals, and predisposed to involvement in Angola by its long history of meddling in the affairs of young African countries.* Like the United States, France saw the Angolan war as a chance to ingratiate itself with Mobutu. In August French intelligence directors had met with the CIA's deputy director, Vernon Walters, and obtained his promise that the CIA would give them \$250,000 as proof of the United States' good faith in Angola. The money was delivered, although it was clear to no one, possibly not even to General Walters, why the United States had to prove its good faith in Angola to

*More than any European power France has remained active in the affairs of newly independent African countries. French army units have been garrisoned in Niger, contended with rebels in Chad, and been on call for crises in other areas. French diplomats and technical advisors have been correspondingly influential in the new governments, while the French intelligence service has maintained agents throughout and sent mercenary squads into various situations, the Comoro Islands, Cabinda, and elsewhere.

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the French. A liaison evolved in which the CIA briefed the French intelligence service in detail about its Angola program, while the French listened carefully but told the CIA nothing about their own activities in Angola and Cabinda. France did provide ENTAC antitank missiles, 120 mm. mortar rounds, and ammunition for Mobutu's Panhard armored cars, which it asked the CIA to haul from Istres, France, to Kinshasa. In December, France donated four missile-firing helicopters, which were delivered to Kinshasa by the CIA without pilots or ground crews.

Black African leaders watched the birthing of the new nation in their midst with sympathy and jealous interest. By 1975 they had learned painful lessons about the competition of West and East in Africa. Almost to a country they had been exploited in civil wars, coups, arms races, and competitive aid programs by the Soviet Union, United States, and various European, Asian, and Latin American countries. They had of course encouraged the Angolan liberation movements in their struggles against Portuguese colonialism, and when civil war erupted in July 1975, most had supported an embargo on the delivery of additional arms to the Angolan factions. Most were predisposed to resent outside interference in what they regarded as a purely African matter. The flagrant Soviet arms program was at first greeted with noisy indignation. All but the staunchest Soviet allies protested the Soviet interference in Angola. The new government of Nigeria expressed its concern. President Nyerere of Tanzania made public speeches criticizing the Soviet arms program. Idi Amin of Uganda castigated the Soviet Union and stormily threatened to sever relations. Egypt and the Sudan denied them overflight clearances for their arms flights to the MPLA.

The United States launched a major political effort to embroil and entrap as many countries as it could into opposition of the MPLA. Secret agents were sent to third world conferences, including the Non-Aligned Nations summit in Sri Lanka, and the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa. United States ambassadors throughout Africa were "brought onboard" in varying degrees, receiving carefully tailored messages which were formulated by the CIA and delivered to the State Department through the working group, ordering them to use whatever leverage they could manage with their host governments to prejudice them against the MPLA.

Savimbi caused the United States a minor embarrassment in September, when he sent feelers to the MPLA for a negotiated solution. The CIA learned of this move through an article in the world press, and a Kinshasa station officer promptly interrogated Savimbi. We wanted no "soft" allies in our war against the MPLA. Similarly, on October 22, when an MPLA delegation arrived in Washington to plead the MPLA's potential friendliness towards the United States, it was received by a low-level State Department officer who reported perfunctorily to the working group.

President Kaunda was a potential problem. While he sympathized with

Savimbi, he was primarily concerned with getting his copper to the sea, and with the Benguela railroad closed his only alternative was the expensive and humiliating route through Rhodesia and South Africa. On September 10 he gave Savimbi sixty days, until Angolan independence, to get the Benguela railroad open. Otherwise he could not guarantee continued support.

To the CIA, Kaunda's ultimatum was a challenge. How could we get him so involved he could never defect? The key seemed to be the transshipment of arms through Zambia. Kaunda had publicly supported the international embargo against the shipment of arms to Angola, and it was felt that if one planeload of arms could be introduced through Zambia, with Kaunda's permission, he would be irreversibly committed to UNITA's support—"pregnant" we said in CIA headquarters.

At first the African leaders did not know about the United States arms program thanks to our ruse of working through Kinshasa. Similarly, the Soviets tried to hide their shipments through the Congo (Brazzaville), but the size of their program made it impossible to conceal. And of course, the CIA launched a major propaganda effort to expose the Soviet arms shipments.

Propaganda experts in the CIA station in Kinshasa busily planted articles in the Kinshasa newspapers, *Elimo* and *Salongo*. These were recopied into agency cables and sent on to European, Asian, and South American stations, where they were secretly passed to recruited journalists representing major news services who saw to it that many were replayed in the world press. Similarly, the Lusaka station placed a steady flow of stories in Zambian newspapers and then relayed them to major European newspapers.

In Kinshasa, Ray Chiles's prolific pen and fertile imagination produced a stream of punchy articles and clever operations to spearhead the agency's propaganda effort. For example, he procured a mimeograph machine for FNLA headquarters in Kinshasa and produced leaflets, which were dropped from airplanes over Luanda itself. The first such leaflet was unaccountably read verbatim over the MPLA's Radio Luanda the next morning, provoking a ripple of laughter in CIA stations throughout Europe and Africa, when they heard of it.

The propaganda output from Lusaka was voluminous and imaginative, if occasionally beyond credibility. In late September, Lusaka news stories began to charge that Soviets were advising MPLA forces inside Angola. This was at first a plausible line and Lusaka kept it going. Certainly Soviet advisors might have been inside Angola, although we had no evidence to that effect. The world press dutifully picked up Lusaka's stories of Soviet advisors, while we at headquarters watched nervously, preferring that propaganda ploys have at least some basis in fact. Then, two months later, Lusaka reported that twenty Soviet advisors and thirty-five Cubans had been captured when UNITA took Malanje. UNITA spokesmen gave this infor-

mation to David Ottoway, who was visiting Lusaka, and it was published in the November 22 edition of the *Washington Post*. The *Post* also printed the TASS denial the same day, carrying stories from the world's two largest intelligence services in the same issue; unwitting that the first story came from the CIA and that it was false; aware that TASS was the Soviet's propaganda arm, but not sure that this time it was telling the truth.

UNITA had captured no Soviet advisors nor had it taken Malanje. World interest in the story put UNITA under uncomfortable pressure and the CIA Lusaka station abashedly let the story die a quiet death.

Another Lusaka fabrication accused Cuban soldiers of committing atrocities in Angola. It mentioned rape and pillage. Then its stories became more specific, "reporting" a (totally fictitious) incident in which Cuban soldiers had raped some Ovimbundu girls. Subsequently it wrote that some of those same soldiers had been captured and tried before a tribunal of Ovimbundu women. Lusaka kept this story going endlessly throughout the program.

Later, Caryl Murphy, a *Washington Post* stringer who had covered Luanda, told me the Cuban soldiers had universally fallen in love with Angola and were singularly well behaved.* The only atrocity we were able to document had Cubans as victims rather than criminals. Sixteen Cuban soldiers captured in October were executed by UNITA soldiers at the end of the war.

Bubba Sanders returned to headquarters shortly after I did and began to work on a "white paper" which the FNLA could present to the United Nations General Assembly. A white paper is one in which the source and therefore the potential bias is not concealed; the FNLA would readily admit their sponsorship of the document. The CIA's role would be concealed. Bubba collected information from agency intelligence reports about Soviet arms shipments and included photographs of Russian ships and weapons taken by journalists who were on the CIA payroll and had visited Luanda on the basis of their press credentials. One of Africa Division's translators put the text of Bubba's message into African-sounding French, i.e., with idioms and expressions which would be used by a literate man in Kinshasa but not in Paris.

Potts enjoyed this sort of thing. He supervised Bubba closely, questioning him in detail during each staff meeting, stubbornly insisting that no corners be cut, that the document meet rigorous standards. The two of them argued about paper and type, as well as text and layout. The end product was assembled in a small folder, printed on rough paper identical to that used by one of the Kinshasa printing offices and even printed with machines similar to those used in Kinshasa. The cover bore the picture of a dead soldier on the Caxito battlefield.

* Ms. Murphy had no relationship whatsoever with the CIA. Our conversation occurred in late 1976, after I had decided to leave the CIA.

The white paper was barely off the press when FNLA representatives arrived in New York in late September to lobby at the United Nations General Assembly. They were broke. Bubba Sanders set up a small task force in a Manhattan hotel room to direct our United Nations propaganda operation. In daily meetings the New York officers secretly funded the FNLA delegation and plotted strategy as they made contacts at the United Nations and with the New York newspapers. They distributed the white paper in the UN and to the U.S. press. They also toured Africa with it, and distributed copies to the Chinese.

The UNITA representatives also arrived broke, and although we did not have a paper for them to distribute, the New York officers provided funds and guidance. Far more capable than the FNLA, UNITA representatives began to establish useful contacts. Both delegations were supplied with up-to-date intelligence. News and propaganda releases were cabled directly from the African stations to the permanent CIA offices in the Pan Am building and two nearby skyscrapers on Third Avenue, and East Forty-second Street. The MPLA and Soviets were active too, but defensively so. Although they managed to prevent an open debate of Angola on the floor of the General Assembly, they could not check the momentum of sympathy which UNITA and the FNLA began to enjoy. Secretary General Waldheim expressed his concern, and announced that the United Nations would send a fact-finding mission into Angola.

During a staff meeting I voiced my concern to Potts—were we on safe ground, paying agents to propagandize the New York press? The agency had recently been warned against running operations inside the United States and propagandizing the American public. Potts seemed unconcerned. We were safe enough, he said, as long as we could plausibly claim that our intent was to propagandize foreigners at the United Nations.

I wasn't satisfied with Potts's attitude toward the situation in New York. It seemed to me that our propaganda operation was leading us onto explosively dangerous ground.

On October 2 the New York base telephoned headquarters, advising us that it was sending the two UNITA representatives down to Washington for the weekend for some medical treatment and to talk to members of the black caucus in Washington, seeking introductions to key senators and administration officials. The New York base requested that I meet them and give them whatever support they needed. I refused. After the call I went in to see Carl, then Potts. They both agreed that the UNITA representatives had to be reined in. We sent a cable to the New York base reminding them that lobbying in the United States by CIA agents was not permitted.

On Monday, an officer from New York arrived at headquarters, and I learned with a jolt that it was I who was out of step. To begin with, the two UNITA reps had spent the weekend in Washington after all. The officer cheerfully admitted that he had given them money for the trip because, he claimed, they were coming anyway, with or without his approval, and be-

sides, they were damned effective. He described their progress in New York with infectious enthusiasm.

Potts bought the whole show. He and the officer devised a neat solution to our little CIA charter problem. In order to keep the two delegations doing their "good work" in New York and in Washington and still protect the CIA from any blow-back, funds would be channeled to them via overseas banks. The officer at first resisted, on the grounds that this was cumbersome, that he or one of his assistants could just slip them some money when they needed it, say \$500 every few days. But Potts insisted, and after the officer went back to New York the task force worked out the details by cabling New York, Lusaka, Kinshasa, and key European stations. Each delegation opened a bank account in Europe to which European-based CIA finance officers could make regular deposits. Thereafter the CIA could plausibly deny that it had funded anyone's propagandists in the United States. It would be extremely difficult for any investigators to prove differently.

This arrangement continued throughout the duration of the program, long after the UN General Assembly closed. The UNITA delegates in New York and Washington were increasingly effective. They managed to see State Department officials, White House representatives, and congressmen, as well as American journalists. Care was taken by their CIA case officers not to record their visits to Washington, although some visits were reported in official memos written by unwitting State Department officers and White House staffers, who did not know they had been visited by CIA agents. UNITA's "news" from Angola continued to be drawn from CIA propaganda, fed to them by their case officers in New York.

In January 1976 Director Colby testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, saying: "We have taken particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not at the United States to influence the opinion of the American people about things from the CIA point of view."* A remarkable statement in view of what we had been doing in the task force.†

It was impossible to measure the full impact in America of the FNLA and UNITA propagandists, except, perhaps by the response of American citizens who were inspired to enlist to fight communists in Angola. The news services reported that Roy Ennis of the Congress on Racial Equality was seeking one thousand volunteers to join the FNLA in Angola. Another group began training in jungle tactics on a farm in North Carolina. Adventurers, self-styled mercenaries, and restless American citizens began

*Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, April 26, 1976, p. 129.

†Director Colby received copies of all IAFEATRE [the cryptonym for the Angola program] cables and memoranda.

to contact the FNLA, and eventually a few made it to the FNLA fighting front in northern Angola where several met tragic deaths.

We had other lines into the American media. For example, a European film crew was sent to Silva Porto to make a film about the war. Featuring Cuban soldiers Savimbi had captured, the documentary it produced was quite successful on European television. It came to the attention of the Voice of America, which proposed to show it in the United States. After discussing the pros and cons, the working group decided to let it happen—subsequently parts of the film appeared on an American television show.

Another time, a European CIA station cabled headquarters, advising that a journalist was enroute to Washington with an FNLA story. When he arrived, the task force deputy chief, Paul Foster, met him secretly in Washington, then brought an article he had written back to CIA headquarters, where a task-force linguist translated it into passable English. The next day Foster returned it to the reporter, who sold it to the *Washington Post*, which printed it.

The article covered several columns, reading in part:

A stern countenance, mustachioed and goateed, a stocky frame in a Mao tunic, a sternness in his bearing and in his remarks, often belied by great bursts of truly African laughter—Holden Roberto is a strange blend of war chief and Alabama Baptist preacher, but a man who obviously inspires a quasi-mystical fervor in his men. . . .

Question: But you have South Africans on your side?

Roberto strikes the table in his Headquarters violently and sends the general staff maps flying. He seems gripped by a cold rage and starts to walk back and forth across the room, his hands behind his back. "You saw the South Africans, did you see them? I say, in the zones which we control, we, the FNLA? Go and see at Savimbi's headquarters I am telling you that we have no South Africans or Rhodesians among us!"

At first we were successful in keeping our hand in the war hidden, while exposing the Soviet arms program. However, cracks began to appear in our cover façade in early September and the working group discussed ploys to cope. When State Department representatives reported the department was receiving inquiries from the press about Angola, the CIA presented them with working group paper #18 which suggested lines to be used in formal press statements: We could refuse to comment. We could categorically deny U.S. involvement. Or we could state that the United States had supported the Alvor Accord, which permitted the three liberation movements to participate equally in preparing Angola for independence, but the Soviet Union had delivered arms to the MPLA, producing heavy fighting. Angola's neighbors were concerned that the Soviet Union was attempting to carve out a dominant position in Angola. We

would add that we were sympathetic but we had not supplied U.S. arms to any of the liberation movements. Whichever, we should emphasize the Soviet Union, so it would not look as though we were attacking a minor liberation movement.

The State Department a few days later reported it had issued a statement refusing to substantiate press inquiries and denying United States involvement:

We have not been in the business of providing arms to the Angolan movements. However, we have received reports that one of the movements, the MPLA, has for some time been receiving large shipments of weapons from the Soviet Union. It is understandable if African governments are concerned about this development and we are sympathetic to those concerns.

In the field our security was fairly good. We and our allies had control over the only transportation into the fighting areas, especially into Silva Porto, and could restrict those areas from all but a few selected reporters or the extremely hardy individuals who were willing to go in overland. However, one European reporter, whom we knew only as Germani, began focusing on Kinshasa itself and was scurrying about town with a good instinct for where we were hiding the stories. The Kinshasa station reported his presence and the working group discussed the threat he posed. It would be easy to have Mobutu throw him out of the country. Could we get by with asking Mobutu to do it? Germani wasn't American. Did we dare have cables on record ordering the station to pull strings and have a legitimate European reporter thrown out of Kinshasa? The press would be extremely angry if it ever found out. The working group stalled, wondering why the field hadn't thought of this solution without headquarters' guidance. They were in daily contact with Roberto and his deputies and could easily plant the idea. They could see Mobutu. There would be no record. Chiefs of station are supposed to have an instinct for such things.

Like magic, Germani was expelled from Kinshasa on November 22. Without any cables or memoranda being written at headquarters, the string was pulled, the problem solved, and there was nothing in CIA records to prove how it had happened.*

*This is the way the ouster of Nkrumah was handled in Ghana, 1966. The 40 Committee had met and rejected an agency proposal to oust Nkrumah. The Accra station was nevertheless encouraged by headquarters to maintain contact with dissidents of the Ghanaian army for the purpose of gathering intelligence on their activities. It was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station's involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place. The station even proposed to headquarters through back channels that a squad be on hand

Increasingly, the propaganda war became uphill work. On September 10, when the FNLA retreated from Caxito the second time, it left behind crates of munitions which bore fresh U.S. Air Force shipping labels. The MPLA displayed these trophies to western journalists and the press picked up our scent. Nor were the newspapers idle. In Washington and New York IAFEATURE was increasingly exposed with accurate reports of our program, our budget, even the amounts of money in our budget. The *New York Times* seemed to have a particularly direct line to the working group, and the thought that we might have a "Deep Throat" in our midst added some desperately needed excitement to the working group sessions.

While IAFEATURE was being described in the *New York Times*, the presence of South African soldiers in Angola became known. On November 22, a journalist, Ken Bridgefield, filed a story in the *Washington Post*, from Lusaka, reporting that South African soldiers were fighting in Angola. The propaganda and political war was lost in that stroke. There was nothing the Lusaka station could invent that would be as damaging to the other side as our alliance with the hated South Africans was to our cause.

Nigeria, the economic giant of black Africa and the United States' second most important source of petroleum, emphatically shifted its support

at the moment of the coup to storm the Chinese embassy, kill everyone inside, steal their secret records, and blow up the building to cover the fact. This proposal was quashed, but inside CIA headquarters the Accra station was given full, if unofficial credit for the eventual coup, in which eight Soviet advisors were killed. None of this was adequately reflected in the agency's written records. [Editor's Note: See the Seymour Hersh article on this subject, in this book.]

This technique has worked for the agency in many other situations. Perhaps an irritating politician in a far corner of the world is magically eliminated, while the CIA records show no evidence of involvement in the crime. When done skillfully it is also the key to the individual case officer's rationalization of his conduct, his "plausible denial" to his own conscience, as though he were not responsible. He can say, "We talked about the problem Germani was causing (or Lumumba, Trujillo, Schneider, et al.), but it never even occurred to me to suggest that anything be done about it." This is my own theory of what really happened in the assassination of Lumumba. The CIA plotted to poison him, but lost its nerve. The now-public record shows that CIA officers discussed the Lumumba threat with other Congolese politicians. They did the rest.

But of course the case officers are responsible; the things wouldn't have been done if they had not been there, setting the stage. For example, in Vietnam I inherited an operational relationship with a sadistic police officer, who occasionally mutilated prisoners in a CIA safehouse called the "Pink House." The police officer was heavily funded by the CIA, which vouched for him to his superiors in Saigon—without this support he would not have held his post. But a succession of CIA case officers had absolved themselves of responsibility for his sadistic orgies by rationalizing that they were only supporting him for his intelligence activities and were not responsible for his other actions.

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to the MPLA, providing it with \$20 million in aid. A crowd of Nigerians demonstrated before the American embassy in Lagos. Tanzania announced plans to train MPLA soldiers in Tanzania in a joint program with the Soviets. Idi Amin reversed his decision to expel the Soviets from Uganda, and when the Soviets publicly defended their program in late December, Amin supported them. Other countries began to recognize the MPLA as the legitimate rulers of Angola.

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The Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane

*by Frederic Laurent and Nina
Sutton*

In the late 1960s, two agents of Aginter-Presse,* Jean-Marie Laurent and Robert Leroy, were presented by the Swiss Popular party, formerly the Swiss Marxist-Leninist Communist party, to the diplomats of the Chinese Embassy in Bern. Once they had won the confidence of these diplomats by their anti-Soviet attitudes, Laurent and Leroy had no difficulty infiltrating many of the African liberation movements.

Before being arrested in Congo-Brazzaville, Jean-Marie Laurent had

[This article is taken from *L'Orchestre Noir*, published 1978 by Editions Stock, Paris.]

*With the colonial wars in Indochina, Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau as an impetus, one of the most significant and least-known chapters of post-World War II history grew out of the regrouping by the Allies of former Nazis and Italian Fascists. Among the manifestations of this development was the emergence of a small, well-disciplined intervention force in the service of the tightly knit international far right. This force was called Aginter-Presse. Financed in part by the Portuguese Ministry of Defense, it began in the 1960s working directly with PIDE—Salazar's secret police. At the same time, the outfit began to organize and train teams of fascist terrorists in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Among the better-known groups that it trained were Patria y Libertad in Chile (which had very close links with the CIA during the destabilization and violent overthrow of Allende's government), the paramilitary Soldiers of the Algerian Opposition, and the right-wing assassination squads in Spain known as Christ the King. Italian authorities have also asserted that Aginter-Presse was the brains behind the bloody bombings that occurred in recent years in Milan and other cities for which neo-fascist elements have publicly claimed credit. A full account of Aginter-Presse is found in *L'Orchestre Noir*. Eds.

been able to infiltrate the liberated zones of Angola held by the MPLA. In Guinea-Bissau, he succeeded in meeting the leaders of the PAIGC and Luis Cabral in particular, with whom he visited the guerrilla base in San Domingo. But the most important operations of infiltration were carried out by Robert Leroy against the FRELIMO in Mozambique.

A 1973 report of the Italian secret service, the SDCI, speaks of a series of missions financed by the Portuguese Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The code name of the operation was Zona Leste, and the missions called for the infiltration of Tanzania and FRELIMO.

In a document written by Robert Leroy himself in a sort of code, we find the details of the missions he executed between June 5, 1968, and October 5, 1969. He used the cover of a pro-Chinese journalist to move about Mozambique and the neighboring countries (Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia), which at that time sheltered the FRELIMO guerrillas. Leroy says that he interviewed the leaders of FRELIMO such as Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos, and Mateus Gwanjare. The interview with Marcelino dos Santos was published in the Swiss Popular party's paper, *L'Etincelle*. Leroy also states that he discovered the clandestine transit points of the FRELIMO guerrillas on the Tanzanian, Malawian, and Zambian borders. He also says that he "intoxicated" the leaders of FRELIMO: Mondlane, dos Santos, Chissano, Colona, Rebelo, Samora Machel, Lazaro N'kavandamo, Mateus Gwanjare, and others.

As an officer of the SDCI explained, "Robert Leroy's job of intoxication consisted of giving false information to the leaders of FRELIMO and of creating discord among them by playing on their personal rivalries and their personal contradictions."

Therefore, is it a coincidence that in Tanzania in February 1969, Mondlane and dos Santos each received a bomb in the mail? Mondlane was killed when he opened the book containing his bomb. In the report of Leroy, very likely dating from the end of 1969, under the title "action," we find written: "Mondlane ass. (unar) Simango." Thus Leroy attributes the assassination of Mondlane to Simango and the UNAR, the National African Union of Rombezia.

A few months after the murder, Simango was expelled from FRELIMO and admitted knowing about the plot on Mondlane's life. Another leader of FRELIMO arrested at that time, Lazaro N'kavandamo, admitted to having taken part in the plot. As for the UNAR, it was an organization created by FRELIMO dissidents and directed by Amos Sumane, former member of the FRELIMO Central Committee.

This dissidence had been encouraged in the middle 1960s by the wealthy businessman Jorge Jardim, who in Mozambique was the brains behind Salazar and later Caetano; Jardim was also nicknamed the King of Mozambique. The objective of this dissidence was to create a buffer state between the Rovuma River on the Tanzanian border and the Zambezi River, so as to block the progress of FRELIMO. This state, Rombezia, was later to

have been integrated into the project for a greater Malawi by Dr. Banda, a friend and associate of Jardim.

The preliminary investigations made by FRELIMO on their leader's assassination suggests that Jardim was also the brains behind the plot. By associating the UNAR, whose real boss was Jardim, with the assassination, Robert Leroy seems to confirm this conclusion all the more, since today the links between Jardim and Aginter-Pressé are known. However, certain points remain to be clarified. According to the police in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the bomb that killed Mondlane was prepared in Mozambique by agents of the PIDE-DGS. It was a very sophisticated device placed inside a book. And of course, we know the taste for such sophisticated machines of death that Aginter-Pressé had.

PIDE and SDECE: Plotting in Guinea

by Ken Lawrence

The intelligence agencies of the European colonial powers had blood on their hands long before the CIA arrived on the scene in Africa, and they continued their dirty work as long as they held sway in any country. Sometimes, vindictively, they plotted against their former colonies even after independence.

After the coup of April 25, 1974, which overthrew the fascist regime in Portugal, many formerly secret documents were published which exposed the colonial government's covert actions in Africa. Undoubtedly the most sensational of these were the secret letters from Jonas Savimbi of UNITA to the Portuguese Military Command in Angola, revealing their collaboration against MPLA, published in *Afrique-Asie* (July 1974).^{*} In October 1975 *Diario de Luanda* published letters from the Portuguese Governor-General of Angola to Savimbi, further documenting UNITA's work for imperialism.

In January 1976 the Lisbon newspaper *Expresso* published articles and documents of covert operations conducted jointly by PIDE (the Portuguese secret police) and SDECE (the French intelligence agency). The first of these, in 1970, Operation Mar Verde (Green Sea), was a plot to overthrow Sekou Toure in Guinea-Conakry. Its failure did not deter PIDE and SDECE; instead they expanded the scope of their scheming with a new plot called Project Safira (Sapphire).

After the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), on January 20, 1973, Barbieri Cardoso, the head of PIDE Afri-

[The extensive quotations in this article are from the January 24, 1976, *Expresso*, published in Lisbon, Portugal. This article was written in July 1979 for this book.]

^{*}See "The Savimbi Letters," p. 212.

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can operations, decided the time was ripe to cripple PAIGC fatally and to reverse the process of liberation which by then had freed almost 75 percent of rural Guinea-Bissau. At the same time the covert operators in France, eager to return Guinea-Conakry to French control, were seeking once again to foment a coup to overturn Sekou Toure's government and replace him with a hand-picked puppet named Col. Diallo. The common interests of the imperialist powers were strengthened by the fact that Toure was supporting PAIGC; they teamed up.

The outline of the PIDE-SDECE conspiracy was this: using two provocateurs code-named PADRE and ANJO who had penetrated the top ranks of PAIGC, deep divisions would be promoted within the liberation movement based primarily on supposed differences in ethnicity and ideology between Cape Verdeans and Guineans. Once a rift was promoted, the plot went, Toure would be naturally allied with the leadership of one faction (Cape Verdeans); the others (Guineans) would view him as the enemy and join in ousting him. A PIDE report shared with SDECE explained the basis for the strategy:

From the initiation of terrorism there have been differences inside the PAIGC in consequence of the diversity of races, cultures, personal and also political interests. These differences became accentuated from the beginning of 1972, a time when the terrorists, particularly the Guineans, began to feel weary of war, since they were the ones who effectively constituted the terrorist groups, while those of Cape Verdean origin occupied the headquarters and more commodious areas, or received scholarships to attend educational institutions overseas.

This discontent, allied with factors of a political order, culminated in the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, the 20th of January 1973, carried out by way of a "plot" formulated by Guinean terrorists, as was opportunely communicated to this general directorship by way of the secret communique No. 217/73-DSInf2, of this division, the 3d of April, 1973.

Beginning with the death of Amilcar Cabral, the chasm between Guineans and Cape Verdeans grew larger and the idea of forming a new party with the designation "PAIG"—African Party for the Independence of Guinea—which up to here had barely been a notion, turned into a determination after the proclamation of the "State of Guinea-Bissau," two ideological lines having defined themselves:

—that of the Guineans who follow the communist or pro-Sekou Toure line,

—that of the pro-occidental or anti-Sekou Toure people, who constitute the dissident faction which intends to carry out a "coup d'etat" inside the PAIGC.

In this respect, this delegation has had some contacts,

by way of one of our collaborators, with several representatives of the PAIGC, Guineans, who intend to put into effect a "coup d'etat" inside that movement and in the wake proclaim a second republic.

The components of this dissident action intend to concretize and put into effect this action before the end of this year, when the independence of the first republic has not been consolidated either within the country or internationally.

Expresso declined to publish the names of 13 PAIGC members and 4 high functionaries of the Republic of Guinea-Conakry who were listed in the document as part of the conspiracy.

The operation was scheduled to begin at the end of June or early July 1974. One especially odd assumption of the conspirators was that the proclamation of Guinea-Bissau's independence—recording PAIGC's greatly enhanced strength, sufficient to exercise sovereignty over the country—was seen as an event that would help PIDE and SDECE deepen the ethnic divisions.

One PIDE document summarized the activities of the secret agents carrying out *Project Safira*:

All the activity of the collaborators PADRE and ANJO is oriented in the direction of creating ever greater splits among the terrorists of the PAIGC, exploiting to the maximum the antagonisms existing between Guineans and Cape Verdeans.

At the same time we are allying with various elements of the PAIGC in order to permit elements of the FLNG—National Liberation Front of Guinea—to infiltrate into Conakry under the disguise and with the connivance of the PAIGC to carry into effect actions of sabotage and, if possible, pass on to the phase of guerrilla activity, aided by the very terrorists of the PAIGC who are disposed to aid the FLNG in getting rid of Sekou Toure.

For some months we have been working on this program of activity, but as is natural among Africans everything takes a lot of time, since it is always necessary to confront many unexpected exigencies, get around difficulties of the moment and satisfy badly disguised materialist appetities—we admit that the expected results will be delayed some months. At the moment we have already achieved what we can call the "demobilization" of some terrorist leaders and the connivance of many terrorists who in spite of never having presented themselves to the authorities have come not to obey orders emanating from Conakry or to oppose passive resistance to their being carried out.

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Ethnic and ideological divisions were not the only political weaknesses the plan sought to exploit. PIDE agents had discovered that some PAIGC leaders believed a purely military victory was impossible. These they sought to compromise by offering the hope of a negotiated settlement with the Portuguese colonial administration. Others who could not be reached in one of these ways could be corrupted. Meanwhile, as PIDE agents were attempting to subvert PAIGC from within, SDECE was planning the military side of the anticipated *coup d'état* in Conakry. The operation would be financed with Brazilian and European capital.

Another PIDE report quoted by *Expresso* reveals how its agents exploited one PAIGC leader's lack of resolve:

In the pursuit of the execution of Project Safira, our collaborator PADRE once again showed up at Cuntima, where he remained several days in order to contact the terrorist leader Samba Djalo, mentioned already in the last report, the person responsible for the security and information services of the PAIGC in the Northern Region, based in Sedhiou in the Republic of Senegal.

The contact with Samba Djalo took place on August 23, 1973, in the Senegalese township of Madina Alfa; the following principal points were discussed:

—necessity of ending the war conducted by the PAIGC and incited by Sekou Toure against the Portuguese, because this war does not lead to results which are going to benefit the people of Guinea;

—for that matter the FLNG—National Liberation Front of Guinea—is losing the support of the authentic Guinean elements of the PAIGC for joining forces to depose Sekou Toure.

Samba Djalo clearly defined his position and that of his two closest collaborators, emphasizing that the project combines effectively all the possibilities of success, given the ethnic and ideological differences among the leaders of the PAIGC and the general conviction of the terrorist leaders that Aristides Pereira was not up to his task, being no more than a puppet maneuvered by Sekou Toure, who is the one who makes all the important decisions. . . .

Besides this, several meetings convoked by the leaders of the PAIGC had been postponed or cancelled to avoid struggles that had already broken out several times between groups of the two tendencies, which indicates that not all is well inside the PAIGC; therefore, Samba Djalo considers the moment propitious for putting into execution Project Safira.

Samba Djalo wanted to know if there was any link between the elements of the FLNG—National Liberation

Front of Guinea—based in Bissau and those in Dakar. Asked the motive for the question, he related that the PAIGC had already received a similar proposal to that presented by PADRE, in which there was reference to Sekou Toure. The proposal came from a delegation composed of three individuals, one of which, Canadian, offered 20 million francs to obtain the support and cooperation of the PAIGC in a coup against the government of the Republic of Guinea. It happens that Otto Charte, responsible for security services in the PAIGC, advised that the Canadian individual was an agent of the CIA—Central Intelligence Agency—and everyone knows that the interests of the CIA are exclusively in the exploitation of the riches of the country, a fact which renders the Americans antipathetic.*

PADRE was able to affirm that Samba Djalo appeared to him to be lively and intelligent and personally interested in the fall of Sekou Toure, given that his experience of living in the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Guinea had shown him that the problems of development of the Guineans should be worked out within the framework of cooperation, as in the case of Senegal, and not as in the Republic of Guinea which had cut ties with France with all the disastrous consequences for the people of that country.

This example is pointed out many times by many elements of the PAIGC, who are impressed by the fact that the Republic of Guinea, because of its radicalism, stagnated, while Senegal, in spite of the poverty of its soil and subsoil, managed to achieve development thanks to its realistic policy of cooperation with France.

Besides this aspect, Samba Djalo was vividly interested in the success of this project, and that it be executed with the greatest despatch in order to block the maneuvers of Sekou Toure, who had taken the firm decision to accelerate the proclamation of the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which he has the intention of annexing in the form of a federation, in order to dispose legally of complete liberty over this territory.

Samba Djalo, who is nephew of the terrorist leader F., showed himself to be disposed to having further contacts with the aim of pursuing the project, promising absolute discretion so that the affair would not have to be set aside before its conclusion.

After having remarked that all men are sensitive to material comfort, Samba Djalo suggested the necessity of

*This CIA approach was used elsewhere in Africa also. See above, page 15.

combining conviction with corruption in order to count on the commanders of the PAIGC camps, whom he judges indispensable for the success of the project, warning us at the same time against eventual vexations that might come up.

Samba Djalo counselled PADRE not to use helicopters as a means of transport, whatever the urgency for moving might be, since the PAIGC had deployed specialized surface-to-air missile groups installed at strategic points. Samba Djalo was disposed, in the near future, to place PAIGC camps at the disposal of the FLNG for the preparation of its men.

A SDECE report of April 4, 1974, summarized agreements reached between the French and Portuguese agencies concerning the receipt, transit and collection of materiel; welcoming, transporting and grouping personnel; construction of a training camp; establishment of a system of radio communications; and stationing a plane to transport the leadership group to Conakry after the success of the nocturnal attack. The document concluded with the proposed timetable:

16-23 April:

- Meeting in an African country—Guineans (Republic of Guinea-Conakry); PAIGC dissidents; Senegalese; C. [Calvao]; Aranha.
- Establishment of a plan of action.
- Coordination of the different elements and groups.

22 April-5 May:

- Instruction of the leaders, by our technicians on station in Europe.

Beginning of May:

- Possible meeting in Brussels, undoubtedly without the PAIGC elements involved.

End of May-beginning of June:

- Installation of the materiel.
- Installation of the personnel.

2d and 3d weeks of June:

- Training of personnel.

End of June, beginning of July:

- Unleash the action.

Unlike so many covert actions which have brought death and suffering to so many, this one came to naught. Three weeks after SDECE had drawn up the schedule, the Portuguese fascist government was overthrown. PIDE's Barbieri Cardoso fled the country—according to *Expresso* he resides near Paris and furnishes his services to SDECE. The liberation movements triumphed. But, as *Expresso* warned when it published the documents of Project Safira, the network built by these agencies undoubtedly still exists, and threatens to cause great harm in the future.

Confession of a "Dog of War"

by René Backmann

From the Congo to Yemen, from Biafra to Benin, from Angola to the Comoros, they have been a part of all the dubious combats, all the clandestine wars and all the covert battles. Paid thugs, outdated crusaders of the West, mercenaries have laid claim to their name: "the Dogs of War." Happily, they are more often unemployed than in battle. There is competition—and there are off seasons—in the commerce of massacre.

Tomorrow they will probably once again be in Katanga, now called Shaba. Today, fifty of them have overthrown the regime in the Comoros, the same one they helped install three years ago. Moreover, under the name of "Colonel Saïd Mustapha Madhjou," one of their veteran members, Bob Denard, from Katanga and from Yemen, has become a member of the political-military directorate that controls the country.

Only yesterday, sixty of them, recruited by Bob Denard's Paris and Lyon hustlers, were fighting in Rhodesia, side by side with Ian Smith's troops, against the nationalist guerrillas. They went for 6,000 francs a month. They all came back in early June because their salary was never more than 2,000 francs. The French unit of the Rhodesian army was dissolved.

The greater part of the mercenaries that formed this unit are in Paris now looking for new contracts. One of them, we will call him X, tells us in the following interview of his incomplete Rhodesian adventure and reveals the nature of the war being fought between the defenders of one of the last white bastions in southern Africa and the nationalist guerrillas:

Q: To begin with, why did you agree to this interview?

X: Because there are things down there in Rhodesia that I haven't

[This interview by French investigative journalist René Backmann with a mercenary first appeared in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, July 3, 1978, in Paris, under the title "La Confession d'un 'Chien de Guerre.'"]

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been able to hack. Mercenary, it's a trade. Cop, that's another. And killer of civilians a third. And me, I believe someone when they give me their word. And Bob Denard's guys don't keep their word. They didn't give a damn about us. We had to really earn our living. We almost had to pay. I don't forgive that sort of stuff.

Q: And that's why you've come back to France?

X: Yeah. Well, not exactly. At the end of a certain amount of time, with the ambushes and beating people in the face with rifle butts, villagers who were no more a rebel than I was, I said to myself that deep down inside I was probably more on their side than on the side of the white Rhodesians.

Q: So for you it's an adventure that's over?

X: Rhodesia and Denard, yeah. War, no. That's something else. I don't know how to do anything else. And then, in Paris, quite truly, nothing's happening. Odd jobs for 2,500 or 3,000 francs I can find, but that doesn't interest me. I don't want to get stuck in my ways at twenty-six. So if someone proposes to me another gig, I'm sure I'll take it. You know there is always something being prepared and we all know each other; we soon know what's up.

Q: For Rhodesia, how were you recruited?

X: I'd enlisted and had just finished four years in a paratrooper regiment of the Eleventh D.L.I. [Division of Light Infantry]; it was the Sixth R.P.I.M.A. [the Naval Infantry Paratrooper Regiment]. I didn't feel like going through the necessary hassle to become a noncom. I don't like courses or exams. And I didn't want to be a simple soldier or noncom all my life. So I quit the army at the end of my stint, and I did odd jobs. I worked with private security companies. I worked as a strong-arm man for the political parties in power.

You know, when you come out of the paratroopers, you're immediately included in a series of circuits by the old buddies, veterans' groups, and by recommendations from certain officers. We all end up in the same places. A lot of my buddies who left the army at the same times as me were strong-arm men for Giscard in 1974 [the presidential elections].

I was recruited in November 1977. I was looking for work, and I had let everyone know when I was contacted by a buddy, a former paratrooper like me, who was working for Bob Denard. He told me that there were things happening and that I should get hold of Roger B., veteran of the Foreign Legion in Indochina who was serving as Denard's lieutenant. Roger B. was then working with a company that specialized in foreign business, with its headquarters on rue Bachaumont in Paris's Second District.

He set up a meeting in a restaurant near the Bastille directed by a Corsican whose first name was Xavier, also a veteran paratrooper of Indochina.

I went, and Roger B. told me, "We're on to something in the Indian Ocean, but the recruiting's been done. It's too bad because there was 10,000 francs each and a steady job with it. But I'll put you on to something else if you want. At any rate, it'll be good training for later on." He gave me a telephone number and a name: Michel D.

I contacted Michel D. He was straightforward and frank about the type of job; less so about the money. He was a former Angola mercenary; he had worked down there with UNITA. He said that this job was to serve in a French unit of the Rhodesian army. The salary was supposedly between 800 and 1000 Rhodesian dollars a month according to your family situation [about 5,600 to 7,000 francs a month]. Everyone began with three years' seniority, no matter what rank you held in the French army. Plus, there was supposed to be extra-duty pay for presence on the front.

In reality—and that's one reason that things went bad—we never got more than 245 Rhodesian dollars a month [about 1,700 francs] and even that was paid to us in unconvertible Rhodesian dollars.

And the work cut out for us: "very aggressive" operations along the eastern front, along the Mozambican border, and even with penetration into Mozambican territory. We were supposed to constitute a French battalion, but we never formed even a company since we were always only about sixty strong.

Q: Everyone in this battalion was recruited in the same way you were?

X: No, not exactly. Some of them had been recruited by classified ads. In October 1977 *France-Soir* published an ad offering "a job with a future abroad" for candidates "minimum twenty-two years old, preferably former noncommissioned officers."

There was a telephone number to call. The number was that of a group of owners of a large apartment complex in Paris's Fifteenth District near the Porte de Versailles. In fact, when you called, you got the chief guard of the complex, who was Michel D., the Angola veteran. In Lyon, the reporters of *Point du Jour* made an investigation after a classified ad appeared in *Le Progrès* on November 17. They revealed the propositions made by the recruiter which forced the whole network to hightail it to Switzerland. I left through Switzerland also, by the way.

Finally, there was a third group that was recruited through the veterans' association for paratroopers. It's an association that organizes a dinner on Saint Michael's day, the patron saint of the paratroopers, and helps paratroopers keep in contact. At the center, there is a cafeteria where you can eat lunch, talk about old times, and get the latest news. There is a file of members that they dig into when a "friend" is looking for some guys who aren't gun shy, for election campaigns or strike breaking.

Q: Did you need visas or passports?

X: Everything went very smoothly. Michel D. got our visas in

twenty-four hours at the South African Embassy. He was in contact with a member of the Embassy, so everything went very quickly. I went to Zurich by train, and we left then on a South African Airways flight. The tickets had been bought by Michel D. in Switzerland in such a way that we couldn't resell them or get them reimbursed. That's how we got to Johannesburg, and there we took an Air Rhodesia flight to Salisbury.

Military vehicles were waiting for us at the airport. They belonged to the First R.L.I. [Regiment of Light Infantry]. They drove us to the regiment base in Cramborne between the airport and the city. It was a huge base separated from the road by a row of trees that hide the buildings.

I can remember our arrival as if it happened yesterday. At the gate, next to the fence, was the large regiment emblem: a rhinoceros head; further on was a Chinese heavy machine gun captured from the guerrillas and carefully repainted black. There was a wide and impeccably clean central avenue; to the right, the police station, the military prison, the truck and tank parking lots; to the left, the different buildings for housing and the pool. Everything was well kept and in perfect shape. There was an immense training ground. Way back, there were the barracks for the First R.L.I. Commandos, one group in each barrack.

All the streets were lined with trees. There were large football fields, rifle ranges, training areas with mock helicopter fuselages that were used to teach us how to jump during landing. There were posts for learning to use a bayonet. The barracks for the French were way back at the end of the camp and the dirtiest; fifteen beds each, without mosquito-nets, the strict minimum. Some of us put up French flags.

The next day arms were distributed: two complete camouflage uniforms, a sort of parka, a combat harness, ammunition clips, three pairs of combat boots, gym clothes, underwear, a sweater, a padded jacket, a camouflage hat and a brush hat. No helmets. They were given to us later. They looked exactly like French ones but I couldn't find any mark on the inside. We were also given a handbook, a sort of field manual for orientation in the bush, a Belgian F.A.L. submachine gun, and paint. They told us to paint stripes of camouflage green on the guns and on the boots, green canvas combat boots with perfectly flat rubber soles. We had to camouflage everything. They also gave us a beret; it was green like those of the Rhodesian army, but under the Rhodesian insignia was a small French red, white, and blue diamond. Next we went through a medical exam, very quickly, and for two or three days we went jogging and played some sports to get in shape.

Q: Your officers were also French?

X: Yeah, or kind of . . . the first bunch who arrived a few months before us designated themselves officers, even if they weren't any more officer than I am. That way, for officers we had guys that sometimes couldn't even read a map, and real officers and noncoms who were in the

unit serving as foot soldiers! The command was composed of mercenary veterans. The better part of our leaders, at least a dozen, had been in Angola; others had participated in the disastrous invasion of Benin with Denard. A good number of those who had done the Benin job were in Rhodesia.

The two bosses of the unit were a Major Laviola and a Major L'Assomption. Laviola is a former noncom of the Second R.E.P. [the Foreign Legion Paratrooper Regiment]. He has piles of friends in the National Front [a French extreme-right party]. When he comes to Paris, he often stays with a writer who sometimes writes for *Minute* [the major French extreme-right publication] and who lives close to the Etoile. Major L'Assomption is a veteran noncom of the 11th Choc [the dirty-work unit of the French CIA, the SDECE]. He has been a mercenary in several African countries. Before coming to Rhodesia, he was an officer of the bodyguards for President Bongo of Gabon.

There was also a Commander Bessi, veteran of Angola too—in theory he was responsible for setting up an officer's school—a Lieutenant Bonnericque, responsible for the administration; a Captain Toumi, a West Indian and a veteran of the Congo who had taken part in the first coup in the Comoros and was an old friend of Denard. He was the second in command of the French unit, the organizer, and the first black officer in the Rhodesian army. There was also a Lieutenant Fournier and a Sergent Linard.

Q: And the soldiers?

X: There was a little bit of everything. Some were there because they had pulled a little robbery. Others, like me, were there only because they didn't know how to do anything else other than jump with a parachute and obey orders, and they like that sort of stuff. Still others, well, they were kind of there like for a crusade. There were a lot of activists from the National Front; some had been to Lebanon where they had fought side by side with the Falangists. They were all there to kill commies and blacks.

The average age was fairly young, about 25. Some were veteran paratroopers or members of the Foreign Legion. Others hadn't even done a year of military service. In fact, a good part of the unit was composed of guys who hadn't had any real military experience. Some had worked in Lyon with the Lyon Security Agency. They wore T-shirts with the emblem of the agency whose assistant director is the ex-police commissioner, Javilliey.

On the base, at least 60 percent of the people were foreigners. Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique, New Zealanders, Australians, British, and Americans, veterans of Vietnam. The Americans turned out to be less enthusiastic. They were accustomed to fighting in better conditions, with constant air cover and logistics much better than those of the Rhodesian army. There were a lot of South Africans. I discovered that South Af-

rican soldiers could do their military service by fighting in Rhodesia. But they were not formed into a unit; they were dispersed. Only the French were formed into a separate unit with its own special command.

So we stayed a couple of days at the base in Cramborne, when the better part of the French troops arrived from a forward base. They had returned especially to take care of some problems with their pay. And we later left with them.

Before leaving we had to fall into ranks, four abreast, to hear a little speech by Major Laviola: "Although you are today serving in the Rhodesian army, you are French, and in the battle that's taking place here against international communism, you represent France. It is not for the money that you are here, etc." He concluded with: "We're leaving for the bush. It's a bit tough, as you will see. You have to grit your teeth and bear it. And now, everyone in the clunkers."

The clunkers—they were the Mercedes trucks of the Rhodesian army. Those trucks were an outrage for the veteran mercenaries. That's because the French unit was the only one not to have crocodiles.

Q: Crocodiles?

X: A crocodile is an anti-mine machine invented by the Rhodesians. Mines were a constant danger. Vehicles blown apart by mines were quite numerous. We were always hearing about them. So they invented and started producing a special vehicle. It's got an elevated Mercedes truck chassis protected by two armored plates that point toward the ground in a V. This reduces the effect of the blast and disperses the shrapnel away from the truck. The sides are covered with armored plates capable of stopping the 7.62 Kalashnikov bullets. It's not perfect, but it's pretty good.

However, the French only had the classical Mercedes truck with the bed covered by two layers of sandbags. To avoid being thrown in case of an explosion, we were harnessed and attached to the central bench, where we sat double file, back to back, about 15 to a truck.

We drove for about four or five hours toward the northeast. We looked at the countryside and we took pictures just like tourists. At Mtoko, our operational base, we were given barracks even worse than in Cramborne, sheet metal huts. There were Rhodesian reserve units with us that came and went all the time. The turnover was very quick in the sector. There we ate very badly. In Cramborne, where almost all the cooks were Portuguese, it wasn't very good, but in Mtoko . . . the cook was a French non-com incapable of any other form of service. According to the latest news, he's on Reunion Island, where he's opened a snack bar. . . .

We spent two or three days in training; from firing the F.A.L. to using the M.A.G. machine guns. And then we went out on operations. We were divided up into sections, each one responsible for a sector. It was very close to the Mozambican border. We ran about under the orders of a Cor-

poral in a very mountainous sector. We moved about with no precise objective other than what the chief of the section wanted. The warnings before departure had been very clear: Always carry your F.A.L. ready to fire, take with you as many clips as you can carry and grenades without national trademarks and with external grids. The kind that are forbidden by the Geneva Convention. And also Claymore mines.

Q: Which are . . . ?

X: Which are antipersonnel fragmentation mines. Each one contains seven hundred tiny steel BBs that shoot out at a sixty-degree angle when someone trips and detonates the mine. It's usually lethal at 25 yards and dangerous up to 75 yards. They are very light, very easy to transport and to use, and they can be linked up. We put them more or less everywhere. We could take as many as we wanted.

During the first operation, we stayed four days in the bush. We were lucky because we had provisions for four days. I said that we were lucky because quite often, units would leave for four days and stay out for six days or more because the Rhodesian command, the only ones who can give the green light to return, had not given the order. We had to listen constantly to the military radio to know what was happening around us and how the other operations in the sector were doing. Most of the radio operators in our unit were Mauritians who had the advantage of speaking English and French.

These routine operations last quite a while; no real ambushes, no exchanges of fire. Sometimes we did police work. With information from the Special Branch—the army's intelligence service—we would seal off a village in combat formation. We would herd the women and children to one side and the men to the other. We would then search all the huts. Often, we would find leaflets of the liberation movements, one side in English and the other in Shona or Matabele. Sometimes even small bills of Mozambican money. Those in whose huts we found something were considered potential terrorists or accomplices and were arrested. I didn't like these operations very much. To fight in the bush is one thing; to beat poor people with your rifle butt or kick them about is another thing. The supposed terrorists were turned over to the Special Branch, who took care of making them talk. All methods were used—electricity, burning their feet, and others you can well imagine.

Q: Do you remember your first exchange of fire?

X: It was toward the end of our first stay in the bush. In theory, we stayed six weeks in the bush and two weeks in Salisbury. I think it was around the fifth week. We had left Mtoko in trucks as usual, and we were heading toward the Mozambican border. At one point, the road goes through a mountainous area with a sixty-foot rock overhang. The commanding officer was standing up in the truck saying, "Keep your eyes open. If there's going to be an attack, it will be here." The guys in the

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truck were laughing while pointing to the rocks. The driver got the first machine-gun blast square in the chest. He was killed instantly. The commanding officer was spared by some miracle. The truck came to a halt right in the middle of the road. Right behind the driver in a straight line of fire, there were eight wounded who were losing blood and screaming, a total panic. Everyone was thinking more about hiding than about returning the fire. The second truck, following at a hundred yards, was stopped on the orders of Lieutenant Fournier. Normally, the guys were supposed to spring out immediately and climb into the rocks to try to engage the terrorists. Nothing doing. In the meantime, those on the other side were emptying their ammo clips on us. Luckily for us, they had badly installed the rings of the mortar shells that they were firing on us. We recovered four of these with the ring still in the safety position. Otherwise, I probably wouldn't be here talking to you.

We waited for orders. If we had had competent officers, the orders would have been sharp and concise. I don't think the guys would have hidden like that. When the enemy had emptied their clips, they broke off the fire fight. Those from the second truck came running up and started moving up toward the enemy position. They didn't try to follow them because they were afraid of falling into another ambush or stepping on mines left behind.

We found a large quantity of 7.62mm shells and circular 150-round ammunition clips. They all had Chinese markings on them. Except for some old Soviet PMs from the last world war and a few Soviet S.K.S. rifles as well, almost all the captured materiel on the eastern front along the Mozambican border is of Chinese origin.

I learned later that this manner of attacking was the habitual tactic of the guerrillas. They pull an ambush, they empty their ammunition clips, and they disappear. In the case I've just described, we were fifteen in each truck, and they were about twenty, well armed and well placed. They could have had a turkey shoot. But they didn't go for it. They're not "out for immediate results." They harass you, and then they disappear. In relation to everything I had heard, I found that their combat potential was very high. Much better than anyone had led us to believe. And I'm sure it's on the rise. What they fear especially is the arrival of helicopters.

Q: Why?

X: Because the helicopters, the French Alouette IIIs, are equipped with 12.7- and 7.62mm machine guns. They're incredible antiguerrilla machines. And also because it's the helicopters that transport the Selous Scouts who know how to trail the terrorists, and attempt to capture them or follow them to find their arms caches. In our case, after an hour the helicopters arrived, only to evacuate our wounded. The terrorists had easily been able to disperse. Usually the helicopters arrive much sooner. All along the border and everywhere in that area, there are these little bases

with one or two aircraft ready to take off in a matter of minutes armed with machine guns and carrying Selous Scouts. In theory, they can be anywhere in less than an hour.

Q: Why are the Selous Scouts so feared?

X: It's a special unit. They go through very difficult training. They learn the customs of the various tribes, their dialects, their behavior. They go through a lot of training in hand-to-hand combat, bush survival, and antiguerrilla warfare. It's a mixed unit, blacks and whites. They are capable, for example, of observing the women of a village going to the stream or well to get water and knowing if people who shouldn't be there are hidden in the village. There is a French Selous Scout. His first name is Jean-Michel. He's been down there for four years. They make the most "catches." But not much is known about them. They don't say anything. We don't even know where their home bases are. When they're needed, they go and pick them up in Alouettes or in DC-3s. During all the time I spent in Mtoko, I never knew where the Selous Scouts of the area were.

Q: Did you get the impression that the Rhodesian Army is well armed and well trained for guerrilla warfare?

X: Without a shadow of a doubt. They have materiel which is light but very effective. The crocodiles, the Eland armored cars [French Panhard armored cars produced in South Africa], the Ferret English armored vehicle, the Alouettes, the Cessna ground-support airplanes [built in France at Reims], the Dakotas, the Canberras. Once on an operation, I saw delta-wing jets that were very fast—French Mirages, I'm almost certain. I didn't manage to see if they had Rhodesian or South African markings. At any rate, they came in to give ground support to the Rhodesian army.

The army is quite solid and well trained. But they've mobilized so many people in that country that there are hardly any more civilians. Or otherwise, they're foreigners or old people. Everyone is on the battlefield or with the Reserve Holding Unit or the B.S.A.P. [British South African Police]. The overall level of training is quite high and very tough. Their paratroopers, for example, jump at 150 yards while on operations. In France, we jump at 250 or 300 yards. To qualify as a paratrooper, you had to pass the Rhodesian exam; they wouldn't accept ours. Even better, not like us, they jump with their gun under their arm, ready to fire; not like us with the gun in a sling that hangs below you until you hit the ground. On the other hand, they've got a lot of guys wasted. . . . In reality, the Rhodesian army has been living in a state of emergency for five years now. And their shock troops like the Selous Scouts, the First R.L.I., or the S.A.S. are really sharp.

Q: What's the S.A.S.'s role?

X: The Special Air Service is a very particular unit that is now

used almost only for operations inside Mozambican territory. Generally, they are dropped at night from high altitude and free-fall toward a precise point for a sabotage operation. They're recovered later by helicopters, for example. The high command finds them so precious that one day they sent a DC-3 into Mozambique to recover a group of sabotage commandos. The plane landed and took off on a road. The pilot was an American, and he was decorated for that. The S.A.S. goes through a very tough training which ends with a long stint on the battlefield and a real-life beating.

Q: Did you participate in a raid into Mozambique?

X: No, but it was included in the planning that our group would participate in these sorts of operations. Those that arrived before us said that they had participated in the raid on the town of Chimoio in Mozambique. They told us that they shot up everything they saw. And the Rhodesian authorities have always explained that that operation was a great defeat for the terrorists. But it was especially civilians that were massacred: The captured military equipment wouldn't even have armed a third of the dead or wounded! After that operation, they returned on foot through the bush. They brought back some Chinese Kalashnikovs and light materiel. Specialized Rhodesian elements had been left behind to cover their retreat and slow the Mozambicans up.

Q: It is also said that the Selous Scouts sometimes carry out particularly horrible terrorist raids on the Rhodesian territory, raids that are then attributed to the guerrillas?

X: That's true. I was told in fact about operations during which the Selous Scouts disguised themselves as either Mozambican troops or guerrillas to attack villages or travelers or to kill church people, for example, which is very unpopular with a good part of the population. That's a speciality with the Rhodesians. They're very good in psychological warfare and consider that one of their tasks is to discredit the terrorists with the population. They also consider that the defense of the Rhodesian territory legitimately calls for attacks against Mozambique since it helps the ZANU guerrillas.

Q: What is the spirit of the Rhodesian Army like?

X: Very, very watchful. Orders are simple: Any person seen in a place where they should not be must immediately be rendered "inoffensive." On the Mozambican border, along the mine field, you fire on sight. And the orders are executed in detail. Among the French, there were a few that added a little touch of their own. For example, at the base in Mtoko, we had prisoners that we put to work for us. The guys from the National Front, for example, used to use their rifle butts on them. I even remember one day when a Rhodesian officer warned a French guy to calm down a little.

Q: What, in general, is the attitude of the people that live in the bush?

X: Fear, as soon as Rhodesian soldiers arrive on the scene. Fear, in fact, is permanent. Not everyone is completely for the guerrillas. The sympathy on which they can count varies from one tribe to the other and also according to the chiefs. But everybody is frightened of the Rhodesian army.

You know, the Rhodesians are herding more and more of the people of the bush into what are called protected villages. These are immense camps surrounded by barbed wire and military guards. Officially, this system is utilized to protect the villagers. In fact, it's to stop the infiltration of guerrillas and to inhibit all contact between them and the population. The peasants can go out during the day to cultivate their fields, but they must return before nightfall. Searches of their huts are frequent, even systematic. The police and the army are everywhere. And there are more and more villages of this type. In the sector where I was, there were about 15. Each one contained several hundred persons.

Q: And the attitude of the white Rhodesians?

X: A lot of them leave. Especially those that have a little money. The others are ready to sell their hide at a high price. They're armed to the teeth. In Salisbury, you see them walking about with a .357 Magnum Colt in their belt or an American carbine over the shoulder. While driving, they've got a submachine gun in their lap. They seem to have an iron will, but I don't think things are as bright as that. You have to remember the kind of life they have been living. The country is completely besieged. To leave Salisbury, you have to wait for a scheduled convoy. There are two a day, protected by armored Land Rovers or armed Leyland trucks. All the civilians are armed. The large farms are protected by farm guards who are military veterans recruited there or in Europe. They each have three or four Africans under their orders. The smaller farms, too far from urban centers to benefit from the protection of the farm guards, are protected by the farm owners themselves. They are all linked by radio to an alert center, and the farmers have the right to buy large quantities of transportable arms and ammunition.

In fact, the "zone of absence of security" is very large. The countryside is no longer secure as soon as you leave the immediate proximity of the military bases. The Rhodesians don't talk about it, but there have been terrorist attacks only two miles from Salisbury. While I was there, there were some guys killed during a guerrilla attack 25 miles from Salisbury. From captured arms caches, they estimate that there are eight thousand terrorists in the vicinity of Salisbury.

In Salisbury itself, the climate is really heavy. Now and then, the police isolate and completely occupy a whole part of the black area—where we were advised not to walk about—and then search one house after the other. Often, they find arms. Out in the country, they know that the terrorist groups are lead by a political commissar who is the only one who knows

where the arms caches are. There are never more than six or seven arms to a cache so as to avoid "accidents."

I've often heard say that the blacks of Rhodesia have the highest standard of living of all Africa. That's questionable. But I think that certain of them would accept to live a little bit worse off in exchange for an end to the bad treatment. They're always being called monkeys; everything is used as a pretext to insult them. If a servant isn't quick enough or if he's clumsy, he's a monkey. They stop and systematically search every car driven by a black while whites drive right on through the police roadblocks as if nothing were there. There aren't any separate toilets and buses for blacks and whites, but they live completely separately. It's *de facto* apartheid. After what I've seen and because of the combativity of the guerrillas, I think the Rhodesians have had it.

Q: Do you think the minefields between Rhodesia and Mozambique are effective?

X: No, they are very porous. They were installed by the Rhodesians to try to limit the infiltration of guerrillas from Mozambique and at the same time to impede the flight of peasants leaving Rhodesia. It's estimated that 15 percent of the people that leave come back as guerrillas.

Q: Is it true that a large number of white Portuguese colonialists from Angola and Mozambique are in Rhodesia?

X: Yes. There are quite a few Portuguese in Rhodesia, particularly in the army. They're not liked at all. In fact, they're treated only a little better than the blacks. The Rhodesians dislike them, first of all, because they lost their colonies and didn't know how to defend them. And also because they lived too close to the Africans and created an important mulatto population in their colonies. In Rhodesia there are almost no mulattoes.

Q: And you, how were you treated?

X: Not badly. In Rhodesian eyes, we were volunteers who had come to help them defend a just cause. They didn't know what had been promised to us and what was really given to us. In fact, militarily, the results of the French unit were not fantastic. The guys were furious at having been misled on their salary. Many of them said so, and quite loudly. There were even incidents of armed threats. The leaders of these were sent to prison for insubordination. In fact, with 245 [Rhodesian] dollars [1,700 francs] a month, we managed to get by fairly well because we only had two weeks every sixth week to spend it in Salisbury. Everyone would meet at the Elizabeth Hotel, which was directed by a Belgian called François, who had a mulatto wife. Life was ordered: bush, guerrillas, pool, women, food, bush again. That was enough for us to spend our 245 Rhodesian dollars, 255 with the special-unit supplement. For those who wanted to stay, their salary was exempted from taxes for the first two years. But they withdrew a tax for the sleeping arrangements when we were on rest leave up at the

base in Cramborne, though we never stayed around there when we went to pick up our pay at the paymaster. Among ourselves or with the Rhodesians, we very rarely discussed political topics. We were hardly informed about what was taking place regarding the attempt to constitute a government with the moderate black nationalist movements.

Q: Did some of you think about settling down in Rhodesia?

X: Yeah, several of us. Some even had their wives come and bought cars. You could find beautiful old Jaguars down there. Everything was rather expensive, and the new cars were old models, except for the Mercedes. The showcases were full of old things, as if everything that arrived in Salisbury was three or four years old. This was true of household appliances, radios, and stereo systems.

Several of us had considered working for UNITA in Angola. There was a contact in the Ambassador Hotel in Salisbury. Others were trying to go to South Africa. I even kept the address of the official recruiter for the South African army, Brigadier General W. R. Jordan, 808 South Port, Kyrkby Street, Johannesburg.

Q: And now, what are you going to do?

X: It seems that Mobutu is recruiting for Shaba. I heard that he was offering ridiculous salaries. If he changes his mind, I'll go there. I've also heard that there's work in the Indian Ocean. After the Comoros, there seems to be something in preparation for the Seychelles.

CIA Said to Have Aided Plotters Who Overthrew Nkrumah in Ghana

by Seymour Hersh

The Central Intelligence Agency advised and supported a group of dissident army officers who overthrew the regime of President Nkrumah of Ghana in February, 1966, first-hand intelligence sources said yesterday.

The Agency's role in the coup d'etat was carried out without prior approval from the high-level interagency group in Washington that monitors CIA clandestine activities, these sources said. That group, known in 1966 as the 303 Committee, had specifically rejected a previous CIA request seeking authority to plot against Mr. Nkrumah, who had angered the United States by maintaining close ties to the Soviet Union and China.

Although the CIA has often been investigated in the twelve years since Mr. Nkrumah was overthrown, there has never been any public disclosure of an Agency role in the coup until now.

At one stage before the overthrow of Mr. Nkrumah, the sources said, the CIA's station chief in Accra, Ghana's capital, requested approval from higher headquarters for the deployment of a small squad of paramilitary experts, members of the agency's Special Operations Group.

Those men, the sources said, were to wear blackface and attack the Chinese Embassy during the coup, killing everyone there and destroying the building. The men also were to steal as much material as possible from the embassy's code room.

[Seymour Hersh, former featured investigative correspondent for the *New York Times*, is at present working on a book on Henry Kissinger. This article first appeared in the *New York Times*, May 9, 1978]

After some hesitation, the sources said, high-level CIA officials in Washington decided against this operation.

Ex-CIA Man's Book

Details of the agency's purported role in the overthrow of Mr. Nkrumah became available after John Stockwell, a former CIA operative, briefly described it in a footnote to his newly published book, "In Search of Enemies."

Mr. Stockwell, who served three tours as a clandestine operative in Africa during his 12-year CIA career, cited the Ghanaian incident in an attempt to buttress his contention that many CIA "problems" were solved in the field, and that "nothing in the CIA records prove how it happened."

In Ghana, Mr. Stockwell writes, after the CIA was told by higher authorities not to try to oust Mr. Nkrumah, the station in Accra was "nevertheless encouraged by headquarters to maintain contact with dissidents of the Ghanaian army for the purpose of maintaining intelligence on their activities."

The account continued:

"It was given a generous budget and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station's involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place.

Attack on Embassy Proposed

"The Station even proposed to headquarters that a squad be on hand at the moment of the coup to storm the Chinese Embassy, kill everyone inside, steal their secret records, and blow up the building to cover the fact."

Although that proposal was disapproved, Mr. Stockwell writes, "inside CIA headquarters the Accra station was given full, if unofficial credit for the eventual coup. None of this was adequately reflected in the Agency's written records."

Other sources who were in Ghana at the time of the coup took issue with the view given in the Stockwell book that the CIA station in Accra deserved full credit for Mr. Nkrumah's overthrow.

Mr. Nkrumah had been the subject of one prior assassination attempt. At the time he was deposed, during a diplomatic trip to China, there were thousands of Ghanaians in jail without trial and growing opposition to his increasingly heavy-handed rule.

His overthrow was met with widespread approval by the citizens of Accra, according to press reports at the time. There were Soviet press reports that the CIA had played a role in the coup.

The Times' sources said that, nonetheless, many CIA operatives in Africa considered the agency's role in the overthrow of Mr. Nkrumah to have been pivotal. At least some officials in Washington headquarters apparent-

ly agreed, the sources said, because Howard T. Banes,* the station chief in Accra at the time, was quickly promoted to a senior position in the Agency. Mr. Banes was eventually transferred from Ghana to Washington, the sources said, where he became chief of operations for the African desk.

"When he was successful," one source said of Mr. Banes, "everyone in the African division knew it. If it had failed, he would have been transferred and no CIA involvement revealed."

At the height of the operation in Ghana, the sources said, the CIA station in Accra grew to include as many as 10 officers, some of them on temporary duty, and all operating under cover.

The sources acknowledged that money was not a factor for those officers who were planning the coup.

It Was in Their Interest

"We didn't have to pay them \$5 million," one source said. "It was in their interest to take over the country."

In his book, Mr. Stockwell specifically charges that the CIA has used the 40 Committee, the high-level review group set up in the Nixon Administration, "to authenticate some of its more sensitive operations but has by no means brought all of its covert actions to the attention of the 40 Committee."

"Without true confessions from the operatives involved it would be impossible to estimate the percentage of operations throughout the years which have been run without NSC supervision, but certainly they were numerous, and some of major consequences," Mr. Stockwell wrote, referring to the National Security Council.

He again refers to the operation in Ghana, noting that the CIA was ordered not to involve itself in the coup, but "played a major role in the overthrow" nonetheless.

"To Obtain Intelligence"

CIA cables and dispatches suggest "that all contacts with the plotters were undertaken solely to obtain intelligence on what they were doing," Mr. Stockwell added.

The Times' sources also said that the CIA group led by Mr. Banes received permission to purchase some Soviet intelligence materials that had been confiscated by Ghanaian Army troops during the coup.

After a payment, of at least \$100,000, the sources said, a special secret airplane flight was arranged and the Soviet materials—including a cigarette lighter that also functioned as a camera—were transferred to CIA headquarters.

One CIA analyst who was involved in the subsequent processing and ex-

*The correct spelling is Bane. Eds.

amination of the Soviet spy gear in Washington recalled in a recent conversation that he and others speculated frequently on the origin of the goods, but were never provided with any information by their superiors.

Mr. Banes and other agents in the Accra CIA station also were said by *The Times'* sources to have been enraged by the Agency's high-level decision not to permit a raid on the Chinese Embassy, at the time the Peking Government's only embassy in Africa.

"They didn't have the guts to do it," Mr. Banes subsequently told one associate, the sources said.

Games People Play

by Jim Paul

We must use to our advantage the dictum "divide and rule."

—Roger Gaudefroy-Demombynes,
A French official in colonial Morocco

The clash over the status of the former Spanish Sahara has brought Morocco and Algeria to the verge of another armed conflict.

During the anti-colonial movements, a tendency for unified revolutionary action emerged throughout the Maghreb. This tendency was particularly strong among the cadres directly engaged in armed struggle. They fought not only to oust the colonialists but also to unify North Africa and to win a new social order serving the needs of the people. French neo-colonial strategists employed every means to contain and crush this tendency. They skillfully used bourgeois nationalism for this purpose, preparing separate national states to succeed the colonial administrative zones. In the mid-1950's, the French made key concessions to the nationalists in Morocco and Tunisia; they then helped to consolidate the power of these moderates and the reactionary Moroccan monarchy as well through assistance programs and political pressures. During the early 1960's, the French employed similar tactics to moderate and stabilize the new Algerian regime under the tutelage of the Algerian officer corps. As the new states developed, motions toward Maghreb unification slowed and the revolutionary tide among the masses began to ebb.

The United States participated actively in subsequent intervention, sometimes in competition with the French but often in alliance with them. The intervention of both powers further consolidated Maghreb national divisions. Economic pressures became a key policy tool. The World Bank,

[Jim Paul is a member of the Middle East Research and Information Project. This article first appeared in their journal, *MERIP Reports*, March 1976.]

the International Monetary Fund, and the "aiding" governments all exerted influence to insure the separate evolution of the new states. The resulting competitive trade relations and narrow internal markets stifled each "national" development and kept the regional economy fragmented and weak. This situation perpetuated a Maghreb economy dominated by primary production for export. The region as a whole necessarily remained within the grip of international capitalist accumulation.

Metropolitan intervention also took a political form. This sought to consolidate the new states as separate entities by reinforcing state structures, a process known as "state building." Assistance programs built up the national armed forces, counter-insurgency units and police. Financial and technical assistance insured the burgeoning of conservative and self-serving new state bureaucracies. France and the U.S. also covertly supported nationalist political tendencies and launched clandestine operations to exacerbate Maghreb rivalries. Among other things, they funded Moroccan opposition guerrillas based in Algeria; the sums they provided were small enough to render the guerrillas' actions harmless but large enough to heighten tension between the two states.

Maghreb politics cannot be ascribed entirely to outside manipulation, of course. Internal social forces and ideological formations, with deep historical roots, provided the conditions and limits for intervention. To recognize this reality does not diminish the importance of intervention, however. In a host of ways, intervention underlies both the general and specific character of politics in the region, and especially the impetus of the present conflict. As Morocco and Algeria clash, metropolitan capital can claim a success for its classic policy: "divide and rule."

Interventionist Strategy Making and the Algeria-Morocco Conflict

In what follows, we explore one example of divide-and-rule strategy. It is particularly relevant to the present crisis for it reveals American planning for a war between Morocco and Algeria. A war-planning exercise was carried out under the direction of American academic, military and intelligence experts in the fall of 1968. This exercise explored the conditions under which a war between the two Maghreb countries might break out and how its course and containment might benefit American diplomacy and interests in the region. The author was present at the exercise and writes from recollection and from a file of exercise documents.

The Center for International Studies of MIT, an establishment well-known for its close connections with the Central Intelligence Agency, developed a war research project on limited war in the mid-1960s. This project used "simulation" or "gaming" techniques known as "political-military exercises," developed by the RAND Corporation and the Joint War Games Agency of the Department of Defense. The project, named

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CONEX, was headed by Professor Lincoln Bloomfield, a former military officer on the MIT faculty. The stated objectives were to study the "control of local conflict in developing regions of the world . . . great power arms and conflict control policies . . . and reactions to U.S. and other arms and conflict control measures."

Funded by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the nominal purpose of the project was to foster peace and arms limitation. In practice, however, the project was as much concerned with promoting regional conflicts for American diplomatic purposes as it was with terminating such conflicts under the auspices of American intervention. Project planners selected a number of potential limited wars throughout the Third World for study as special exercises. The second exercise in the project series, CONEX II, which took place on December 6 and 7, 1968, at the MIT Endicott House, a mansion on the outskirts of Boston, was to be a war between Morocco and Algeria, to take place hypothetically in July 1970. There were about 40 participants, not including a scattering of technical assistants, military aides and special observers. They came from universities, the State Department, military intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Institute for Strategic Analysis, the Institute for Naval Research, and, of course, the CIA.

Professor Bloomfield introduced the leading participants and enthusiastically described how the exercise would contribute to world peace and American national security. He then briefly outlined the game procedures. A "scenario" drawn up by Professor I. William Zartman of New York University (see *MERIP Reports*, No. 38) would provide the general background of the events leading up to the conflict period. Participants would divide up into four teams: Morocco, Algeria, the United States and Control. The country teams would act as governments and Control would act as all other governments as well as internal political forces in the team countries. All communications would be by written messages to permit future study; in addition, team deliberations would be subject to continual television monitoring and would be tape recorded. The exercise would develop in a series of six stages, known as "move periods" with historical time of one or more days elapsing between each. If the projections of the scenario were correct, the exercise would move up to conditions of open warfare between the two countries and then return to a ceasefire under the auspices of Great Power diplomacy.

Team assignments had organized each country team like a formal government. Team members were assigned specific functions: chief of state, foreign affairs minister, defense minister and so forth. Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University was assigned to play the President of the United States; John F. Root, undersecretary of the Air Force, was to play President Boumedienne; and Ambassador William Whitman II was to play King Hassan. The Control team had its own special division of labor. North African Affairs were to be

handled by Zartman and Paul from NYU; arms capabilities by Priscilla Clapp and John Hoaglund from Browne & Shaw; Mashreq and Europe by Waldo Dubberstein, chief of the Middle East desk at CIA; and Russia by Professor Uri Ra'anani, a Soviet specialist from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Soon Bloomfield adjourned the briefing session and the teams assembled in their separate rooms. Events moved slowly at first as the teams gingerly felt their way along. The scenario provided for considerable tension between Morocco and Algeria at the outset, but this did not precipitate any dramatic action. The scenario had informed the teams that the two countries were hostile due to the undefined border, lingering grievances from the 1963 war, and a developing conflict over the Spanish Sahara. Both regimes were also said to be under pressure from internal opposition forces, tempting them to rally national unity through external crisis. But in spite of these factors, the Moroccan and Algerian teams were cautious and reluctant to assume the risks of heightened tension.

The Control team began to stir up the crisis, skillfully crafting a situation of growing urgency. Clapp informed the Moroccan team that 3,000-4,000 Soviet instructors had been introduced into Algeria. Ra'anani drew up and circulated a Pravda article denouncing "some Western organs which openly refer to 'prospects of conflict in North Africa.'" Excitement was building. The Moroccan team urgently requested a summit meeting with Algeria and simultaneously called on France and the U.S. to supply more arms. Control took new initiatives. Ra'anani announced a new Soviet arms shipment to Algeria while Dubberstein launched a French offer of arms to Morocco in exchange for "mineral concessions." Messengers raced around the house with the latest communications; the television monitors showed grave deliberations of state. At the typewriters of Control, provocative newspaper "plants" and disquieting intelligence reports were in the works when the move period ended and lunch was announced.

The participants gathered in the spacious dining room with a mood of anticipation muted by a professional detachment and a chummy "old boy" camaraderie. Casual conversation turned to mutual concerns; arms and espionage, war and domestic protests, the failing battle for Vietnam. The former inhabitants of the mansion stared down with bourgeois composure from their heavy-framed portraits. Beyond the wide windows, the silent garden warmed in the bright winter sun. For a time the imminence of war subsided. According to the scenario, after all, the guns would likely remain mute until the following day.

Move Period B began after lunch, to be followed shortly by another move period in the later afternoon. As fresh communications and strategy appraisals appeared at the hands of the messengers, the diplomatic situation began to clarify. The United States was anxious to contain the "radical" initiatives of Algeria, behind which it saw the malevolent strategy of Soviet diplomacy. Qualified support for the "friendly" government in Ra-

bat, joined to complex maneuvers with France and the Soviet Union, would permit the conflict to mature so that eventual "peacemaking" efforts would moderate regional politics. France and the Soviets, the immediate arms suppliers of the two belligerents, would be discredited and lose their diplomatic and economic initiatives. America would emerge with firm hegemony in the region.

In this context, the Control team had a dual function that was increasingly clear if never explicitly stated. On the one hand, it was to function as separate and distinct from the American country team; on the other, it was to function as a kind of clandestine operations unit of American policy in provoking an outbreak of hostilities. Since no one actually admitted that American policy favored the provocation of war, the thrust of Control toward war occurred under the "logic" of the exercise. The scenario called for an escalation. Game Director Bloomfield reminded the Control team that it was up to them to see to it that the game progressed as it was supposed to!

Throughout the afternoon, the conflict drifted along lazily, for all the best efforts of the Control team. Soviet and French arms offers were renewed to Algeria and Morocco respectively, but qualified by heavy concessions that neither recipient was anxious to make. Egyptian support, including the direct provision of aircraft, gave a slight advantage to the Algerian forces, but intelligence reports indicated that the Saudis would greatly moderate Egyptian involvement. Meanwhile, the two governments moved their troops toward the border, but it was clear from their deliberations that they were ready for a fight. So Control began to set in motion internal pressures on the two regimes. Belkasim Krim, Algerian opposition leader in exile, appeared in Morocco and the Algerian team was warned that he was "believed to encourage Moroccan aggressive measures" as well as stirring up unrest in the Algerian border zones. Likewise, the Moroccan team was warned of Algerian subversion and the possibilities of popular discontent in Morocco if the regime did not take decisive action. War pressures were visibly mounting.

Dinner intervened at last and the big television monitors showed silently empty rooms where moments before the flurry of diplomacy had prevailed. The participants were getting weary and lingered over cocktails and dinner.

Move Period C which followed was short and inconclusive. Six calendar days were supposed to have passed since the beginning of the exercise, the moment planned for war was nearing, and yet everything still moved in slow motion. The American team fretted over its many imponderables and all wondered how they would fare in thwarting (in the words of the scenario) the alliance between Algerian "regional ambitions" and Moscow's "accelerating drive" for influence in the area. Control cooked up a few more newspaper stories and intelligence reports to raise tensions. Algeria and Morocco made fresh efforts to avert the impending crisis. Little of sub-

stance had changed when nine o'clock arrived and the exercise was concluded for the night.

The morning of the 7th, a subtle change in the mood of the participants was evident: the moment for war had come. People finished their breakfast quickly and moved to their respective quarters for an early beginning of the crucial Move Period E. But a vital question remained to be answered: what would precipitate the crisis? Director Bloomfield reminded the Control team of what was expected. Since the arms race experts had failed in their provocations, it was clearly up to the North Africa members. Zartman was confident he could push the countries over the brink. At 9:45 his message went out: three symbolic locations in Algiers were hit by terrorist bombs and Belkasim Krim held a press conference in Rabat claiming credit. At last! At exactly 10:00 the message was delivered announcing that Algeria was going to war. The Algerian government had declared a state of emergency, broken off diplomatic relations with Morocco and launched air strikes against alleged terrorist camps in Eastern Morocco. Soon the Moroccans had retaliated. They declared a state of emergency, expelled the Algerian ambassador and launched air and sapper strikes against Algerian air bases. Now the UN Security Council was called into emergency session, "hot line" messages were exchanged between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The belligerents sent out urgent requests for immediate arms deliveries. All teams were now intent and excited, talking quickly and drafting scores of messages. The mood was one of sober elation. The moment long anticipated had finally arrived.

The American team, now confident, moved swiftly to consolidate a cease-fire under its auspices. As one policy document concluded, the risks of the war for American diplomacy were slight by contrast with the gains: if temporary Algerian advances led to an overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy, a military regime equally favorable to American interests would surely follow. Meanwhile, troop movements and border clashes continued. But the belligerents began to look for a negotiated settlement, realizing that real victory on the battlefield was impossible. At the same time, France and the Soviet Union faced a dilemma. Unable and unwilling to risk further commitments, they reluctantly began to swing behind the American position. As the move period ended, the fighting continued. Nevertheless, a conclusion to the war was clearly in sight.

Move Period F, the final one, began in the early afternoon. Several days had hypothetically elapsed since the previous period. War had gone on, according to the scenario, in a limited and inconclusive way, ending finally in a Great Power-imposed ceasefire. Under pressure from the U.S. and without alternate foreseeable gains, both the French and the Soviets had agreed to refuse arms to the belligerents. The activities of the final brief exercise period involved efforts to develop a final settlement and a mutual pullback of forces. The game ended before this was achieved, but a future "normalization" under American sponsorship was clearly in the cards.

The afternoon ended with an evaluation session filled with talk of "scientific policy studies," "furthering the cause of peace" and similar kinds of ideology and self-congratulation. The participants, satisfied at the outcome and in a mood of earnest enthusiasm, took their leave. Staff cars and limousines were waiting at the door. As darkness settled over the suburban landscape, only the caretaker remained behind in the somber Endicott mansion.

Conclusion

Seven years later the Maghreb is on the verge of a war not very different from the one played out in CONEX II. How can we connect the game with the present crisis and the struggle which lies ahead? The answer is not completely obvious, for the game is two-sided. On the one hand, it seems the epitome of sinister, powerful manipulation. On the other hand, it appears as absurd and ridiculous, an example of shallow, stupid arrogance. In fact, the game cannot be understood as merely one side or another of this polarity; it contains both.

From the standpoint of successful manipulation, the game must be situated in terms of the tremendous power and vast interventionist resources available to American policymakers in the region. These include not only the apparatuses of espionage and clandestine operations, but also the network of overt economic and political relations: treaties, agreements, conversations, advisers, military aid, police training, loans, grants, investments, export purchases, currency agreements, and the like. Morocco is firmly embedded in this nexus of client relations; Algeria is exposed as well, through giant oil and gas deals, industrial development projects, bank loans, and so forth.

Against this background, the game reveals the development of a general policy strategy. It poses the question: can limited war be used to benefit American power in the region? It answers the question in the affirmative: such a war has few risks and many potential benefits. The evolution of the game also suggests how such a war can be touched off and how its course and conclusion can be manipulated in the interest of American policy.

The connection between the game and American policymaking is not as remote as the university setting might seem to imply. There is every reason to suppose that the initiative for the game came from the highest policymaking circles. Equally important, many participants held top regional responsibility in key government operations agencies: CIA, military intelligence, State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff. These people translate global strategy into regional implementation. In the game they were testing out a global idea in their regional setting (other games in the CONEX series explored the same situation in other areas).

How, then, did the game become actual policy practice? Clearly it was a test of a strategic principle, not an operational plan. This is evident from

the fact that in the *real* July 1970 (the hypothetical date of the war game) the Maghreb did not experience any dramatic arms build-up or flare-up of internal political tensions. In fact, the summer of 1970 marked the peak of *détente* between the Moroccan and Algerian regimes. The two heads of state met at Tlemcen at the end of May; they reached an accord on the border dispute and exchanged statements of friendship, cooperation and unity of purpose. At that time, however, the seeds of future conflict were already being sown.

American policy had begun to support Spanish diplomatic initiative on the Sahara question. Spanish efforts aimed at splitting the unity of the Maghreb states and pitting them against one another. This plan of action was substantially successful. At the same time, American strategists began a calculated destabilization of Moroccan internal politics whose principal goal was apparently to weaken or overthrow the monarchy in favor of aggressively nationalist elements within the army. Sometime in 1970, a top Moroccan general was informed by American officials of the terrible corruption in the royal regime. A deal may have been made. In any event, the general led a major coup attempt in the summer of 1971. Only a year later, a second coup was attempted by elements of the Moroccan Air Force operating out of the American naval air station at Kenitra. Although the coups did not succeed, they put pressure on the monarchy to adopt a more vigorously nationalist stance and to curry American favor all the more ardently.

More recently, especially in the past year, American moves to step up the conflict have intensified. The American government greatly increased the pace of its arms shipments to Morocco. The American press has been full of stories of growing hostilities between Morocco and Algeria and the likelihood of war. American officials have made statements which can only have aggravated tensions. Even the visible part of the American campaign is obvious enough; the invisible part must be still more extensive. The CONEX strategy is being put into practice. Whether war breaks out or not is largely immaterial. A conflict situation is being generated. The manipulative side of CONEX II thus has a definite and disturbing reality.

At the same time, the game is fundamentally absurd, especially when measured by long-term historical standards. It presumed a level of control over events that is utterly impossible, even for the strongest protagonist. The complex movement of history, full of unexpected turns, usually defies such arrogant plans and frequently upsets them completely. Endless planning of the same type was devoted to the war in Indochina. But even as the strategists met in Endicott House, they admitted their stunning defeat in Southeast Asia. We may expect that the future development of the Maghreb will permit a similar judgment on the vicious but illusory counter-revolutionary plans developed at MIT.

[Prof. Bloomfield became a National Security staff member in the spring of 1979. Eds.]

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How the West Established Idi Amin and Kept Him There

*by Pat Hutton and Jonathan
Bloch*

That Idi Amin was a brutal dictator of extraordinary cruelty is well-known and becomes more so as the tally of his victims is totted up by the new regime. What is less known is the role of the British government and its allies not only in maintaining Amin's machinery of repression but in actually establishing him in power. Although Amin became alienated from his friends in the West, we can show here that the break between Amin and Britain became complete only when his fall was imminent and that, regarding him as the least evil option from the point of view of British interests, Britain actively helped keep him in power.

The tale of how western imperialist powers took measures to reverse the decline of their fortunes in Africa during the 1960s is complex in detail but simple in principle. In Uganda, once dubbed the "Pearl of Africa" by Winston Churchill, huge British financial, industrial, and agricultural interests were under threat from the regime of Dr. Milton Obote, the Prime Minister. Unease about Obote's intentions was combined with attempts by the imperialists to ingratiate themselves. Obote accepted aid from the Israeli government, which was desperately trying to avoid total diplomatic isolation while being used as a proxy by the United States in countries where its own reputation was tarnished. The Americans and Israelis worked in very close cooperation in Uganda, particularly through their respective intelli-

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gence agencies, the CIA and MOSSAD. The Americans provided some development aid while Israeli troops trained the army and air force.* The British economic and political presence was always predominant and this was one of the situations that Obote hoped to change.

Throughout the late sixties, Prime Minister Obote was consolidating his personal power and introducing legislation that was to shake the colonial interests. Although Obote was no Castro or Nyerere, his "Common Man's Charter" and the nationalization of eighty British companies were not welcome in London. As one prominent commentator put it, "The Obote government was on the point of changing not only the constitution but the whole political system when the army coup occurred" in January 1971. A vital source of raw materials, Uganda was not about to be permitted to determine its own political development at the expense of the entrenched interests. Soon, plans were being laid by the British in combination with the Israelis and Americans to remedy this situation.

"A Little Short on the Gray Matter"

The first task was to choose Obote's possible successor, and Idi Amin proved an obvious choice. Known by the British as "a little short on the gray matter" though "intensely loyal to Britain," his qualifications were superb. He had started his career as a noncommissioned officer in the British colonial regiment, the King's African Rifles, and later served in the British suppression of Kenyan nationalists in the late 1950s (mistakenly known as the Mau Mau rebellion). As one of those in charge of the concentration camps he earned the title "The Strangler." In Uganda he had helped form the General Service Units (the political police) and had even chosen the presidential bodyguard. Some have said that Amin was being groomed for power as early as 1966, but the plotting by the British and others began in earnest only in 1969.

This plotting was based in the southern Sudan, in the midst of a tribe that counted Amin among its members. Here, the Israeli government had been supporting a secessionist movement called the Anya-Nya against the central Sudanese government, in an effort to divert Arab military forces from Israel's western front with Egypt during the "no peace, no war" period of the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of those helping the Anya-Nya was Rolf Steiner, a German mercenary veteran of several wars, who told of his time there in a book published in 1978, *The Last Adventurer*.

Steiner said that he had been introduced to representatives of the giant Roman Catholic charity, Caritas International, and referred by them to two men who would help him provide assistance to the Anya-Nya—Bever-

*In March 1977 it was revealed that the Israelis had been used by the CIA as paymasters in part of their massive bribery program, which included several heads of state, including King Hussein of Jordan.

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ley Barnard, a "former British diplomat," and Anthony Deval, also British. They also suggested that Steiner keep in touch with a British mercenary called Alexander Gay.

Steiner had made Gay's acquaintance when they were both serving as mercenaries on the Biafran side during the Nigerian civil war. A former bank clerk, Gay had fought in the Congo from 1965 to 1968 and then in Nigeria, where he met the famous novelist Frederic Forsyth, then a war correspondent. Gay was one of the key figures in the mercenary operation to mount a coup d'etat that Forsyth organized solely to provide material for his book *The Dogs of War*. (Forsyth said that he was incapable of writing from imagination and had to be inspired by real experiences!)

Forsyth had stood bail and given character references for Gay in November 1973 when he stood trial for making a false statement to obtain a passport and for possession of a pistol, ammunition, and gelignite. On conviction, he was sentenced only to a fine and a suspended sentence, and one of the factors leading to this leniency may have been that the Special Branch had praised him in court and testified that he had provided "information which was great and considerable help to western powers." Another of the mercenaries involved in Forsyth's abortive coup d'etat alleged that Gay was working for MI6, backing Steiner's allegations. This man, Alan Murphy, was later shot dead in London's East End in suspicious circumstances.

However, back in East Africa, Barnard, Gay, Deval and Steiner established themselves in the southern Sudan with a radio link to their other base in the Apollo Hotel in Kampala. But Steiner said he did not know of the real intentions of his British colleagues until he heard Gay had been casting aspersions on him to the Anya-Nya leadership. In a confrontation over this, Steiner forced Gay to tell him what his real task was—to overthrow or assassinate Obote. The British government had no interest in supporting a southern Sudanese secession and was only using the Anya-Nya as cover for their plans for the future of Uganda.

Steiner said that he wanted to know more, so he made Gay come with him to Kampala to search Barnard's room at the Apollo Hotel. They came away with a mass of coded documents detailing the British plot that had been transmitted to London by the British Embassy. Steiner says in his book that Gay explained to him why Obote's successor had been chosen; saying, "Blunden [the pseudonym Steiner uses for Barnard] told me that the British knew Idi Amin well and he was their first choice because he was the stupidest and the easiest to manipulate." As Steiner remarks, "Events were later to prove who was the most stupid." Little more is known about this episode except that Steiner claims that Barnard was operating an airline called Southern Air Motive, and had planned the December 1969 assassination attempt on Obote. It has been independently confirmed that Gay and Barnard were working for MI6 and also that Steiner found MI6 code books at the hotel.

The Israeli Hand

That it was the Israelis who were providing so much help to the Anya-Nya while the Britons plotted against Obote lends support to the allegations of a former CIA official in March 1978 that Amin's coup was planned by British intelligence in cooperation with MOSSAD. Amin was known to have visited the southern Sudan at least twice in 1970, once in disguise, and was in constant touch with the rebels.

One of Amin's Israeli friends has spoken of his role in the coup and how he helped Amin. Colonel Baruch Bar-Lev, head of the Israeli military delegation, said that Amin approached him, saying that he feared that people loyal to Obote would be able to arrest and kill him before he could secure Kampala. Bar-Lev told Amin that troops from his own tribe should be on hand, as well as paratroopers, tanks and jeeps. Bolstered by the Israeli assistance and the greater power of the tank corps, Amin was able to overwhelm the majority of the armed forces loyal to Obote. The southern Sudanese were a core of the forces in the coup, and thousands of them later joined the Ugandan army as mercenaries and carried out many of Amin's early bloody purges.

The Israelis had clearly been cultivating Amin for some time through their military presence in a manner consistent with their role as American proxies and in accordance with the CIA's standard tactic of the day, to cultivate members of the armed forces for whatever purposes might be deemed necessary. These times were the heyday of the CIA's worldwide efforts to subvert radical regimes and in Africa to assert the predominance of the United States as far as possible. Active in Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria, the United States was also seeking to gain influence in Uganda, especially by means of the intelligence officers of the navy and air force stationed in Kampala, together with the CIA agents working under the cover of the Agency for International Development. One of the features of the January 1971 coup was its similarity to the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966. Like Obote, Nkrumah had been putting forward nationalization measures and, when on a visit abroad (like Obote), was toppled by a military force that was immediately supported by the CIA.

But the local army may well have had the backup of other forces in case Amin had had a tougher time taking control. Just a few days before the coup, seven hundred British troops arrived in neighboring Kenya. Although they were apparently scheduled to arrive long before, the *Sunday Express* speculated that they would be used to put down anti-British riots following the decision of the British Conservative government to sell weapons to South Africa, remarking that the presence of the troops, "seemingly co-incidental—could prove providential." It added that they would be used "if trouble for Britons and British interests starts." The report was followed two days later, still before the coup, by strenuous denials.

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When the coup took place, Dr. Obote was attending the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. He was aware that the internal situation in Uganda was not to his advantage and went to the conference only because President Nyerere had impressed on him the importance of being there to help present effective opposition to the British government's South African arms sales. The African members of the Commonwealth were piling the pressure on the Conservative government. At a meeting with Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Obote, British Prime Minister Ted Heath was threatened with the withdrawal of those countries from the Commonwealth should the South African arms decision go through. During this tempestuous meeting Heath was reported to say, "I wonder how many of you will be allowed to return to your own countries from this conference."

Other reports have stated that Heath's apparent foreknowledge of the coup was the result of information passed to him by MI6, who wanted him to inform Obote of the moves against him. In view of MI6's role in helping plan those moves, and the outright hostility between Obote and the British government, the previous Labour administration included, this seems very unlikely.

No more credible than that report was the account of the coup repeated in the British press. There, it was put forward that a sergeant-major operating a telephone exchange had overheard a conversation concerning plans by Obote supporters in the army to move against Amin. Upon hearing the news, Amin moved into action, quickly seizing all strategic points in Uganda. Apart from the fact that the army would not have attempted to remove Amin in the absence of Obote, this version ignores the British and Israeli plans.

On Amin's accession to power, all was sweetness and light between him and the British establishment. He was hailed as a conquering hero in the British press, and even the U.S. government considered the British government's recognition of Amin, one week after the coup, as showing unseemly haste. The *Times* commented, "The replacement of Dr. Obote by General Amin was received with ill-concealed relief in Whitehall." Other press comments included, "Good Luck to General Amin" (*Daily Telegraph*); "Military men are trained to act. Not for them the posturing of the Obotes or Kaundas who prefer the glory of the international platform rather than the dull but necessary tasks of running a smooth administration" (*Daily Express*); and more in the same vein.

Amin supported Ted Heath's stand on selling arms to South Africa, breaking the unified opposition of the states at the conference. He also denationalized several of the British companies taken over under Obote, and in July went to London for lunch with the Queen and meetings with the Conservative cabinet. There, the seeds of discord between Britain and Amin were being sown as he began to fail to live up to their expectations of servility. After the coup Uganda was granted ten million pounds in eco-

nomic aid (to be administered by Britain), fifteen "Ferret" and thirty-six "Saladin" armored cars, other military equipment, and a training team for the army; however, Amin resented the fact that Lord Carrington (then Defence Minister) and Alec Douglas-Home (then Foreign Secretary) would not give him fighters and other sophisticated equipment to help his expansionist ambitions. In particular, Amin had plans for an invasion of Tanzania, so that he could have a port on the east coast of his own. However, it was admitted that most of the military equipment was provided to help Amin put down resistance by supporters of Obote.

For help in this project, which was becoming an obsession, Amin then turned to the Israelis: He asked them for Phantom jet fighters and other sophisticated weapons, permission for which would have been required from the American government. Saying that the requests "went beyond the requirements of legitimate self-defense" they refused Amin, which probably was a factor in his expulsion of the Israelis in early 1972. Although short of the hardware necessary, Amin was well supplied with strategic advice. This came from another collaborator with British intelligence, Major Ian Walsworth-Bell. Acting as an internal security adviser to Amin, Walsworth-Bell was living on the Kagera River, on the border with Tanzania, where Amin used to come to visit him frequently by helicopter.

This former officer in the Seaforth Highlanders had been a member of the International Commission of Observers sent to the Nigerian civil war to investigate charges of genocide, but he was sacked amid allegations that he had offered his services to the federal government as a mercenary. But at a National Insurance Tribunal in England, where he was protesting his dismissal and claiming compensation, Walsworth-Bell explained that his real role in Nigeria was to collect intelligence for the British government and offer strategic military advice to the federal forces. In spite of strenuous denials from the Foreign Office, the Tribunal accepted his story and described him as a "frank and honest witness."

It is not known whether Walsworth-Bell's activities on behalf of Amin were officially sanctioned by the British government, or parts of it, but his role seems to have been similar to the part he played in Nigeria. At any rate, he took the invasion planning very seriously, undertaking spying missions to Tanzania to reconnoiter the defenses and terrain in secret. Walsworth-Bell supplied Amin with a strategic and logistical plan to the best of his abilities, and although lack of hardware was an obstacle, evidence that he never gave up the idea has come in the fact that the invasion by Tanzanian and Ugandan anti-Amin forces which brought his rule to an end was immediately preceded by an abortive invasion of Tanzania by Amin's army.

In the manner which characterized the major's behavior after the Nigerian episode, he did not maintain discretion when back in England. He wanted to publish his story of cooperation with Amin in the *Daily Express*, but this was scotched by an interesting move by the government—a "D-

Notice" banning the story on grounds of national security. According to one intelligence agency, Walsworth-Bell was actually seen at Entebbe airport at the time of the invasion in early 1979, although this is impossible to verify.

CIA Trains Torturers

Beginning with his purges of the army, later extending them to those who had carried out the purges, the ferocity and cruelty of Amin's rule increased steadily—most of it performed by the dreaded "Public Safety Unit," the "State Research Centre," and various other bodies. These received training assistance and supplies from Britain and America. In July 1978 the American columnist Jack Anderson revealed that ten of Amin's henchmen from the Public Safety Unit were trained at the International Police Academy in the exclusive Washington suburb of Georgetown. The CIA-run academy was responsible for training police officers from all over the world, including training in torture, until it was closed down in 1975. Three of the Ugandans continued their "studies" at a graduate school, also run by the CIA, called International Police Services Inc. Shortly after the coup the CIA had one full-time police instructor stationed in Uganda. Controversy raged in the United States when it became known in November 1977 that forty to fifty Ugandans were training in the United States in the use of equipment sold to Uganda. Twelve of these were police helicopter pilots for American Bell helicopters that had been delivered in 1973.

Security equipment of various types also found its way to Uganda from Britain, and most of it came as a result of the groundwork done by another collaborator of British intelligence in Africa, Bruce Mackenzie, the ex-RAF pilot and long-serving adviser to President Kenyatta of Kenya. He was the East African agent for Pye Telecommunications, the giant British electronics firm. Trade in radio transmitters and other devices continued right up to Amin's fall from power.* This security equipment was only part of the cargo of what was Amin's lifeline for most of his rule—the Stansted shuttle.

Several times a week the aircraft of Uganda Airlines would touch down at Stansted airport in Essex to unload quantities of tea and coffee and take on board all the necessary supplies for Amin's survival, luxury goods like

*The *Daily Express's* writer on intelligence, Chapman Pincher, said that he met at Mackenzie's home senior officials in MI6, Israeli intelligence, the CIA, and the Iranian SAVAK, adding that Mackenzie had "built up a joint intelligence network with Israel which had sensational consequences." Mackenzie was, apparently, involved in the planning of the Entebbe raid, and on one occasion was responsible for the arrest of Palestinians in Kenya who were secretly turned over to the Israeli authorities. Mackenzie died when a bomb planted by Amin's police exploded in his private plane, but the trade with Pye continued afterward.

whiskey and furs, and military supplies. In spite of all the revelations of the nature of Amin's dictatorship and his dependency on the Stansted shuttle, it continued right up to February 1979, when the British government ended it in an extraordinary piece of opportunism. The chief advantage of the shuttle to Amin was that it obviated the need for foreign exchange, of which Uganda had virtually none.

In June 1977, the *Sunday Times* revealed that the planes were picking up Land Rovers (twenty-eight were delivered), one of them specially converted and bristling with sophisticated electronic equipment for monitoring broadcasts, jamming, and other capabilities. The cargo spotlighted by the *Sunday Times* also included a mobile radio studio, which is almost certainly whence Amin was continuing to assert over the airwaves that he was in control long after he had been ousted from Kampala. At the same time, an extensive relationship between Uganda and the Crown Agents, the trading agency with strong links in the former colonies controlled by the British government, was exposed. The Crown Agents had arranged a deal for Amin to buy 120 three-ton trucks, made at Vauxhall in Luton. These trucks are thought to have been converted for military purposes before being shipped out. The firm that supplied the electronic equipment, Contact Radio Telephones, and another firm in the same field had also supplied the State Research Centre with telephone-tapping equipment, night-vision devices, burglar alarms, and anti-bomb blankets. When Liberal MP David Steel questioned Prime Minister Callaghan about all this, all he had to say was that the devices were "intended to track down television licence dodgers." To add to all that, it was said that after the Entebbe raid by Israeli troops, the radar damaged there was sent to England for repair.

The principal value of the shuttle was to maintain Amin's system of privileges, vital for retaining the allegiance of the army. His power elite, consisting of army officers not subject to the stringent rationing imposed on the rest of the population, depended on the goods brought in on the shuttle. During times of the frequent and widespread shortages of basic commodities linked to inflation of around 150 percent, the officers could use the British goods to make their fortunes on the black market.

A further aspect of the Stansted shuttle involved all the previously mentioned intelligence agencies; this was in the provision of the aircraft. According to the intelligence sources of the then London correspondent of the *Washington Post*, Bernard Nossiter, Pan Am was instructed by the CIA to sell several Boeing 707s to ATASCO, an Israeli company with former Ministry of Defence connections owned by Shaul Eisenberg, a millionaire with a vast commercial empire. ATASCO sold one of the Boeings to Zimex Aviation, a small firm based in Switzerland, which passed the plane on to Amin in May 1976. The function of Zimex is to act as a "laundry" for the financing of projects backed by MOSSAD.

In 1977 ATASCO wanted to sell another Boeing to Uganda Airlines, but with the notoriety of Amin's regime getting worse, they feared losing

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the U.S. State Department approval they had won for the first deal. The plane was sold to Ronair Inc., which then leased the plane to Uganda Airlines. Ronair is very closely tied to ATASCO and is situated in the same building in New York. The purpose of this extraordinary generosity was to spy on the Libyan military airfield of Benghazi, where the planes always refueled before going on to Stansted. MOSSAD and the CIA provided "navigators" for the planes to spy on the airfield and make reports which were shared out among CIA, MOSSAD, and MI6. The information was probably of very little use, since the Libyans almost certainly knew of the presence of the "navigators" on the planes. But Amin was getting a very cheap service for the coffee and tea bound for London and the other goods that returned.

The Americans also provided pilots for the planes. A California company, Avtec, supplied the pilots acting as a subcontractor for Zimex. Avtec also had close links with ATASCO but, according to Nossiter, "has no formal intelligence links."

In general, the British-government attitude to Amin's regime was neatly summed up by the *Times* when Amin had just expelled the Ugandan Asians in the summer of 1972: "The irony is that if President Amin were to disappear, worse might ensue." In a similar comment, exemplifying the relationship with Amin as being "the devil you know," etc., the prominent weekly the *Economist* stated, "The last government to want to be rid of Amin is the British one." This attitude persisted even beyond the break in diplomatic relations in July 1976, as shown by the fact that the Stansted shuttle continued. Important political commentators in the British press believed that the government would not impose sanctions on Uganda under Amin, since this might set a precedent for sanctions against South Africa. The government plainly considered the bad image consequent on maintaining links with Amin not as serious as the consequences of breaking links with South Africa.

Nonetheless, as the body count of Amin's victims, former friends, members of the clergy, soldiers and mostly ordinary people, mounts daily, stock should also be taken of those who helped him stay where he was and turned a blind eye to the amply documented brutality of his regime. As many British companies flock to Uganda with claims for compensation and offers of multimillion-pound deals, the present Ugandan regime could do worse than ask the British government to account for its activities there over the past ten years.

The Confessions of a Spy

from Afrique-Asie magazine

While the maneuvers brought to life by the Anglo-American plan monopolize the attention of the international press, attacks aimed at profoundly destabilizing the most radical countries among the front-line states are fomented from Salisbury with the complicity and cooperation of certain Western powers and Pretoria.

That is what develops from the revelations made last September 17 in Maputo by a spy captured in Mozambique while he was carrying out a reconnaissance mission on behalf of Ian Smith's army.

According to the prisoner, a Mozambican named Afonso Joane Cotoi, the Rhodesian forces were preparing a raid of broad scope, aimed chiefly at the physical elimination of the Mozambican leaders. Already, significant quantities of war materiel and many soldiers—Rhodesians and foreign mercenaries—had been assembled in preparation for this attack, which was imminent.

Cotoi had been recruited by the Rhodesian racists in November 1974, when he worked as a miner in South Africa, where he had already shown his capabilities. At a time when a strike paralyzed the mine where he was employed, Cotoi had not only boycotted the movement, but had collaborated with the management and turned the names of the leaders over to the police. Not long after these events, he had been contacted by the counterrevolutionary agents.

Cotoi, as he stated, learned first the handling of all sorts of arms. "The soldiers who trained us," he adds, "were Rhodesians, Portuguese, and South Africans. There were others who spoke other foreign languages."

During this training, Cotoi learned of the existence of the Organization of Free Africa, constituted of traitors and saboteurs and organized by im-

[This article appeared in a 1978 issue of *Afrique-Asie* magazine, under the title "Les Aveux d'un Espion."]

perialism to act against the progressive African countries and particularly southern Africa. At the same time, he learned that one of the leaders was Jorge Jardim, businessman and well-known fascist who lived in Mozambique before the defeat of the Portuguese colonialists. "It was explained to us," recounts Cotoi, "that with our leader Jardim we were going to chase Frelimo from Mozambique. We would then no longer have to work, because the people would do it for us. Jardim would be the President We were told as well that in order to take power we had to attack and kill the principal leaders and cadres of Frelimo.

"In the course of my training period (in a military camp on the Rhodesian frontier) other recruits arrived; they had been contacted in the same manner as I by the South Africans or similar people."

For his first mission, Cotoi participated in a raid against the small city of Mapai in the Mozambican province of Gaza. While the Frelimo forces opened fire, scoring a direct hit on one of the Rhodesian army reconnaissance planes and preventing the helicopter that transported the aggressors from landing, Cotoi and his companions dropped incendiary bombs on the villages they flew over, on the old men, women, and children in flight.

On his return to Rhodesia, Cotoi was put through a new specialized training, with the purpose of carrying out missions of reconnaissance and espionage. The "monitors" were all foreigners.

It was after this second course that Cotoi was parachuted into Mozambique.

"When we left by helicopter, we were five hundred men," he explains. "A hundred were parachuted at N'Gala. Four other men and I continued to Mapai. My companions were dressed in uniforms and were supplied with radio transmitters. I wore civilian clothes and had been given Mozambican money. The helicopter was supposed to return to pick us up after a few days."

Cotoi had been instructed to circulate alone throughout the region in order to pinpoint the emplacements of military camps and ascertain troop strengths, the types of armament utilized by Frelimo, etc.

When he was arrested, he had already traversed, on foot, by train, and by bus, the regions of Chokwe, Barragem, and Mabalane, writing in his notebook the most complete information. "The helicopter was supposed to come for us the next day and I was preparing to watch for it all night," he explains. "I asked for hospitality at a house where I said that I was coming from Maputo. Being very tired, I went to sleep. A few hours later, I was awakened by a group of Frelimo combatants. I showed them my papers, saying that I was coming from the south. But as they insisted on taking me with them, I understood that the game was over. So I admitted everything. I confessed that I had come from Rhodesia and that I was an agent of the Organization of Free Africa."

Speaking before the press in Maputo, Afonso Cotoi did not for a moment express remorse. He declared simply, "I regret that they caught me."

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ZAIRE, OTRAG, AND ANGOLA

The CIA and U.S. Policy in Zaire and Angola

by Stephen Weissman

Introduction

The CIA has pursued its most substantial African covert actions in Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) and Angola. As the recent paramilitary, political and propaganda operation unfolded in Angola, both U.S. policy-makers and distressed African observers were struck by its connection to earlier American intervention in Zaire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggested that Angolan independence was fraught with the same dangers

[This article, in an expanded form, was written in 1976, when the author was Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. It was published in 1978 in Lemarchand, Ed., *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance* (University Press of America). A revised version was published in the Summer 1979 issue of *Political Science Quarterly*. The author is now on the staff of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.]

for U.S. security as Zairian independence in 1960.¹ From another perspective, an editorial in a Government-owned newspaper in "pro-Western" Ghana complained, "The U. S. is now fighting tooth and nail to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola from taking the reins of government just as it used Tshombe to destroy Patrice Lumumba in order to prevent his socialist-oriented party from taking power at independence in the Congo."²

This article examines covert action policies in Zaire and Angola in contexts of covert U.S. and Western support, including fundamental and long range implications of intervention for U.S. diplomatic interests.

Covert Action in Context

ZAIRE

On June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo received its Independence under a democratic coalition Government headed by the militant nationalist, Patrice Lumumba. "Shortly thereafter," Lawrence Devlin arrived in Leopoldville to assume his duties as Chief of the CIA Station in the American Embassy.³ Within a few weeks he was deeply involved in an effort to overthrow the Government and assassinate some of its top officials, the first of a series of covert action and related "intelligence" programs that would continue into the 1970s.

Soon after independence the Congolese army mutinied; Belgian troops reoccupied the country, organizing the secession of the Katanga province; and Prime Minister Lumumba and Chief of State Joseph Kasavubu called in United Nations forces to help reorganize the army and remove the Belgians. The U.N., however, delayed in replacing the Belgian troops and refused to move against the Belgian-led Katanga secession. This policy received crucial backing from the Republican Eisenhower Administration which shared Belgium's vision of conservative order and was disposed to follow NATO leads in black Africa. As Belgian-organized secessionist and political pressures mounted against his Government, Lumumba threatened to dispense with the U.N. Force except for sympathetic African left-nationalist contingents and to invade Katanga with Afro-Asian and Soviet military assistance.

In the view of U.S. policymakers, Lumumba's persistent, emotional, and shifting pleas for outside help against Belgium revealed his "personal instability" which the Soviet Union came to exploit through "leftist," "anti-white," "Communist," and "Pro-Communist" advisers in the Prime Minister's entourage.⁴ Referring to incidents in which elements of the Congolese army arrested Belgian and U.N. personnel, Ambassador Clare Timberlake warned,

... If the U.N. does not immediately act to take the army out of Government control ... most of the handful of Europeans still in Leopoldville will leave and the remain-

der would be some foreign embassy personnel, Communist agents and carpetbaggers. We are convinced that the foregoing is the Communist plan. Lumumba, [Minister of Information] Kashamura, Ghanaian Ambassador Djin and [Chief of Protocol] Madame Blouin are all anti-white and the latter is a Communist. So are their Guinean advisers. Our latest arrival [French press secretary] Serge Michel of the [Algerian National Liberation Front] is even more in the Commie camp and anti-Western. They seem to have no trouble urging Lumumba further down roads which his own instincts direct him at least part of the way.⁵

The State Department noted that Lumumba "was receiving advice and encouragement not only from Guinean and other African leftists but also from European Communists and of course from the Soviet and other Communist representatives in Leopoldville."⁶

On August 18, Devlin cabled CIA headquarters,

Embassy and Station believe Congo experiencing classic Communist takeover Government Whether or not Lumumba actually Commie or just playing Commie game to assist his solidifying power, anti-west forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left in which take action to avoid another Cuba.⁷

At a National Security Council meeting the same day, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon remarked, "If the U.N. were forced out, we might be faced with a situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo," and further observed that Lumumba "was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets." President Eisenhower exhibited acute concern that "one man supported by the Soviets" could threaten the UN operation, and one top aide in attendance remembered the President seeming to issue an assassination order. In any event, other forms of covert action were apparently approved since CIA headquarters on the following day authorized the Station "to proceed with operation (to replace Lumumba "with pro-Western group") and the resulting activities were discussed August 25 at a meeting of the NSC Special Group which oversees CIA covert actions.⁸

The CIA Station quickly undertook "covert operations through certain labor groups" and "the planned attempt to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba" in the Congolese Senate. After August 25, when the Special Group agreed at Eisenhower's behest that "planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba," a series of assassination plots were encouraged, developed, and put into effect.⁹ If any additional impetus were necessary, news arrived on August 26 that an estimated 100 Soviet Bloc technicians in the Congo would soon be joined by 10

IL-18 Soviet transport planes to be used in a planned Central Government invasion of Katanga.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on Alleged Assassinations Plots ignores, save for a few unanalyzed suggestions, CIA political action programs against Lumumba and his followers in the fall and winter of 1960 and the role of U.S.-financed leaders with respect to assassination. As I have shown elsewhere, there is strong circumstantial evidence of a U.S. role in the Kasavubu coup of September 5 against Lumumba; and there is the direct testimony of a U.S. diplomat on the scene as well as two former U.S. officials that the CIA was involved in the decisive Mobutu coup of September 14.¹¹ A recently declassified State Department Chronology of the Congo crisis seems generally confirmatory:

Planning, of an operational nature, dealt with covert activities to bring about the overthrow of Lumumba and install a pro-Western Government [Operations under this plan were gradually put into effect by CIA.]¹²

Two reliable U.S. diplomatic sources have now confirmed that the Special Group authorized payment to Kasavubu shortly before his coup. This certainly casts light upon the Assassinations Report's observation that, on the day following Kasavubu's initiative, two CIA officers approached "a high level Congolese politician to warn him of the Lumumba danger," offer assistance "in preparation of a new government program," and provide assurances that the U.S. "would supply technicians."¹³

Several American and foreign diplomats agree that Colonel Joseph Mobutu and his "Binza Group" of political allies (including Foreign Minister Bomboko, Finance Commissioner Ndele, and Security chiefs Nendaka and Kandolo) constituted a compact and frequently cooperative vehicle of CIA funds and counsel.¹⁴ As the State Department Chronology relates,

The UAR and Ghana were not the only ones to pump money [in their case to the Lumumbists] into the political picture. By mid-November, U.S. activities on the political scene in Leopoldville were of sizeable proportions and may have been fairly conspicuous

Ambassador Timberlake and the representatives of another Agency [Authors note: clearly the CIA] had intensive discussions with Kasavubu, Mobutu, Ileo, Bomboko, Adoula, Bolikango and others [Timberlake cabled] I hope the Department is not assuming from a few modest successes that the Embassy has Kasavubu, Mobutu, or any other Congolese "in the pocket." While we have consistently endeavored through counsel and advice to guide moderate elements along a reasonable path, they rarely consult us voluntarily regarding their prospective moves

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[U.N. Representative Rajeshar Dayal] in an interview with the New York Times correspondent [not printed] broadly implied that he knew the U.S. was financing Mobutu

[U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld] told the American Ambassador to the U.N. it would be most helpful particularly if we could put some "fire" into Kasavubu [to help in forming a new government acceptable to parliament] so long as we could do it "delicately" and not "visibly" and so long as we "put nothing in his pocket"—an apparent reference to U.S. "covert" activities in Leopoldville¹⁵

Among the "modest successes" of the Americans were the frustration of African and Congolese efforts to reconcile Kasavubu and Lumumba, and efforts by Congolese "moderates" to expand the base of Mobutu's regime.¹⁶

CIA financed and counseled leaders also seem to have gone along with more forceful entreaties although their role has been obscured by the Assassinations Report. The latter notes that Devlin "warned a key Congolese leader" about coup plotting by Lumumba and two of his supporters, and "urged arrest or other more permanent disposal of Lumumba, Gizenga and Mulele"¹⁷—a good example of the linkage between CIA "intelligence" and "covert action" programs. But it fails to mention that Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga was in fact arrested by Mobutu and a decision was made to transfer him to his bitter enemies in Katanga. At the last minute he was released by sympathetic U.N. troops from Ghana.¹⁸ Similarly, Devlin is portrayed as an "adviser" to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba on the day after Mobutu's coup. But there is no indication in the Report that Lumumba was arrested on the following day, but managed to escape his captors.¹⁹

In late November Lumumba left U.N. protective custody to try and return to his political base at Stanleyville. The CIA Station worked with the Mobutu Government to get roads blocked and troops alerted to possible escape routes. After Lumumba's capture it appeared that the troops guarding him would mutiny and return him to power, so he was transferred to Katanga, where he was murdered probably on the evening of January 17-18.²⁰

The authors of the Assassinations Report failed to consider this powerful context of CIA political action and influence in reaching their conclusion that,

Despite the fact that [Devlin] knew of a [Government] plan to deliver Lumumba into the hands of his enemies at a time when the CIA was convinced that "drastic steps" were necessary to prevent Lumumba's return to power, there is no evidence of CIA involvement in this plan or in bringing about the death of Lumumba in Katanga.²¹

The CIA was subsidizing and advising (with "modest" success) the top Congolese leadership which decided to transfer Lumumba. It was a "Congolese Government leader" who voluntarily informed Devlin of the plan. The CIA had been working with some of its political protégés—as well as other Congolese and a European—from August through November in efforts to assassinate or abduct Lumumba.²² Its recommendation for "permanent disposal" of Lumumba's deputy had been followed by his arrest and a Government decision to deliver him to his "bittersweet enemies" in Katanga. Given this background of covert political influence including specific assassination plots, the CIA's failure to question its clients' plan to dispose of Lumumba must have appeared as an expression of tacit consent. In any case it is hard to avoid the judgment that it represented a definite complicity in murder.

Overt diplomacy made an essential contribution to the success of covert operations in this period. The U.N. controlled potentially decisive military and financial resources in Leopoldville. But its dependence upon American economic, political, logistical, and administrative support ensured that these trumps would be used either directly in behalf of American objectives or indirectly in the manner of benign neutrality. Thus U.N. Representative Andrew Cordier did not discourage Kasavubu from his CIA-supported coup and give it a probably decisive boost by closing the airports and radio station, preventing Lumumba from mobilizing his supporters. Having invoked the shibboleth of "law and order" this time, the U.N. fell silent and remained impassive when its military protégé, Mobutu, pulled off another CIA coup several days later. Although certain political and administrative changes enabled the U.N. to assume a more even-handed stance in the following weeks (e.g., it offered protective custody to Lumumba before his escape and capture), it nevertheless gave considerable *de facto* support to the U.S.-sponsored Mobutu regime.²³

The advent of the Democratic Kennedy Administration did not bring any lessening of concern about Soviet exploitation of the Lumumbist movement. After all Gizenga had set up a regime in Stanleyville which received financial and political support from the Soviet Union and United Arab Republic. But the Kennedy Administration had more confidence than its predecessor in the perseverance of civilian moderates and it possessed a new sensitivity to African relations. It decided to bring about a legal parliamentary regime under Cyrille Adoula that would absorb Gizenga and his allies, and to gradually move the U.N. and reluctant NATO allies to deal with Katangan secession. Covert CIA and U.N. bribery of parliamentarians at the meeting which selected Adoula has been confirmed by a member of the American Embassy and several unofficial sources, and received the following tribute in a CIA Memorandum in President Kennedy's files: "The U.N. and the United States, in closely coordinated activities, played essential roles in this significant success over Gizenga." This

document also revealed the CIA program for Adoula as of November 1961:

The [State] Department, in conjunction with other branches of the Government [Author's Note: clearly the CIA] is endeavoring to help Adoula improve his political base of support and enhance his domestic power and stature. This activity is in the areas of political organization with connected trade union and youth groups, public relations and security apparatus.²⁴

The Prime Minister's key political supporters, the Binza Group, continued to receive CIA subsidies according to several diplomatic sources. In addition, political action funds were used to keep parliament in line and to launch RADECO, a pro-Adoula political party. Another example of uses of "intelligence" for "covert action" was provided by the CIA's discovery of a plot to assassinate Mobutu. The information was passed on to Mobutu, whose gratitude was said to make him more receptive to CIA suggestions.²⁵

Again conventional diplomacy was a crucial backdrop for covert action to stabilize a pro-Western regime. American support enabled the U.N. Force to subdue Katanga secession, bringing new financial means and nationalist prestige to Adoula's Government. U.S. economic aid, at first through voluntary contributions to the U.N., then bilaterally, greatly increased the Government's resources. A military assistance program of equipment and training started in 1963, in conjunction with Belgium and Italy. The American Ambassador and U.N. Representative took the lead in urging Adoula to purge Gizenga from his cabinet and remove him from the political scene. The U.N. would collaborate in his arrest.²⁶

After the subjugation of Katanga, Afro-Asian support for a U.N. military presence in the Congo flagged and the Operation was phased out by mid-1964. Lumumbist rebels, encouraged by Soviet and Chinese diplomats in neighboring countries, quickly spread across half the country and threatened the capital.

Under President Johnson, the CIA conducted a major paramilitary campaign against the Kwilu and Eastern rebellions for nearly four years. Covert action and planning focused mainly on direct combat operations, and were coordinated with overt U.S. and Belgian military assistance in the areas of equipment and support functions. Thus in early 1964 a CIA front organization in Miami furnished Cuban exile pilots to the Congo Government to fly armed Italian T-6 training planes against "Mulelist" insurgents in the western Kwilu Province. (The Government had no pilots of its own.) In the spring, rebel advances in the east led to the dispatch of U.S. Department of Defense T-28 fighter planes armed with rockets and machine guns (6), C-47 military transport planes (10), H-21 heavy-duty

helicopters (6), vehicle spare parts, 100 "military technicians" to show the Congolese how to operate and maintain their new equipment, and "several" counterinsurgency advisers for Congolese commanders. While Belgium sent pilots and maintenance personnel for the *non-combat* aircraft, the CIA obtained additional Cubans to fly the T-28 fighters under Station supervision.²⁷

Following the fall of Stanleyville to the rebels in August, Secretary of State Dean Rusk approved an "immediate effort . . . to concert with [the] Belgians to help Tshombe [who had just replaced Adoula as Prime Minister with the backing of Kasavubu and the Binza Group] raise gendarme-mercenary force along with bolstering whatever force there is to hold present strong points and to start rebel roll back."²⁸ Again the interdependent overt-covert pattern of support appeared. Four American C-130 military transports with full crews and parachutist "guard" arrived in Leopoldville, along with 4 or 5 B-26 bombers, ground vehicles, arms and ammunition. The Belgians also supplied equipment as well as 300 to 400 officers who assumed background roles of command and logistical support. Nearly all this overt assistance was in behalf of a 700 man force of South African, Rhodesian and European mercenaries which did much of the fighting as "spearheads" of selected Government troops. CIA Station Chief Benjamin Hilton Cushing told the Belgian Commander that he was prepared to subsidize Tshombe's entire mercenary recruitment if hard currency were lacking (it wasn't). The Agency did supply more Cuban pilots for the B-26s which joined the rest of the CIA Air Force in support of the mercenary advance.²⁹ (By January 1965, two additional T-28s were operating in the Congo as were 3 or 4 more B-26s apparently provided by Inter-mountain Aviation, a CIA proprietary.³⁰

As certain African countries began to ship arms to the rebels across Lake Tanganyika with apparent promises of Soviet replacement, the CIA engaged pilots and crews, reportedly South African, for patrol boat operations. A CIA front organization, Western International Ground Maintenance Organization (WIGMO), chartered in Lichtenstein, handled maintenance for the boats as well as the fighter planes with a staff of 50 to 100 Europeans.³¹ The WIGMO mechanics and maintenance personnel enabled U.S. and Belgian military personnel to escape direct association with air and sea combat operations; they also represented an attempt by the CIA to get away from its increasingly visible Cuban connections.³² Yet the CIA also formed a force of 17 or 18 Cubans for a possible operation to rescue U.S. diplomatic hostages, including CIA personnel, in Stanleyville. This objective was achieved on November 24, 1964 when U.S. C-130s dropped Belgian paratroops on the city. At that moment, the Cubans were accompanying a mercenary force just hours away, and prepared to act if the air-drop was canceled.³³

By mid-1966 there were said to be a dozen Cuban aviators and 100 other

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WIGMO personnel in the Congo,³⁴ but the paramilitary campaign ended, according to Special Group Member Cyrus Vance, around mid-1967.³⁵ However in July 1967 a mutiny of white mercenaries against the Government raised a new threat of dismemberment and dangerous instability. Three C-130s with "supporting personnel" were rushed in to fly armored cars and troops to battle. But senior Congressmen fearing a new Vietnam forced President Johnson to withdraw two of the planes in August and the third in December.³⁶ Johnson also issued an order that the U.S. "would not again get so involved in Africa except out of the most overwhelming necessity."³⁷ Still, according to a high State Department official and another diplomatic source, the temptations of covert action were strong enough to sanction a return of several Cuban combat pilots to the Congo in late 1967.

On the political action side, say reliable diplomatic sources, the CIA continued to assist the Binza Group during the Tshombe era (1964-65). In view of a Constitution which vested great power in the President's Office, there was increasing competition between Prime Minister Tshombe and President Kasavubu, both of whom looked forward to a future Presidency. The Americans were "concerned" when Kasavubu sought "an opening to the left" by dismissing Tshombe and appointing a Government ready to consider the dismissal of mercenaries, recognition of Communist China, and improved relations with left-nationalist African states.³⁸ According to three informed individuals—a U.S. official then in Washington, a Western diplomatic Congo specialist, and an American businessman who talked with the returned CIA man Devlin—the CIA was involved in the second Mobutu coup of November 25, 1965.

As the CIA-assisted repression succeeded, Mobutu began to consolidate his political and financial hold. Trained Congolese pilots started returning from European military schools. There seemed to be a decreasing need for covert action. A U.S. diplomat whose information has always proved reliable states that CIA political action payments to Mobutu ceased "at the end of the 1960s." Still, according to a State Department official and a foreign diplomat in Zaire, the Agency was in charge of training Mobutu's personal bodyguard "during the 1970s." The aforementioned diplomat personally observed that the CIA Station Chief James Kim continued to furnish Mobutu with "intelligence" regarding both African and internal political developments, and "tried to influence him" partly through such contacts as Dr. William Close, an American citizen who was Mobutu's long-time personal physician and political counselor. A 1967 White House memorandum referred to Close's letter to President Johnson "commending" him on his decision to send C-130s to the Congo that summer. It noted that Close "exercises considerable influence on President Mobutu, has been used by him as an emissary on many occasions, and has always been helpful and cooperative with our Embassy at Kinshasa."³⁹

By 1975 when the political crisis in neighboring Angola exploded, Secre-

tary of State Kissinger was reportedly "banking" on Mobutu "to oppose Moscow's interests" in Africa generally and "to further Washington's interests in various international forums"—particularly those where the U.S. was being assailed by Third World forces.⁴⁰ In the same vein, CIA Director William Colby designated Zaire "a future regional big power."⁴¹ The U. S. rushed to Mobutu's aid in 1975 when copper prices and Government revenues fell, debt repayment problems with U.S. and foreign creditors arose, popular discontent became increasingly overt, and Mobutu worried about the presence and example of a post-colonial leftist regime in neighboring Angola. Abandoning its "low profile" in Africa, the Administration provided more than \$100 million in overt aid.⁴²

Covertly, one reason for the surprising CIA operation in Angola was to psychologically boost the Zairian regime, as we shall see below. It remained to be seen whether in light of Mobutu's continuing precariousness the Carter Administration would expand CIA programs in behalf of either Mobutu or a replacement team. Ironically, Lawrence Devlin was now back on the scene as the American Representative of U.S. businessman Maurice Templesman—a major supporter and beneficiary of Mobutu's regime. Devlin had risen to the top of the CIA's clandestine Africa Division before finding his upward mobility in the Agency stalled. According to diplomatic sources, Mobutu relies upon him to make contacts with U.S. officials at moments of "misunderstanding" or strain between the two countries, and considers him a "second CIA" to keep an eye on the first one in the event of changing U.S. policies.

As we have seen, CIA covert operations and interrelated overt diplomacy played essential roles in the triumph of American-approved leadership. After 1967 they continued to sustain the Zairian Government. Even though their immediate impact was probably not decisive, their retrospective and potential influence were undoubtedly intimidating. By 1975 Mobutu's external fears (and hegemonial ambitions)⁴³ and his internal difficulties had provoked an escalation of U.S. support which again threatened to become the arbiter of Zaire's political destiny.

ANGOLA

Until 1975 Portugal refused to follow in the path of peaceful European decolonization of black Africa. Portuguese President Salazar told the American Ambassador in 1961 that the "only nationalism" in Angola and Mozambique "was Portuguese, deriving from centuries of close association with Portugal."⁴⁴ This dogma was enforced by the suppression of any political activity that seemed to have a modern, African nationalist, tone.

Influenced in part by the achievement of independence in the neighboring ex-Belgian Congo, various clandestine Angolan movements participated in the violent revolts of February and March 1961 in Luanda, the capital, and the northern region of the country. The Portuguese responded to

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these poorly prepared uprisings with a veritable bloodbath. However, as we have seen, the liberal Kennedy Administration had decided to fight the Cold War with a new emphasis upon Afro-Asian sentiment. So the U.S. voted for the March 1961 U.N. resolution calling for self-determination in Portuguese Africa.

The U.S. launched a quiet diplomatic campaign, including promises of economic aid, to persuade Portugal to institute reforms leading "eventually to self-determination."⁴⁵ Overt support for the Angolans themselves included an emergency food and humanitarian assistance. Finally, as Secretary Kissinger acknowledged, the U.S. soon began to supply covert "financial, non-military aid" through the CIA to Holden Roberto, the leader of an Angolan political movement based in Zaire.⁴⁶ As early as April 1961 the American Embassy in Leopoldville was in close contact with Roberto. When the Portuguese Foreign Minister privately accused "U.S. services" of being involved with "Portugal's enemies," the State Department ordered the Embassy "to initiate no further contacts with Roberto unless otherwise instructed" although he still could be seen at his own request.⁴⁷

In contrast with Zaire, overt support for America's favorites was limited by the persistence of colonialism and the military importance of a Portuguese air base to the United States. The diplomatic effort rapidly ebbed, leaving covert action an isolated and ineffective strand of U.S. policy.

With Portugal steadfast and the U.S. faint-hearted, Roberto depended increasingly upon the hospitality and assistance of the Zairian Government. Of course, top Zairian leaders were on the CIA payroll and their relationship with Roberto could only be enhanced by the sense of a common benefactor. But the Zairians also had independent interests of their own. For instance, Prime Minister Adoula was a close friend of Roberto and worried that the Angolan would be "pushed aside by less moderate [forces]" and Adoula would "find himself with [a] Communist-oriented government in exile" in Zaire.⁴⁸

Apparently acting on its own initiative, Zaire permitted Roberto's GRAE to send men and material over the Angolan border and established a training base at Kinkuzu where Algerian-trained Angolans instructed the GRAE army, which was supplied with Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan weaponry.⁴⁹ According to Professor John Marcum, Adoula even financed Roberto out of his own funds when necessary.⁵⁰ Zaire's 1963 decision to recognize the GRAE as the sole legitimate Angolan nationalist movement seems to have been taken against the advice of Assistant Secretary Williams and the American Embassy.⁵¹

The inadequacy of a largely covert, financial and non-military, U.S. role was underlined at the end of 1963, when Roberto appeared to the American Embassy in Leopoldville to be "considering basic reorientation Angolan nationalist policy in favor closer cooperation with Communist bloc."⁵²

Roberto's labor adviser, Carlos Kassel, approached Embassy officers with the information that

since Roberto's recent return from New York he had found him changed man . . . completely disillusioned with western, and specifically U.S. policy on Angola. He was convinced that the U.S. would never jeopardize its military ties with Portugal and that, in last analysis, it was U.S. military aid to Portuguese that enabled them to hold Angola.⁵³

At Kenya Independence ceremonies in Nairobi, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi was supposed to have offered Roberto "large scale military aid," and a visit to Peking by a GRAE delegation was envisioned. Kassel himself was instructed to "establish contact" with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.⁵⁴ At this point, the Zairian authorities themselves came under attack by Chinese-encouraged rebels, and "indicated their concern re Chicom involvement with Angolan nationalists, and stated that Chicom technicians would not be welcome in (Zaire)."⁵⁵ Yet the U.S. and Zaire remained concerned that Roberto "might soon be ousted by extremists . . . mortgaging their future to the Communists" and ultimately reaching "a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one."⁵⁶

Given the constraints on overt diplomacy and the liberals' preference for non-violent nationalism, Williams could only suggest, in May 1964, that a new and expanded covert political action program be launched in Angola and Mozambique. The Assistant Secretary's proposal seems, in retrospect, to have been rooted in some wishful thinking which failed to take account of the difference between Portuguese and other European colonialisms in Africa:

We believe that the nationalists should alter their present [violent] tactics and concentrate their energies, with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This organization should be based on non-racial principles Inside the territories [it should conduct] political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination.⁵⁷

The fate of Williams' proposal is not known.

Later on in the Johnson Administration, even covert assistance took on an air of ambivalence. CIA funds continued to flow to Roberto: according to a former official of the State Department's African Bureau, doubts about Roberto's "leadership quality" were not sufficient to jeopardize "our historic relationship." On the other hand, Marchetti and Marks state—

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and two former officials confirm—that the U.S. decided to sell Portugal 20 B-26 bombers for use in her African territories. CIA employees delivered 7 planes to Portugal before they were arrested by U.S. Customs personnel in a bureaucratic snafu.⁵⁸ This break with the last vestige of overt pressure on Portugal—the arms embargo—was protested in vain by Williams.⁵⁹ While the specific motivation for this sale is not known, there is some evidence that it *might* have had to do with the provision of certain facilities for Polaris submarine forces by Portugal.⁶⁰

In spite of having gained recognition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964, the GRAE remained largely dependent upon one African country, Zaire. The Mobutu regime provided limited funds and weapons. More important, it arrested Roberto's internal opposition which was imprisoned at the Kinkuzu base, and it continued an earlier policy of denying the MPLA access to the Zaire-Angola border, the most suitable frontier for guerrilla operations.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the Soviet-assisted MPLA was finally able to mount revolutionary warfare from bases in Congo-Brazzaville and, most significant, Zambia. By 1969 the latter operations were "rated by the Portuguese as the most effective guerrilla force they face,"⁶² and Roberto was increasingly accused of lassitude and *embourgeoisement*.⁶³ In 1971, the OAU withdrew recognition for his movement.

Both overtly and covertly, U.S. policy in Southern Africa moved even further away from African nationalism during the Nixon and early Ford Administrations. Conservative Republican policymakers found it convenient to accept such assumptions as: "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them," and "Violence in the area will not increase greatly because the blacks recognize the military superiority of the whites, and will not risk their security in confrontation."⁶⁴ From these they drew the policy implication that the U.S. could adopt "a general posture of partial relaxation [of restrictions on dealing with the white regimes] . . . balancing our relations in the area by compensating for—rather than abandoning—our tangible interests in the white states." In the case of Angola, this meant "avoiding pressures on the Portuguese," particularly "as the Azores negotiations come forward."⁶⁵ Hence the Republican Administrations eased the arms embargo on Portugal by exempting non-lethal equipment which had dual civilian and military uses such as Boeing 707 transport planes.⁶⁶ And, according to intelligence sources, CIA covert action subsidies for Roberto were scaled down to "minimal" payments of about \$10,000 per year for "intelligence collection."

With the diminution of American support, Roberto's movement came even more under the influence of Mobutu whose dependence on the U.S. in the early 1970s was nearly ultimate. Zaire took the initiative in training and supplying Roberto's forces, and putting down a mutiny of 1,000 GRAE troops in 1972.⁶⁷ Zaire's importance rose further in 1974 when a revolutionary military Government in Portugal commenced decoloniza-

tion and Roberto's historic opportunity seemed to have arrived. Mobutu had followed Nixon to China in 1973 and, in turn, prepared the way for a subsequent visit by Roberto. Between May 1974 and October 1975 the Chinese, previously unsuccessful in exploiting divisions within MPLA and GRAE, provided approximately 120 military instructors for Roberto's forces—now called FNLA—in Zaire. They also trained an estimated 5,000 FNLA troops and equipped them with small arms (AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and light mortars). Mobutu intervened with President Spínola in a vain effort to procure Portuguese recognition for MPLA dissident Chipenda, who would later join the FNLA.⁶⁸

By January 1975, when the Portuguese set up a transitional tripartite coalition government in Angola, the Chinese- and Zairian-assisted FNLA had a large edge over the Soviet-aided MPLA in troops trained or in training, amount and quality of military equipment, and the number of nearby foreign advisers. The third major group, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, had a very small and poorly armed force.⁶⁹ According to American diplomats in Luanda, the MPLA did not achieve parity in military resources until late spring. Nevertheless a CIA proposal to bolster Roberto with \$3,000,000 in political action funds was approved by the 40 Committee and President Ford in late January. (The CIA's request for a \$100,000 subsidy to Savimbi was rejected). An official of the 40 Committee recalls that the "basic concern" in this decision was not to respond to the Soviet-assisted MPLA but rather to "bolster psychologically our immediate ally" Zaire. Thus U.S. covert and overt "successes" in Zaire were now leading toward further intervention in Angola.

After a couple of rounds of Soviet-Cuban and U.S.-Zairian-South African escalation, the MPLA did not have a significant advantage in military supplies and training, but its political and organizational superiority helped it drive the opposition from Luanda, Cabinda, and key Southern ports and district capitals. The 40 Committee approved a \$14 million two stage program of arms and other aid to Roberto and Savimbi on July 17th, and President Ford signed off on July 27th. An additional \$10.7 million was approved in early September.⁷⁰

Unlike the Zaire operations of 1964-67 U.S. military aid was *entirely* covert in nature although CIA Director Colby warned that the chances for exposure were "considerable".⁷¹ Kissinger justified the attempt at total secrecy by referring to legal obstacles to military assistance to insurgents, especially through neighboring states, and by contending that overt aid could have led to an "unmanageable" and "open" confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁷² Still, legal barriers might have been surmounted and the risks of disproportionate Soviet reaction to some overt aid lessened if Congress and the public had been as supportive as in the days of the Zaire rebellions.

Various American diplomatic sources provided the following breakdown and description of covert action expenditures by the middle of the

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fall: \$5.80 million—political action support; \$500,000—other propaganda; \$900,000—travel, miscellaneous; \$10 million—arms and equipment; \$350,000—communications gear; \$5.4 million—shipping of arms and equipment; for a total of \$22,950,000. Arms were provided to FNLA and UNITA both directly and through replacement of arms supplied by Zaire and possibly Zambia. The latter course had the virtue of speed and, by providing much non-American equipment, helped submerge the U.S. role. The first direct U.S. arms shipments went in C-141s to the go-between countries. It was thought that Mobutu would "know we were serious" when he saw the large planes. A propaganda campaign to expose Soviet arming of MPLA and embarrass the conduit countries was launched. Savimbi and Roberto received regular monthly political action payments for internal propaganda, organizational sustenance, etc. These subsidies and other moneys were used to hire white mercenary "military technicians"—former Portuguese sergeants, Frenchmen, Brazilians, and others. Although paid with CIA money, the mercenaries were not hired or directed by CIA personnel. The U.S. was covertly financing 3rd country nationals as it had in Zaire, but this time the CIA did not take on a direct supervisory role à la WIGMO. This pattern was one which had been foreshadowed by the CIA's 1964 offer to subsidize Tshombe's *own* recruitment of white mercenaries. As in Zaire, American CIA personnel were forbidden to give in-country military advice or training to their clients. According to American diplomats, U.S. CIA personnel did help assure the delivery of airlifted equipment from Zaire to their protégés in Angola. In addition, according to both John Stockwell and William Colby, approximately one dozen U.S. paramilitary advisers were in Angola, despite the 40 Committee's explicit order that no U.S. military personnel be present. Finally, although the CIA ran its Angolan operation out of its Kinshasa station, there was also a CIA station in Luanda which "did intelligence collection feeding into FNLA and UNITA." Again "intelligence" was deeply entwined with covert action.

By mid-November the 40 Committee and the President had authorized a final dose of \$7 million, making a total of \$32 million for covert action in Angola during 1975.⁷³ However, the arrival of South African combat troops, to bolster the increasingly desperate FNLA-UNITA coalition, had already begun to undermine both African and domestic tolerance for U.S. policy. The Soviets and Cubans were further encouraged by the relatively impressive performance of the MPLA, a group they had known and aided for more than a decade, though not always without reservation. In these circumstances, so different from those which had obtained in Zaire, the two Communist powers provided massive military assistance in the form of arms and troops. In late January, a Congressional coalition of liberals and conservatives succeeded in stopping the covert action program. Shortly the South Africans, anxious to resurrect their policy of *détente* with moderate black Africa, also withdrew. The MPLA was victorious.

PATTERNS

The rationale, mechanisms, and short-term local results of covert action in Zaire and Angola bear comparison with similar U.S. efforts in other parts of the Third World. As in Vietnam, Laos, Chile, Cuba, etc., a prime motive of covert intervention was fear of external Communist subversion and its international implications. Each administration sought to deal with this fear in conformity with its own political ideology. Beyond this negative sort of preoccupation, the Mobutu regime was increasingly counted on to oppose Moscow's interests and advance Washington's in continental and Third World arenas. Zaire's position as a regional strong point for American policy—in many ways reminiscent of the Chilean "showcase" in Latin America—helped stimulate the abortive CIA paramilitary operation in Angola.

Together Zaire and Angola have constituted the terrain for a particularly wide variety of covert action techniques employed by the CIA in the Third World. These included: propaganda, manipulation of labor unions and student associations, subsidization of political leaders and parties, military and internal security functionaries, and coup-makers, political assassination plots, technical assistance for a Presidential bodyguard and security apparatus, provision of 3d country foreign military combat and combat-support personnel, arms and related equipment. In addition, CIA "intelligence" activities were often difficult to distinguish from covert action since the political and military information gathered might be consumed by the CIA's local allies as well as U.S. analysts. And in a period of diminished covert action, "intelligence" support could help sustain a favorable disposition on the part of a Mobutu or a Roberto pending future occasions for clandestine struggle. Similarly the CIA "intelligence" program for the Chilean military during the leftist Allende Government included the passing of anti-Government information to a Chilean officer, and was partly designed "to put the U.S. Government in a position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution depending on developments within the country and the latter's impact on the military themselves."⁷⁴ Just as covert action support of Mobutu and Roberto escalated in the period of Angolan decolonization, so too did covert assistance to the Chilean military in the aftermath of the 1973 coup against Allende.

Covert Action and the Long Run

So far, covert action has been evaluated in terms of its contribution to such proximate goals of U.S. policy as overthrowing a government, building up its replacement, and strengthening a friendly group in its drive for political power. But these CIA operations must also be judged in light of more fundamental and long-term consequences for American interests.

For instance, in opposing the Lumumbists and the MPLA, has the U.S. really prevented or delayed "Soviet takeovers" in Central Africa as the

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principal rationale for intervention suggests? Or has it simply frustrated strong nationalistic forces which would have pursued independent foreign policies?

Political visibility, "development," and African acceptance have been instrumental goals of U.S. anti-Communism in Zaire and Angola, and with increasing consciousness of America's economic, political and military interdependence with the Third World, they are also becoming terminal objectives. But have U.S.-backed leaders significantly contributed to the political stability of their respective states? Have they really made any progress in the direction of an efficient and humane political economy? Or have their actions led to an increasingly successful opposition which is by force of circumstance, anti-American as well as to severe economic mismanagement, and embarrassing violations of human rights? Has U.S. involvement with its Zairian and Angolan friends generally improved American relations with Africa, or has it tended to complicate them?

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST THREAT

In both Zaire and Angola, American intervention stemmed from the conviction that foreign Communists, especially the Soviets, were willing and able to exert massive, long-term influence over politically strong African left-nationalists, effectively blocking good relations with the U.S. and ultimately jeopardizing the world political balance. Yet Lumumba was neither a Communist nor the leader of a political organization which would yield readily to foreign control. The vision which Lumumba and his successors had of their country was conditioned by their strong belief that equality and dignity could never be achieved within a framework of foreign domination. Their political ideology was a militant, populist nationalism, and their preference for "positive neutralism" and non-alignment was therefore an integral part of their whole approach to politics. If they had a preferred external identification it was with other African leaders. Beyond their political creed, the Lumumbists' political talents and relative popular success implied that they would not have to depend on external support as much as other politicians.

For example, Lumumba's appeal for Soviet military aid to counter a much larger Western intervention in Katanga may have been unrealistic given the U.S.'s violent reactions; but it was not the result of Soviet-exploited "personal instability" since it arose from his group's basic political formula for militant nationalism. Nor were his actions guided by "pro-Soviet" advisers as the Americans charged.

Born out of discussions between African nationalists and Portuguese Communists and leftists, compelled to organize guerrilla warfare against Portuguese colonialism, the MPLA also developed its own brand of African Marxism—and a stronger politico-military organization than the Lumumbists ever had. Spurned too by the U.S. and the West in their long war against colonialism, the MPLA turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba

for arms and advisers. But they also received significant arms supplies from anti-Soviet Yugoslavia as well as bases, sanctuary and other aid from African states (Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville) and liberation movements (Mozambique's FRELIMO, Guinea-Bissau's PAIGC). As we have seen, Cuban troops appeared in large numbers only as the South Africans began to assist MPLA's opponents.

Skeptics may wonder whether these elements of ideology and internally rooted strength are sufficient to forestall a determined Soviet or Cuban advance. However on the Soviet side there is a lack of evidence of any major effort to achieve a degree of satellization in Central and Southern Africa. In Zaire, the late CIA Director Allen Dulles, publicly admitted that "we overrated the danger" and while "it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at takeover in the Belgian Congo, well it did not work out that way at all".⁷⁵ Although decisive Soviet and Cuban military aid was provided to the MPLA in 1975, Administration briefings to Congress did not mention any drive for strategic military bases or other long term interests compatible with a major effort at satellization.⁷⁶

AFRICAN RELATIONS

The initial impact of the Congo crisis was to "reveal and intensify" divisions between the new African states.⁷⁷ The U.S. was presumably able to strengthen its relations with "moderate" governments while sacrificing ties with "radical" ones. If it were necessary to fight the Cold War in Central Africa this was worthwhile because one needed allies. If Cold War diplomacy was a mistake and the U.S. has an "interdependence" interest in the Third World, then relations with the "radicals" need not and should not have been strained. A similar case can be made regarding Angola policy.

It is also true that the most aggressive forms of American intervention, particularly covert action, antagonized even the "moderates." The overthrow and murder of Lumumba—and suspicions of U.S. complicity—helped move the "moderate" states closer to the position of the "radicals." During the Rebellions, the white mercenaries (offered money by the CIA) and Cuban exile pilots (paid by the CIA and acting in support of the mercenary force) helped estrange such friends as Kenyatta's Kenya from American policy. The Stanleyville rescue, synchronized with a mercenary assault, was almost universally condemned in Africa.⁷⁸ Tainted by *de facto* cooperation with South Africa, the CIA paramilitary operation in Angola was rejected by most African Governments including such traditional "moderates" as Nigeria and Ghana. "Shut Up, President Ford" exclaimed the headline in a Government-owned newspaper in Nigeria, which contributed \$20 million to the MPLA.⁷⁹

American policymakers hoped that negative reactions to U.S. and CIA intervention would not be cumulative. And often the storm did seem to pass. But there is increasing evidence that it had only subsided, and would

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break out with new fervor as conditions warranted. The CIA intervention in Angola and official revelations of past misdeeds in Zaire were sufficient for "moderate" Ghana to draw the critical parallel between U.S. opposition to Lumumba and the MPLA quoted at the beginning of this essay. In politically ambiguous Ethiopia and Uganda, the credibility of official accusations of CIA plotting could only be furthered by past behavior in Zaire and Angola—the major African theaters for covert action.⁸⁰

PATTERNS

In numerous other Third World countries, CIA and overt diplomacy have also proceeded on the assumption that politically strong left-nationalism will be more or less subverted by external Communist supporters. There is good reason to question this premise even outside of Zaire and Angola. For instance, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile revealed CIA and State Department intelligence memoranda challenging policymakers' expectations of a Soviet-Cuban takeover of Allende's Government. These appreciations portray Allende as a strong nationalist and the Soviets as unwilling to overcommit themselves in behalf of a new, financially draining, nationalistic Marxism.⁸¹

Actually the most conspicuous Soviet "successes" in the Third World have been the products of extremely unusual circumstances: Soviet wartime occupation of North Korea; a strong indigenous Communist party in Vietnam; and continuing Western economic and military intervention in behalf of a discredited *status quo* in Cuba. These conditions exist in no African countries and few other places. And under contemporary circumstances of nuclear stalemate, quasi-*détente*, and polycentrism, even the special cases do not exclude good relations with the U.S.

Many other U.S. and CIA interventions in the Third World have foundered on client incapacity, inefficiency and inhumanity and subsequently reaped a whirlwind of anti-Americanism. The familiar case is Vietnam. In Chile, the U.S.-supported Frei Government was unable to implement promised economic and social reforms, underwent internal strain, and plummeted in popularity. The CIA had spent approximately \$6 million in its behalf for 8 years,⁸² was visibly implicated in its failure, and may even have contributed to its demise:

In a country where nationalism, "economic independence" and "anti-imperialism" claimed almost universal support, the persistent allegations that the Christian Democrats and other parties of the center and right were linked to the CIA may have played a part in undercutting popular support for them.⁸³

Regarding the overall diplomatic consequences of covert action, the

Senate Select Intelligence Committee reached conclusions similar to those of the specific analysis of Zaire and Angola:

... Certain covert operations have been incompatible with American principles and ideology and, when exposed, have resulted in damaging this nation's ability to exercise moral and ethical leadership throughout the world. The U. S. involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders and the attempt to foment a military *coup* in Chile in 1970 against a democratically elected government were two examples of such failures in purposes and ideals. Further because of widespread exposure of covert operations and suspicion that others are taking place, the CIA is blamed for virtually every foreign internal crisis.⁴⁴

Concluding Note

In March 1977, an estimated 800 to 1,500 armed, leftish Katangan exiles returned to their home province from neighboring Angola and nearly toppled the Mobutu Government. As the poorly paid and politically demoralized 60,000 man Zairian army proved to be ineffective, the regime was forced to call upon 1,200 Moroccan troops, 80 French military advisers, about 50 Egyptian pilots and mechanics, French transport planes, and Belgian and Chinese arms. Although the new U.S. Administration was reluctant to lead the counterrevolution (no arms or advisers were dispatched), it did provide tangible aid: \$15 million of combat support equipment including a G-130 plane to fly troops and arms into battle, spare parts for previously delivered C-130s, airplane fuel, parachutes for paratroops, rations and clothing for soldiers, communications gear, etc. And President Carter's request for \$32.5 million in military aid for Zaire in Fiscal Year 1978—half the total for Africa—indicated a continuing commitment to the Mobutu regime. Furthermore, there is some evidence of CIA covert action planning in the days before Mobutu was able to clinch his French and Moroccan personnel support. In an open letter of resignation to the CIA Director, covert operator and CIA Angola Task Force Chief John Stockwell charged,

Yes, I know you are attempting to generate token support to help Zaire meet its crisis—that you are seeking out the same French mercenaries the CIA sent into Angola in early 1976. These are the men who took the CIA money but fled the first time they encountered heavy shelling.⁴⁵

By June, Mobutu's foreign supporters had managed to contain the immediate threat as the exiles retreated rather than waste their forces in conventional warfare. Old problems of political fragmentation also prevented

the Katangans from gaining the active support of similarly disposed forces in other areas of the country such as the PRP in the East. Still the regime's military humiliation and demonstrated political weakness suggested that its days were numbered. Most of the relevant academic experts and many diplomats expected a military or military-civilian coup in the near future, or even a complete collapse of order in the penurious urban centers, leading to a new Government. If the U.S. persevered in its close association with the regime, its eventual successor was likely to have, or take account of, anti-U.S. and anti-CIA sentiment.

Western and U.S. intervention on behalf of Mobutu intensified political cleavages in Africa, fueled the suspicions of several leading states about Western objectives, and appeared to complicate the task of accommodation and avoidance of great power proxy wars in Southern Africa. While a number of small, conservative, French-speaking African governments encouraged the Western intervention, it was criticized by spokesmen for several leading countries, not all of them "leftist." For example, the official newspaper of "moderate" Zambia stated:

The almost obscene haste with which the west has rushed to pour arms into Zaire reinforces the argument of many Africans that behind every attempted or successful coup on this continent is the hand of a foreign power Although Cyrus Vance and others have not come out and said so bluntly, there is little doubt that they are hoping for a full-scale confrontation between Zaire and Angola. It gives them an opportunity to make amends for alleged betrayal of the anti-MPLA forces during the civil war. It is to be hoped that President Carter puts a halt to this political adventurism before it is saddled with his own Vietnam. If he and his administration hope to come out of such a confrontation with their image in Africa unscathed, they need to do some rethinking.⁸⁶

Significant reservations were also expressed by Nigeria, Tanzania, and Algeria. Soviet statements, as well as past actions in Angola, raised the possibility of a future counteraction in such favorable settings as Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, and Angola-Zaire.

The preponderant rationale for U.S. aid to Mobutu was anti-Communism. It was clear that behind such official slogans as "friendship," "historic ties," and "territorial integrity," lurked the fear of a "pro-Soviet" regime in the geographic center of Africa. Yet there was no evidence that the anti-Mobutu Katangans were Soviet-influenced. Indeed the populist flavor of their propaganda was more reminiscent of Lumumbism than of even Angolan Marxism. Ironically, U.S. support of "anti-Communist" Zaire probably contributed to the Katangan invasion itself. According to an informed American official, the U.S. did not examine very closely Angolan charges that Mobutu was permitting exile attacks on Northern Angola.

Mobutu's assurances that he had "cut back" support of the Angolan exiles were simply accepted. However the sequence of events suggests that Angola allowed the Katangans to return to Zaire in response to these incursions.

The latest Zaire crisis* has dramatized the long term risks for U.S. interests of two decades of U.S.-CIA intervention in Zaire and Angola. By sticking to a well worn path of overt intervention in the area (with only modest refinements) and apparently continuing to contemplate covert action, the U.S. is in danger of reenacting the Ethiopian syndrome: continuing American identification with a Government that is increasingly perceived by its people as oppressive, revolutionary change, and the emergence of a successor regime which is deeply suspicious of U.S. diplomacy. By contributing to inter-African polarization and Cold War tension, the U.S. was increasing the chances for a great power proxy war in Central and Southern Africa and diverting its attention from the new, multilateral issues of Third World interdependence that were becoming more and more urgent.

Notes

1. *New York Times*, November 25, 1975, p. 1.
2. *New York Times*, January 4, 1976, p. 17.
3. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, November 20, 1975, p. 14. See below, note 7.
4. Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974, pp. 81-83.
5. Memorandum for Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, the White House, "Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crises," from L. D. Battle, March 9, 1961, p. 25, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (NSF-JFK).
6. *Ibid.*
7. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 14. Although this report uses a pseudonym for Devlin and identifies him only as a "Station Officer," it is clear from the context that he is the Chief of Station. On Devlin, see Weissman, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96, 97n., 138.
8. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, pp. 55-58, 15.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 15.
10. "Analytical Chronology," pp. 26-27.
11. Weissman, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-98.
12. "Analytical Chronology," p. 30.
13. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 17.
14. Weissman, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
15. "Analytical Chronology", pp. 46-47, 57-58.
16. Weissman, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-95; "Analytical Chronology," p. 57; Memorandum for Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House, "Supplement: January 20 to March 6, 61 to Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crises," March 11, 1961, p. 1, NSF-JFK.

*This paper was written before the second Shaba invasion.

17. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 18.
18. G. Heinz and H. Donnay, *Lumumba: The Last Fifty Days* (New York: Grove Press, 1969), pp. 23-24, 61-62; see also "Analytical Chronology", p. 38 which refers to Gizenga's release by U.N. Moroccan troops.
19. Heinz and Donnay, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-23; "Analytical Chronology," p. 37; Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 17.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49; Heinz and Donnay, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-78, 145-46.
21. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 49.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 16-48.
23. Weissman, *op.cit.*, pp. 87-109.
24. CIA Memorandum, "Congo: United States Assistance to Adoula Against Gizenga," n.d., pp. 1-3, NSF-JFK. A CIA-Embassy-planned "psychological" campaign is referred to in Leopoldville to Secretary of State, October 2, 1961, NSF-JFK.
25. Weissman, *op.cit.*, pp. 109, 208, 210.
26. *Ibid.*, ch. V and pp. 204-07; G. Mennen Williams to George C. McGee, "Steps Against Gizenga," December 12, 1961, Williams Papers, National Archives (WP-NA); Leopoldville to Department of State, December 23, 1961, and January 16, 19, 26, 1962, and Department of State to Leopoldville, January 12, 1962.
27. Weissman, *op.cit.*, pp. 226-230; Cyrus Vance to W. Averell Harriman, April 20, 1964, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (NSF-LBJ).
28. Memorandum, "A New and Longer Term Approach to the Congo," from G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, August 7, 1964 (with Addenda August 10, 1964), p. 1, WP-NA.
29. Weissman, *op.cit.*, pp. 239-243; Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1967* (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, C.R.I.S.P., 1969), p. 355; Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1965* (Brussels: C.R.I.S.P., 1966), p. 291.
30. Leopoldville to Department of State, January 11, 1965, NSF-LBJ.
31. CRISP, *Congo 1965*, p. 248; *Congo 1966* (Brussels: C.R.I.S.P., 1967), p. 37; *Congo 1967*, pp. 350, 362, 510; *New York Times*, April 26, 1966, pp. 1, 30.
32. For evidence of increasing Cuban visibility, see Weissman, *op.cit.*, p. 230, n. 47.
33. *Ibid.*, 246-252.
34. C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1967*, p. 362.
35. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 155-56.
36. *New York Times*, August 3, 1967, pp. 1-2; Lyndon B. Johnson to Richard B. Russell and J. W. Fulbright, December 16, 1967, White House Central Files, LBJ.
37. Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 120.
38. Memorandum, "Congo Situation", from G. Mennen Williams to Robert W. Komer, The White House, November 16, 1965, WP-NA; Briefing Memorandum, "Congo Leopoldville's Position on Chinese Communist Admission to the U.N.", from G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, October 26, 1965, WP-NA; Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence (CIA), Intelligence Memorandum: "The Situation in the Congo," August 26, 1965, NSF-LBJ; C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1965*, pp. 388-406.
39. Memorandum for Mr. Walt W. Rostow, The White House, "Reply to Letter from Dr. Close to President Johnson," from John P. Walsh, August 25, 1967, White House Central Files, LBJ.
40. *New York Times*, September 25, 1975, pp. 1 ff; October 16, 1975, p. 2.
41. Leslie Gelb, "Should We Play Dirty Tricks in the World?" *New York Times Magazine*, December 21, 1975, p. 15.
42. Figures obtained from the Zaire Desk of the Agency for International Development (U.S.), Washington, D.C., February 1977, see also, Emma Rothschild, "The Politics of Debt," *New York Review of Books*, June 24, 1976.
43. For influence in Angola and especially oil-rich Cabinda Province.
44. Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 15, 1961, p.3, NSF-JFK.
45. Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House, "Task Force on Portu-

guese Africa: Chairman's Report on Actions Taken", From L. D. Battle, July 31, 1961; Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 15, 1961, p. 3; NSF-JFK.

46. Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, p. 8.

47. Lisbon to Secretary of State, May 1, 1961; Department of State to Lisbon and Leopoldville, May 10, 1961; Lisbon to Secretary of State, May 20, 1961; NSF-JFK.

48. Stanleyville to Department of State, March 28, 1964, p. 2, NSF-LBJ.

49. G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, December 18, 1963; John Marcum, "Three Revolutions," *Africa Report*, 12 (November 1967), pp. 9-10.

50. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 259.

51. Department of State Circular to All African Posts, July 4, 1963; July 17, 1963, NSF-JFK.

52. Leopoldville to Department of State, December 30, 1963, p. 1, NSF-LBJ.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. Department of State to Lisbon, January 17, 1964, p. 5, NSF-LBJ.

56. "Portuguese African Territories: Action Memorandum," to the Secretary from G. Mennen Williams, April 29, 1964, p. 1. NSF-LBJ.

57. *Ibid.*, 3-4, 7-8.

58. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1974), pp. 155-57.

59. G. Mennen Williams to Mr. Kitchen, September 17, 1965, WP-NA.

60. Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 31, 1964, NSF-LBJ, reveals that the U.S. asked Portugal for "early action" on its request for LORAN-C facilities for Polaris submarine missiles. The installation of a Portuguese complex was considered "exceedingly important" for missile accuracy and "redundancy of navigational aids" for Polaris submarines and eventually a multilateral force. The American Ambassador to Lisbon believed that any agreement was "likely to be a straight quid pro quo deal" involving U.S. military equipment for the war in Africa.

61. Marcum, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 14, 16; Davidson, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

62. Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *National Security Study Memorandum 39: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976), p. 153.

63. Davidson, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-226.

64. El-Khawas and Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 105; Memorandum for the President, "Decisions on Southern Africa Policy," from Henry A. Kissinger, January 15, 1970, p. 2.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 3 (Approved by President Nixon); Memorandum for the President, "Policy Issues Regarding South Africa and the Portuguese Territories", from Henry A. Kissinger, January 15, 1970, p. 4.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5; El-Khawas and Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

67. Davidson, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227; John Marcum, "The Anguish of Angola: On Becoming Independent in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century," Presidential Address, Eighteenth Annual Meeting African Studies Association, San Francisco, October 29, 1975, p. 17.

68. Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, pp. 184-185; John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (April 1976), p. 410.

69. Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, p. 191; Marcum, "Lessons," p. 410.

70. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, p. 152; "The Pike Papers" (House Intelligence Committee Report), *Village Voice Supplement*, January 1976, p. 37.

71. The quotation is from an interview with an intelligence source. The substance of Colby's disagreement is conveyed in *Washington Post*, December 19, 1975.

72. Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, pp. 20, 37, 40.

73. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, p. 152.

74. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Re-

spect to Intelligence Activities, *Staff Report, Covert Action in Chile*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, December 18, 1975, pp. 28, 37-39.

75. "CBS Reports," April 26, 1962: "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles." Transcript obtained from CBS Television, pp. 19-20.

76. Graham Hovey, "Fog and Worse on Angola," *New York Times*, December 30, 1975. According to an informed governmental source, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence concluded that the Soviets had "no long term interests" in Angola.

77. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 43.

78. Weissman, *op.cit.*, pp. 244-46, 254.

79. *New York Times*, January 8, 1976; January 4, 1976, p. 17.

80. Amin refers to the CIA and Lumumba's death in *New York Times*, February 26, 1977, p. 6.

81. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Chile*, pp. 44-49.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-23.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

84. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, p. 156.

85. *Washington Post*, April 10, 1977.

86. *Times of Zambia*, March 21, 1977.

A Tough Little Monkey

by Jack Bourderie

Johannesburg, Leopoldville, Zanzibar, Rio de Janeiro . . . what makes the present American Ambassador to Portugal, Frank Charles Carlucci, appear at the site of the great tragedies of the Third World?

"For the White House, Europe today is another Third World, with its problems: Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and now Portugal. For Washington it is necessary to influence events there." Victor Marchetti, co-author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, member of the "Company" up until 1969, only confirms what has been recently said in the American Senate before the Europe Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee: "What happens in Portugal is infinitely more serious than anything that can happen in Cambodia or in Vietnam."

The Mediterranean has become a subject of serious preoccupation—even without including the Azores with its Lajes base. Serious to such a point that the 40 Committee, after an entire session devoted to the case of Portugal, unleashed its "dogs of secret war." But things got worse. On September 28, 1974, Spínola lost. This was not expected so soon in the report that Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, the number two man in the CIA, made after his August trip to Portugal to verify the information sent back by the old liberal Ambassador, Stuart Nash Scott.

The Department of State quickly sent a new secret mission to Portugal during the month of October when it learned that the yacht *Apollo*, a precious way-station for CIA agents in the Mediterranean area, had been exposed and was seized at Funchal in Madeira on October 3 by an angry crowd enraged by "the attempted *coup d'état* of the silent majority."

[This article first appeared in *Afrique-Asie* magazine, April 7, 1975. At that time Frank Carlucci was the newly appointed Ambassador to Portugal. He is now Deputy Director of the CIA.]

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Alan Lukens, a specialist on the Iberian peninsula at the Department of State; Robert Ryan, economic expert; Peter de Vos, a Portuguese speaking Latin-American; and Michael Samuels, an Angolan on a scholarship and specialist in long-term planning, all confirmed what the very Catholic boss of the CIA, William Colby, had been able to sense from Madrid which he visited during the same month of October. It was time to act! The liberal Scott was sacked and in his place Frank Charles Carlucci III was named in November.

"Portugal is a country in which every diplomat would like to live," he declared on arriving in Lisbon on January 17. "A beautiful country, an agreeable climate, inhabited by a friendly people We have a great interest in it because it is struggling for democracy Here people speak of elections, of self-determination and of social justice. These are words to which we Americans are responsive. And Portugal and the U.S. are long-time friends."

B-26's for Salazar

This is true. From 1960 up until 1971, Radio Free Europe, the radio station of the CIA based in Munich, dispensed propaganda for its listeners in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria thanks to a transmitter in Portugal. The Commission for the Dismantling of the PIDE recently presented documents proving that the American government (the CIA specifically) received at that time in its training camps officers of the political police of Portugal, the PIDE, in order to initiate them in the modern practices of the fight against subversion and in types of torture more refined than the bathtub and electric shock.

The American sensitivity to self-determination is a little peculiar since, in 1965, while the Portuguese colonies were engaged in furious battle against the colonial-fascist grip of Salazar, the U.S.—which had officially agreed not to ship arms to the Portuguese armed forces—sold, among other things, by means of Intermountain Aviation, twenty operational B-26s for use in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. After the scandal was discovered, the British pilot responsible for their clandestine delivery, John Richard Hawke, recognized without qualms in front of a jury: "Obviously I flew the B-26s to Portugal, but it was on the orders of the Department of State and the CIA." He wasn't, by the way, even condemned.

But the revolution of April 25 got rid of all those nauseating odors. There is no question that the new ambassador Carlucci will "aid those deserving friends." "Economic aid" is understood, as is aid in "the domains of health, education, and culture." The CIA? "The Embassy still has the same personnel. Hardly more than two or three persons have arrived to reinforce us. All of that is rumor without basis"

And when, on January 31, 1975, the Berlin newspaper *Extra Dienst* announced that a putsch attempt would take place before the end of the

month of March involving the American Embassy, the German Embassy and certain Portuguese personalities, there was a cascade of denials: ".... journalistic inventions."

Not only journalistic since on March 11, the evening following the aborted *coup d'état*, the Deputy chief of Copcon, Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho himself, citing foreign interventions and attempts to discredit the provisional Portuguese government by destabilization maneuvers and other techniques, remarked that "by coincidence or for other reasons, these sorts of activities have increased." And he added, in a flamboyant understatement, "I do not know what will be the attitude of our government, but, to be cautious, it would without a doubt be preferable for Mr. Carlucci to leave Portugal, even for his personal security. Because I cannot, at this time, guarantee his physical security, and it is possible that, at the point where we are, he might experience certain regrettable incidents. This would be extremely disturbing for our government."

Champion of the diplomatic euphemism, Frank C. Carlucci declared himself certain that "the Portuguese government and the military authorities of the MFA were perfectly capable of assuring my personal security."

A veiled threat was made by Bruce Laingen, Deputy Under Secretary of State, who declared to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that "the U.S. would look poorly upon any obstacles put in the way of holding free elections in that country." Kissinger was "worried by Portugal's move to the left."

Was the Portuguese climate suddenly less agreeable to Frank Charles Carlucci III? It's true that the reassuring attitude he tried to adopt for his official photograph didn't go well with his nomination: "The participation of communists in a Portuguese government would without any doubt bring about a reexamination of American policy concerning economic aid to Portugal and their membership in NATO." That reassuring attitude also doesn't go well with the visit he made on March 25 to President Costa Gomes to express "the concern of the U.S. over the situation in Portugal." And it doesn't jibe at all with his career.

Grandson of an Italian stone cutter and son of an insurance salesman, Frank Charles Carlucci, third of the name, was born in Bear Creek, a suburb of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Seminary school gave him a rigidity that Princeton and Harvard Business School would varnish. Two years of service in the Navy would complete his rigid stance along with a crew-cut, a shaved neck, and the unanswering face of a Piedmont waiter just barely lit by a blue-gray stare.

Finishing as a first lieutenant, Carlucci entered the Foreign Service Reserve in 1956. The grandson of an Italian had become a typical American, looking for a job. Successively in housing, a salesman, management trainee in a textile company, second *maitre d'hôtel*, he found his vocation in 1957 when the Foreign Service extracted him from his uniform grayness and sent him to Johannesburg as an economic analyst. He enjoyed himself in

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the country of apartheid but remained only a year. He was recalled to the U.S. for "complementary training" whose nature is not disclosed in his biographies.

The hour had then come to give responsibilities to this "brilliant, energetic, and dynamic young man." The birth of the Congolese nation was difficult. Patrice Lumumba led a strong fight against the Belgian-American interests who were skinning his country, struggling for a true independence. Frank Carlucci disembarked there in March 1960. First Vice-Consul, then Second Secretary at the Embassy, and finally "political officer," it was he who wrote from Leopoldville a daily political analysis, a true calendar of "destabilization"—the word was not yet in use—for the management of the Department of State. He became the brains in the Embassy. In his combat against Lumumba and Gizenga, and in his support of Tshombe and Mobutu, he experienced a few adventures that were the delight of the American press.

The Cross of the Brave

The reporters knew very well whether it was 35 Belgians or 50 Americans that he saved from the clutches of those "xenophobic Congolese," but at any rate, molested by a furious crowd "and showing great physical courage, he intervened to have them liberated."

As he tells the story: "Patrice Lumumba, who was tall, over six feet I remember, gave me a slap on the shoulder and said to me: 'I give them to you. You can do what you want with them.' And they were released."

In order that his reports be first-hand information, he made "incursions into hostile territory." He daily underwent dangers that made his father swell with pride: "My boy is a tough little monkey"—a tough little monkey who moved about with great ease in the veritable bacterial culture of agents of all sorts who haunted Leopoldville by night. Among them an Englishman, Michael S. Thompson, CIA agent in close contact with the Belgians and today Chief of Station in Brussels.

But Carlucci also made "friends" among the Congolese: "It's easy. All you have to do is go see them, shake their hand, and talk to them." Cyrille Adoula, who had become Prime Minister, was invited to lunch one day in 1962. "Where is Carlucci?" he asked Kennedy, who was obliged to ask Dean Rusk to go find the man who was the Congolese Premier's gray matter. He was swallowing a cold lunch in a snack bar before he was dragged back to the President's table.

Two years went by in this manner in the Congo, just enough time to witness the overthrow and the assassination of Lumumba and to place in orbit the Tshombes and Mobutus who were supposed to "take the Congo out from under communist domination."

At the end of this mission, Carlucci received the Senior Service Award, the highest reward of the Foreign Service, when he had worked for them only five years, three overseas.

With his shiny new cross of the brave in his pocket, he arrived in Zanzibar in February 1964 where, since the troubles in January, the situation was rather confused. Were the Zanzibarians more difficult to charm than the Congolese? The new Consul General didn't last the standard two years there. He was recalled on the request of Julius Nyerere. His passage through the country of cloves "civilized" his military bearing. His haircut was less strict. But he still ran his two miles every morning—"in fourteen minutes."

In July 1965, he found himself "political officer" at the American Embassy in Rio. The coup of 1964 had put an end to the situation about which Ted Noland, director of the CIA in Quito, had said in 1963 to Philip Agee: "Brazil is our most serious problem in Latin America; much more serious than Cuba since the missile crisis" (like Portugal today).

The Brazilian thugs installed with dollars seemed for the time being favorable to a policy of welcoming foreign capital. That didn't keep the CIA from pursuing relations with a polyglot globe-trotter, Herbert S. Okun, who today frequently hops back and forth between Munich, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Buenos Aires, and Brasilia, where he is Consul. Through him the CIA maintained a privileged relationship with a group led by none other than Carlos Lacerda, who was one of the principal conspirators in the overthrow of Goulart and who was then conspiring against the military men he had helped bring to power.

Frank Carlucci made friends with Lacerda and succeeded in organizing a meeting between the American ambassador Tuthill and Lacerda which provoked a Brazilian protest addressed to the Department of State. The nights in Rio brought together, other than Carlucci, Roberto Campos, Minister of Planning (economy); Cordeiro de Farias, Minister of the Interior (police)—that is to say, the dispensers of American imperialism—as well as Golbery do Couto e Silva, the creator of the Brazilian CIA.

Miguel Arraes, governor of Pernambuco and avowed adversary of Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, declares today without hesitation: "Carlucci was the coordinator of the multiple networks of the CIA that operated in Brazil at that time." The same man of whom the leader of the Portuguese socialists, Mario Soares, said, "He's an honest man!"

Having become the number two man in the Embassy, Carlucci had the luck of leaving Brazil in July 1969, just before that "disgusting August"—the month of annoyances—which saw the elimination of Costa e Silva, struck down by sickness and the intensification of Marighela's commandos' activities and was crowned by the kidnapping in early September of the American ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick, later exchanged for political prisoners.

Back in Washington, Carlucci occupied various positions in the Nixon administration and in particular that of Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, where he was responsible for reducing the budget of VISTA for aid to the unemployed and the poor, and that of Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

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This puts in a quite different light the declaration that he made in Lisbon on February 15, 1975: "There are rumors One of them concerns the visit of a group of Doctors. The first time I heard of them was in the Portuguese press. Now they are tourists. Does Portugal want tourists to come or not? This has nothing to do with American aid to this country in the domain of health."

Nonetheless, on March 5 Portuguese specialists protested: "Considering the offer of the U.S. to build hospitals in Lisbon, Porto, and a city of the south . . . and the offer to send technicians to help in the domain of health and others; considering that these offers originate from the Agency for International Development, an organization well known as an instrument of the CIA; considering that those loans and grants . . . serve as cover for the infiltration of CIA agents; considering that American imperialism is the enemy of the Portuguese people . . . we call the attention of the government to the real dangers that this type of support hides, and whose consequences have been revealed in Chile, Santo Domingo, Bolivia, Guatemala and in so many other martyred countries."

In fact, on February 28, while the rumors spread that the CIA had decided to make "human investments" in Portugal, Frank Carlucci, to prove the "good faith" of the U.S. and their desire to "respect the wishes of the Portuguese people," signed two agreements: one for a credit of one million dollars for "technicians to come study the improvement of communications and the health services," and the other a grant of \$750,000 to Portugal through AID.

In Lisbon, Carlucci, whose face now seems to be sculpted in the stone that his grandfather cut, whose eyes, now more metallic, are sunken into sockets underlined by large dark bags, this Carlucci has established good relations with Spínola, "on reserve" with the businessman Champalimaud, who goes often from Cascais to Massam to see his "friend" and relative, Spínola.

Who prides himself on having warned Spínola of the supposed "assassination attempt" against him? Who welcomed him in Brazil after his flight from Portugal? Who was in Paris at the same time as Champalimaud? Carlos Lacerda, the "friend" of Frank Carlucci. Who directed Latina-Thompson, subsidiary of J. Walter Thompson, the American advertising agency famous for its Marine Corps recruitment slogan ("The Marines could use a few good men") and responsible for creating a reassuring image of Pinochet in Portugal? The Brazilian Alvaro Gurjao da Silveira, now dead, who seems to have served as the intermediary between Lacerda and Spínola.

Why did Spínola, in December, in the company of Diaz Alegria, the "Spanish Spínola," withdraw 50,000 contos from the Bank of Biscaye in Madrid, according to a witness? What had the AFL-CIO "unionist" Irving Brown come to do in Lisbon in March, he who for twenty-five years

has played a major role in the activities and plots of the CIA, especially in the Third World?

In asking all these questions and in pulling all these leads, we find two curious points of convergence: one at the American Embassy in Lisbon and the other on the banks of the Potomac. Does that mean, as one hears now and then, that Frank Charles Carlucci III could be the number 4 man of the CIA? A man who can declare without a smile, "I don't know what the expression American imperialism signifies," has, we can be sure, a "plausible denial" up his sleeve.

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OTRAG: Missiles Against Liberation in Africa

by Informationsdienst
Südliches Afrika

One of America's leading gold dealers, Douglas Johnson, discussed South Africa's future at a conference in New Orleans in October 1977: "Contrary to contemporary conventional wisdom, South Africa is not about to go down the drain. A truly great people, a formidable people, the Germans, will not allow it." He went on to justify his extraordinary claim by noting that most of West Germany's oil followed the Cape route, and many of its essential minerals came from South Africa. "The Germans know that if

[In its Autumn 1977 issue, *Race and Class*, the journal of the Institute on Race Relations and the Transnational Institute, published in London, shocked the world with their publication of the complete text of a secret contract between the government of Zaire and a little-known West German company, OTRAG (Orbital Transport and Missiles, Ltd.). The contract leased to OTRAG a vast section of Zaire, twenty-nine thousand square miles, and gave the company complete sovereignty and control over the area. The company is ostensibly in the business of developing cheap satellite-launching missiles for private industry, but the application of its technology to military purposes—purposes forbidden the West German government since World War II—was quickly apparent. Numerous articles appeared suggesting links between the company and the West German government, the South African government, and the CIA. Nothing was confirmed, but the pressures on the Zairian government became so strong that in early 1979 they announced that OTRAG would not physically launch missiles from Zaire. However, it is still functioning, and the controversy continues. The following article, published in late 1978 in Bonn, documents the activities of OTRAG.]

South Africa falls, they fall too. So they have built a vast missile base in Zaire to make certain that their supply lines are secure."¹ Johnson was of course referring to OTRAG's allegedly peaceful missile-research program in the Zairian province of Shaba.

We have traced OTRAG and its supporters back to those Nazi scientists who worked on the V1 and V2 rockets during World War II, and who later continued their activity in the United States, France, and Argentina. For example, Dr. Kurt H. Debus, at present Chairman of the Board of OTRAG, once worked at the Peenemünde V2 program and later, until 1975, worked as director of the Cape Canaveral space program. Richard Gompertz, OTRAG's technical director and a U.S. citizen, once was a specialist on V2 engines and later presided over NASA's Chrysler space division. Lutz Thilo Kayser, OTRAG's founder and manager, when young was quite close to the Nazi rocket industry, often called "Dadieu's young man," a reference to Armin Dadieu, his mentor, who served as a prominent SS officer and as Göring's special representative for a research program on storing uranium. While working for OTRAG Kayser also acted as a contact for the West German government, a special adviser to the Minister of Research and Technology on matters concerning OTRAG. He was also on the ad hoc committee on the Apollo program transport systems.²

Financing by the German Federal Government

According to its own definition, OTRAG is a private company financed by private funds. Indeed, during a Lusaka press conference Chancellor Helmut Schmidt insisted upon this: "The government has no shares in OTRAG nor does it have any other finger in the pie."³ The real facts are rather different.

OTRAG is chartered as a transcription company, which means that shareholdings are credited by the government as paid taxes multiplied by a factor of 3.26; that is, OTRAG is subsidized by the government. Development of OTRAG's missile technology was also financed by the government. Since 1967 the state-financed Institute for Chemical and Rocket Engineering in Lampoldshausen has done all the developmental work. OTRAG's predecessor, Stuttgart Technology Research, received as much as DM 14.6 million for missile research studies from federal grants. A number of OTRAG employees are paid by the government-run German Research and Experiment Institute for Aviation and Spacecraft. Its head, Dr. Theo Peters, was a co-founder of OTRAG, and is on the Board of Directors. Reconstruction of highways and bridges within the OTRAG territory of Zaire is also being financed by German government development aid.

Kayser's business group was given many strange government orders. For example, in 1976 its technological research group received DM

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764,000 for scientific investigations of coal gas; Kayser had a job as an "expert" in the "Airbus" contract, and some related deals. The development of a TIROC engine for satellites with which he was involved received, between 1974 and 1976, DM 1 million from the federal government. A former government airfield in Kassel-Lohfelden was reserved for one of OTRAG's manufacturing plants.⁴

A Colonial Treaty

The contract between OTRAG and the government of Zaire, involving the "unlimited use" of nearly 30,000 square miles, made OTRAG sovereign over territories once inhabited by 760,000 people. OTRAG is authorized to conduct any excavation and construction it chooses, including airfields, energy plants, communication systems, and manufacturing plants. All movement of people into and within the OTRAG territory is only with the permission of OTRAG. The state of Zaire is obliged to keep everyone else out and away. The same applies to the air space over the granted territory. OTRAG is absolved from any responsibility for and damage caused by the construction or transport of missiles. Its people enjoy complete immunity from the laws of Zaire in the granted territory. These exclusive rights are granted until the year 2000.⁵

War Preparations

The governments and the press in Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique have expressed worries about the development of offensive military weapons using OTRAG missiles in Zaire. The Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, and Cuba have all denounced the OTRAG project as a means by which West Germany may circumvent the restrictions against certain weapons laid down in the 1954 Brussels Treaty. The *London Evening Standard* quoted U.S. military officials as suspecting the West Germans and France of the secret development of missile forces on OTRAG territory to prohibit an invasion of South Africa.⁶ In March 1978 an article in *Penthouse* by Tad Szulc said, based on secret service sources, that OTRAG was an extension of West Germany's arms companies Dornier and Messerschmidt—developing and testing cruise missiles and middle-range rockets on OTRAG territory. France and the U.S., the article said, were also participating in the project.

That month the racist paper *Rhodesian Viewpoint* published the following letter to the editor: "... Those reports on the German missile base are wonderful! My grandson in the army does not fight for a black government but for a Christian country."

Despite all this, the West German government continued to insist that OTRAG was a peaceful project. A question in Parliament by Representative Norbert Gansel "whether the Federal Government was able honestly to deny that OTRAG missiles are being used for military purposes" was

given this false response: "According to our own investigations, the missiles, still in a state of development, are not fit for military purposes."⁷ However, in an interview with the magazine *Der Spiegel*, OTRAG chief Lutz Kayser admitted that "of course everything could be used militarily,"⁸ and admitted in an unpublished letter that his missiles were able to carry "ten hydrogen bombs."⁹ OTRAG said that the load capacity of its missiles was five tons, and the range about 1,000 kilometers.¹⁰ Kayser noted that OTRAG was also able to launch observation satellites. "OTRAG is going to launch satellites for observation and the spotting of mineral reserves as well as other projectiles, too dangerous and sensitive for shuttle transport."¹¹

The time it takes to fuel missile engines is no argument against military use in possible nuclear attacks on Dar es Salaam, Luanda, or Maputo, because the missiles can easily be stored while fueled.

The history of OTRAG underlines the close contact between the company and the Ministry of Defense in Bonn. Chairman Debus would not name the three high NASA officials who inspected and praised OTRAG's concept. Their techniques are also kept secret.¹² The Bureau for Tunnel and Mountain Engineering in Karlsruhe issued a secret study on construction possibilities for tunnels on OTRAG's territory. Bundeswehr planes flew OTRAG materials into Zaire and Bundeswehr equipment was transported into OTRAG territory on East African Railways.

That military rockets are being installed or tested on OTRAG territory is illustrated by the fact that "mobile launching sites" are being scheduled.¹³ The military aim of invulnerability is indicated by the underground tunnel systems. Also the clandestine takeoffs at the end of 1977—in addition to the publicly announced ones—point out military cover of the project.

Moreover, tests and deployment of Cruise missiles on OTRAG territory must be suspected since the H.P. Gauff Company of Nuremberg, one of OTRAG's collaborators in Zaire, is looking for a French-speaking pilot to do "aerial photography in Africa." These photos are necessary for programming cruise missiles that find their targets by surface reconnaissance television and computers. According to Szulc, distant control systems for OTRAG's missiles are being provided by the Thomson CSF company in France. A CIA agent told a British journalist that the Boeing Company had provided OTRAG with Cruise missile technology.

On April 27, 1979, Zaire's ambassador in Brussels declared that his government intended to forbid any further satellite launching by OTRAG, but contrary to the reports in the press, there was no hint that the contract was to be canceled. Given all the information available, it must be assumed that activities are going on as usual.

Notes

1. *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, September 13, 1978.
2. Gesellschaft für Unternehmensberatung, Hamburg, 1976, Diagnosebericht OTRAG, p. 12.
3. Bulletin of the Press and Information Center of the Federal Government, No. 75, July 6, 1978.
4. *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika*, No. 10/11, Bonn, October 1978.
5. *Der Spiegel*, August 4, 1978.
6. *The Evening Standard*, February 13, 1978.
7. *Deutscher Bundestag*, 8th Session, 98th Sitting, June 15, 1978, 11.
8. *Der Spiegel*, August 4, 1978.
9. Unpublished letter, Kayser to Hoelzgen, September 1975.
10. *Prospekt OTRAG*, May 1977.
11. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, September 12, 1977.
12. Gesellschaft für Unternehmensberatung, *op. cit.* p. 9; Report of the German Research and Experiment Institute for Aviation and Spacecraft, DFVLR/B-PT-TE 26-4.239/75, July 31, 1975.
13. *Welt Am Sonntag*, August 19, 1976.

The Savimbi Letters

from Afrique-Asie magazine

The Long Treason of UNITA

On June 17 [1974], a ceasefire was concluded between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Portuguese army in order "to create an atmosphere propitious to the initiation of a political dialogue aimed at reestablishing peace." This is surprising because, at the same time, the MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC all conditioned an end to the fighting upon the independence of the "overseas Portuguese provinces."

Less astonishing, however, is that UNITA and its president, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, were being given all sorts of honors by the Portuguese army general staff. The Commander-in-Chief at Luanda stated, "Not too long ago, UNITA was one of the three liberation movements which, in the east, presented the greatest resistance."¹ Another officer declared, "The result of the conversations between Savimbi and the Commander-in-Chief of Luanda has been studied by the Portuguese government."² Spínola, who had "received with great pleasure the letter sent to him by the leader of UNITA," had found the "brave soldier" he needed to "stop the fighting" and put an end to the war between the "turras"³ and the "tugas."⁴ In fact, this is not the first time that Jonas Savimbi made the headlines.

In July 1964 the conference of chiefs of state of the OAU was held. Holden Roberto, president of the GRAE,⁵ was present, and was accused of "collusion with the American imperialists." Who was the accuser? Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, "Minister of Foreign Affairs," left-wing member of GRAE, and close associate of Holden. He cited names and unchallenge-

[After the Portuguese fascist regime was overthrown in April 1974, numerous secret documents were found. Among the most explosive were a series of letters between Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, and representatives of the Portuguese government. They were published, in French, in the July 8, 1974, issue of *Afrique-Asie* magazine, with an introduction by Jack Bourdier. The introduction and excerpts from the letters follow.]

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able facts which proved that the FNLA was infiltrated to the marrow by the CIA.

This *assimilado*, from Bie, went to the Universities of Lisbon and of Lausanne to get a doctorate in political and juridical sciences. Did he intend to rejoin the MPLA, which he had contacted casually in 1960? No. On December 12, 1964, with about 20 others, he published a "manifesto of the Friends of Angola" (Amangola), in which he proclaimed his willingness to "cooperate sincerely with all political-military formations of Angolan patriots within and outside Angola," given the fact that "a good Angolan never kills another Angolan."

Promoting an active struggle "to isolate Portugal from the rest of the world," denouncing "all collaboration with Portuguese colonialism," Amangola declared its willingness "to prepare the whole country to . . . forge a permanent spirit of struggle, the only guarantee for the creation of popular power after the democratic revolution." A trial balloon. On May 13, 1966, in the center of Mexico, Savimbi founded his own movement, UNITA. But the red buds of the Amangolan discussions blossomed and were enriched with Chinese petals. Savimbi's speech was replete with slogans taken from Mao Tse-tung's thoughts, like "rely on our own forces," "people's war," "internal contradictions," and "correct resolution." The charter published after the congress of August 1973 looked like nothing but pieces taken from the Little Red Book. The program was also ambitious; it purported to present all the characteristics of a state "in the best revolutionary traditions of a popular democracy."

Was UNITA the most revolutionary product of Angolan nationalism? The question was being asked by many, including us. Why did we express some mistrust when many progressive journals around the world were reprinting the fiery prose of Savimbi? We are now in a position to present the proof that they were mistaken. The readers must be the judge. We obtained four letters of unquestionable authenticity after April 25 [the date of the *coup* in Portugal], from which the following two conclusions can be drawn:

1. The new Portuguese government, despite the statements of some and the promises of others, is taking the same colonial approach as its fascist predecessor: In entering into this fictitious cease fire, it is strengthening UNITA.

2. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, its president, has been since 1972 an agent of the Portuguese and of their politics, whatever the difficulties. At the time these letters were written, there was talk of a repressive program of Marcelo Caetano which General Cunha was asked to implement. It included the theories of "social promotion" and of "integration" of the population. The number-one enemy was MPLA, which UNITA was given the task of destroying.

In his talk to the congress of August 1973, Savimbi concluded: "If this war ends with the victory of the Angolan forces it will require the total de-

struction of the structures created by the Portuguese in our country. If the conflict ends with a compromise it will leave behind the seeds from which will grow neo-colonialism. Therefore to build a different and better society, the Angolan people must impose a real defeat on the colonial army and end the conflict with the total destruction of Portuguese colonialism." But today, Jonas Savimbi, in a letter of June 9, 1974, identifies himself with a project of Spínola: "UNITA supports the idea of a period of preparation of the Angolan people for the rule of democracy. To achieve this it is necessary that the liberation movements participate in a campaign among the people to stop the war. It is very easy to talk of immediate independence for Angola, but when one thinks seriously about the problems which come with the birth of a state, especially when that state is Angola, there is reason to be prudent." He is convinced that "the process of decolonization of Angola, if it is to be authentic, must be the exclusive responsibility of the Portuguese government."⁶

Is treason too strong a word?

Document A: Letter from Jonas Savimbi to General Luz Cunha;⁷ via General Bethencourt Rodrigues,⁸ September 26, 1972

Excellencies:

Before getting to practical matters, I wish Your Excellencies to transmit my heartfelt compliments on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the coming to power of His Excellency Professor Marcelo Caetano, President of the Council of Ministers. I would also like to use this occasion to send my congratulations to His Excellency General Luz Cunha for his nomination to the very responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Angola.

The difficulties of the clandestine struggle, the realities of life in Angola, and the prospect for an equitable solution to the problems that afflict the people of this land lead me to predict the final outcome of events in Angola. Whatever the distance left to be covered, we are certain that the authorities are already victorious, thanks to the new social policies practiced by the government. As for us, we wish only to completely eliminate war in this eastern sector. We have done everything within our power to weaken the forces of our common enemy.

We see the MPLA as the principal obstacle to peace, not only in the east, but throughout Angola. First-hand information we possess leads us to believe that MPLA is preparing other ambushes and operations against the armed forces and against UNITA, and that they intend to drive the UPA⁹ from Zaire, maneuvering some kind of unity between MPLA and UPA.

Zaire knows that the MPLA, rather than dislodging its UPA protégés

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from the border zones, will soon be engaged in subversion against the Kinshasa regime. General Mobutu's prudence is based on two factors:

1. The position that the Americans might take concerning a unification between MPLA and UPA. But history has already shown that American policy is unreliable, always acting late, and only when its interests are at stake. In the flirtations between the superpowers and the OAU, no one can be certain the U.S. will not once again miscalculate regarding Africa.

2. The political errors that ambition might cause General Mobutu to commit, which would disturb the army, would be fatal errors for a weak regime.

The OAU conference in Rabat on June 11, 1972, and that in Dar es Salaam on September 10, 1972, have continued to put pressure on Zaire to accept the MPLA, using this same story of unification. We know very well that there are great differences between the MPLA and the UPA, but on the other hand, the UPA is looking for new support within the OAU to break its isolation of the last five years. The diplomatic strength of the MPLA is much greater, and we see maneuvers developing which could result in the liberation movements being accepted in world organizations as observers. This bothersome situation is due to the relations between the UN and the OAU. We can therefore understand the rumors that a UN delegation visited Guinea,¹⁰ and might even visit the liberated territories of the MPLA and FRELIMO.

The conference in Dar es Salaam agreed to allocate parts of the neighboring territories to the liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, with freedom to install their administrative organizations, hospitals, schools, and training camps. This resolution, proposed by Zambia and Tanzania, follows the line of the Zambian government to clean out the border zones, which was announced on August 18, 1972.

UNITA continues to maintain active cells in Zambia in spite of that government's hostile attitude toward us. We don't even get simple tolerance. But we have support in the population, which gives us information on MPLA's activities in Zambia, its plans against us, and even the plans of Mr. Kaunda's government which, in 1970, worked with MPLA in a plan to liquidate UNITA. Since those plans failed, Kaunda has resorted to forbidding anyone from UNITA to live in or pass through Zambia. Nevertheless we are trying to reinforce the work of our activists in Zambia, since we could not reasonably engage in defensive warfare without information on the MPLA.

The latest plot of the MPLA and Zambia was to send to us, without notice, a journalist named Josephat Kachoto. We received him graciously. Before the visit it was our intention to weaken MPLA with hard blows and to undermine its authority abroad, so the world would wonder whether it even existed. We cannot do much, though, because we don't have much materiel at our disposal. But often the best plans are those of a dozen brave men who will undertake great schemes.

We believe that Kachoto is a member of the Zambian CIB,¹¹ but he has given us valuable information on the political situation in Zambia. Since he is neither very intelligent nor very capable, he could be used either by his government or by us to penetrate areas where we have not, up until now, been able to go. He came to find out our attitude about a united front with MPLA, and interestingly never mentioned the UPA, and never spoke about an alliance these two movements could have, in Brazzaville and in Rabat.¹²

Our position is irreversible. We are no longer interested in the OAU, nor in Zambia, and even less in alliances with the MPLA. If these aspects of UNITA's policies are not yet sufficiently clear for the authorities in Angola and in Portugal, it is still an irrefutable fact: we have actively participated in the weakening of the MPLA in regions of the east.¹³ We have no illusions about alliances with the kind of people we have been fighting, and whom we continue to fight without letup. Whatever the thoughts of the government, we will never entertain taking up arms against the authorities. We use our arms so that one day we will force the MPLA to abandon the east.

To have peace in the east, we believe, the following must be taken into consideration:

1. The weakening of MPLA forces within Angola to lead to their liquidation. This task can be accomplished by the combined efforts of the military forces and the forces of UNITA.

2. The liquidation of MPLA's camps in the border areas of Zambia. This can be more easily accomplished by UNITA because we have no political status which would lead to censure by an international organization. Our plans are beyond the preliminary stage.

3. To discredit the MPLA. In this regard, we are also aiming at the OAU, at least as concerns liberation movements. Once the MPLA is weakened or liquidated in the east, great horizons are open to us.

I still maintain my philosophy that the giving up of fighting by the masses and their leaders is only part of the solution to the problems that affect peace in Angola. There must be a force that can combat those who cause us all these horrors, a force not limited or hampered by international conventions, a force that will be an important factor in governing our nation. Our information network abroad is quite large, and we use it to our advantage, fighting the MPLA not only with arms, but also at the diplomatic level, where they get all their support and mystification. I very much want this aspect to be closely studied by the authorities, to see in what way our efforts could be of public use.

The powerful covet the riches of Angola, and its privileged strategic position, and they await the deterioration of the situation. We can accelerate that condition within the liberation movements and within the camps of their leaders. Though I have gone on about the MPLA, it is no longer a seven-headed monster impossible to attack. If I don't speak much about

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the UPA, it is because I don't think that in the future it will be a serious enemy. Also, we don't get as much information about the UPA, as we can only get serious intelligence through Katanga.

With this said, UNITA asks Your Excellencies' temporary authorization to use the Lufuta-Luanguinga-Luvo corridor. The authorities know that we possess a mobile force on the banks of the Luanguinga close to Zambia. It was this force that attacked the MPLA during April and May in Zambia and forced them out of Lutembo. But this force always runs the risk of attack by your militia at Lutembo.¹⁴ However, it has orders never to return fire from the militia, but to retreat as quickly as possible and to inform me.

[The letter then provides whatever "information" Savimbi had about the location and weapons of MPLA units observed by UNITA forces and descriptions of various battles with MPLA forces.]

As for your question of us providing you guides, our position remains the same. We are ready to provide them as soon as a camp has been positively located. The difficulty comes from the fact that the enemy discovers the footprints of our men as soon as they leave. We have therefore adopted the procedure of sending in groups whose mission is to immediately attack any camp they locate. We believe that what would facilitate those missions would be joint actions between our troops and yours in a predetermined sector. This problem should be studied with our delegation so we can determine what preparations are necessary for such an operation.

[Savimbi then provides a list of various items he wishes, "sent as a loan," from seeds and animals to school supplies and medical equipment.]

I would like to add to this memorandum a request that has special importance to me. I once again ask Your Excellencies to furnish me with at least 1,500 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, since our actions against the MPLA and the UPA always take place with weapons of this caliber. Please note that we never use this ammunition against the nationals. My request for hand grenades can be ignored, as we still have enough for the time being. As regards camouflage, we will ask the timber merchants for another type of cloth, as you recommended, but I ask that, if possible, at least two good uniforms, in genuine camouflage cloth, be sent, one for me and one for Puna.

I humbly ask Your Excellencies to accept my salutations and high esteem.

Lungue-Bungo, September 26, 1972

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi

Bachelor of Political and Legal

Sciences of the University of Lausanne,

President of UNITA.

Document B: Letter from Jonas Savimbi to Lieutenant Colonel Ramires de Oliveira, October 25, 1972.

Lieutenant Colonel Armenio Nuno Ramires de Oliveira, Chief-of-Staff of the Eastern Military Zone:

A few days ago I asked our Captain Clemente to send you our thanks for the 7.62 millimeter ammunition and also to express our satisfaction that each meeting brings us closer to the objectives we both seek.

An action was executed against the UPA on October 12, 1972. As soon as the camp mentioned in the notes you were so kind to send me was located, we discovered that the UPA troops had moved out, and our combat group pursued them. They caught up with them at Suta.

On October 13, 1972, our forces executed an action against the MPLA. A group of 20 men, 17 armed, penetrated our region. As they were retreating in the direction of Quembo, with no time for us to warn the commander of the eastern military zone, we were obliged to pursue them. Encountered at Cassingo, we violently attacked. Information obtained there indicates that there are three more enemy camps in that region, each of which has more than 20 guerrillas. This is why we must ask Your Excellency for permission to move more freely in zones 2 and 3, from November 5, 1972, for a period of no longer than a month, or until the action is terminated. Our forces will then immediately leave the area.

A few months ago we captured a 7.92 millimeter machinegun from the UPA. I ask if it would be possible to send this to you to have it repaired, because it would be very useful to us.

I have in my possession a document of the OAU which I consider to be of great importance. I have just received it. It concerns the procurement of weapons by the MPLA and other movements in Portuguese territories; finances, transportation, etc. I think it is quite useful in that it reflects the state of mind present at the last meeting of the African chiefs of state in Rabat. As soon as I have finished studying it I will have it forwarded by the usual means, as it would be a pity if such an important document were lost.

As for our meeting, I always prefer to meet with the authorities face to face. But such a meeting should be prepared by our delegation, until we have agreed on place, date, form, agenda, and personalities who will attend. In any event, I think our delegation will be able to make concrete proposals at the next meeting concerning the installation of a radio transmitter-receiver here with us.

I would like to use this occasion to send my respectful greetings to His Excellency Engineer Santos e Castor for his nomination to the high post of Governor General of Angola.

Respectfully,
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi

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Document C: Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Ramires de Oliveira to Jonas Savimbi, November 4, 1972.

To Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi:

His Excellency the Commander of the eastern military zone has asked me to transmit to you the decisions made concerning the points mentioned in your memorandum of September 26, 1972, as well as to reply to your letter of October 25, received on October 31, 1972.

1. The analysis you have made of the internal and external situation of subversive movements in Angola, of their relations between each other and with the African countries that support them, has been duly studied and highly appreciated. As I have already told you, it coincides with our views.

2. We agree on the great utility which could result from continuing to maintain the UNITA cells in Zambia for the following objectives:—gathering information about MPLA and the political situation in Zambia and other African states;—maintaining pressure on the Zambian government to change its policy toward Portugal.

a. To maintain an unfavorable attitude toward the MPLA among the population, is very important. All the rest depends on it. Moreover, irritation and poor relations which can be created will heighten their difficulties in moving from Zambian to Angolan territory.

b. There are many advantages to spreading the rumor that there are not "liberated territories," no schools, no hospitals, of the MPLA in Angola, and that the people who follow them know only hunger and discomfort, and that MPLA has won no villages and only meets defeat.

c. Small attacks should be done with the support of the population. The authorities are interested in actions against a specific objective, as we will explain below.

d. The gathering of information is very important. Still, the problem of its distribution must be considered. This will be dealt with in our next exchange.

e. Political pressure exerted on the Zambian government by specialists could be extremely interesting if it can change the attitude of that government toward the subversive movements in Zambia.

3. Information of the most importance to us is that concerning the possibility of any agreement between the MPLA and the UPA. The UPA, even if it has problems, still has certain advantageous geographical positions in the east which the MPLA would like to occupy. Moreover, MPLA's communications would be greatly improved if it had at its disposition the facilities in Zaire.

We know that a "national conference" of the UPA will probably take place soon in Kinkuzu, and the first congress of the MPLA will be in November and December in Shikongo. It would be very important to infiltrate the latter in order to know what is discussed and decided.

4. The authorities agree that the most important thing for UNITA at this juncture is to keep the upper Lungue-Bungo region out of the war, and to secretly reinforce cooperation with our troops. In this phase we can hope for the surrender of the mass of the population. As for UNITA, we speak not of surrender, but of "integration," although the details can be defined in exchanges in which you will participate.

We wish therefore to maintain a zone of peace which will continually get larger as we encourage the population to cooperate against the guerrillas of MPLA and UPA. Small experiments in integration can begin and be carried as far as the conditions in the east permit.

5. The secret character of these contacts unfortunately, but necessarily, has its problems.

a. One is the impossibility of granting free use of the Lufuta-Luanguinga-Luvo corridor. Each time this corridor must be used, it will be necessary to warn headquarters so that we can withdraw our troops from the region for the necessary amount of time, under some pretext. Other than such periods it is impossible to guarantee your safety in the corridor.

b. Similarly, zones 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 should not be used without a prior request or, in an emergency, an immediate okay. You did not inform us of your October 12 action in zone 1 until October 21, and we have just learned of another action in zone 2. As our troops are often there, sometimes with helicopters, you are obviously taking risks.

c. Also because of the secrecy it is difficult to exchange prisoners.

6. We also believe that the destruction of MPLA's foreign bases is of extreme importance. But we think it should be done only with some guarantee of success, and with all necessary precautions, so not to compromise national authorities. If you agree, we can arrange a plan at our next exchange, and discuss the support we can give you.

7. Our forces may be active in zones 2 and 3 at the end of November. They will not go beyond the limits of those zones, however. I also take the occasion to congratulate you on the results obtained against our common enemy.

8. Concerning the support for the population, it has already been furnished or is in the process of being delivered.

9. His Excellency, the Commander, has authorized the repair of your machinegun as requested in your letter of October 23, 1972. It should be forwarded by the timber merchants, disassembled and wrapped, if possible.

10. It would be very helpful if you could lend us the OAU document to which you referred, which will be photocopied and immediately returned.

11. We agree to study with your delegation the details of a personal meeting.

As usual, you will propose the date for a meeting. The main points on the agenda could be:

a. The actions of UNITA against the MPLA and the UPA inside the national territory

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- b. the activity of the UNITA cells in Zambia
- c. the use by UNITA of the Luanguinga corridor
- d. attacks by UNITA against MPLA's foreign bases
- e. the installation of a radio transmitter-receiver with you
- f. necessary aid to the population
- g. means for the exchange of information.

12. We received the request from Captain Clemente of UNITA concerning a medical checkup for you. We hope that there is nothing wrong, but His Excellency the General has requested me to renew his firm guarantee concerning your physical security, whatever your recuperation might require.

13. The greeting you sent to the Governor General of Angola will be transmitted.

For the Good of the Nation

The Chief of Staff

Armenio Nuno Ramires de Oliveira

Document D: Letter from Jonas Savimbi to Lieutenant Colonel Ramires de Oliveira, November 7, 1972

Dear Sir:

I am anxious to reply to your kind letter of November 4, 1972, for which I thank you.

Please transmit my sincere apologies to His Excellency the Commander General of the eastern military zone for the trouble caused by the delay of my arrival in the forest area in order to consult the doctor that His Excellency had the kindness to put at my disposal.

[There follows a lengthy explanation for the delay.]

The occupation of the sector allocated to us will depend on a greater tolerance by the authorities of our troop movements in zone 1. We must view this problem clearly. I am ready to follow your instructions, despite my point of view, but my strategy is adapted more to the movement of small forces than to that of the large forces which Your Excellency commands. In all the regions where UNITA has been stationed since my arrival in Angola we have cultivated fields which satisfy our need for food without becoming a burden to the people. But when our groups are sent into desert-like regions and told to remain there, it is frankly impossible to maintain the discipline of the forces.

The map of the regions allocated to UNITA was established with more consideration to the overall strategy of the war in the east than to the contribution that UNITA can make to the fight against MPLA and UPA. I accepted the situation, and I have asked for nothing more. But your role there is reduced to that which we do. And when our troops are outside a UNITA region there are troubles between the authorities and the population, as a few days ago in Satanda, when the troops attacked the people. I did not mention this to the authorities there, hoping that one day those au-

thorities will understand our good faith in the fight against this war which no longer benefits anyone. We should find the solution to all these difficulties in keeping with the spirit that His Excellency Professor Marcelo Caetano has expressed. Although a political and strategic solution should come from higher up, from Luanda, even from Lisbon, tactically the lower echelons are obliged to find local solutions to local problems.

We thank His Excellency the Commander General of the military zone for his kindness in having authorized the repair of our machinegun.

With my most sincere compliments.

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi

Notes

1. *Diario de Noticias*, June 27, 1974.
2. *O Seculo*, June 27, 1974.
3. Portuguese military slang for terrorist.
4. Guerrilla slang for Portuguese soldier.
5. Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, founded April 5, 1962, at Leopoldville.
6. Letter to Carlos Periera Mendes, correspondent of *Provincia de Angola*, at Luso, published June 13, 1974.
7. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Angola, who later became the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Army, on March 14, 1974, when Caetano fired General Costa Gomes and General Spínola. He was linked through his brother-in-law to a right-wing *coup* attempt against Caetano and was suspended from the armed forces after the *coup* of April 25, 1974.
8. General Bethencourt Rodrigues became Governor of Guinea-Bissau after General Spínola was relieved of duty on April 29, 1974.
9. Holden Roberto's Union of Angolan Peoples (later FNLA).
10. A visit that did take place in 1972.
11. The Zambian security service.
12. An agreement that was finally signed in Kinshasa December 13, 1972.
13. This was confirmed by the MPLA, who, since the opening of the eastern front, had accused UNITA of complicity with the Portuguese.
14. These were local forces, trained and armed by the Portuguese.

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Dress Rehearsal

by Miles Africanus

The Ford Administration's adventure in Angola presented a strange and contradictory spectacle. It was at once tough-minded and preposterous, aggressive and unsteady, banal and calamitous. It was the characteristic lashing out of a state and a ruling elite in growing disarray. At the same time, it was not simply a mistake. It was both logical and absurd, prefiguring things to come. Angola was a dress rehearsal for the coming war in southern Africa. In Angola the United States committed itself actively to preserving the status quo in that oppressed region.

The two books under review are very different. One, by the former chief of the CIA's Angola task force, is an account of a large-scale covert operation, the Angolan intervention of 1974-1976. The other, by the foreign affairs analyst of *Pravda*, is a narrative of the history and politics of an entire decade, focusing on the Agency's cardboard allies, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Taken together, the books by Stockwell and Ignatyev provide an absorbing picture of events in Angola, and of the secret war which Portugal and the United States began to wage against the future government of that country long before independence was achieved.

In Search of Enemies is an insider's story. Stockwell was the chief of the CIA's Angola task force, its executive officer. He saw everything of importance that there was to see. And he tells a great deal of what he saw, although by no means everything. His book demonstrates clearly once again—as if any demonstration were needed—that the CIA is a runaway, an intelligence agency whose politics lead inevitably to intervention. *In Search of Enemies* reveals the leadership of the CIA for what it is, a pro-

[This article, a review of *In Search of Enemies*, by John Stockwell, and of *Secret Weapon in Africa*, by Oleg Ignatyev, first appeared in the April-May 1979 issue of *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. Miles Africanus is the pseudonym of a well-known American expert on southern African affairs.]

tected clique of ignorant and truculent men running a lawless machine which can lay waste a vulnerable nation in the space of a few months.

Stockwell's account is particularly valuable for two reasons. The first is that the official mythology of the Angolan war is a lie. The second is that he gives us an unusual and detailed account of the evolution of a large-scale covert action.

It is clear from Stockwell's account that there never was a "civil war" in Angola at all, that the CIA paid the FNLA and UNITA and armed them in order to mount a challenge to the MPLA. The Pike Report and Seymour Hersh's December 1975 articles in *The New York Times* suggested that U.S. intervention began in January 1975. Stockwell reveals that the CIA began funding the operation in mid-1974 without the approval of the 40 Committee. As he puts it, the CIA spent "enough for word to get around that the CIA was dealing itself into the race." It was also that covert action which triggered the massive Soviet assistance to the People's Republic many months later. "Only in March 1975," he points out, "did the Soviet Union begin significant arms shipments to the MPLA." The CIA bureaucracy refused to see that its attempt to destroy the MPLA made a Soviet response almost inevitable.

Stockwell also gives us a close look at the CIA in action. Agee was able to describe the structure of the Agency and the operations carried out in particular Latin American stations. Stockwell, however, shows the whole Agency mobilizing to carry out a political and paramilitary coup in Angola. His is the first description of a major covert action program to come from an insider. He describes the dynamics of the Agency. He gives vivid and sometimes detailed accounts of reconnaissance missions in Angola, of daily routine at Langley, liaison with the Department of Defense, propaganda operations at the United Nations and in Kinshasa and Lusaka, Interdepartmental Group meetings, dealings within the CIA bureaucracy and the free-wheeling operations of station chiefs.

The information that Stockwell has set out in his book needs to be carefully sifted and analyzed. It is of great value to anyone who wants to understand how the CIA actually works. It complements the work of Marchetti and Marks, Agee, Wolf, Corson and others who have looked at the Agency critically from other perspectives. Stockwell has assembled a description which, although far from complete, tells us a great deal about the nature and organization of covert intervention.

Yet, while Stockwell's book is fascinating and important, it is also strangely disembodied. His description of events is so caught up with what was happening in the Agency that it too seems hermetically sealed from the outside world. Stockwell plunges into Angola like Mark Twain's innocent abroad, this time armed with a shotgun. Although he is ultimately revolted by what the Agency does in Angola, he does not seem to comprehend, in human terms, the remarkable drama which was unfolding there after 1974. His view of Jonas Savimbi, for instance, is surprising. Stockwell

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evidently saw Savimbi as an engaging, intelligent leader of his people. His description of Roberto, with whom he was also in contact, is again personal rather than political. He appears not to have read anything, or thought it relevant to try to read anything, beneath their expressions in conversation.

The value of Ignatyev's book is that it is political. It reflects what any CIA case officer would call a shrewd understanding of what was going on in Angola in the years from 1966 to 1976. It is also grounded in a respect for and sympathy with the aims of national liberation. In a frankly impressionistic way, Ignatyev seeks to fill in the background which Stockwell leaves out, to describe the origins of the conflict which Stockwell sometimes appears to view as a vast, crashing football game. Ignatyev examines the long record of U.S. opposition to liberation in the former Portuguese colonies, the backgrounds of Roberto and Savimbi, the conspiracy between Mobutu and General Spínola to carve up Angola, the South African invasion of the country and the role of the CIA and its mercenary hirelings. In sum, he puts Stockwell in perspective.

What is especially interesting for an American audience is that Ignatyev reviews the tawdry political history of Roberto and Savimbi, the chosen "leaders" of Angola on whom the CIA lavished the taxpayers' dollars. He shows them to be nothing but opportunists and thieves driven by ambition and ruthlessness. He asserts that Roberto was recruited by the CIA at a very early stage, in 1959 when he was working in New York, and that he was sent back to Kinshasa to prepare himself for the time when the Portuguese would leave Angola and the U.S. would need a local manager. He suggests that Savimbi too was recruited early on, although he is not clear about who may have recruited him. (The present writer believes that Savimbi was in fact recruited by the British in the late 1960s. He was inexplicably established in Gower Street at the beginning of the decade, from which vantage point he made absurd and unconvincing Maoist noises in a little newsletter.)

Ignatyev makes a good case that neither Roberto nor Savimbi can claim to have led a liberation movement in Angola. Basing himself on public documents of the MPLA, records of the OAU and Portuguese press reports, he reveals that both were widely regarded with suspicion as early as the mid-1960s. Roberto is widely believed to have spent much of his time hunting out and engaging MPLA units. The record is not clear on the extent of his overt cooperation with the Portuguese military. In the case of Savimbi, however, there is fairly clear evidence. In 1974 the journal *Afrique-Asie* published several letters exchanged between Savimbi and various senior Portuguese officials and military men. These documents were evidently captured at the time of the fall of the Caetano regime. Ignatyev quotes from them at length, and the letters are devastating.

Secret Weapon in Africa contains a great deal of interesting material. One of the most intriguing passages, which spans nearly a chapter, is a

slanting attack on the American Committee on Africa and its Executive Director. Ignatyev points out what no one denies, that in his early days Roberto knew the Executive Director and was assisted by the ACOA, as were many African nationalists who went one way or another. Ignatyev suggests, however, that Roberto held meetings in ACOA offices with his CIA recruiters. Such things can happen, of course, without implicating anyone in the recruitment. But such a prominent, if veiled, attack by a senior Soviet journalist raises important questions. Why would such a person attack an organization like the American Committee on Africa? Is Ignatyev sending a political message? Is he suggesting that liberal organizations like ACOA are too tame to support the liberation struggle effectively now that the chips are down in Africa?*

For Western readers Ignatyev's book is stylistically difficult. It uses artifices of narrative that are unusual for us, such as the more or less accurate (probably) but imaginary account of conversation between two men which the author did not actually overhear. It also fails to document points which some Western journalists (not all) would feel obliged to footnote. It is also highly impressionistic, an odd mixture of first-hand narrative, analysis, lengthy quotes and some speculative reconstructions. But these are relatively trivial objections to a style which may be better understood in the original. The important point is that Ignatyev's book, despite its faults, is able to convey more than *The New York Times* conveyed in its entire coverage of Angola up to the exposure of the CIA's role there.

These books remind us that we are living in a paradoxical, tumultuous and dangerous time. American power is being eroded and its rulers cannot really understand that fact. They wish to avoid "repeating the mistakes of the past," but they are driven to repeat them. There is no other way that the Robertos and the Savimbis can be placed in power and held there even for a short time. The Hudson Institute study of the Angola crisis, published in June of 1975, openly acknowledged that the MPLA would have

*George Houser, Executive Director of ACOA, wrote Ignatyev on November 3, 1978, requesting an explanation of the reference to him in this section of the book. Ignatyev replied in a letter of December 17, 1978, forwarded for translation to the Soviet commercial legation in Washington, and transmitted to Houser on March 5, 1979. In the letter, Ignatyev says, "There is nothing in the book, 'Secret Weapon in Africa,' that could give grounds for any conclusion that you have contacts with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, nor could I have inferred that, because none of the materials I had gathered for the book links your name directly with the CIA. Unfortunately, I cannot say the same for the ACOA" The letter concludes, "I want to stress once again that I have no reason at all to question the purity of your reputation. What is more, I am wholly convinced that most of your ACOA associates are sincere in their feelings towards the people of Africa, and are motivated in their activity by the wish to render what assistance they can to the African continent." [Editors' note.]

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won an election in Angola, just as SWAPO would win an election in Namibia if South Africa and its Western allies should be so rash as to permit one today.

In 1976 Brzezinski described an "America in a hostile world" and argued it could not survive if it did not learn to adapt to new realities. His search for the means of adapting, however, proved fruitless. The last sentence of his remarkable article is: "Above all, it is vital to remember that it is only America that has the power to shape a hostile world for itself." This means that America will use its power as the world seeks to free itself of the Pahlevis, the Litton Industries, the Suhartos, the Bothas, the General Dynamics, the Hassans and the Pfizer Chemicals.

At the same time the ruling elite will seek to preserve the illusion that it is doing nothing of the kind. In short, they will increasingly use clandestine power. The CIA will grow more powerful, not less, in the coming years. It was created to reconcile the imperial necessities of armed forces and the sensibilities of a democratic consensus. And there will be greater need for it as the contradictions become sharper. The growth of the Agency's power, however, will also signify its decline. For by its very nature the CIA is an institution of transition. Its creation was a recognition that, even at the height of America's power, this democracy-and-empire could maintain its sway only by institutionalizing a capability for permanent warfare on its subjects.

The fact that the capability is being used more and more frequently and less and less effectively, when all is said and done, means that the problem, opposition, is becoming more than the institution can cope with. The experience of Angola therefore stands as a metaphor of a larger decline. The CIA launched a massive operation to smother a nation at its birth. It failed. And it failed precisely as its activities became known to the world and partly because of that. This is a dilemma, fortunately, from which the protected clique of ignorant and truculent gentlemen cannot escape.

What Britain Did in Angola

*by Pat Hutton and
Jonathan Bloch*

While the American public has been treated to the full exposure of its government's involvement in the Angolan civil war, similar publicity has not been accorded one of the United States's allies in Angola, the British Labour government. While on the one hand making sanctimonious statements about foreign intervention, the British government at any rate turned a blind eye, and probably encouraged the activities in Angola of its secret service, prominent companies, and the notorious mercenaries in efforts to defeat the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). We will trace here each of these aspects of the government's hypocrisy, beginning with the political and economic links with Portuguese colonialism.

The Duke of Edinburgh's official visit to Portugal a few years ago, to mark the 600th anniversary of cooperation, was only one of the many expressions of confidence in the fascist dictatorship made by the British government. In May 1971, the then Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, visited Lisbon in what the *Financial Times* called a "vote of confidence" in the Portuguese government. British commercial interests in Portugal and its colonies were always strong and in 1975, a government minister in the House of Commons conservatively put the British stake in Angola at sixty million pounds. Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. owned and operated the Benguela railway (which runs from the copper fields of central Africa to the Angolan coast), and other firms with heavy stakes included Associated

[This article, by correspondents of *Peoples News Service*, London, is a condensation of material that appeared in *PNS* 152, August 1, 1978; *PNS* 153, September 5, 1978; and *PNS* 155, October 3, 1978. The article was prepared in April 1979 for this book.]

Engineering, Babcock & Wilcox, British-American Tobacco, British & Commonwealth Shipping, British Oxygen, International Chemical Industries, Racal Communications, Rio Tinto Zinc, and Hill Samuel, as well as several with interests in the diamond exploitation consortium, Diamang. Sixty million pounds does not seem a great deal, but it should be remembered that a cornucopia of wealth had yet to be opened from the vast reserves of oil, copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, and other vital minerals.

Diplomatic support for the Portuguese government was always forthcoming, and the British mission to the United Nations voted against, or abstained on, every motion condemning Portuguese colonialism, even at a time when the brutality of the armed suppression of liberation movements in all its colonies was becoming known. With the fall of Portugal's dictator Caetano to the Armed Forces Movement in April 1974, British diplomatic support was shifted to those who sought to adopt the mantle of colonialism which the Portuguese had so suddenly dropped. It was, of course, the United States that did this, and in its efforts it enlisted the support of Britain, France, and West Germany. This alliance lent its best efforts toward preventing the MPLA from victory in the war against the FNLA in the north, and UNITA and the South African army in the south. It might even be said that without the active cooperation of the European governments, the United States's massive intervention through the CIA would not have been possible, so sensitive were they about colonial wars just after the fall of Saigon.

Small arms from the United States were permissible, but sophisticated weapons were out of the question. However, they tried to persuade others to provide weapons that might tip the balance. The CIA officer in charge of the Angola Task Force, John Stockwell, relates how the British government was approached to supply guided missiles. Although the British were wary of this sort of involvement for the same reasons as the Americans, other initiatives were forthcoming.

In late 1975, the U.S. government made strong overtures to the British, particularly since the military efforts seemed to have failed. In December Henry Kissinger pledged "to generate as much support from other countries as we can." When William Schaufele, Kissinger's Undersecretary for African Affairs, came to London the *Manchester Guardian's* diplomatic correspondent, Patrick Keatley, reported "Ford wants British backing for his efforts to get a peace formula [sic] for Angola and Whitehall was ready to oblige." These moves were directed toward blocking recognition of the MPLA internationally. Having done this, Ford and Kissinger thought perhaps other NATO countries could be persuaded to lend significant military support for the anti-MPLA forces. However, the response of the European NATO members was cool.

At the NATO conference in December 1975, Britain, Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands wanted to stop well short of full-scale military intervention. James Callaghan (then Foreign Secretary) told the conference

that neither the United Kingdom nor NATO should become associated with South African military ambitions. However, it was Callaghan who proposed that NATO put on the pressure to try to halt the recognition of the MPLA. Callaghan, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Minister of West Germany), President Ford, and President Giscard d'Estaing all sent letters to the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) who were to meet in January 1976, to demand a cease fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The British government called in the South African, Cuban, and Russian ambassadors to ask them to withdraw their troops. The OAU, many of whose members were outraged at receiving instructions from the West on what they should decide, resolved to recognize the MPLA government.

By now the U.S. administration had changed hands, and Kissinger, whose obsessive determination to counter the Soviet Union globally by smashing the MPLA had dominated the entire scenario, was removed from office. The British government recognized the MPLA in February 1976. It was from this time that the story about NATO countries' covert assistance to the FNLA and UNITA began to emerge. While the CIA secret war began to make headlines, the allegations about British, French, and West German involvement went almost unnoticed.

In March 1976 an article by Leslie H. Gelb of the *New York Times* alleged that Britain and France had also been involved in the Angolan war. French aid had been "substantial" and that of Britain "modest." Although both governments have issued categorical denials of any complicity in the war, the Ford administration officials Gelb quoted said, "Intelligence operatives in the field knew in a general way what each other was doing, and of course, we [the CIA] and the British kept each other informed." They also said that the British "did the absolute minimum just to keep their hand in"—which seems to have been prudent, since they were writing letters to every African state condemning foreign intervention. The Ford officials also said that Britain had been supporting UNITA and supplying it with communication equipment. Racal had already been implicated in the supplying of its equipment to the Rhodesian army and, until July 1978, owned a subsidiary in South Africa in the same line of business. In this case, Racal had provided UNITA with seven radio transmitters for broadcasting propaganda, bringing in the equipment from Zambia. They also supplied a technician to help install it all.

Lonrho, never far from the center of political events in Africa, supplied an executive jet to Jonas Savimbi, the president of UNITA. A Lonrho subsidiary, Armitage Industrial Holdings, which had as one of its directors Wilhelm Wilding, the personal pilot of "Tiny" Rowland, the chairman of Lonrho, ferried arms and equipment into the battle zone by air. Having served its purpose, the company is now dormant and has sold its planes. In mid-1977 Savimbi was reported to be still using the jet.

More air support came from the West. A mysterious company called

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Pearl Air operated a Viscount four-engine aircraft to ferry arms in to the UNITA-controlled areas of Angola from Lusaka, Zambia. This company was registered in Hong Kong, a British colony, and dissolved in 1975, though it turned up again in the Caribbean state of Grenada—virtually a colony of Britain at the time—listing two Germans and two Grenadians as directors. The Viscount that Pearl Air operated was, according to John Stockwell, hired by UNITA with money given them by the CIA. American newspapers confirmed this account with the testimony of the two British pilots of the plane.

Evan Davies, who acted as advisor to UNITA during the war, was a former Kenyan Special Branch officer and tobacco firm security adviser who had helped set up the Institute for the Study of Conflict and was accompanied to Angola by Robert Moss (also of the ISC)—of whom more later. Davies also claims to have helped Jorge Sangumba, UNITA's "foreign minister," years before when he was down on his luck.

Sangumba, as it happens, visited London in April 1975 and met Joan Lester, Labour MP and then parliamentary Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office. London hosted him again in January 1976, and he said then, "We would be glad to accept finance, arms, and political support from Britain. But we do not need mercenaries." Mercenaries were probably not required since the CIA and the South Africans had been providing personnel. The British capital was also the base of Britain's official UNITA representative, Tony Fernandes, a right-hand man of Savimbi's who had trained with him in China. Fernandes's 150-pound-per-week flat in London just happened to be situated literally in the shadow of the biggest CIA station in the world outside the United States, in the U.S. embassy at Grosvenor Square, near Oxford Street.

More sinister and secret moves involved the British with organizations hostile to Angola's new government. In late 1977 there took place a mysterious series of meetings to organize against the MPLA in various European capitals. These were attended by representatives of UNITA, an oil company in Mozambique, the Voice of Free Africa, the radio station based in Umtali, Zimbabwe, which is the voice of the Mozambique National Resistance (MRM)—a group of right-wing former settler Portuguese who are still carrying out acts of sabotage and atrocities in Mozambique—and two of the MRM's organizers, Jorge Jardim (a confidant of Salazar and once one of the richest men in the Portuguese colonies) and Miguel Murrupa. These meetings were also attended by officers of the security forces of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Britain. After the last meeting, apparently, the Briton, the Rhodesian, the South African, and Jardim left for Las Palmas to transfer to a flight to Rhodesia.

When John Stockwell and the aforementioned Ford administration officials pointed to CIA-British intelligence cooperation in Angola, they were also referring to a long-standing relationship between the two organizations in Africa. With decolonization, the British spies passed on much of

their experience to the imperialists in the region, and where British intelligence has maintained a presence, its relationship with the CIA has been regarded as a good one. So it is not surprising that Britain sent two MI6 men (MI6 is the foreign intelligence organization of which MI5 is the domestic equivalent) on the ill-fated trip to Angola by British mercenaries. According to the recruiters themselves, who included the notorious former corporal in the British army, John Banks, the CIA spent something like 300,000 pounds on the export of mercenaries to fight with the FNLA in the north of Angola. The CIA agent John Banks met with the MI6 "observers" when they were on board the plane. One of them, Barry Thorpe, returned to Britain after being wounded in a mine explosion, but the other, Vic Gawthrop, died of a heart attack when out on his first patrol in Angola.

In August 1978 an article in the fortnightly magazine *Private Eye*, probably quoting government sources, confirmed the suspicions that government departments had given the CIA the go-ahead for mercenary recruitment in London and added that the relevant ministers responsible had been kept informed. The government's motivation, *Private Eye* said, was to find out the morale of the different sides in the war, what sort of weapons the armed wing of the MPLA was using, and the extent and nature of Russian and Cuban involvement, reasoning that this experience might be valuable in the context of the war in Zimbabwe and developments in South Africa. MI6 and Ministry of Defense officials had argued that this intelligence could be gathered only by army-trained agents fighting with the mercenaries. These reported regularly to MI6 stations in the field, and when defeat became inevitable they followed their own carefully planned escape routes.

John Banks had multifarious links with the Special Air Service, military intelligence, and the Special Branch, though he is not actually a government employee. However, he was instrumental, barely two months after his return from Angola, in framing the Provisional Sinn Fein organizer in England, John Higgins, on an arms charge. Banks had said that although some of the mercenaries did not have passports and others were on bail (and thus forbidden by law to leave the country), Detective-Inspector Tucker of the Special Branch (also involved in the Higgins case) made sure that no obstacles were put in their way during the embarkation at the airport.

Banks's links in Angola were with the FNLA, which has had as much freedom of movement in Britain as UNITA. It is represented in Leeds, and a solicitor there administers funds for it, while its political representatives include a recidivist burglar and a man who posed as a doctor, McDonald Belford. Severe embarrassment was caused to the Conservative Party when two of its most senior members of Parliament, Julian Amery (who has many intelligence connections) and John Davies, met a senior FNLA representative accompanied by Banks and Belford in the House of Commons.

They were questioning the FNLA on the progress of the war and about the Russians and Cubans while Belford told the press, "I set up the meeting because some of the Tory top brass are sympathetic to our cause." The supposedly secret meeting came only two days after the Foreign Office announced that it condemned mercenary recruitment and pledged to President Neto that it would do "everything possible" to try to prevent a new flood of mercenaries from going to Angola.

The legislative initiatives the Labour government claimed it was making to outlaw mercenary recruitment never materialized during its term of office. Inquiries announced by the Director of Public Prosecutions into Rhodesian army recruitment in Britain were followed up about two and a half years later, in August 1978, with the conviction of an eccentric ex-army officer for distributing Rhodesian army recruitment literature. He was discharged and had to pay only a hundred pounds in court costs. This is the sole prosecution so far, although legal experts have claimed that present British statutory provisions are quite sufficient for the prosecution of mercenary recruiters.

There was another, more curious quarter from which the FNLA received support, this one implicating indirectly the British trade-union movement. In early 1978 it was revealed that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (to which the British TUC contributes the largest proportion of funds) gave financial assistance to the Angolan General League of Workers, which ICFTU officials admitted was a front for the FNLA. It does not seem likely that any of the money that went to the Zaire-based organization was devoted to trade-union development.

At the same time that Lonrho, Stockwell, Banks, and others were supporting UNITA and FNLA on the ground, several thousand miles away more public and less direct encouragement to the anti-MPLA forces was being provided in the *Times*. Just as the news of the CIA operation was coming out, two Tory MPs and a "journalist" counterattacked in the letter columns by criticizing a vaguely pro-MPLA article by a member of the clergy, which the *Times* had carried, stressing the need to stem the tide of communist subversion. The two Tories were Patrick Wall and Peter Blaker, both of whom were indirectly implicated in the "Muldergate" scandal, both of whom have intelligence connections, and who both form part of the pro-South Africa lobby in Parliament. The other letter writer, George Martelli, served with intelligence during World War II and was a special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Angola in the early 1960s.

Others who waded into the propaganda battle included the two Institute for the Study of Conflict luminaries, Robert Moss and Brian Crozier. The ISC's links with the CIA were exposed in 1975 when Brian Crozier's Forum World Features news agency was revealed to be a CIA front. The ISC had been formed four years before Forum was wound up, and Crozier had once headed both simultaneously. Both Moss and Crozier are also linked to the extreme-right-wing National Association for Freedom (now known

as the Freedom Association). Moss had in the past used material from the Voice of Free Africa in his journalistic efforts, and he wrote a series of articles in the *Daily Telegraph* whitewashing the South African involvement in Angola. Many quotes from these articles were used the South African government-sponsored "Club of Ten" in its newspaper advertisement campaign in the British press.

Feeling bitter, and betrayed by the West, the South Africans lapped it up. "Dawie," a columnist in the Afrikaans newspaper *Die Burger*, said of Moss, "It is strange that it took a British journalist to write in English about South Africa and Angola in a way that tangibly rouses our national pride and self-respect."

For his part Crozier provided ammunition with the script to *The Angolan File*, a film privileged enough to win the official endorsement of the South African army. In addition, one of Crozier's unsigned articles in the *Times* in June 1976, under the byline of Iain Hartford, was called "Who Really Pulls the Strings of Angola's Puppet Government?" It made the absurd suggestion that President Neto was under the complete control of the Russians and Cubans, provoking several angry replies. The article, for which Crozier was paid fifty pounds, led directly to the expulsion of the *Times* staff reporter who was covering the trial of the mercenaries in Luanda.

British intelligence's interest in the war was also evidenced by the presence of several Foreign Office and Ariel-connected people at a seminar on "Angola since 1974" held in London in January 1978. At least two of those invited, John Syson and Christopher R. Hill, are known to have been associated with Ariel.* The Foreign Office's research department was also well represented, and one member, Peter Butcher, used to work for the Foreign Office's cold-war propaganda organization, the Information Research Department. Big business represented there included EMI, the Mitsubishi Corporation, Standard Chartered Bank, Charter Consolidated, Unilever, Glanvill Enthoven, the Bank of England, the Longman Group, Diamond Trading Company, Ove Arup Partnership, Wiggins Teape, and Racal.

Although much of the British involvement has been exposed, many aspects, including the large part played by other West European countries, have barely been touched on and there is undoubtedly much information (not yet available) to substantiate all this. However, although the aftermath of Angola affected the United States very considerably, no compunc-

*Ariel Foundation, a so-called educational organization, was started in 1960. In the tradition of CIA-funded institutions, it finances the study and training of the intelligentsia of the Third World. Ariel also funds junkets from Britain by politicians, and scholarships and trips for overseas students and politicians, with emphasis on "problems" arising from the independence of former British colonies and East, Central and Southern Africa. Informed observers say that Ariel is run as a cover organization by British Intelligence.

tion has been shown by the British. The fact that a low profile was adopted by Britain excuses the government only from publicity, not from complicity, and until publicity is forced on it for taking actions such as these, more of which continue even now, we can expect little change. To show the concern of the Labour Party about the question we will conclude with this ironic letter from the Labour Party International Committee after the authors had sent copies of the original articles to them. It read, "Thank you for your letter about the British government and Angola. The Labour Party has long been concerned about such questions as mercenary recruitment and has on many occasions expressed its views. You may rest assured that we will continue to do so. Yours sincerely, Jenny Little (International Secretary)."

Cabinda: A Joint Operation

by Karl Van Meter

Before the fall of the fascist regime in Portugal on April 25, 1974, few people had heard of the small enclave of Cabinda (2,800 square miles, population 60,000) on the central west African coast. But Cabinda soon promised to become another Biafra or Katanga, because of the rich oil fields which had been discovered in the late 1950s. Oil production had begun in earnest when Gulf Oil obtained exclusive rights from the Portuguese, in 1966, and since 1968 Gulf has been drawing an average of 150,000 barrels a day from some 120 offshore wells.

As the victory of the MPLA in Angola became clearer, the West had no desire to allow Cabinda to become a part of a progressive independent Angola. To justify the covert interventions which were to take place between 1974 and 1978 the Western powers, particularly France and the United States, utilized three different pretexts. The first involved the statement by France that 80 percent of the population of Cabinda spoke French. It turned out, however, that *80 percent of those Cabindans who spoke a foreign language* (a small percentage of the population) spoke French.

The second justification was the geographical fact that Cabinda is separated from Angola by a thin strip of land, about 20 miles wide, through which the Congo River flows to the Atlantic. Because of this, covert operations could involve the invention of separatist movements or "local" independence movements. The fact that none of the movements which sprang up had existed or been active against the colonial Portuguese, however, is another sign of foreign manipulation.

The third reason, often invoked with the previous one, is a concept of "historical precedent." This notes that the colonial manifestos, from the 1493 Bull of Pope Alexander VI to the Berlin Conference of 1885, had placed Cabinda under the Portuguese sphere of influence and that Cabin-

[This article was written in June 1979 for this book.]

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dan leaders, undoubtedly under duress, had signed a treaty with Portugal, shortly before the Berlin Conference, placing themselves under the "protection" of the Portuguese flag. Although the Portuguese had administered Cabinda jointly with Angola since 1956, the Portuguese constitution prohibited a technical merger. (By 1971, Portugal referred to all of its colonies as "overseas provinces," in a singularly unsuccessful attempt to avoid attacks in the United Nations over failure to decolonize.)

When the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the regime in April 1974, they announced their intention to offer the "overseas provinces" self-determination. This was just the opportunity the Western powers were looking for, and the appropriate "liberation movement" soon became noticed—the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).

FLEC claimed to have quite a history of its own, beginning as the Movement for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (MLEC) in 1960, uniting in 1963 with two newly formed groups, the Committee for action of Cabindans for National Unity (AUNC) and the Mayombe Alliance (Aliama). On April 4, 1963, the three movements merged, with an MLEC leader, Luis Ranque Franque as head of the newly named FLEC. According to a Paris newspaper, however, M. Franque had spent his whole life in Zaire, and had very close ties with Gulf Oil.¹

In January 1975, Franque announced at a press conference in Paris that "General Mobutu would never let Angola cut off his access to the sea" and added that "thugs and mercenaries would be welcomed" as far as he was concerned.² On August 2, 1975, he proclaimed Cabinda independent and prepared to invade Cabinda with the help of the CIA, SDECE, and Mobutu's forces—a friendly joint operation.

Yet Franque represented only one set of interests; FLEC was being used for several different purposes by different interest groups. While Franque was being groomed in Zaire, a FLEC general staff was being supported by Cabinda's other neighbor, Congo-Brazzaville. While the U.S. interests were paramount in the Zairian support, the hand of France was evident in Congo. After a last-ditch "Congress of Unification" held on June 30, 1974, FLEC split, with Franque still leading the group based in Zaire, along with Henrique Tiago N'Zita and August Tchoufou, the new leader of FLEC-Congo. Tchoufou had been the assistant director of ELF-Congo, the local subsidiary of the French multinational oil company, ELF, which had always been jealous of Gulf's monopoly in Cabinda. Tchoufou was also described as close to President Bongo of Gabon, and the SDECE officers rampant there.

In mid-1974, with a French-backed FLEC in Congo and a U.S.-Zaire-backed FLEC in Zaire, the new Portuguese government was attempting to establish a transitional government in Angola, negotiating with the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA. In January 1975, the four parties signed an agreement noting that "Cabinda is an integral and indivisible part of Angola." If the West was going to take Cabinda, they were going to have to

fight for it—through FLEC. The Congo-FLEC, unsuccessfully using a former PIDE agent to recruit troops, turned to two SDECE agents, Bernard Litier and Maurice Bodenan. Bodenan had organized the kidnapping of Moise Tshombe in 1967.³ The SDECE men recruited a number of mercenaries, including Jean Kay, who had fought in Yemen, Lebanon, and Biafra, and with the French terrorist Secret Army Organization (OAS).

SDECE's hope, it seemed, was to use the mercenaries along with some local FLEC troops to sabotage Gulf's drilling operations. In the fall of 1975, a sympathetic local official let the gang into the capital city, but they were no match for the Gulf security forces, and when the MPLA forces advanced, they all fled back to Congo. There, Tchioufou had been ousted and replaced by Alfred Raoul, a former Congolese army officer, and his half-brother Jean da Costa, who had served with the French army in Indochina and Tunisia. The latter was working closely with another SDECE officer, "Colonel Prevost," who was training da Costa's men in Gabon. Prevost was apparently close to several ministers in France, meeting at Gabonese firms' offices.⁴

These contacts led to visits by FLEC-Congo representatives to France, and there, on January 20, 1976, the France-Cabinda Association was founded, "to serve as an intermediary between the two parties," that is, SDECE and FLEC-Congo.

In the meantime, Mobutu was beefing up FLEC-Zaire. The "Voice of Cabinda" was broadcasting from Zaire, and Mobutu had obtained recognition of "his" FLEC by Idi Amin. We also know from John Stockwell's "In Search of Enemies" that the CIA, through its then Deputy Director, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, gave a quarter of a million dollars to SDECE in August 1975 for its cooperation in the Angola-Cabinda intervention.⁵ The French gave no hint of this to Mobutu, who, in October 1975, asked the CIA for help in organizing an invasion. They sent arms and advisers.

On November 2, 1975, a three-column invasion force, including a few French mercenaries probably sent by SDECE via the notorious mercenary Bob Denard, tried to enter Cabinda. One of them later described the debacle: "We sent the guys from FLEC out in front of us to probe the area. It was a massacre. We stayed behind, chugging down beers, and when things went bad we got out of there."⁶

At the same time, the U.S. government was forcing Gulf Oil to halt the royalty payments to the MPLA, which had become the government of Angola and Cabinda. In November 1975, Gulf had to stop operations temporarily and evacuate employees, because of the fighting. Nevertheless, the MPLA, with Cuban assistance, easily held Cabinda, protecting, incidentally, the property of Gulf.

By this time, Congo forbade FLEC to use its territory, and Alfred Raoul, later became a Congolese ambassador. Tchioufou left for Paris where he sued the author of a book which linked him to SDECE, and lost.⁷

In the spring of 1976, he and da Costa changed the name of FLEC to the Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MOLICA). By mid-1976 they were ludicrously claiming to control over half of Cabinda, and to have killed 1500 Cuban soldiers.

In January 1977, three French technicians and two Congolese workers were kidnapped for two weeks by "FLEC" while working on a Congolese railroad. Oddly enough, leaders of both FLEC-Kinshasa and FLEC-Paris claimed credit.

FLEC continued to splinter. A French businessman with Gabonese connections, Bernard Bory, appeared in Paris and declared himself the "Paris representative of the FLEC." Then, a friend of Bory's, Jean-Marc Varaut, who had been Jean Kay's lawyer, announced that he was the "legal counselor of the FLEC."

This disintegration did not keep Mobutu from using the remains of FLEC-Kinshasa and MOLICA for terrorist actions against Angola. In early 1977, President Agostinho Neto of Angola denounced the "Cobra 77" program by which Zaire was using military installations near the border against Cabinda.⁸ However, the two Shaba invasions and Western interventions distracted Mobutu to the point of a relative détente between Zaire and Angola. FLEC-MOLICA activity in the area has virtually disappeared, although there remains a FLEC public-relations office in the United States, with unclear support and considerable printing bills.

The SDECE-CIA-coordinated operations seem over. On March 10, 1979, N'Zita arrived in Paris to try to meet with the Angolan Ambassador "to find a humanitarian solution for the people of Cabinda,"⁹ a problem which apparently exists only in his head. He was refused entry into France and sent back to Dakar, Senegal. Whether SDECE will again encourage the creation of a Cabinda separatist movement remains to be seen.

Notes

1. "Le FLEC ou la Longue Chasse au Pétrole Cabindais," *Liberation*, January 18, 1977.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Patrice Chairoff, *Dossier B. . . . Comme Barbouzes*, Editions Alain Moreau, Paris, 1975, p. 98.
4. "La France Angoliste," *Le Canard Enchaîné*, December 24, 1975.
5. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, Norton, New York: 1978, p. 192.
6. Francois Soudan, "Guerre Secret au Cabinda," *Jeune Afrique*, February 14, 1979.
7. *Ibid.*
8. "Les Plans d'Invasion Militaire de l'Angola," *Afrique-Asie*, March 21, 1977.
9. *Liberation*, March 13, 1979.

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ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA

In Zimbabwe 1,000 American Mercenaries Fight Against African Liberation

by Malik Reaves

As the Rhodesian authorities face the ever tightening noose of a national liberation war, they are increasingly forced to depend on Western mercenary forces. Hampered by a relatively small white population, now little more than 200,000 and shrinking rapidly, the rebel Salisbury regime has forced more and more Africans into its army, now 80% black, according to the *New York Times* (but still white officered). As the Patriotic Front

[Malik Reaves is a longtime southern-Africa activist and organizer for the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa. He is a member of the collective of *Southern Africa* magazine. This article first appeared in the November 1978 issue of *Southern Africa*.]

continues to win both popular support and military victories, informed observers note that the African soldiers will likely become increasingly unreliable.

Given these difficulties, the US and the European powers have responded by increasing available white mercenary forces from 1,000 two years ago to perhaps as many as 5,000—a considerable number considering that Rhodesia's regular armed forces totaled some 10,000 in 1977.

The present American mercenary contingent numbers more than 1,000, constituting the largest group of foreign troops. Patriotic Front spokesmen have indicated that many more Americans are on their way, a belief borne out by the announcement in early fall that a Chicago-based church was sending 300 former Green Beret "Christian soldiers" to Rhodesia to protect missionaries.

The Rev. Paul Lindstrom, leader of the Church of Christian Liberty, announced that the force would reopen the Elim Mission in eastern Rhodesia where three British missionaries were killed in June. "We see ourselves as crusaders," said the force's leader, Vietnam War vet Giles Pace, to the *Washington Post*. "We are not interested in dialogue or *détente*" with the Front popular forces. "We will shoot the bastards on sight." The *Tanzanian Daily News* reported that Giles added that he might call on 500 Cuban exiles to join his force later.

The Rhodesian regime blamed the Elim Mission killings on Front guerrillas. The Front and other informed Rhodesia-watchers have pointed to the terrorist actions of Salisbury's Selous Scouts who dress up as guerrillas and commit atrocities in an effort to turn the people against the Front.

Last year, a British mercenary deserter confessed to participating in the killing of two priests at a mission which was friendly to the guerrillas. He told the British weekly, *The Sunday People*, "It was in the interest of the Rhodesians that missionaries should be stopped from helping the blacks."

The British Pentecostal group that operates the Elim Mission has announced plans to reopen the mission on its own, denying any need for the American intervention. The Rev. Ron Chapman, head of the mission, told the *Johannesburg Star* that Pace's mission was "a lot of nonsense."

On September 16, Radio Salisbury reported that the 300 man force had left London and was "on its way to southern Africa."

NO PROSECUTION

Recruiting mercenaries or serving as one is clearly illegal under Federal laws. Yet despite the illegality and the widespread press publicity given to the Church's efforts in recent weeks, as of press time, no official steps had been taken to stop the action or prosecute those involved.

This is not the first time such actions have gone without a response from U.S. legal authorities. Numerous self-confessed mercenaries, or *mercs*, as they call themselves, and recruiters have been interviewed and given wide publicity in the media, particularly since the CIA-backed mercenary oper-

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ations during the Angolan "Civil War" in 1975. The Angolan exercise was richly documented in ex-CIA officer John Stockwell's book, *In Search of Enemies*, yet our investigations indicate that *no one has ever been prosecuted*.

Consider the following:

Last year, David Bufkin talked to reporters from the *Chicago Sun-Times*, the *Washington Post*, and National Public Radio about his background as a mercenary in Latin America and the Congo in the 60's, his stints in Korea and Vietnam, and his mercenary recruiting experiences for the CIA in Angola. He admits to placing recruitment ads in California newspapers and raising 12 mercs for service in Angola. Stockwell confirms his presence in Kinshasa during CIA operations in Angola and indicates that a CIA officer purged Bufkin's records from CIA files. *Newsday* reported that the CIA told the Justice Department that it would not cooperate with a pending investigation of Bufkin; he was never prosecuted. The *Washington Post* revealed that Bufkin also worked with Rhodesian intelligence. Conceivably, he still does.

Both *Internews* of California and the British *Guardian* report that University of California-Berkeley student Lawrence Meyers was recruited to fight in Rhodesia by the head of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) there in 1976. He was told there would be no problem getting to Rhodesia with "the help of friends in Washington." After further urging, *Internews* reports, Meyers wrote the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington and the RIO illegally sent Meyers applications for the Rhodesian military. (The FBI announced an investigation had been launched against the RIO for illegally funding Americans traveling to Rhodesia. No court actions have been reported to date.)

Meyers fought for the Rhodesians but deserted to neighboring Botswana and then was deported home, according to the *International Herald Tribune*. The FBI launched an investigation but Meyers was granted immunity from prosecution. The ROTC head who recruited Meyers left that post but reportedly no legal actions were taken against him either.

SOLDIER OF FORTUNE

The extent of U.S. government involvement in mercenary recruitment is graphically illustrated by the history of Lt. Col. Robert K. Brown, *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, and the Special Forces Group of the U.S. Army Reserve.

Brown, who admits to having worked with anti-Castro Cuban exiles during the 60's, has been a mercenary recruiter since at least 1974, the year in which the armed struggle in Rhodesia expanded rapidly. Brown's firm, Phoenix Associates, began placing ads in military-oriented magazines and distributing "information packets" containing propaganda and applications for the Rhodesian Army and military police.

In June 1975, Tapson Mawere, ZANU representative in the US, ex-

posed the presence of some 400 American mercenaries in Rhodesia. He charged that many of these men had been recruited through a network that reached into the U.S. military through people like Brown and operated with the tacit approval of the U.S. government. Brown denied the charges and, true to form, a State Department official, Temple Cole, also disavowed that Brown was actually recruiting. As reported by the *New York Times*, Cole said that Brown was just providing information.

Late in 1975, Brown began publication of a glossy bi-monthly magazine, *Soldier of Fortune*, which has since served as a major recruitment vehicle for mercenary operations in Rhodesia. Brown, who was a major in the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) US Army Reserve when he started recruiting, was promoted to Lt.Col. at about the time his magazine appeared.

Every issue of *SOF* carries at least one feature article on mercenary operations in Rhodesia, with titles like "How Does an American Become a Mercenary in Africa?" *SOF* has also run interviews with major Rhodesian military figures such as Commander-in-Chief G.P. Walls and army recruiter Major Nick Lamprecht. The tone of the articles tends towards fantastic and highly glorified accounts of mercenary exploits ("George Bacon III—A 20th Century Crusader," "American Mercenary Destroys Cuban Espionage Ring"), couched in racist ("this embattled outpost of European civilization") terms. In addition, *SOF* regularly carries ads giving the names and addresses of merc recruiters, mercs in search of a war, military and paramilitary hardware, war booty, right-wing newspapers, books and pamphlets.

CIA/SPECIAL FORCES LINKS

The little that is known about the origins and operations of *SOF* suggest strong ties to U.S. government and military figures. In late 1976, the magazine revealed that a known CIA agent had been involved in starting *SOF*. George Bacon, idealized and idolized by *SOF* following his death as a merc in Angola, was a close friend of Brown and had discussed with him possible uses for the magazine in supporting counter-insurgency overseas. According to *SOF*, Bacon told Brown just before the magazine appeared that it "could be an excellent way to spread the good word" about the CIA-Angola operations and other such efforts.

The *SOF* article also revealed that Bacon, like Brown, had been a member of the Airborne Special Forces which carried out extensive counter-insurgency operations for the CIA in Vietnam. Of Brown's current editorial staff, a ZANU Support Committee report reveals that three are identified with Special Forces Reserve Units, two specifically with the 12th Special Forces (Airborne) and one as a Special Forces medic.

In September 1976, two Chicago-based Jesuit priests confirmed that members of the 12th Special Forces were involved in "what appears to be illegal mercenary recruiting activity" for Rhodesia, as reported in the Sup-

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port Committee's study.* "We have since learned," said the ministers in a letter quoted in the report, "that the 12th Special Forces is a 'Green Beret' reserve unit."

GREEN BERETS AND CRIPPLED EAGLES

Another important figure in the Rhodesian mercenary network is Robin Moore, author of *The Green Berets* and *The French Connection*. Moore, a Sheraton heir, has established two institutions to promote the mercenary war and the Salisbury regime. The first is a mansion in Salisbury that Moore opened last summer as the unofficial "American embassy." It serves as a social and political center for American and other foreign mercs serving with the Rhodesians.

His other base is the Crippled Eagles Foundation, of Marina del Rey, California, which lobbies on behalf of Smith's internal settlement and raises money to support Moore's pro-Rhodesian activities.

One ex-merc was even emboldened to run for Congress. Major Mike Williams, a Special Forces captain in Vietnam and a former commanding officer in the Rhodesian infantry, was defeated in the Democratic primary in Florida's first district this fall [1978].

"One is forced to conclude," says Rhodesia-watcher Professor Richard Lobban, "that the presence of American mercenaries in Rhodesia is simply an unacknowledged portion of the American foreign policy for that nation."

INVADING MOZAMBIQUE

"Foreign soldiers form a crucial part of Rhodesia's defense system, especially near the Mozambique area," admitted a French merc deserter to *Le Nouvel Observateur*. According to this and other sources, American soldiers have been deployed mainly along the strategic eastern regions of the country. "One day," recalled the French deserter who was recruited in 1977, "the General Staff ordered a DC-3 to Mozambique to recover sabotage commandos. The plane was flown by an American."

Patriotic Front sources confirm that many Americans in Rhodesia have been operating as pilots for the Rhodesian forces. The infamous airborne raids on the refugee camps at Chimoio, Mozambique in late 1976 which left more than 100 dead—mostly women and children—included American pilots on the bombing runs, Front sources reveal.

At least two Americans have admitted to participating in raids into Mozambique. Keith Nelson, a Special Forces veteran from Illinois, admitted to the *Chicago Daily News* that he had fought in Mozambique from Rhodesia and said that he went to Rhodesia because he loved military adventure.

*Chicago ZANU Support Committee, *Guns for Hire: How the CIA and U.S. Army Recruit Mercenaries for White Rhodesia*, Chicago: 1976.

Frank Sweeney confessed to the *Christian Science Monitor* that he had participated in raids on Mozambique from Rhodesia. On his return to the United States, Sweeney placed ads in *Shotgun News* asking "young Americans of European ancestry to write for free details pertaining to recruiting."

U.S. RACISM

American mercenaries, who operate in bands, according to *Soldier of Fortune*, have a reputation for particular viciousness.

The French deserter reported that he left because he "got tired of rifle-butting villagers in the mouth who were no more rebels than I was." No American has made such a statement, although some have deserted.

Racism and a violent fear of "communism" seem motive forces for the mercs who go to Rhodesia. Their activities reflect the continuing power of racism in the United States. Young blacks in every ghetto still run the risk of being shot by an edgy white policeman; black inequality before so-called justice still runs rife.

U.S. mercenaries refer to Zimbabwe's freedom fighters as "terrs" (terrorists). They seem not to see people, only targets, a view which has most certainly been reinforced by the fact that many of them have been fighting and killing nonwhite people across the Third World with impunity for the last twenty years.

It is not surprising that many, in the words of a Rhodesian official, "find adjustment to civilian life difficult" and relating to the people in a national liberation war impossible.

Yet as noted above, there have been desertions and they will undoubtedly rise, particularly as the coming rainy season favors guerrilla warfare. Most of the countryside is now liberated or hotly contested. One Rhodesian businessman recently admitted to the *Wall Street Journal* that "three quarters of the country is out of control." In this context, the reported Western plan to double the merc forces becomes increasingly significant to the life of the Rhodesian regime.

Yet, in spite of such aid, the words of the French merc deserter are perhaps prophetic: "In comparison to what I have heard, I found the guerrillas' potential to fight to be very high, much better than what we have been told. And I am sure that it is rising. After what I saw, what with the combativeness of the guerrillas, I think the Rhodesians are done for."

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SIGINT for Namibia

by Chris Walker

Now that SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) has rejected the proposed inclusion of NATO forces in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) destined for Namibia, the plans of the five Western powers for electronic surveillance of the ceasefire between SWAPO and South African troops have received a considerable setback. The proposed participation of a British Royal Signals Squadron in the UNTAG force by the five Western powers played a key role in their plans for establishing a presence once the South Africans have withdrawn all but 1,500 troops.

In the biggest U.N. peace-keeping operation ever mounted, the British Signals Unit was to have been part of a force of 2,300 providing support services to the 7,500 strong UNTAG military force. Under the U.N. plans for a ceasefire the South African defense force and the SWAPO armed forces are to be restricted to base, including, in SWAPO's case, those of its forces in neighboring countries. South Africa has asked the U.N. to monitor these bases, saying this was its understanding of the agreement. SWAPO, however, disagrees with the *military* monitoring of bases outside Namibia, stating that there is no reference to this in the U.N. documents.

It is in this sense that the planned use of the Royal Signals Squadron is significant. The squadron is closely connected to the notorious British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) which is responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT), and operates GCHQ bases overseas. Signals intelligence is now officially defined as "Reception and analysis of foreign communications and other electronic transmissions for intelligence purposes." In an article in the London *New Statesman*, February 2, 1979, Duncan Campbell pieced together an alarming picture of SIGINT operations. Besides interception of telecommunications from bases on the

[This article is an update of a report that first appeared in *Peoples News Service*, Number 167, April 3, 1979. It was written in June 1979 for this book. Chris Walker is a member of Peoples News Service.]

ground, SIGINT work has involved "provocative" incursions into foreign air and sea space.

GCHQ is a senior partner with the United States National Security Agency (NSA) in a multinational "SIGINT Pact," whose task it is to monitor the entire globe. Other parties in the pact include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—three countries who offered contingents for the original UNTAG force. Campbell states that links have also existed between the SIGINT Pact and South Africa.

Within the SIGINT Pact, the British GCHQ is in charge of SIGINT activities in Africa. It is believed that SIGINT has had a monitoring post near Francistown, Botswana. In 1977 a British M.P., Robin Cook, questioned in Parliament why it was necessary to have a signals unit there and to whom the information is passed. As is to be expected, there was no government reply. Mr. Cook still has not received any answer to his inquiries. It is, however, widely believed that the post is utilized to intercept the communications of guerrilla movements, commercial enterprises operating in the area and the various African and white governments. Another base for intercepting communications is Malawi. Recently a Russian-speaking British monitor was appointed to the base.

SWAPO has opposed the inclusion of the British Royal Signals Squadron in the U.N. force (along with all NATO troops, which it regards as South Africa's military allies) thereby putting the damper on more rigorous communications interception in Namibia.* Nevertheless, the use of electronic surveillance equipment to monitor troop movements has continued to be a contentious issue between the parties involved in the U.N. plan. Despite the fact that the details of the U.N. ceasefire did not include any reference to electronic equipment, the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, unilaterally offered the South Africans electronic sensing equipment designed to monitor movements near the Namibia-Angola border. This matter was never discussed with SWAPO in the U.N. negotiations and the first SWAPO learned of it was apparently through reading the U.S. press. Subsequent inquiries by the SWAPO office in New York were met with evasive answers by Vance. SWAPO's position seems to be that if such surveillance equipment is included its use must first be approved by all the parties concerned in the U.N. negotiations. South Africa's keenness to use U.S. surveillance equipment is rather tempered by the fact that, after setting up an £8 million Marconi British-built troposcatter (to relay information by bouncing radio waves at 500 mile distances linking the Angolan border with Cape Town), it is now known that this equipment has not been effective enough in monitoring guerrilla movements. The U.S. encountered the same problem in Vietnam. However, the U.S. is not showing

*SWAPO's argument about the troop composition of UNTAG is that a sensible compromise would be to exclude both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, something South Africa refuses to accept.

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all parties what their latest equipment can do, except, it seems, Major General Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African armed forces in Namibia. Geldenhuys convinced the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, to accept the U.S. equipment as an "additional aid" to monitor SWAPO bases.

The presence of SIGINT stations in strategic positions in Southern Africa, against the background of Western economic and strategic interests in the area, and the allegation of SIGINT cooperation with South Africa, would make the involvement of the British Royal Signals Squadron, or their U.S., Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand counterparts in Namibia highly disadvantageous to SWAPO and would cast doubt on the neutrality of UNTAG. The unilateral action by the U.S. government in offering sophisticated surveillance equipment gives the Western powers a good excuse to be directly involved in UNTAG. Meanwhile the British Ministry of Defence states that a Royal Signals Squadron of up to 80 men is still awaiting U.N. instructions.

Arms for Apartheid: New Evidence of Illegal U.S. Arms Sales to South Africa

by Michael Klare

For years, opponents of *apartheid* have charged that vast quantities of U.S. arms were being smuggled to South Africa in defiance of the UN embargo. But because these critics could not produce air-tight evidence of such transactions, the State Department has always been able to argue that these charges were without foundation. Recently, however, "respectable" Western sources ranging from the British Broadcasting Corporation to the *Washington Post* have confirmed that millions of dollars' worth of U.S. arms have reached South African forces via illegal channels. Such deliveries reportedly include howitzers, armored personnel carriers, artillery shells, and troop-carrying helicopters. Given the scale of the shipments involved—in some cases involving entire *shiploads* of 155-mm. artillery shells—there is no doubt that the U.S. Government has been sorely derelict in carrying out its responsibility to enforce the embargo.

U. S. compliance with the South Africa embargo has always been an uneven affair. Although Washington has prohibited direct sales of conventional military hardware—tanks, missiles, bombers, etc.—it has repeatedly condoned sales of "gray-area" equipment such as helicopters, transport planes, and radar sets which fall into a murky world between military and civilian systems. As reported in *The Nation* a year ago (see Michael Klare

[Dr. Klare is director of the Militarism and Disarmament Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., and author of *War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams* (Knopf, 1972). This article first appeared in the July 26, 1979, issue of *The Nation*.]

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and Eric Prokosch, "Getting Arms to South Africa," July 8-15, 1978), such items were routinely classified as "non-combat" products and thus exempted from the UN embargo. Indeed, during the Nixon Administration, such embargo-relaxing transactions were given White House approval. As a result of such measures, Pretoria has acquired a wide range of U.S. transport, communications, and surveillance equipment, greatly enhancing its capacity for long-range commando raids against neighboring black states.

Although Washington has reluctantly acknowledged its role in such gray-area sales, it has always affirmed its commitment to the ban on regular combat gear. This commitment, however, applied not only to government-to-government sales under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, but also to exports by U.S. arms firms—and it is in this area that the problems have occurred. Thus, while there is no evidence of illegal sales under the FMS program, there is evidence of widespread embargo violations by U.S. corporations and their overseas subsidiaries. These and similar transactions by arms firms in other Western countries have enabled Pretoria to acquire an awesome arsenal of modern weapons. "Despite the fifteen-year-old UN arms embargo," former NATO Commander-in-Chief Gen. Sir Walter Walker wrote in 1978, "South Africa has been able to build up an impressive military capability."

Washington cannot, of course, be expected to block every black-market transaction by small-time operators on the fringes of the arms industry; when such deals involve substantial shipments by major U.S. companies, however, it is natural to assume that there has been a breakdown in Washington's export control operations. And when such breakdowns occur repeatedly—as the transactions described below suggest—it is appropriate to ask whether they are the result of negligence or design.

The first indication of illegal corporate sales came to light in 1976, when the New Haven *Advocate* revealed that employees of two Connecticut gun companies—the Colt Firearms division of Colt Industries, and the Winchester Arms division of the Olin Corporation—had arranged to ship rifles, shotguns, and ammunition to South Africa via dummy firms in the Canary Islands, Austria, Greece, West Germany, and Mozambique. These disclosures led to several court proceedings, the first of which resulted in a one-year sentence for Walter Plowman, an employee of Colt. Because Plowman pleaded guilty, he was never placed on trial and thus Colt was spared the embarrassment of having its officers testify on the South African deals under oath; in pre-trial hearings, however, Plowman indicated that such transactions were known to be commonplace in the arms industry. Even more revealing was his statement that the State Department regularly "acquiesced" to these sales by "looking the other way" when presented with fraudulent export declarations—a charge which the federal prosecutor evidently neglected to follow up.

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Hints of government "acquiescence" to illegal arms deals next arose in the court proceedings against Olin-Winchester, charged with smuggling 3,200 firearms and 20 million rounds of ammunition to South Africa between 1971 and 1975. After pleading *nolo contendere* (no contest) to a 21-count conspiracy indictment, Olin was ordered to pay \$510,000 to charities in New Haven as a form of "reparations" for sabotaging the U.S. policy of opposing apartheid. In a plea for leniency, Olin's lawyers argued that given the patently fraudulent nature of the company's export declarations—in some cases hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of shotguns were ostensibly shipped to the Canary Islands, which obviously had a limited market for such hardware—Olin assumed that the State Department "had no serious objection" to these transactions. Such permissiveness was attributed, in the Olin brief, to the Nixon Administration's policy of selectively relaxing the embargo in order to covertly assist the Pretoria regime. "Whatever the actual policy of the U.S. Government was during this period," Olin affirmed, "the Winchester employees principally responsible for dealing with the State Department on export license matters over the years developed the belief that the Department was 'winking' at the representation that arms actually sent to South Africa were [supposedly] destined for other countries."

While government laxity in the Colt and Winchester cases could be rationalized on the grounds that the quantities of arms involved were too small to arouse immediate suspicion, the same cannot be said for the next violation to surface, involving the Space Research Corporation (SRC) of North Troy, Vermont. On November 7, 1978, the British Broadcasting Corp. revealed in a well-documented TV special that SRC—a military research firm with extensive Pentagon contracts—had shipped tens of thousands of 155-mm. artillery shells to South Africa via ports in Canada, Spain, and the Caribbean island of Antigua. The BBC charges were largely confirmed by the U.S. government, which subsequently impaneled a grand jury in Rutland, Vermont, to hear evidence that SRC willfully violated U.S. arms export regulations. Separate investigations are underway in Canada, where SRC maintains extensive facilities, and in the other countries used by SRC to "launder" its illegal arms transactions.

The SRC disclosures are significant both for the scale of the operations involved, and the degree of apparent government negligence. Consider: between March 1977 and March 1978, SRC sold at least four shiploads of long-range 155-mm. shells—each worth hundreds of dollars—to south African authorities. The first known transactions occurred in March and May of 1977, when SRC sent two shiploads of shells from St. John's, New Brunswick, to Antigua and then loaded them onto a West German-registered vessel, the *Tugelaland* (actually owned by South African Marine), which later carried them to Cape Town, South Africa. Next, in August 1977, the *Tugelaland* picked up at least 10,000 shells in St. John's and delivered them directly to Cape Town after making a stop in Antigua. Subse-

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quently, in January 1978, SRC trucked 4,500 shells to Canaveral, Florida, where they were loaded onto two U.S. military cargo vessels, the *Inagun Cloud* and the *Star Trek*, and then shipped to Antigua; at this point they were transferred to another vessel and thence carried to South Africa. Finally, in March 1978, SRC shipped 21,000 shells from St. John's to Barcelona, Spain, where they were loaded onto a Dutch ship, the *Breezand*, which then carried them to Durban. In no case was any effort made by U.S. officials to check the validity of SRC's customs forms or cargo declarations, or to ascertain the ultimate destination of the shells. Such laxity is particularly hard to explain in the case of the Florida shipments, for which SRC apparently obtained a shipping manifest from the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground exempting the company from normal customs reporting requirements despite the fact that SRC no longer had any contracts with that agency.

Journalists who have investigated the SRC case have uncovered a long history of government acquiescence to questionable practices. In 1968, Space Research obtained a special permit from the U.S.-Canada Border Commission to operate its own customs site on its 8,000-acre compound, which straddles the Vermont-Quebec border, thus permitting the firm to ship goods from the United States to Canada without undergoing normal customs inspection. "We'd buy stuff on the American side," a former SRC employee told reporters for the *Rutland Herald*, "and the shipping and receiving [department] would pick it up and take it to the other side." Customs Service officials who sought to make on-site inspections of these shipments were ordered by their superiors to stay off SRC property. According to the *Herald*, these inspectors were told that "the company enjoys special privileges not allowed to individuals and other businesses." Ostensibly these "privileges" derived from SRC's status as a military contractor. "We all assumed that SRC was doing a lot of hush-hush military work," is the way one Customs officer put it in an unpublished interview with Vermont reporters.

For most of the past ten years, Pentagon contracts did in fact account for most of SRC's income—but in recent years such work has dropped off and the company has concentrated on commercial arms transactions. In 1972, SRC and a Belgium firm, Société Générale de Belgique (the parent firm of Belgium's Fabrique Nationale, a leading arms manufacturer), formed Space Reserach International to market the SRC's long-range 155-mm. shells abroad. Given SRC's links with both the Pentagon and the international arms industry, it is easy to see why some experts believe that the company may have been used by the CIA to smuggle ammunition to Pretoria for use against Cuban-backed forces in Angola. Such speculation is prompted by a statement by John Stockwell, former CIA mission chief in Angola, that the CIA agreed to help the South Africans obtain ammunition for their 155-mm. howitzers during the Angolan civil war.

Whether or not the CIA was involved in the SRC shipments to South

Africa, there can be no doubt that Washington bears some onus for those transactions by failing to scrutinize the company's operations as required by law. Such laxness would surely be deemed inexcusable—not to mention inconceivable—if the final destination of the SRC shipments was Russia instead of South Africa. And if, however improbable, such deliveries were made to the U.S.S.R., one would expect swift and harsh retribution. Yet the federal grand jury now meeting in Rutland is meeting only once every three weeks! Surely a violation of U.S. law on this scale—involving the credibility of our government abroad—calls for more vigorous prosecution.

If the SRC shipments are the largest violations to surface in the past year, they are by no means the only ones. In December 1978, the *Washington Post* reported that "a Western intelligence source" had confirmed that 25 Huey troop-carrying helicopters were sold to South Africa in 1974 or 1975. The Huey, or UH-1 as it is officially known, was widely used in the Vietnam war to ferry U.S. troops from one jungle battlefield to another. A civilian version of the Huey, designated the 205A, is produced by Bell Helicopter of Ft. Worth, Texas (a subsidiary of Textron, Inc.), and, under license, by Agusta of Italy. According to the *Post*, it is the latter firm which apparently produced the Hueys sold to South Africa. But while the principal culprit here may have been an Italian firm, U.S. law holds any foreign-built Hueys (or other weapons of U.S. design) are subject to the same export restrictions as those built in the United States. Since, however, the helicopters supplied to South Africa were of the "civilian" 205A type, the State Department is apparently not taking action against companies involved.

Such "third-country" transactions, involving overseas subsidiaries or affiliates of U. S. corporations, also figure in other recent disclosures of illegal arms smuggling to South Africa. In its December 1978 issues, *Armies & Weapons* magazine reported from Monaco that the South African Army has acquired "a sizeable batch" of U.S. M-113 armored personnel carriers (APC's) and M-109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers. Both weapons are produced under license by OTO Melara, a leading Italian arms firm, and *Armies & Weapons* suggested that the South African M-113's and M-109's were "almost certainly built in Italy by OTO Melara." Although other specialists have charged that South Africa has obtained U.S.-designed M-113's and M-109's from Italy—most recently Sean Gervasi in his 1977 testimony before the House International Relations Committee—this was the first confirmation of such deliveries by a source friendly to Pretoria. U.S. Embassy officials in Rome are reportedly investigating the *Armies & Weapons* story, but Washington has not as yet confirmed the M-109/113 transfers.

In addition to these reports of illegal arms deliveries, there have also been a series of disclosures concerning illegal transfers of military technology and major infrastructure equipment. Such reports are particularly significant because while South Africa is becoming increasingly self-sufficient

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in the production of conventional military gear—rifles, APC's, artillery, etc.—it is still highly dependent on the West for its advanced electronics and computer systems. So long as Pretoria has access to imported Western technology, it can rely on domestic sources for its basic military hardware.

South Africa is especially deficient in the area of computer technology, and thus it is not surprising that Pretoria has made a concerted effort to acquire advanced computers from the West. And because such equipment is not explicitly covered by the UN embargo, Washington has tended to be relatively lenient in regulating such sales—even those which have obvious military implications. In 1976, for instance, the *Washington Post* disclosed that the Commerce Department had allowed the Foxboro Co., of Foxboro, Mass., to sell two giant computers to the South African Energy Board for use at its Prelindaba nuclear enrichment plant—reportedly the site of Pretoria's secret nuclear weapons program.

Under new export guidelines adopted by the Carter Administration in February 1978, U.S. firms are no longer permitted to sell computers or other support equipment to South African military and police agencies. Nevertheless, there are some American companies that have already violated this new injunction. In March 1979, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* revealed that Control Data Corporation of Minneapolis, Minnesota, had supplied computer subsystems to a British firm, International Computers Ltd. (ICL), for use in a large computer system being produced for the South African police. This system is reportedly to be used for enforcement of Pretoria's notorious "pass laws," a key instrument of the apartheid system. According to the *Post-Dispatch*, Control Data officials were aware that the sale to ICL would violate the Administration's new guidelines.

Other U.S. firms reportedly involved in illegal technology transfers to South Africa include Sanders Associates of Nashua, New Hampshire, and the now infamous Space Research Corp. In 1976, Sanders requested and received a license from the State Department to supply South Africa with a sophisticated \$150 million ocean surveillance system. The license was later revoked by the Carter Administration in line with its new export controls, but according to *Africa News*, there are indications that Sanders or an allied firm delivered some of the equipment through regular civilian channels.

In addition to supplying artillery shells, SRC apparently has also provided Pretoria with the technology to manufacture its own guns. SRC employees have been known to work with Armscor, South Africa's government-owned munitions company, and they may have played a role in the design of Armscor's new 155-mm. howitzer, the G-5. And while Pretoria insists that the G-5 is of South African design, most experts believe that it incorporates foreign technology—which, given the SRC connection, may well be American technology.

From all that we have learned about covert arms sales, it is hard to believe that these are the only instances of illegal U.S. exports to South Africa. In

many cases, it was only through chance or coincidence that reporters learned of the particular cases described above. It is safe to assume, therefore, that we will witness more such revelations in the years ahead. But we needn't await additional disclosures before concluding that U.S. officials have been inexcusably negligent in their enforcement of the embargo on South Africa. Indeed, as we have seen, there has been a consistent pattern of laxity in U.S. enforcement of the embargo which for years allowed U.S. companies to circumvent the measure with relative impunity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that corporate officials acquired the impression—as suggested by the Olin brief—that Washington “had no serious objection” to such transactions.

Seen in the best possible light, such negligence suggests a consistent *in-disposition* on the part of Washington to take the kind of steps necessary to assure full compliance with the UN embargo; seen in the worst light, it bespeaks of an unofficial policy of covertly aiding the Pretoria regime by “acquiescing” to illegal arms deliveries. At this point, there is insufficient evidence to determine which of these interpretations is the correct one; but whichever the case, it is obvious that the question of illegal arms transfers merits a full-scale investigation by Congress or the Department of Justice to determine whether there was any official misconduct in the implementation of U.S. export restrictions.

Such a probe is also needed to determine whether U.S. corporations received any of the funds reportedly spent by Armscor to facilitate violations of the embargo. While many Americans now know that Pretoria's Information Ministry established a secret fund to promote pro-*apartheid* views in the United States and other Western countries (the so-called Muldergate operation, named after former Information Minister Cornelius Mulder), few know that Armscor has a similar fund for use in obtaining foreign arms. According to respected British journalist Anthony Sampson, the Armscor fund included “money for bribes and commissions” and “was far bigger than Mulder's slush fund.” At this point, it is not known whether any of these funds were spent in the United States, but since the U.S. was a major target for the Muldergate operation it is reasonable to assume that it was likewise a target for Armscor's secret dealings.

When asked last November about SRC's illegal arms shipments to South Africa, President Carter replied that he was unaware of such transactions but would look into the matter. “If it is true,” he told the White House press corps on November 16, 1978, “it would be in direct violation of the pledged word of honor of the nations involved, certainly including all those who voted for the arms embargo against South Africa through the United Nations.” Few could argue with this characterization of America's responsibility; sadly, however, we have yet to see the kind of investigation needed to ascertain the cause and extent of government negligence in its

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enforcement of the UN embargo, and to identify all the gaps in the U.S. enforcement machinery which must be filled if Washington is to assure full compliance with the UN measure.

The CIA and BOSS: Thick as Thieves

by Stephen Talbot

Since the creation in 1969 of South Africa's notorious Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the Central Intelligence Agency and BOSS have been as thick as thieves. Like thieves, however, the CIA and its South African counterpart are given to bouts of rivalry and periods of deep mistrust—despite their history of collusion.

Both intelligence services are obsessed with the Soviet Union, loathe African revolutionaries, and seek to preserve the political and economic interests of the "free world." They cooperate in a variety of ways: trading information, planning joint operations, entering into secret agreements outside the normal review processes of the U.S. Congress and the South African Parliament.

In a rare interview with the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* in 1977, the deputy chief (now director) of BOSS, Alexander van Wyk, acknowledged for the first time that BOSS undercover agents operated overseas and had been "highly trained" in the United States and West Germany. Van Wyk added: "All countries have intelligence services. Most Western countries have undercover agents here—I know those from America, Britain, France and Germany. Every now and then we get together and discuss our mutual interests."¹

Former CIA officer John Stockwell provides additional evidence of CIA-BOSS collaboration in his book *In Search of Enemies*. "The CIA has traditionally sympathized with South Africa and enjoyed close liaison with BOSS," writes Stockwell. As the head of the CIA intervention force in Angola in 1975-76, Stockwell experienced first-hand the close cooperation between the U.S. and South African intelligence agencies. "To the CIA, the South Africans were the ideal solution for central Angola," says Stock-

[Stephen Talbot is an Editor of the *International Bulletin*, Berkeley, California. This article was written for this book in May 1979.]

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well. "Potts [CIA Africa Division chief], St. Martin [a pseudonym for Stuart E. Methven, the CIA chief of station in Kinshasa, Zaire], and the COS's [chiefs of station] of Pretoria and Lusaka welcomed their arrival in the war. Especially in the field, CIA officers liked the South Africans, who tended to be bluff, aggressive men without guile. They admired South African efficiency." Stockwell further reveals that during the U.S.-South African intervention in Angola, CIA and BOSS representatives met regularly in Zaire, one of the central command areas, and "on two occasions the BOSS director visited Washington and held secret meetings with Jim Potts," the CIA's top Africa man.²

Drawn together by their mutual interests, their political conservatism, and their racism, senior CIA and BOSS officials established an "old boy network" of cooperation and information exchange—complete with gentlemen's understandings about what was off-limits to the other agency. For instance, BOSS does not tolerate CIA spying on South Africa's top secret and extremely controversial nuclear development program. When a young CIA agent was exposed by BOSS in his clumsy effort in 1975 to obtain information about Pretoria's nuclear capabilities, he was expelled from the country. But the CIA did not complain. It acquiesced and maintained cordial relations with BOSS—accepting the expulsion as part of the rules of the game and sending in better prepared agents to try again.³

Stockwell cites a number of anecdotes to show that racial prejudice is strong within the CIA and that the Agency's Africa chief, James Potts, was seemingly oblivious to the liabilities of a U.S. alliance with South Africa's internationally ostracized apartheid regime. "Eventually Potts concluded, in one of our conversations, that blacks were 'irrational' on the subject of South Africa," recalls Stockwell.

The shared racism and political assumptions of the CIA and BOSS have, at times, seriously distorted the "intelligence" provided by the agencies to their respective governments. In late 1969, Henry Kissinger's National Security Council drafted a secret report, National Security Study Memorandum 39, including the so-called Tar Baby option, which was based on the erroneous premise that "the whites are [in southern Africa] to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists."⁴ Within five years Kissinger's assessment of the white-minority regimes' invulnerability and the weakness of black resistance was swept away by the success of the guerrilla movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, by the escalating armed insurgencies in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and by the upsurge in black protest within South Africa itself. NSSM 39—which guided U.S. policy toward southern Africa—was based, in part, on CIA reports which were, in turn, heavily reliant on data provided by BOSS and the Portuguese secret police, PIDE. With similar assistance from BOSS and PIDE, the CIA failed to predict or

prepare for the April 1974 military coup in Portugal, sparked by the victories of the liberation movements in the Portuguese African colonies and the resulting collapse of Portuguese army morale. Despite the inaccurate BOSS-CIA-PIDE assessments of the strength and resolve of the various guerrilla movements in southern Africa, "the Pretoria CIA station still depends on BOSS reports about revolutionaries," according to noted British journalist Anthony Sampson.³

The CIA has cooperated with and even depended upon South Africa for a wide range of covert actions and information gathering—from assistance in preparing a mercenary army to intervene in the Congo in the early sixties to monitoring Soviet shipping around the Cape of Good Hope and in the Indian Ocean. However, at the moment, relations between Prime Minister Pieter Botha's regime and the Carter administration are strained—as evidenced by Pretoria's expulsion of three U.S. Air Force personnel on charges that the U.S. embassy was using a hidden camera in a 10-seat, twin-engine Beechcraft plane to take aerial photographs of "very sensitive" areas in South Africa. Washington retaliated by expelling two South African military attachés from their embassy in Washington.

To understand the current tension between Washington and Pretoria and the concomitant CIA-BOSS problems (*Christian Science Monitor* columnist Joseph Harsch goes so far as to say, "It is understood that South Africa has in fact broken off relations between its own intelligence branch and the American CIA"),⁴ it is necessary to examine the origin of BOSS, the failure of the U.S.-South African intervention in Angola, and the changes in the South African government caused by revelations in Pretoria's "Muldergate" propaganda and bribery scandal.

BOSS was officially created on May 1, 1969, to investigate "all matters affecting the security of the state" and to assume overall planning and direction of all South African security police and intelligence operations. It was placed under the direct control of then Prime Minister John Vorster, who chose his old friend and political ally General Hendrik van den Bergh to head the new organization, whose sinister acronym and seemingly unlimited and unsupervised (by Parliament) powers frightened even the mildest critics of the apartheid regime.

Van den Bergh and Vorster had been interned during World War II by the pro-British Union of South Africa government because of their pro-Nazi sympathies. In 1963, when Vorster felt that the white-minority regime was threatened by the mass protest and sabotage campaigns of the two liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) he turned to van den Bergh to command the Security Police's counterattack. Armed with new repressive legislation giving the police the authority to detain suspects for up to 180 days without charge and using a heavy dose of torture during interrogations, van den Bergh's Security Police ruthlessly suppressed the scattered armed resistance.

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The South African military was not pleased by the tremendous power concentrated in van den Bergh's hands nor by the allocation of increasingly large sums of money to BOSS at the expense of the military. The military intelligence budget plummeted from 830,000 rands in 1968-69 to 39,000 rands in 1969-70, while BOSS rose from an initial estimated 4,063,000 rands in 1969-70 to 12,536,000 rands in 1974-75.⁷ In the reorganization of South Africa's security system, BOSS took over many of the functions and staff of the military and police intelligence departments.

In his role as director of BOSS and as Prime Minister Vorster's closest adviser, van den Bergh was widely considered to be the second most powerful man in the ruling, all-white National party. He was also the most feared. Lean, tall (6'5"), austere, van den Bergh was an ominous figure. Between his appointment as head of the Security Police in 1963 and his forced retirement from BOSS in 1978, at least 48 black and Asian prisoners are known to have died in detention at the hands of the Security Police.⁸ Van den Bergh controlled a small army of agents and informers—white and black, domestic and foreign—and had at his disposal the most sophisticated surveillance equipment and computer technology the West had to sell. In 1979 he told the Erasmus Commission investigating the Muldergate scandal: "I can tell you here today, not for your records, but I can tell you, I have enough men to commit murder if I tell them to kill I do not care who the prey is. Those are the kind of men I have." The Commission concluded that van den Bergh was the "power behind the throne" and condemned him for his willingness to "stop at nothing" to achieve his ends.

Van den Bergh, the torturer, had another side. Unlike the hawks in the South African military, he advocated *détente* with Pretoria's African-ruled neighbors to the north. In a profile of van den Bergh, journalist Anthony Sampson describes the BOSS chief as "much more than the traditional Grand Inquisitor: he was an adventurous diplomat, always encouraging his Prime Minister to develop contacts with the black states, and always confident that blacks could be bought. He traveled under different passports and names, and he would slip in and out of unlikely black capitals . . . the persecutor of blacks at home, and the conciliator abroad . . . The CIA had come to value the realism of van den Bergh."⁹

It was van den Bergh's advocacy of a *détente* policy in southern Africa which led him to join forces in 1972 with the ambitious Minister of Information, Connie Mulder. With Vorster's approval they conceived a grand scheme to sell the unsellable—to try to win over or buy out African, European and U.S. opinion makers and politicians. To carry out their plan, Mulder hired a charismatic, aggressive aide, Dr. Eschel Rhodie, and gave him a secret slush fund which eventually totaled at least \$73 million. One of the first targets of the campaign was the relatively liberal, English-language South African press. After failing to purchase control of the SAAN newspaper chain—which owned the *Rand Daily Mail*, the main opposition

paper—the van den Bergh–Mulder–Rhodie conspirators financed their own English-language mouthpiece, the *Citizen*. This was followed by more than 160 secret projects: channeling \$10 million to right-wing Michigan newspaper publisher John McGoff to try to buy the *Washington Star* and failing that, the *Sacramento Union*; financing a small, pro-South Africa political party in Norway; purchasing media outlets in France and Britain; and arranging diplomatic breakthrough trips for Vorster to the Ivory Coast and Israel. South African newspapers have charged that Department of Information funds were also used to finance the campaigns of pro-South Africa politicians in the United States, including Gerald Ford's 1976 presidential election bid, S.I. Hayakawa's 1976 U.S. Senate race, and Roger Jepsen's defeat in 1978 of Iowa Senator Dick Clark—South Africa's most effective foe in Congress.¹⁰

The Department of Information's clandestine propaganda war began to fall apart when word spread that Rhodie and his lower-level associates were skimming the war chest for their own personal aggrandizement: family vacations to the Seychelles Islands, luxury homes, nightclub entertainment, rugby-stadium box seats, profitable investments. As the conspiracy began to unravel under pressure from the press and finally a government commission, van den Bergh sought to cover up and protect his political ally, Connie Mulder, who was assumed to be Vorster's chosen successor. But van den Bergh's best efforts, including intimidation of government-appointed investigators, failed to save Mulder. In a bitterly contested power struggle within the National Party after Vorster resigned—ostensibly for reasons of ill health—Mulder, tainted by scandal, lost his campaign to become prime minister by 24 votes to Defense Minister Pieter Botha.

Internationally, the exposé of the Muldergate scandal has further tarnished the image of the apartheid regime and aroused indignation at Pretoria's attempts to tamper with the political process and news media in other countries. Domestically, the short term impact of the scandal has been to discredit and drive from power the "internationalists" within the Afrikaners' National Party. Vorster, Mulder, van den Bergh and Rhodie—the faction which believed it was imperative for South Africa to overcome its pariah status and improve and deepen its ties with the West and conservative African states—have all resigned in disgrace. Rhodie is in hiding somewhere in Europe, warning that his lawyers have been instructed to release all his taped secrets if he is murdered by South African "hit men."

Replacing the internationalists is the military under Prime Minister and Defense Minister Pieter Botha. In effect, there has been something akin to a military coup. Where Vorster relied on BOSS, Botha has turned to military intelligence. Where Rhodie tried to buy editors and newspapers, Botha is more concerned with evading the U.N. arms embargo and obtaining weapons through a "network of military agents and arms buyers [that] is far more extensive than the propaganda capers of Mulder and Rhodie" Where Vorster and van den Bergh favored some degree of cooper-

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ation with the West in negotiating transfers of power to internationally accepted "moderate" black regimes in Namibia and Zimbabwe, Botha is more inclined toward "internal settlements" and the formation of a military and economic confederation of like-minded states in southern Africa which would "go it alone."

It would be suicide for Botha to break completely with the West. The apartheid regime is dependent for its survival on Western investments, bank loans (\$5.5 billion since 1972, according to a recent U.N. report),¹² sophisticated technology, oil and even arms. But Botha's hardline government can decide to be less cooperative diplomatically with the West, especially with the Carter administration. The South African regime has long complained that Carter and his State Department, especially U.N. ambassador Andrew Young, has been pressuring them to reform the apartheid system and grant independence to Namibia under a majority rule government dominated by the leftist liberation movement, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). Pretoria has overtly and covertly sought to rally support among Carter's conservative opponents in hopes that the administration's Africa policy can be derailed.

Botha's mistrust of the West can be traced to Angola. In the South African parliament in 1978, Botha became the first senior South African official to publicly accuse Washington of encouraging and then abandoning Pretoria's abortive 1975-76 invasion of Angola. The U.S. "recklessly left us in the lurch," Botha complained. Despite embarrassed denials by the State Department, Botha insisted that U.S. planes had delivered arms to South African-held bases in Angola. "I was there myself," Botha stated. "I saw how the arms were offloaded."¹³

Interestingly, van den Bergh opposed South Africa's intervention in Angola and clashed with Botha. The story first emerged in a book published in Pretoria in 1977, *The Tangled Web*, by South African historian A. J. P. van Rensburg, who wrote that van den Bergh implored Vorster not to invade Angola, but Defense Minister Botha—impulsive, stubborn and given to military solutions—won the day, and Pretoria intervened. The book says that BOSS opposed the intervention because it was more aware of African and international opinion and was a major architect of Vorster's *détente* and dialogue policy with black Africa. Van den Bergh's diplomacy and pragmatism were also aired in a *Newsweek* interview in late 1976. Departing sharply from the public position of the government, van den Bergh said that a "Marxist victory in Rhodesia will not jeopardize South Africa's security," that Pretoria should seek an accommodation in Namibia with SWAPO and not fight the liberation movement, and that South Africa should try to normalize relations with the leftist MPLA government in Angola.¹⁴ "Van den Bergh had outspokenly criticized Botha's crude military intervention in the Angolan war, and he made no secret of his dislike," wrote Anthony Sampson in the *London Observer*. "As he even told one liberal journalist: 'There's one thing we agree about: P.W. Botha is

rubbish.' But Botha was a considerable enemy, with all the mounting apparatus of the Army and military intelligence behind him."¹⁵ When van den Bergh threw all his weight behind his candidate, Connie Mulder, and Mulder lost to Botha, it meant van den Bergh's defeat and the eclipse of BOSS by military intelligence. Instead of BOSS's fearsome repression at home and aggressive outreach program abroad, South Africa was becoming a militarized society, a garrison state, with little regard for diplomacy. As one of Connie Mulder's associates complained: "P. W. Botha always has one answer: move the tanks in."¹⁶ The *Johannesburg Sunday Times* was equally disturbed, saying Botha's "principal weakness is a tendency to shoot first and think later."¹⁷

To elect Botha prime minister is a decision by the majority of the ruling National Party—in power continuously since 1948—to go deep into what Afrikaners call the "laager": An Afrikaner national symbol, the laager is a circle of wagon trains the white settlers used to form when they fought the Zulus and other original inhabitants of South Africa. A life-long white supremacist (Botha earned the nickname "Baby Botha" by urging Afrikaners to have more children to keep pace with the rising black population) and militarist, the balding Botha has an irascible temper and an authoritarian style. Like van den Bergh and BOSS, he is obsessed with the Soviet Union and communism, but he is less sophisticated and discerning when it comes to distinguishing the shades of political opinion in neighboring African countries. In public speeches, he refers constantly to Moscow's "diabolical" support for black liberation movements, which he says are the "forces of the devil." Unlike van den Bergh, for example, Botha has declared on many occasions that he will never tolerate a Namibian government led by SWAPO.

If van den Bergh was Vorster's closest adviser, General Magnus Malan, Commander of the South African Defense Force, is considered Botha's most influential adviser. Gen. Malan is regarded as the architect of Botha's "total strategy" of defense against the enemy's "total onslaught." It is a military strategy which emphasizes as much independence of the West as possible.¹⁸

A series of incidents—including Pretoria's denunciation of the U.S. negotiator on Namibia, Donald McHenry, as an "enemy" of the South African state, and culminating in Pretoria's spy plane charge against Washington—have signaled the ascendancy of Botha's faction. So far, the Carter administration has responded with restraint to South Africa's increasingly public rejection of the Western diplomatic initiatives in southern Africa. If it wanted to get tough with Pretoria—as African nations have been urging for months—the U.S. could begin to impose sanctions or even support an oil embargo, but the administration does not have the political will to do this. On the contrary, the administration feels the most pressure now from Congressional right wingers, who are partisans of the South African and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian regimes and complain that Washington is trying to

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force them to deal with "Marxist terrorists." While temporarily appearing to hold the line on the issue of lifting sanctions against Rhodesia, the Carter administration has been conspicuously silent about South Africa.

For the moment, the rise of Botha's militarists and the decline of van den Bergh's internationalists have cooled U.S.-South African relations and probably limited BOSS-CIA collaboration. Stripped of his passport, in forced retirement on his farm in the Transvaal, van den Bergh denies that CIA-BOSS relations have soured. "That's a lot of bull," he told the *London Observer*. "On the contrary, only today I had lunch with a friend of mine who is back here on holiday, who is very senior in the CIA."¹⁹ However, even before South Africa unceremoniously roused him out of bed in the middle of the night and seized his passport, van den Bergh was denied a visa to visit the United States.²⁰

One acid test of U.S.-South African relations—especially of CIA-BOSS or military intelligence ties—will be to what extent Pretoria is able to obtain U.S. weapons despite the mandatory 1977 UN arms embargo.²¹

In South Africa's aggressive search for arms—fueled by the state-run arms procurer, Armscor's, secret fund for illicit deals and bribes—the Botha regime may well seek the assistance of sympathetic intelligence agencies, like the CIA and Britain's MI6, which have worked closely with BOSS over the years.²² One disturbing indication that this may be happening is the case of Space Research Corporation, a defense contractor which straddles the Vermont-Canada border and was exposed by a well-documented BBC-TV investigation in November 1978 for illegally selling tens of thousands of 155-mm artillery shells worth millions of dollars to South Africa via the Caribbean island of Antigua and Spain. In his book, *In Search of Enemies*, Stockwell charges that the CIA agreed during the Angolan war of 1975-76 to provide South Africa with ammunition for their 155-mm howitzers. South Africa, he says, had made the request through the CIA station in Pretoria.

For its part, the CIA appears to be increasing its presence in South Africa and Zimbabwe as the liberation struggles intensify. CIA agents are currently operating in Rhodesia under cover as American mercenaries, according to Stockwell. In a recent interview with *Internews*, Stockwell said: "To my knowledge, the CIA is in Rhodesia to have its finger on the pulse. The agency knows who all the players are. It has people on the ground, in the military, gathering information. Of course, this could be in preparation for a paramilitary operation like Angola." Based on his Angolan war experience, Stockwell said the CIA station in Lusaka, Zambia, is still probably "very active. I would expect they're trying to get lines into all the liberation movements." One CIA agent in Rhodesia, he said, operated out of Johannesburg under the guise of an "adventurer."²³ At the same time, the number of CIA agents operating under "deep cover" in South Africa has risen since the Angolan fiasco. The exact number of CIA agents in South Africa is not known, but a recent article in the *Johannesburg Star* estimat-

ed that there were at least 12 and perhaps as many as 40. At least as late as June 1979, the CIA chief of station in Pretoria was Gerry Francis Gossens. He took over from Dorwin M. Wilson, who had served previously in Kenya and Zambia and succeeded Pretoria station chief Francis John Jeton in 1975.²⁴ Some of these CIA agents will undoubtedly try to learn more about South Africa's nuclear energy and nuclear weapons program, which has troubled the Carter administration.²⁵ Others, however, will probably delve further into the CIA's traditional area of concern: preventing the success of "Soviet-backed, Cuban-supported" liberation movements—the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia and the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe.

Notes

1. *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, July 24, 1977.
2. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), page 187.
3. The *Johannesburg Star*, April 21, 1979, names Ernest B. Brant as the CIA agent "unmasked by BOSS after he began probing South Africa's uranium enrichment plans."
4. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1976).
5. Anthony Sampson, *The London Observer*, 3-part series "How South Africa Tried to Sell the Unsellable" on the Department of Information scandal, January 21 and 28 and February 4, 1979.
6. Joseph Harsch, *Christian Science Monitor*, April 19, 1979.
7. At the current rate of exchange, one rand equals approximately \$1.15. The BOSS budget estimates are taken from the International Defence and Aid Fund booklet, *BOSS: The First 5 Years* (London: IDAF, 1975), pages 10 and 14.
8. For a list of the 45 detainees killed between 1963 and September 12, 1977 (the death of Steve Biko), see: Donald Woods, *Biko* (New York and London: Paddington Press Ltd., 1978), pp. 6-7.
9. Sampson, *Observer*, January 21, 1979.
10. See Sampson series and the *Internews International Bulletin*, March 12, April 9 and June 18, 1979.
11. Sampson, *Observer*, February 4, 1979.
12. "Huge Loans to South Africa Called Boost for Apartheid," *San Francisco Examiner*, April 3, 1979.
13. Reuters, April 17 and 18, 1978. See also, *Internews International Bulletin*, April 24, 1978.
14. Arnaud De Borchgrave, "The View From BOSS," *Newsweek*, October 25, 1976.
15. Sampson, *Observer*, January 28, 1979.
16. Sampson, *Observer*, February 4, 1979.
17. *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, October 1, 1978.
18. *Financial Times* (London), June 14, 1979.
19. Sampson, *Observer*, January 21, 1979.
20. Van den Bergh blamed the rejection of his visa application on President Carter's liberal State Department. He seems, however, to have been able to move in and out of the United States with no formal record of his visits. As previously noted in this article, John Stockwell says that van den Bergh met in Washington with the CIA's Africa director, James Potts, on two occasions during the Angolan war of 1975-76. Yet in records obtained from the U.S.

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Dept. of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service on March 9, 1979, by William Johnston of the New York-based Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa (under the Freedom of Information Act) van den Bergh is listed as paying only one visit to the U.S. during the 1975-76 period: June 18-19, 1975 "for pleasure." The record also lists van den Bergh in the U.S. on three other occasions: July 27-August 6, 1965, July 5-13, 1969, and August 30-September 8, 1973.

William Johnston, again pursuing a Freedom of Information request, also learned September 30, 1978, from Immigration that Brigadier Lothar Paul Neethling, the man in charge of the police laboratories in Pretoria, was in the U.S. "as a visitor for business purposes" twice in 1972, twice in 1973, once in 1974, and once in 1976. Johnston believes that Neethling may have been involved in training here. Johnston's requests to the FBI and CIA for information on BOSS acknowledgement that its undercover agents are "highly trained" in the U.S. has so far received no substantive response.

21. See Michael T. Klare, Institute for Policy Studies, "Memorandum on Recent Reports of Illegal Arms Deliveries to South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe," 1979. And see following article in this book.

22. BOSS has been particularly active in Britain (Graham Greene even made BOSS agents in Britain the subject of his latest novel, *The Human Factor*). Eschel Rhoodie told BBC-TV that South Africa organized "dirty tricks" against the British Anti-Apartheid Movement: "If a certain organization was out to arrange an anti-South Africa rally or was trying to get companies to withdraw investment in South Africa, then obviously we would put people in the field to argue against them and we would perhaps send out notices and documents cancelling the meeting so that the other party wouldn't know what was going on."

Former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson claimed in a 1977 *London Sunday Observer* interview that BOSS had burglarized his London home and the residences of his staff about 10 times while he was prime minister. Wilson also charged that there was a pro-South Africa faction within MI6, Britain's secret service.

Van den Bergh told the *Observer* this year: "I used to come to London often. I didn't bother them, and they didn't bother me."

23. *Internews International Bulletin*, February 26, 1979.

24. *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, April-May, 1979, and July-August, 1979, the *Johannesburg Star*, April 21, 1979, and *The Citizen*, July 9, 10, and 18, 1979.

25. It is ironic that the U.S. is now worried about South Africa's development and possible use of nuclear weapons since the U.S. has played such a key role in developing South Africa's nuclear capability. See: Robert Manning and Stephen Talbot, "Carter's Nuclear Deal with South Africa," *Inquiry* magazine, October 30, 1978. And see Barbara Rogers article below.

South Africa Gets Nuclear Weapons— Thanks to the West

by Barbara Rogers

For years, South Africa's secret emissaries have been building up contacts with the nuclear-industrial complex and its allies in governments—in West Germany, Israel, and various western European countries, under the benevolent gaze of American intelligence. A top State Department official told me, "We knew all about the German deals to give South Africa an enrichment capability. We did nothing, of course, because apart from anything else we wouldn't have wanted them to know we had our agents there."

It is an open secret, in fact that virtually nothing happens in Bonn without the huge United States Embassy knowing about it, and this includes West German industry as well as the Federal German government. Ironically, the secrecy has been directed mainly at those elements of the U.S. government which are trying to stop nuclear proliferation.

While the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was working frantically to block the export of key items for the South African enrichment plant, the CIA and its allies in the Pentagon were facilitating its construction with the approval of two vital Foxboro computers, while winking at the collaboration of their German and Israeli surrogates. In the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, vast financial subsidies for the uranium indus-

[Barbara Rogers is a former British Foreign Office employee, now a freelance journalist. She is co-author, with Zdenek Cervenka, of "The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa." This article was written in April 1979 for this book.]

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try in South Africa were arranged through IMF loans and quiet manipulation of the gold price (gold mining being linked to uranium in South Africa).

The German Connection

West Germany is prohibited by the Brussels Treaty, the basis of its NATO membership, from building nuclear weapons on its own territory. But since the signing of the treaty in 1948, the armed forces in West Germany have exerted constant pressure to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A government bulletin of 20 August 1960 argues: "The soldiers of the *Bundeswehr* are entitled to weapons of equal effectiveness to those of the enemy. As matters stand now, the commanding officers' responsibility for their soldiers compels them to demand nuclear weapons."

The urgency of the demand has recently been reinforced for militarists in West Germany by the discussion in the Pentagon of the fact that NATO forces will be prepared to abandon large areas there in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact armies. In fact, however, West German possession of nuclear weapons would be highly provocative to the Warsaw Pact and a major factor for increasing tension in Europe; but the military leaders have always demanded nuclear weapons and have been looking for a way round the Brussels Treaty on this point.

One of the main features of West Germany's approach to a commercial nuclear power program has been the attempt to close the nuclear fuel cycle—in other words, to acquire every process from mining uranium to reprocessing spent fuel to recover the plutonium. It has gradually been building up its nuclear research-and-development capability and constructed a network of nuclear reactors. The nuclear-industrial complex in West Germany was initially held back by international objections to the location of any nuclear installations in that country, but through its own government-led program and membership of the Urenco "Troika" (with Britain and the Netherlands), it has become one of the most formidable exporters of nuclear technology and hardware to Third World countries, particularly those known to be interested in acquiring nuclear-weapons capability.

For several years there have been rumors of a nuclear weapons deal among West Germany, South Africa, Israel, and—before its coup d'état—Portugal, with the Americans allegedly aware of and quietly encouraging the transactions. Evidence has now appeared of top-secret deals between the West Germans and South Africans: direct correspondence between the two governments. *The Nuclear Axis*,* whose authors were given access to these documents by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Afri-

*Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, *The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa* (New York: Times Books, 1978).

ca, uses them as the basis for detailed investigations in West Germany, Sweden, Britain, France, the United States, and elsewhere. It is striking that although the South Africans and West Germans have refused to admit the facts in the documents, preferring to launch vicious personal attacks on those who are publishing the information, neither government has attempted to question the authenticity of these documents. Instead, they have launched massive investigations to try to discover the source of the leak.

The documents show close and secret contacts among the military, nuclear, and industrial concerns on both sides, revolving around one major project: the construction of a pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba, South Africa, using West Germany's "jet nozzle" technique of uranium enrichment. Important new modifications were jointly developed, using Karlsruhe (the West German nuclear research center) for theoretical work and Valindaba, South Africa, for the practical application.

The full significance of this lies in the fact that the plant at Valindaba is beyond the reach of all nuclear safeguards, including Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency; it is the only unsafeguarded enrichment plant in the world other than in the existing nuclear-weapons "club." Enrichment is the key process, which nonproliferation experts had hoped to keep from all countries that do not yet have nuclear weapons.

South Africa as a Nuclear Power

The Valindaba plant has made it possible for the South Africans to reach a stage where testing a nuclear bomb becomes feasible, and a test site has been constructed in the Kalahari Desert. The Soviet Union gave an unprecedented public alarm in August 1977, when their satellite spotted this site. American satellites had almost certainly already observed it, since they were overhead at the time, but no announcement was made until they had to confirm the Soviet report. Pressure was put on the South Africans to halt the test, amid considerable confusion: President Carter at a press conference quoted the South African government as promising they would not test a nuclear weapon, but the South Africans then denied having given him any such assurance. The test site has not been dismantled and could be used at any time, although weapons tests are no longer of much more than symbolic importance, since an explosive can be confidently used without prior testing.

South Africa not only has its own nuclear weapons-capability, but it is also moving toward a position where it can supply fissile materials to other "near nuclear" countries, thereby making nonsense of all attempts to limit nuclear proliferation. Its installations so far are small scale, but if enough time, money, and technical assistance are allowed South Africa, it could start turning out these fissile materials in large quantities. It is crucially

important that action should be taken now, to prevent the construction of large-scale facilities.

Transnational Collaboration

A variety of countries are involved in the nuclear deals with South Africa to build up its research-and-development capability. Britain, for example, is heavily involved through a massive government contract for uranium from South African-occupied Namibia, despite promises by the Labour Party while out of office to cancel the deal. British scientists worked with their American counterparts to create the uranium-mining-and-processing industry in South Africa, to provide the foundations of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiles after the Second World War. They also contributed greatly to the early phases of training the nuclear-research establishment.

The French government has played a critical role in the provision of delivery systems suitable for nuclear weapons. The latest Mirage fighter-bombers, specially designed for France's own nuclear weapons program, have been made available to the South Africans. These and other arms deliveries have apparently been negotiated in conjunction with a deal to supply South Africa's first nuclear reactor and the delivery of South African uranium to France.

Iran under the Shah was also deeply involved in this relationship, with the creation of a tripartite deal: Iran was to supply oil to both France and South Africa; South Africa would supply uranium to the other two; and France would sell nuclear hardware and technology to the two near nuclear powers without too many questions about their ultimate purpose.

Israel is also heavily implicated; hundreds of Israelis are working on secret projects in South Africa, some of them scientists with military backgrounds, working in South Africa's most sensitive nuclear programs. The two countries have recently become very close, largely owing to the careful work done by undercover agents of General van den Bergh, until recently the head of BOSS (Bureau of State Security) in South Africa, and his protégé Eschel Rhodie. Israel has much to offer South Africa in terms of clandestine operations in Western Europe and elsewhere (much of their own uranium was obtained by theft from the United States and western Europe); they can also help to fill gaps in technological expertise with experience of their own in the nuclear field.

Another tripartite deal exists among South Africa, Brazil, and West Germany. The modifications to the jet-nozzle enrichment process developed at Valindaba are apparently to be applied to the enrichment plant that West Germans are to construct in Brazil. Brazilian engineers and scientists have also held exchange visits with South Africans, particularly in the field of uranium mining (before continental drift separated them, Na-

mibia and Brazil were part of the same geological formation). Brazil could well be one of the customers for South Africa's fissile materials. Its own motives for acquiring the complete nuclear fuel cycle from the West Germans have been seriously questioned: Economically, the scheme is a disaster for Brazil, but the present government there is considered one of the prime candidates for nuclear weapons.

Responses to South Africa's Nuclear Ambitions

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was drawn up by the Soviet and U.S. governments, has proved completely inadequate in the face of clandestine operations launched by South Africa and its allies to get nuclear hardware and knowhow for a weapons program. West Germany, under intense pressure from the Soviets, signed the NPT, but has not been in any way prevented from selling the means of proliferation. South Africa has so far refused to sign. There have been hints that it might now do so, but without an additional agreement for inspection of all its facilities this would have no impact on its already existing capability.

Perhaps the most dangerous reaction is that being proposed by some nonproliferation people in Washington: to extend the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" over any country that acquires its own nukes. Virtually all the likely candidates are in fact, like South Africa, on the outer fringes of the western alliances. Although this is supposed to make the country in question feel more secure, and therefore less likely in theory to use its nuclear weapons, the most important result of "security guarantees" of this kind is to guarantee that South Africa could spark off a major East-West nuclear war by using its own first-strike and rather low-level weapons in Africa.

It is still an open question how the United States and allied governments will deal with South Africa as a nuclear power. One thing that is quite clear is the vital importance of bringing the secret deals currently under discussion into the open. Our survival could depend on uncovering these secrets.

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The literature on the role in Africa of the Western powers, and particularly their intelligence agencies, is extensive. This bibliography does not purport to be complete, or even nearly so. It presents a number of articles and books that, had we had the space, we might have reprinted or excerpted in this book. We hope they may be of some assistance to readers interested in further research.

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Africa Series



Dirty Work: The CIA in Africa is as much about the United States as about Africa. Today the Continent is vital to the West economically — oil for the US from Libya and Nigeria, uranium for Britain from Namibia, huge American and EEC investments in South Africa, Kenya and elsewhere. Few people realize how interested Western intelligence agencies are in Africa. *Dirty Work* gives the answer. It presents up-to-date, comprehensive and new information about what the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies have actually done in Africa. Espionage, of course. But they have also staged coups (Ghana), participated in or planned assassinations (Cabral, Lumumba, Mondlane); shored up corrupt and bloody dictators (like Amin in Uganda and Mobutu of Zaire); recruited mercenaries (for Angola and Zimbabwe); manipulated trade unions (out of Addis Ababa); used academics; planted bogus stories in reputable Western newspapers; and collaborated with South Africa over arms supplies, the invasion of Angola, and the development of nuclear weapons.

Sober fact finding, accidental leaks of information, and the inside knowledge of former CIA agents are the raw material for this astounding volume.

Several contributions deal specifically also with the role of the British, French, Portuguese and South Africa secret services. Seven articles are here translated from French for the first time, one from Portuguese, and one from German. Of the 25 other pieces, 15 have been written specially for this volume.

Also included is a *Who's Who* naming names with detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA employees recently or still stationed in Africa.

This book raises fundamental questions: By what right do Western governments secretly manipulate, and even control outright, certain regimes in Africa? Are there no limits to the immorality of method used by official representatives of the Western democratic powers? How far is Africa unstable precisely because of this interference by *Western* powers rather than for internal reasons?

The Editors are Ellen Ray — journalist, political documentary film director, and former editor of *Counter Spy Magazine*; William Schaap — lawyer, writer, and co-editor of *CovertAction Information Bulletin*; Karl Van Meter — freelance journalist in Europe and specialist in the intelligence complex; and Louis Wolf — co-editor of *CovertAction* and the companion to this volume *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*. The contributing authors include former CIA agents Philip Agee and John Stockwell; investigative journalists like Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* and Barbara Rogers; as well as academics, notably Dr Michael Klare, author of *Wars Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams*.